Operational Design Domain (ODD) specifications describe where an automated driving system (ADS) is permitted to operate, but they do not prescribe what the ADS must demonstrably do once deployed within that domain. This gap between operating condition specification and behavioral validation represents a critical unresolved challenge in ADS safety assurance. This paper presents a structured, standards-grounded taxonomy of 21 behavioral competencies organized across three operational domains-Highway (HWY), Urban (URB), and Hub (HUB)-derived systematically from the PEGASUS six-layer model-based ODD. Each behavior is decomposed along longitudinal and lateral control axes and characterized against a four-property framework: Safety (gap maintenance, conflict avoidance, kinematic stability), Compliance (legal rules and behavioral norms), Comfort (rider dynamics and trust), and Efficiency (mission completion and product-level metrics). We further demonstrate that the crossing of ODD layer parameterizations with behavioral competency specifications yields concrete scenario families suitable for systematic behavioral testing and SOTIF coverage evidence. The taxonomy is grounded in AVSC00008202111, SAE J3237, and SAE J3016, and is validated as an operational specification layer through its deployment in a rule-enforced trajectory optimization system. The Hub domain is identified as a structurally distinct, underspecified domain warranting dedicated research attention.
Over the last few years, research on autonomous systems has matured to such a degree that the field is increasingly well-positioned to translate research into practical, stakeholder-driven use cases across well-defined domains. However, for a wide-scale practical adoption of autonomous systems, adherence to safety regulations is crucial. Many regulations are influenced by the Operational Design Domain (ODD), which defines the specific conditions in which an autonomous agent can function. This is especially relevant for Automated Driving Systems (ADS), as a dependable perception of ODD elements is essential for safe implementation and auditing. Vision-language models (VLMs) integrate visual recognition and language reasoning, functioning without task-specific training data, which makes them suitable for adaptable ODD perception. To assess whether VLMs can function as zero-shot "ODD sensors" that adapt to evolving definitions, we contribute (i) an empirical study of zero-shot ODD classification and detection using four VLMs on a custom dataset and Mapillary Vistas, along with failure analyses; (ii) an ablation of zero-shot optimization strategies with a cost-performance overview; and (iii) a suite of reusable prompting templates with guidance for adaptation. Our findings indicate that definition-anchored chain-of-thought prompting with persona decomposition performs best, while other methods may result in reduced recall. Overall, our results pave the way for transparent and effective ODD-based perception in safety-critical applications.
Recent end-to-end (E2E) autonomous driving policies achieve high driving scores in closed-loop simulations. Yet it remains unclear whether these policies handle common safety-critical scenarios. We present Safe2Drive (S2D), a set of Bench2Drive-aligned scenario extensions focused on three frequent families of road hazards: work zones, pedestrian jaywalking, and occluded vulnerable road users (VRUs). Safe2Drive adds 100 common but challenging scenarios and introduces SafeDriving Score (SDS), a safety-centric metric that augments prior evaluators with pre-crash braking, work zone-object contact, lane centering, and smoothness checks. Evaluating two state-of-the-art policies (LEAD and SimLingo) on S2D, we find that their driving scores drop sharply relative to their reported Bench2Drive baselines (LEAD: from 94.70 DS on Bench2Drive to 39.95 DS on S2D; SimLingo: from 85.07 DS on Bench2Drive to 41.00 DS on S2D) and that SDS on S2D is low (11.85 for LEAD and 15.27 for Sim-Lingo). These results are consistent with brittle safe-driving behaviors such as poor work-zone understanding, red-light violations, and late or absent braking for pedestrians. This study highlights a lack of safe behavioral reasoning in E2E models even when tested on CARLA towns that are part of the training set. We plan to release the code and videos for all 100 S2D scenarios.
European Union (EU) policymakers adopted revolutionary data collection provisions for Automated Driving Systems (ADS) in the recently approved regulation that allows driverless vehicles to be operated on public roads. The framework is inspired by best practices developed at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe(UNECE) level: the In-Service Monitoring and Reporting (ISMR); and by similar operational data collection regulatory approaches in nuclear energy production and transportation fields. The collection of real-world data will enable the competent safety authorities to gather the information needed to confirm the homologation safety target. Safety-relevant driving scenarios discovered during the real-world operation of a given ADS can also be stored in a scenario catalogue to investigate how other ADS types might have addressed such a traffic conflict. Moreover, lessons learnt deriving from the data collected can be shared among original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and safety authorities. Ultimately, the ISMR is recognised as a necessary tool to properly tackle the challenges associated with ADS safety assessment given the number of unknowns that might remain undisclosed by leveraging the traditional homologation validation scheme only.
Riccardo Donà, Espedito Rusciano, Germana Trentadue +2