Intention Inference Under Execution Noise: Separating Aleatoric and Epistemic Uncertainty in Social Dilemmas

Productive dialogue alignment requires distinguishing \emph{surface coordination} (acknowledgments and smooth task progression) from \emph{epistemic alignment} (convergence of belief states); standard preference-based methods typically optimize response-level preferences without explicitly modeling the latter. We operationalize Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference as a control signal within Frictive Policy Optimization by extracting, at each referring expression, a four-part belief structure: the speaker's intended referent, the addressee's interpretation, and each participant's model of the other's belief. This makes friction mechanically computable from epistemic-state comparisons, capturing \emph{silent divergence}, where both participants proceed confidently while grounding to different referents. We evaluate the signal at two levels. At the representation level, ablating the second-order channel reduces misunderstanding recall from $65\%$ to $26\%$. At the policy level, reward-shaping (FAR) and trust-region (FTR) variants improve intervention F1 and warranted-context calibration over DPO, with Brier scores independently supporting the calibration gains. Across three training runs, FAR and FTR remain substantially more stable, whereas DPO varies widely and can degrade intervention competence already present in the base policy. Thus, ToM-grounded friction provides a trainable signal for context-sensitive intervention under referential belief divergence.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave less cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents in equilibrium. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become more effective under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly tasked with strategic decision-making under incomplete information, such as in negotiation and policymaking. While LLMs can excel at many such tasks, they also fail in ways that are poorly understood. We shed light on these failures by uncovering two fundamental gaps in the internal mechanisms underlying the decision-making of LLMs in incomplete-information games, supported by experiments with open-weight models Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt-oss. First, an observation-belief gap: LLMs encode internal beliefs about latent game states that are substantially more accurate than their own verbal reports, yet these beliefs are brittle. In particular, the belief accuracy degrades with multi-hop reasoning, exhibits primacy and recency biases, and drifts away from Bayesian coherence over extended interactions. Second, a belief-action gap: The implicit conversion of internal beliefs into actions is weaker than that of the beliefs externalized in the prompt, yet neither belief-conditioning consistently achieves higher game payoffs. These results show how analyzing LLMs' internal processes can expose systematic vulnerabilities that warrant caution before deploying LLMs in strategic domains without robust guardrails.