Emergent Culture in Minimal LLM Systems

LLM-powered AI assistants acting on behalf of users can produce poor collective outcomes at scale. We introduce a framework for evaluating their emergent behaviour in social dilemmas, applied to three iterated games (Public Goods, Collective Risk, Common Pool Resource). We prompt each model to produce a natural-language strategy, then have the same model translate it into code. This aims to isolate strategic reasoning from input-parsing, enables pre-deployment inspection, and scales to populations of hundreds of agents. We propose three analyses: behavioural fingerprinting via exhaustive evaluation over opponent histories; self-play robustness across mixtures of a model's strategies with either a Selfish or Collective disposition; and cultural evolution under payoff-biased imitation. Applied to three state-of-the-art LLMs, we find substantial cross-model differences in self-play welfare, and that cultural evolution converges to low-welfare, Selfish-dominant equilibria in larger groups.

The growing rate at which LLM agents interact with one another raises key questions about language evolution in multi-LLM-agent settings, with implications for safety and monitorability as well as for linguistic accounts of LLMs. To address these questions, we introduce GlossoGen, a novel platform for studying multi-agent language evolution in complex scenarios. Within GlossoGen, we build the SaveVeyru scenario, which requires agents with partial information to communicate under pressure. We find that language evolution does occur between LLM agents, that the resulting languages are compositional and morphologically productive, and that they deviate from the LLMs' English prior in ways that render them incomprehensible to humans. Moreover, we identify several qualities essential to this evolution: pressure towards efficiency; the strength of the models backing the agents; and access to a "postmortem" stage in which agents can agree on linguistic conventions. Importantly, we observe that different conditions govern the transmission of language to new agents. Specifically, we find that agents learn new languages from usage alone, take an active role in this learning, and that while stronger models are required for novel language emergence, weaker models can learn an existing language once it has emerged. Taken together, our results indicate that current LLMs have the potential for cumulative cultural evolution -- previously attested only in humans -- with mixed populations of agents developing capacities that go beyond their lowest common denominator.

Can cooperation among large language model (LLM) agents be evolutionarily stable against free-rider invasion? We study an indirect reciprocity donation game where LLM agents observe behavioral traces and donate on a continuous scale. Strategies, represented as natural language prompts, evolve through cultural transmission across generations. Across four LLM backends, robustness to free-rider invasion varies by more than an order of magnitude. The strongest predictor of this robustness is opponent endowment sensitivity, the degree to which agents discriminate between cooperative and uncooperative opponents, operationalizing the classical Image Scoring mechanism. By contrast, adherence to the Leading-Eight L1 norm does not predict robustness. Robustness depends on defector exclusion: while both cooperator reward and defector punishment vary across models, only the stringency of defector exclusion predicts resistance to free-rider invasion. These findings reveal that LLM agents are confined to Image Scoring-like discrimination and fail to develop the more robust Leading-Eight norms, highlighting a fundamental vulnerability in culturally evolved LLM cooperation and motivating bottom-up approaches to norm construction.