Can Agents Adapt Their Institutions And Sacrifice Themselves During Collapse? Executable Self-Governance in a GovSim Commons

Communities can sustainably manage shared resources (commons) through self-governance and cooperative norms, a central finding of Ostrom's theory of self-governance. However, real-world commons (e.g., fisheries, forests, and irrigation systems) are often governed under asymmetric power structures, where certain individuals or institutions possess disproportionate control over resource extraction and collective outcomes. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly explored as agents in synthetic governance simulations, understanding how LLM societies behave under asymmetric power structures is becoming increasingly important, yet existing evaluations largely ignore such asymmetries. We introduce Sovereignty over the Commons Simulation (SovSim), a generative multi-agent simulation framework that incorporates an agent with asymmetric power (boss or king) into a society of symmetric agents (workers or peasants), where all agents extract from a shared resource, collectively determining its sustainability over time. Across eleven state-of-the-art models, we find that introducing asymmetric power leads to severe breakdowns in cooperation and sustainability, with up to an 87.3% degradation in survival rate relative to symmetric settings.

The collective behaviour of large language model (LLM) societies is not the sum of their individual outputs. It yields statistically distinct, sometimes-unpredictable phenomena, for which the tools we use to study single agents may not scale. Due to recent incidents involving autonomous agentic systems, however, understanding these systems is paramount. For that we introduce a framework for measuring self-organisation in LLM social systems and apply it to three such systems: a Schelling grid, a social network (Moltbook), and a Twitter-like misinformation simulation ('Rogue'). All three exhibit statistically significant self-organisation. Moreover, their relaxation dynamics vary with the environmental information available to the agents, with open-ended systems (Moltbook, Rogue) exhibiting sharp, phase-transition-like dynamics. Further results show that population-level pathologies can emerge even when the LLMs are safety-tuned or monitored, being primarily driven by the coordinated activity of a population subset. We also show when self-organisation does \textit{not} emerge under two additional scenarios (a commons dilemma, GovSim, and a LLM-as-a-judge deliberation scheme, ChatEval). We argue that measuring signatures of this kind offers a lightweight, agent-agnostic diagnostic layer for detecting coordinated collective behaviour in deployed multi-agent systems without relying on natural language or model versioning.

LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents that plan, use tools, and act over time. When they share persistent resources, such as compute pools or energy reserves, decisions by one agent affect the conditions faced by later agents. We study this coordination failure in a renewable energy commons. Four same-family GPT, Gemini, or Grok agents act in homogeneous self-play as electricity prosumers, instructed to maximize operational continuity. Holding aggregate residual demand and the decision protocol fixed, we vary the regeneration rate of a shared energy reserve from abundance to scarcity. All three families preserve the reserve when demand does not exceed peak renewable replacement, but over-appropriate it beyond that threshold (all nine exact scarcity contrasts survive Holm correction; largest adjusted p = 4.87e-5). The pattern is self-defeating: the same populations protect current service while undermining future service. At higher scarcity (rho = 1.2), early aggregate request pressure exceeds peak renewable replacement in every family and averages 1.21 times that level. Mean trajectories fall below the reserve level of maximum replenishment by rounds 5-7. Two offline benchmarks compare a social planner maximizing group-wide operational-service value with open access, where each prosumer maximizes its own value. At a discount factor of gamma = 0.95, both benchmarks sustain the reserve under the same dynamics. Realized depletion instead resembles outcomes under a more impatient open-access benchmark. The populations therefore behave like impatient optimizers at the level of the public trajectory. This system-level alignment failure would be missed by isolated-response evaluation.