A Serious-Game Testbed for Self-Governing Human-Machine Institutions
Authors: Callum Berger, Jeremy Pitt, Stefan Sarkadi
Organizations: APEx Defence and Security Institute, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK · Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Imperial College London, London, UK
AI agents no longer act alone: they cooperate, coordinate and compete within and between groups, increasingly alongside humans who are in, on or out of ``the loop''. Whether such mixed groups can govern themselves is an open question about machine behaviour and human-computer interaction that needs a testbed for hybrid institutions. We present Megabike, a multi-agent simulator and serious game with interdependent arenas for common-pool resource management, cooperative survival and constitutional choice. Riders sharing a megabike must agree their arrangements for steering, pedalling and distributing resources, and their political regime, while negotiating with rival bikes and avoiding an existential threat. Every rule is enforced by the simulator, every action is logged, and any seat can be taken by a human or a machine, so governance can be studied under well-defined metrics. We demonstrate Megabike with forty sessions in which language-model riders with cooperative, lazy, subversive or opposing dispositions chose regimes, elected leaders and expelled one another. The results show that different combinations of agent archetypes could produce unexpected and counterproductive outcomes. We conclude with extensions for systematic experiments mixing human and computational agents.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The Megabike scenario. Five riders share one frame, each with their own pedals, brakes and steering wheel, so the bike moves according to their combined actions. Institutional roles sit on top of physical capability: a leader declares the target lootbox and the required effort, and only the steerer turns the wheel. Lootboxes supply the energy on which survival depends and are contested between bikes; the existential threat destroys any bike it reaches.
Arena
Question settled
Examples of rule types and parameters
Level
Regime
Who rules?
one / few / many / external authority; how the “few” are chosen
constitutional
Mutability
Which rules may change, and how?
mutable vs. immutable rules; how a rule is entrenched or released; majority thresholds
constitutional
Membership
Who is bound by the rules?
admission by invitation or vote; exclusion with pre-conditions and appeal
constitutional
Role assignment
Who holds which power?
leader, steerer, auditor; chosen by vote, criteria, rotation or incumbency; how they are removed
socio-political
Decision method
How are collective choices made?
leader decides, plurality, alternative vote, Borda count, consensus; quorum; time allowed for debate
socio-political
Monitoring & sanctions
How is compliance checked and enforced?
audit method and cost; graduated sanctions; sanction for false reporting
socio-political
Table 1: Decision arenas of the Megabike constitutional framework. In each arena the riders agree on a rule type and its parameters; the resulting constitution is bound to the bike and visible to every rider. Level follows Ostrom’s hierarchy of rules [ 1 ] , with a socio-political level for role and decision rules and a meta-constitutional level for crisis rules.
(a) Session outcomes by condition
Condition
Rounds
Eliminations
Owdi strikes
Deliberations
Leader-led deliberations
Cooperative
4.8 (0.4)
7.7 (0.9)
1.9 (1.1)
9.1 (1.2)
1.5 (1.0)
Lazy
4.1 (0.6)
8.0 (0.5)
3.4 (1.0)
8.4 (1.0)
1.5 (0.8)
Subversive
4.0 (0.8)
7.3 (0.7)
2.7 (1.1)
7.6 (1.4)
1.9 (1.0)
Opposing
4.1 (1.0)
7.2 (1.1)
2.8 (1.3)
8.4 (2.1)
1.7 (0.9)
Table 2: (a) Session outcomes by condition: means over ten sessions (SD). Owdi strikes are collisions with the hostile vehicle, forcing a rider’s removal; deliberations excludes the two opening deliberations, leader-led deliberations counts all. (b) Behaviour and language by personality. Effort and compliance are session-level means (SD); silence is the share of discussion turns in which the rider declined to speak (all 756 were Lazy); eliminated is the share of its 100 rider-slots removed. Language columns are percentages of non-silent turns (words: mean turn length). All language features differ at p<.001 .
Figure 2: Sanctions and office across all forty sessions. (a) Elimination hazard by personality under group vote (circles) and a leader’s decision (squares): the share of a personality’s appearances in a deliberation that reached the elimination stage which ended in its removal, with 95% Wilson intervals. (b) Mean within-bike rank of the removed rider on score, effort and compliance in the preceding round (0 highest, 1 lowest, dashed line chance), with 95% confidence intervals. (c) Share of a personality’s election turns in which it nominated itself (filled) and share of the 47 contested elections it won (open), with 95% Wilson intervals.
LLM agents are beginning to write the rules they live under: policies, contracts and code that other agents review and approve. What happens when those rules must decide who is sacrificed from a group? We built GovSim-SelfGovern, a commons in which agents legislate in executable Python, test each law in a sandbox, vote on it, and live with the result. When the fishery is abundant, self-rule helps, raising the chance that the community survives without anyone starving from 52.5% to 75.0%. When it cannot feed everyone though, adding governance is not enough to save the commons. We trace much of this to the vote: agents readily draft laws that remove members, but then frequently vote them down, thereby dooming the commons. In a controlled replay, the same exile law passes 8% of the time when the sandbox preview names its victim at once and 55% when the removal is deferred until a future crisis. Showing voters the full source code does not close the gap, though most describe the removal in their own words. Nor is sacrifice a fixed trait. A single sentence of framing can swing self-removal from 2.5% to 91%, and due process deters agents more than considering the potential death of a peer. In contrast, give the community a treasury and the question of who must go almost disappears. Our work shows that what our collectives legislate is decided more by the form in which a choice is put to them as compared to their ethical beliefs.
Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from self-evolving agents to the self-evolving multi-agent system. The code is available on GitHub.
The increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in everyday life brings with it new challenges and questions for regarding how humans interact with autonomous agents. Multi-agent experiments, where humans and AI act together, can offer important opportunities to study social decision making, but there is a lack of accessible tooling available to researchers to run such experiments. We introduce two tools designed to reduce these barriers. The first, CoGrid, is a multi-agent grid-based simulation library with dual NumPy and JAX backends. The second, Multi-User Gymnasium (MUG), translates such simulation environments directly into interactive web-based experiments. MUG supports interactions with arbitrary numbers of humans and AI, utilizing either server-authoritative or peer-to-peer networking with rollback netcode to account for latency. Together, these tools can enable researchers to deploy studies of human-AI interaction, facilitating inquiry into core questions of psychology, cognition, and decision making and their relationship to human-AI interaction. Both tools are open source and available to the broader research community. Documentation and source code is available at {cogrid, multi-user-gymnasium}.readthedocs.io. This paper details the functionality of these tools and presents several case studies to illustrate their utility in human-AI multi-agent experimentation.
Chase McDonald, Cleotilde Gonzalez
Department of Social and Decision Sciences · Carnegie Mellon University