This paper addresses Carl Hempel's longstanding problem of statistical ambiguity in inductive-statistical inference, in which contradictory predictions are derived from statistical laws. To avoid such predictions, Carl Hempel proposed the Requirement of Maximal Specificity (RMS) for the statistical laws used in the inference. An analysis of the RMS refinements made by Wesley Salmon, Alberto Coffa, and James Fetzer led to the following definition of maximally specific statistical laws: "the lawlike premises of an adequate explanation must specify all and only those properties whose presence or absence made a difference to the occurrence of its explanandum-phenomenon." However, there was no proof of a solution to the statistical ambiguity problem based on this definition. We use Nancy Cartwright's definition of causes that raise probabilities across background contexts, and then introduce the concept of Causal Rules. Then we define a special semantic probabilistic inference procedure that incrementally refines these causal rules by incorporating all statistically relevant information. This procedure yields Maximally Specific Causal Relationships (MSCRs), for which we prove (Theorem 1) that predictions derived from them are consistent. This resolves the statistical ambiguity problem. The semantic probabilistic inference procedure provides a probabilistic causal learning system, which may be used in such new areas as Causal AI and Causal Machine Learning. They fundamentally explore causal inference as a tool for understanding cause-and-effect relationships within complex systems. Properties similar to RMS remain under discussion. Several notions related to RMS are considered: invariant feature learning, invariant causal prediction, and spurious association.
Modern Artificial Intelligence achieves remarkable predictive power by optimizing statistical risk functionals over vast corpora. Yet a gap separates this from genuine intelligence: the inability to distinguish correlation from causation. This paper argues that causal inference (identifying mechanisms invariant under intervention) is AI's indispensable statistical conscience. Without causal grounding, AI systems are correlation machines: powerful in familiar domains, brittle under distribution shift, and biased in high-stakes settings. Three contributions develop this argument. First, a Statistical Necessity Theorem for Causal Generalization: any algorithm achieving out-of-distribution generalization must encode causal structure, formalizing the distinction between prediction P(Y|X) and intelligence P(Y|do(X)). Second, a unified framework connects Pearl's do-calculus, the Potential Outcomes framework, Double Machine Learning, and Invariant Risk Minimization as a family of Causal Statistical Estimators, each identifying interventional distributions under different assumptions. Third, three AI failure modes (hallucination in large language models, reward hacking in reinforcement learning from human feedback, and degradation under distribution shift) are manifestations of causal blindness, each admitting a principled statistical remedy. Trustworthy AI is, at its core, a problem of causal statistics. The statistical community is not merely equipped to solve it -- it is the only community with the foundational tools to do so rigorously.
Explanations are central to causal reasoning, and cognitive science has long established that the human drive to explain is itself a mechanism for learning about causality. Despite this, learning from those abductive signals is largely ignored in artificial intelligence. While explainable AI (XAI) increasingly draws on causal models to generate explanations, the converse direction about what explanations can do for causality remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we propose xWhyL, a formal framework connecting causality and XAI by learning causal models from explanations. We develop a mathematical theory that translates explanations into a learning signal complementary to observational data, and demonstrate how it enables overcoming the limits of observational causal discovery. As explanations can be derived from incorrect beliefs and clash with data, a tension we call the Causal Tug-of-War, we prove conditions under which our framework rejects misspecified explanations rather than absorbing them. Our practical instantiation, Causal Interactive Learning (CIL), shows how expert explanations can efficiently support causal discovery and distinguish correct from incorrect explanations.
Nicholas Tagliapietra, Florian Peter Busch, Moritz Willig +4
Probabilistic logic programming is a formalism of statistical relational artificial intelligence that supports causal queries, including interventions from outside the system. When the structure of a probabilistic logic program is learned from data, however, only probabilistic information is used, and a single probability distribution may be compatible with several causal orders. This leads to ambiguity in interventional reasoning, raising the question of when the causal order is uniquely determined by the distribution. Exploiting the relationship between acyclic probabilistic logic programs and Bayesian networks, we derive conditions under which the probabilistic information encoded in a program determines a unique causal order. We also incorporate constraints arising from relational structure by taking into account prescribed sets of causal symmetries induced by the underlying relational vocabulary. The result is a method for verifying when a learned probabilistic logic program supports well-defined intervention semantics.