AI advice suppresses people's willingness to say "I don't know", even when the advice is wrong and accuracy is incentivized
Authors: Chiara Marcoccia, Walter Quattrociocchi, Valerio Capraro
Organizations: Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France · University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy · University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy
Abstract
Knowing when to say "I don't know" is fundamental to human judgment, yet AI assistants offer a fluent answer to almost any question. In five experiments (N = 3,132; four preregistered, one direct replication), participants answered difficult questions and could always decline to respond. We engineered the questions so that AI advice was wrong, separating AI use from its accuracy. Merely having access to AI nearly eliminated participants' willingness to suspend judgment, and this held whether the advice was actively requested or simply displayed. Consequently, participants answered more questions but were correct about a third as often as when AI was unavailable-yet their confidence nearly doubled. Incentivizing accuracy and penalizing inaccuracy led participants to seek and follow AI advice less, answer more accurately, and suspend judgment more often, though still far less than when AI was unavailable. As AI suggestions grow ubiquitous and unsolicited, they may not simply affect answer accuracy; they may even alter the metacognitive threshold at which people decide whether they know enough to answer.
Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.
AI assistants in human-AI collaboration often correct suboptimal human actions through behavioral feedback (e.g., alerts or steering-wheel nudges in assistive driving). Such interventions can mitigate immediate errors, but long-term improvement requires addressing the underlying misconceptions that cause repeated mistakes. We introduce SENSEI, a framework that infers user misconceptions from interaction behavior and provides targeted, minimal yet sufficient suggestions to correct them. Our approach departs from action- or trajectory-level interventions by operating over a structured knowledge representation to localize and correct the sources of erroneous behavior. Across three long-horizon tasks with diverse misconceptions and corresponding behaviors, SENSEI demonstrates zero-shot compositional generalization, disentangling multiple overlapping misconceptions despite training only on single-misconception cases. A user study further shows that our method identifies real human misconceptions and provides effective guidance that improves long-horizon task performance, successfully correcting 90% of student misconceptions. Code and project page are available at https://misoshiruseijin.github.io/SENSEI/.
AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.