AI agents pose significant risks as they are granted increasing autonomy. A commonly proposed solution is human oversight and keeping a ''human in the loop'', but this is not a simple solution: Not only do current approaches to AI agent design impede effective human oversight, but the cognitive capacities required for it are also themselves degraded by extended use of AI systems. This position paper argues that current approaches to the development and deployment of AI agent systems do not support effective human oversight -- they contribute to its degradation. To address this, a top priority in the advancement of AI agents should be supporting the situated goals and cognitive requirements of effective human oversight, treating the human needs of overseers at the same level of importance as AI agent capability. To put this idea into practice, we connect work on automation and human-computer interaction to AI agent processes, outlining design-level affordances and organizational protocols that (1) support overseers in exercising critical judgement and (2) counteract the skill atrophy that arises from extended use of automation. We urge developers and deployers to adopt these or similar approaches. Without explicit support for the cognitive demands of effective human-agent interaction, AI agent systems will continue to passively incentivize the degradation of the very human skills they rely on.
Autonomous software agents hold promise to increase developer productivity but make mistakes and exhibit novel failure modes, making human oversight central to successful human-agent collaboration. Existing research on agent oversight is largely conceptual; normative frameworks exist, but how users actually oversee agents is less known. In this paper, we bridge this gap by providing early empirical anchors for the theoretical discourse on agent oversight. Drawing on interviews with 17 experienced developers, we conduct an exploratory inquiry examining what forms of emergent oversight work developers perform, when, and how. We also document the oversight challenges developers face and the strategies they have started using to address them. We found at least four forms of emergent oversight work: a priori control, co-planning, real-time monitoring, and post hoc review. We show that oversight work is not only reactive and retrospective, as portrayed in existing research, but also preventative and proactive. We describe situated oversight challenges (e.g., difficulty reviewing agent-generated code) and outline heuristics developers adopt to address such challenges (e.g., using test results as guarantees for code correctness). We conclude with high-level takeaways, future research directions, implications for the human-centered design of software agents and for software engineering practice, and limitations of our research.
Human feedback is critical for aligning AI systems to human values. As AI capabilities improve and AI is used to tackle more challenging tasks, verifying quality and safety becomes increasingly challenging. This paper explores how we can leverage AI to improve the quality of human oversight. We focus on an important safety problem that is already challenging for humans: fact-verification of AI outputs. We find that combining AI ratings and human ratings based on AI rater confidence is better than relying on either alone. Giving humans an AI fact-verification assistant further improves their accuracy, but the type of assistance matters. Displaying AI explanation, confidence, and labels leads to over-reliance, but just showing search results and evidence fosters more appropriate trust. These results have implications for Amplified Oversight -- the challenge of combining humans and AI to supervise AI systems even as they surpass human expert performance.
As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person. We argue the gate is the easy part; the hard part is the judgment - which actions to stop - which the field evaluates against two false assumptions: that there is a ground-truth notion of "risky," and that the human reviewer is a perfect, infinitely-available oracle. On a hand-labeled set of 125 adversarially-weighted agent actions we show that (i) reviewers only moderately agree on what is risky (Fleiss' kappa = 0.52), so there is no single correct label; (ii) framing the guard as selective classification under asymmetric cost makes its operating limits measurable, and on hard inputs the guard cannot safely auto-decide; and (iii) when the reviewer is modeled as endogenous (fatiguing as escalation load grows), realized safety becomes an inverted-U in the escalation rate: more human oversight can make a system less safe, and the safety-optimal guard escalates below full escalation - a setting a load-aware policy also uses to resist a flooding attack that slips a malicious action past a fatigued reviewer. Agent oversight, framed this way, is not only a classification problem but a resource-allocation one: human attention is finite, and the guard's escalation policy spends it. We claim none of these mechanisms as novel - fatigue-aware learning-to-defer (FALCON), cost-sensitive deferral under workload constraints (DeCCaF), trajectory-level guarding, and reviewer-fatigue/flooding attacks are all prior art we cite. Our contribution is an open-source agent-oversight system that operationalizes and measures them in the LLM-agent action-gating setting, turning "is my guard good?" from a guess into a curve. The inverted-U and the flooding attack are modeling results that motivate a human study.