Polyscene: Scenario Planning as Diversity Planning
Organizations: School of Computer Science, University of St Andrews, St Andrews · School of Natural and Computing Sciences, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen
Abstract
Scenario planning is a foresight practice in which analysts construct a small set of plausible futures and prepare an organisation for each. Each scenario is a narrative that must be plausible, internally consistent, relevant and challenging, and the set as a whole must be differentiated. The practice remains manual: a workshop (i.e., a facilitated meeting in which a small group of experts writes the narratives) considers only the factors it has time for, carries the biases of the experts who run it, and cannot be redone whenever conditions change. In this paper, we automate scenario planning by casting it as a diversity planning problem, in which two scenarios differ when they end in different narratives on the analyst's drivers. The result is a set of scenarios, one for each narrative that the topic can reach within a budget. Our implementation, Polyscene, is a generic engine that generates scenarios from a topic. We use geopolitical conflicts and shipping-route disruptions as case studies. For the first, we build the planning problem's initial state from the GDELT Project so it reflects current relationships among the countries involved. Polyscene then generates scenarios showing how relationships among those countries change. With a board of six countries as of 1 January 2021 and a budget of five events, the conflict set puts five of the 15 country pairs at war, and each of the three wars that break out among these countries by 1 January 2026 ends a scenario. For the second, we build the initial state from ship traffic, a supply-pressure index, and the news, and Polyscene generates scenarios showing what a closed or diverted route could do to a manufacturer's parts stock. With four routes per board and the same date and budget, each set includes three outcomes, and the Suez Canal set includes the March 2021 blockage and the December 2023 Red Sea container diversion.
Figures & tables
| Operator | Name | Holds at position when |
|---|---|---|
| next | holds at ; false at the last position | |
| until [ 29 ] | holds at some position , and holds at every position from up to, but excluding, | |
| yesterday [ 30 ] | and holds at ; false at position | |
| since | holds at some position , and holds at every position after up to and including | |
| sometime | holds at or at a later position | |
| always | holds at every position from to the last |
| Condition | Judges | A narrative breaks it when | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) intentional | an actor’s action | the action raises no objective of its actor, replies to no action aimed at its actor, and starts no causal chain that ends in an action that does either | intentionality [ 31 ] , read through utilities [ 32 ] |
| (2) connected | an actor’s action after the first | no causal link reaches it from an earlier action, and it replies to none and undoes none | causal links [ 45 ] |
| (3) connected | a happening | no causal link leads from it to a later action of an actor | happenings [ 31 ] |
| (4) loop-free | an actor’s action | the state before the action occurred earlier in the narrative | loop-free plans [ 46 ] |
| Given a narrative with the states and , an actor , a fluent , a value , positions , and a bound on the number of actions of a narrative; denotes the fluents that occur in the precondition of , the happenings, the states of , the formula that holds in the state alone, and ranges over the values that an objective takes. | ||
| First-order definition | LTL f implementation | Holds when |
| the action is the actor ’s | ||
| the action has an actor | ||
| the action is a happening | ||
| the action reads | ||
| the state occurred at an earlier position | ||
| Step | Element of | Geopolitical conflicts ( Section 4.1 ) | Supply chains ( Section 4.2 ) |
| 1 | : domain | 65 action schemas over 6 countries, 1 per CAMEO event type; fluents for the pair ladder, 9 ties, discontent and the economy. | 17 action schemas over the lines, the maker, the rivals, the supplier and the authorities, 6 of them happenings; fluents for closure, attack, diversion, shortage, orders and stops, and 4 numeric levels; flying parts in, switching source and escorting ships require a fact the analyst states on the board (air-transportable parts, a qualified second source, spare warships), false on every board here. |
| actors | the 6 countries; every action is a country’s, and its target is the country it is directed at | the lines, the maker, the rivals, the supplier and the authorities; the 6 happenings have no actor | |
| 2 | the partnership of each pair and the economy of each country | the maker’s stock | |
| whether each of the 15 pairs is at war | whether the route is closed, whether the lines have diverted, and whether the maker has stopped a line | ||
| objectives | the week’s motives and the maintained table; 1 preference per motive, weighted by the motive’s weight | lines want ships moving ( ) and rates up ( per level); buyers want no missed delivery ( ), their lines running ( ) and stock up ( per unit); the supplier wants fillable orders ( ); the authorities want routes open ( ) and safe ( ) | |
| escalation, stranger, reversal and capitulation | none; the invariants are in the preconditions |
| Outcomes at budget | Budget | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Topic | Board (1 January 2021) | Time | Memory | ||||
| Conflicts | 6 countries | s | GB | ||||
| Supply chain | Suez Canal | s | MB | ||||
| Panama Canal | s | MB | |||||
| Baltimore | s | MB | |||||
| Strait of Hormuz | s | MB | |||||
| Wars at the end | Scenario | Happened |
|---|---|---|
| Iran–Israel | Israel masses forces against Iran and strikes it | Iran–Israel: April and October 2024, 13 to 24 June 2025 |
| Iran–US | Iran masses forces against the United States and strikes it | Iran–US: 22 to 24 June 2025 |
| Iran–Ukraine | Iran masses forces against Ukraine and strikes it, then masses forces against the United States | no |
| Iran–Ukraine, Iran–US | Iran masses forces against Ukraine and strikes it; Iran and the United States mass forces against each other; the United States strikes Iran | Iran–US: 22 to 24 June 2025 |
| Iran–Israel, Iran–US | Iran masses forces against Israel and strikes it; Iran and the United States mass forces against each other; the United States strikes Iran | Iran–Israel: April and October 2024, 13 to 24 June 2025; Iran–US: 22 to 24 June 2025 |
| Russia–US | Russia imposes targeted sanctions on the United States; the United States appeals to Iran for support against Russia; Russia threatens the United States; the United States masses forces against Russia and strikes it | no |
| Outcome | Scenario | Happened | ||
| closed | diverted | paused | ||
| true | true | false | demand for the parts surges; the canal is blocked; the lines reroute round the Cape of Good Hope; the maker inflates its order; the lines add a surcharge | yes: 23–29 Mar 2021, the Ever Given |
| false | true | false | demand for the parts surges; the canal is blocked; the lines reroute round the Cape; the maker inflates its order; the authorities clear the canal | yes: from mid-Dec 2023 to the end of the window |
| true | false | false | demand for the parts surges; the rivals inflate their orders; the canal is blocked; the maker inflates its order; the lines add a surcharge | no |
Model-Based Planning
Model-Based Planning uses explicit or learned models of how actions change states to simulate futures, compare plans, and choose actions.
See all 208 papers