Full-consensus rates are often treated as indicators of collective cognition, yet depend on how participation and final states are operationalized. We replayed 100 held-out human Wason groups with matched large language model (LLM) agent groups, seeding one belief-anchored agent per participant's pre-discussion answer and scoring agents and people with the same code. Across human scoring definitions, estimates ranged from 24.0% to 57.0%; about one fifth of participants never posted, whereas agents almost always did. Agent groups remained more consensual in two post-unblinding sensitivity analyses: the submit-based comparison (n = 98) yielded gaps of 34.0 and 43.9 percentage points for chat and reasoning modes, and the participation-matched comparison (n = 45) yielded gaps of 34.1 and 44.4 points. These complementary routes reduced different measurement asymmetries yet converged within 0.5 percentage points. The gap persisted without early stopping and under a reparameterization removing the memorizable answer; reasoning-mode groups then agreed nearly unanimously, mostly on incorrect answers. Simulated consensus did not track collective accuracy, and belief-anchored agent groups were biased estimators of the human group-outcome distribution in this setting. These analyses provide a scoring-explicit basis for assessing simulated-group estimates of human deliberative outcomes.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making. Here we test LLM agents against a direct empirical benchmark: a large-scale networked Prisoner's Dilemma experiment with human participants. Using the same interaction protocol, payoff structure, and network topologies, we compare nine open-weight LLMs with the human data. The selected model reproduces several macro-level features of cooperation dynamics, including the early decline and later stabilization of cooperation. This aggregate agreement, however, does not extend uniformly to finer levels of behavior. LLM populations underestimate individual-level heterogeneity and generate conditional cooperation patterns that differ from those observed in humans. Adding a fraction of random agents improves some aspects of micro-level agreement, but does not remove the mismatch in decision rules. These findings reveal a macro--micro dissociation in LLM-based social agents: collective outcomes can appear human-like even when the underlying behavioral distributions and mechanisms are not. They suggest that validating LLM agents as human surrogates requires comparisons across aggregate dynamics, individual heterogeneity, and context-dependent decision rules, rather than outcome-level agreement alone.
Henrique Ferraz de Arruda, Carlos Gracia Lázaro, Alberto Aleta +1
LLMs are increasingly deployed in settings that require collective reasoning on complex, value-laden problems. Confidence in these deployments rests largely on benchmarks for verifiable tasks (mathematics, coding, coordination games), yet many of these applications concern problems where no objectively correct answer exists and where decision quality instead depends on integrating pluralistic perspectives to find mutually acceptable solutions. We argue that LLM reasoning capacity on this class of problems cannot be fully inferred from verifiable-task benchmarks, and that procedural evaluations of LLM discourse (respectfulness, justification, engagement) are systematically insufficient. We apply the Deliberative Reason Index (DRI), a measure developed in political science and validated across citizen assemblies, as a tool for evaluating reliable group-level reasoning on pluralistic, non-verifiable problems. Synthesizing recent evidence across 1,980 five-agent LLM runs on 12 citizen-assembly topics across 11 frontier model configurations, we find that LLM groups produce discourse with procedural quality comparable to human deliberation, while gains in intersubjective consistency are small, topic-dependent, and concentrated on tractable rather than ethically contested questions. LLM groups exhibit roughly one-third the perspective diversity of human assemblies and reverse the human convergence pattern: human deliberation decreases dispersion as diverse views synthesise, whereas LLM deliberation increases it. Engineering diversity through persona prompting does not restore the human dynamic but inverts which component of deliberative reasoning is updated. Our conclusion is constraining rather than prohibitive: LLMs can function as tools supporting human reasoning on pluralistic problems, but current evidence does not license treating them as autonomous deliberative agents.
Previous work in group recommender systems has demonstrated a sensitivity to the distribution of preferences within a group. Specifically, the selection of the preference aggregation strategy benefits from considering such group configurations. In this paper, we study whether LLMs are able to mimic this sensitivity and to select the ideal aggregation strategy (and corresponding recommendation) according to nuanced human perceptions of fairness, satisfaction, and consensus. We do this by fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) on human survey data to serve as real-time judgmental models within the recommendation pipeline. Using a reasoning dataset distilled from DeepSeek-V3.1 and human ground truth assessments, we develop Judgmental Llama and Judgmental OLMo to simulate group assessments. Our pipeline successfully generates multiple recommendation candidates based on social choice-based aggregation strategies and dynamically selects the one that maximizes these predicted human-like evaluations. We further validate these suggestions in a user study (n=284) and find that our methodology achieved the highest scores for satisfaction and group consensus. Furthermore, we find that LLM judgments are most aligned with human perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and consensus when we also consider interaction effects between our LLM-based method and group configuration (e.g., minority or coalition). These findings give further support for dynamically adapting aggregation strategies to specific within-group preference distributions, and highlight the advantage of using LLMs for an adaptation that is aligned with subjective human judgments.
Cedric Waterschoot, Nava Tintarev, Francesco Barile