Loop-Back Authority in LLM Agent Teams: A Paired Experiment on Flat and Hierarchical Coordination

Large language models are increasingly used in multi-agent systems, where they see and respond to other agents' answers. A key risk is conformity: a model may abandon its own answer simply because others agree on a different one. Prior studies show that LLMs often revise toward a majority answer, but it remains unclear whether these revisions help correct mistakes as often as they introduce new errors. In this paper, we conduct a controlled study in which an LLM first answers a question, then sees simulated peer responses before making a final decision. We manipulate two social cues: consensus structure and authority labels assigned to peers, and measure how they influence beneficial and harmful revisions. Across four open-weight LLMs and seven QA datasets, we find that peer agreement makes it much easier to mislead initially correct models than to correct initially wrong ones. Authority labels make models more likely to choose the endorsed answer, regardless of whether it is correct. More concerningly, generic reasoning interventions such as chain-of-thought and reflection do not reliably reduce harmful revision while preserving beneficial revision. These findings suggest that multi-agent LLM systems should verify peer answers rather than simply aggregate them.

Multi-agent LLM pipelines increasingly span organisational boundaries; when a fault surfaces, someone must determine where it entered. The artifact available is rarely a full execution trace: it is the reports each agent filed, and a filed report can state a conclusion alongside its observations. Using a pre-registered, institutionally partitioned pipeline of six agents with process-level information boundaries, balanced defect injection and matched clean twins (345,600 requests per chain model, two models), we first report that our pre-registered hypothesis -- that collective responsibility framing degrades escalation with chain length -- is not supported. The layer nevertheless fails asymmetrically. It originates almost nothing: zero allegations across 7,996 clean episodes where every agent stayed silent. It filters upstream error poorly, naming an innocent party in 34.4% and 62.6% of clean episodes where an agent raised a false alarm. Conditional on no agent proposing the true origin (59.5% of episodes on one chain model), an auditor reading the reports recovers it in 4.1% of cases -- below a uniform guess (20%) and the best fixed-link accuser (31.0%) -- while reaching 60.3% from the raw documentation of the same episodes. Deleting one clause, the field carrying the agents' own conclusion, isolates the cause at constant observations: accuracy rises to 45.2% (+41.2 pp, 95% CI +35.3 to +46.9) and adherence collapses from 94.4% to 3.4%; where the suggestion was correct the same deletion instead costs accuracy, 70.5% to 55.7%. The harm replicates on two frontier auditors in four conditions out of four (+8.5 to +39.0 pp) and in a second domain (+47.7 and +61.1 pp), where the cost disappears. The net effect is governed by upstream reliability together with both conditional magnitudes. An accountability layer needs evidence sufficiently independent of the conclusions it verifies.

Multi-agent LLM coordination papers report small benchmark deltas as evidence that one architecture beats another. A prior question: how much paired trial-0 disagreement do two protocols produce on the same model and benchmark when their API inputs are configuration-equivalent (matched by code inspection plus a SHA-256 byte audit), short of full identity-replay? On Claude Haiku 4.5 against tau^2-bench retail, the clean configuration-equivalent contrast (no_coord vs. intercept, both inert at trial 0) gives signed paired gaps of +10pp and 0pp across two n=100 seeds; pooled across both, +5pp with Wilson CI [-2,+12], not significant. The largest single-seed contrast (+18pp pull-vs-intercept, p_corr=0.012) did not reproduce at the second seed (-3pp, p_corr=1.0); no trial-0 contrast is significant after Bonferroni at either seed or pooled. The envelope of observed paired gaps spans [-3,+18]pp across two seeds, with pooled upper Wilson CI ~15pp. Seven of ten recent multi-agent coordination architectures report headline effects below this local floor, and one more sits inside the envelope; whether they survive a same-model paired replication is, by construction, untested in their original settings. We define coordination-active pass^k, pass^k restricted to trials where the coordination mechanism is logically active, as the minimum reporting protocol, with sample-size targets and runtime hooks in the body. Measurements run on ET-MCP, a task-scoped negative-knowledge store conformant with MCP 2026-07-28, used as a substrate to isolate reader-side choices, not as a contribution. On Haiku 4.5 the candidate readers (pull, intercept) do not improve trial-1 recovery; we give a preliminary diagnosis of failure modes with refinements on existing production hook surfaces.