Billions of Sketches Reveal Hidden Cultural Variation in Human Concepts
Authors: Arianna Pera, Mauro Martino, Nima Dehmamy, Douglas Guilbeault, Luca Maria Aiello, Andrea Baronchelli
Organizations: IT University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark · MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, Cambridge, MA, USA · Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA · City St George’s University of London, London, UK
Claims about the universality of human concepts have been predominantly assessed through linguistic similarity across languages and cultures. However, words are effective as communication devices because they compress rich experiential variation into shared conventions, potentially obscuring hidden individual and cultural differences in how concepts are mentally represented. Here, we analyse 2.6 billion human-made sketches of common concepts from 236 countries and territories to examine conceptual structure through people's visual imagination. Consistent with recent work on image-based cognition, we find that single concepts unfold into multiple distinct visual exemplars, revealing latent information about similarities and differences in conceptual structure across cultures. This variation is strongest for concepts involving haptic interaction, suggesting that visual imagery reflects variation in embodied experience as much as conventional definitions. Comparing embedding models of sketches with word embedding models across languages, we find that their geometries diverge, with visual representations preserving rich semantic and cultural structure that language models compress. Cross-cultural similarities derived from sketches align 45% more closely with established cultural distances than do text-based measures. Together, these results suggest that patterns of human conceptual universality may depend critically on the modality through which concepts are measured, with large-scale sketching providing a direct, high-resolution probe of conceptual diversity across embodied and cultural dimensions of thought.
Humans can learn and generalize novel concepts from sparse data because they express knowledge in rich structural formats. In this paper, we propose that programs are a strong candidate for universal representation of concepts. We review computational models of concept learning that use programs as their concept representation and evaluate their contribution toward a universal representational language.
How concepts are represented in neural networks is a fundamental question in machine learning. The dominant view treats concept representations as stationary geometric objects. Yet concepts appear in context, and context transforms them. Drawing from neural population geometry, we formalize concept representations as point-cloud manifolds and contextual transformations as vector fields, and instantiate this framework in large language models. Across six model families of varying scales, we find that context moves each concept differently. The variance in these displacements is semantically organized, correlating with lexical concreteness and density. Importantly, both the concepts being transformed and this variance structure are shared across models: displacement structure transported from one model predicts held-out displacements in others significantly above chance. Together, these findings show that models share a common geometry not only in how concepts are represented, but more importantly in how context transforms them, a structure with richer organization than prior work has recognized.
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