Retrieval-augmented generation vs. deterministic tax computation in multi-agent financial advisory: A 2x2 factorial experiment

Generating actionable financial advice from business records demands that models integrate numerical reasoning, domain knowledge, and sound judgment, while avoiding recommendations that could harm the business. Direct supervision is difficult: historical decisions are not necessarily optimal, and high-quality free-form labels are expensive to obtain. We formulate financial advice generation as a reinforcement learning problem and fine-tune an open-weight language model using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Our reward is an LLM-as-a-judge rubric that scores each recommendation across multiple binary dimensions of advice quality, augmented with a safety gate for harm prevention. Since LLM-based evaluation alone cannot confirm whether improvements reflect genuine business value rather than adaptation to the judge, we complement it with a judge-independent audit based on a standard doubly-robust Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE) estimator. Under this observational off-policy audit, our trained LLM achieves approximately twice the estimated gross-profit lift of the strongest evaluated commercial baseline ($0.0228$ vs.\ $0.0104$), together with the lowest downside rate and the least negative tail risk of any policy evaluated. Notably, the two evaluations do not rank the baselines identically: the untrained base model places last on the judge rubric but second on the causal audit, indicating that the audit captures a signal the judge does not. Our results demonstrate that GRPO with a finance-grounded reward signal can produce substantially more useful business recommendations than commercial LLMs, and that a judge-independent causal audit is a valuable complement to, rather than a confirmation of, LLM-as-a-judge assessment in financial NLP.

Multi-agent systems built from large language models are deployed widely, yet how much performance is lost when two LLMs must coordinate rather than act alone remains unclear. We formulate the collaboration tax as the team-decentralisation loss of a two-player cooperative game with private information, with two propositions characterising its sign and its equivalence to a max-superadditivity violation. We operationalise this definition on 32 solo-tractable tasks grouped by source of grounding friction and measure it on 11 models from 7 providers. The tax is structured along two no-exception axes: a category ordering across every model and a monotonic decrease with capability. The proximate mechanism is not a reasoning deficit but a four-stage conversational cascade in which agents make ungrounded claims, fail to query the partner, skip integrating both views, and accept the answer without re-derivation. The tax is mechanically predictable from conversation features and partly tractable: a prompt intervention targeting all four stages closes a substantial fraction of the gap, with the dominant bottleneck differing across categories. In heterogeneous pairs the tax is pulled toward the stronger partner rather than the additive midpoint, empirically realising the max-superadditivity violation predicted by our framework. Together these results recast collaboration in LLM systems as a measurable, predictable, and partly tractable cost.

Multi-agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) for financial trading have grown rapidly since 2023, yet the field lacks a shared framework for understanding what drives performance or for evaluating claims credibly. This survey makes three contributions. First, we introduce a four-dimensional taxonomy, covering architecture pattern, coordination mechanism, memory architecture, and tool integration; applied to 12 multi-agent systems and two single-agent baselines. Second, we formulate the Coordination Primacy Hypothesis (CPH): inter-agent coordination protocol design is a primary driver of trading decision quality, often exerting greater influence than model scaling. CPH is presented as a falsifiable research hypothesis supported by tiered structural evidence rather than as an empirically validated conclusion; its definitive validation requires evaluation infrastructure that does not yet exist in the field. Third, we document five pervasive evaluation failures (look-ahead bias, survivorship bias, backtesting overfitting, transaction cost neglect, and regime-shift blindness) and show that these can reverse the sign of reported returns. Building on the CPH and the evaluation critique, we introduce the Coordination Breakeven Spread (CBS), a metric for determining whether multi-agent coordination adds genuine value net of transaction costs, and propose minimum evaluation standards as prerequisites for validating the CPH.