AI Accountability

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14 papers in the last four weeks, up 133% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 110

Apr 29, 2026cs.CY

The AI Accountability Ecosystem in the Era of Language Models

This article reviews and updates the framework for accountability in AI based on account- ability ecosystems. We update the framework in light of the latest developments since the release of Large Language Models for general public use. We propose three interlinked updates to the original AI accountability ecosystem: (i) reorienting the accountability ecosystem to AI infrastructure and supply chains, (ii) providing greater emphasis on outcomes monitoring and identification of issues that support decentralized system improvement, and (iii) incorporating end-user accountability given the new risks of unpredictability of language models in-the-wild. Collectively, these updates mark a shift towards accountability as distributed, continuous, and institutionalized, away from a system in which frontier AI applications can be modeled as discrete products controlled by single identifiable actors with industry-specific oversight.

Chris Percy, Artur d'Avila Garcez

University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK · City St George’s, University of London, London, EC1V 0HB, UK

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 29, 2026cs.CY

Algorithmic Authority and the Clinical Standard of Care

The integration of artificial intelligence into clinical medicine creates a fundamental tension between algorithmic probabilistic reasoning and the experiential intuition of expert physicians; applying Lawrence Lessig's \enquote{Code is Law} framework, I argue that the architecture of clinical AI systems already functions as de facto medical regulation, reshaping liability and the standard of care. Reframing AI \enquote{hallucination} as structurally analogous to well-documented human cognitive failures such as confirmation bias and premature diagnostic closure, I show that both failure modes demand a unified governance response. I therefore propose a dialectical standard of care that treats the integrated AI-physician dyad as the singular responsible diagnostic entity, mandating the synthesis of algorithmic precision with human interpretive authority within robust data governance and patient privacy frameworks.

Aizierjiang Aiersilan

The George Washington University

AI Accountability Healthcare Clinical Decision-Making AI Governance Human-AI Decision Making Human Oversight of AI

Apr 28, 2026cs.CY

A Faceted Proposal for Transparent Attribution of AI-Assisted Text Production

Artificial intelligence systems are increasingly integrated into writing processes, challenging traditional notions of authorship, responsibility, and intellectual contribution. Current disclosure practices usually indicate whether AI was used, but rarely explain how it was used, where it intervened, or how its output was reviewed. This paper proposes a faceted model for representing AI-assisted text production at the levels of documents, chapters, sections, and paragraphs. The proposal introduces a core model based on Form, Generation, and Evaluation, and an extended model that adds Intent, Control, and Traceability. The model is positioned as a minimal operational baseline with extensibility toward higher-fidelity representations. A worked example based on the production of this article demonstrates applicability.

Geraldo Xexéo

Programa de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computação, COPPE - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro,RJ – Brasil[cs.CY]

AI Accountability Authorship Attribution Human-AI Co-Creation

Apr 25, 2026cs.AI

AI Identity: Standards, Gaps, and Research Directions for AI Agents

AI agents are now running real transactions, workflows, and sub-agent chains across organizational boundaries without continuous human supervision. This creates a problem no current infrastructure is equipped to solve: how do you identify, verify, and hold accountable an entity with no body, no persistent memory, and no legal standing? We define AI Identity as the continuous relationship between what an AI agent is declared to be and what it is observed to do, bounded by the confidence that those two things correspond at any given moment. Through a structured survey of industry trends, emerging standards, and technical literature, we conduct a gap analysis across the full agent identity lifecycle and make three contributions: (1) a structural comparison of human and AI identity across four dimensions (substrate, persistence, verifiability, and legal standing) showing that the asymmetry is fundamental and that extending human frameworks to agents without structural modification produces systematic failures; (2) an evaluation of current technical and regulatory documents against the identity requirements of autonomous agents, finding that none adequately address the challenge of governing nondeterministic, boundary-crossing entities; and (3) identification of five critical gaps (semantic intent verification, recursive delegation accountability, agent identity integrity, governance opacity and enforcement, and operational sustainability) that no current technology or regulatory instrument resolves. These gaps are structural; more engineering effort alone will not close them. Foundational research on AI identity is the central conclusion of this report.

Takumi Otsuka, Kentaroh Toyoda, Alex Leung

1AIFT, Singapore · 2Graduate School of Fundamental Science and Engineering, Department of Computer Science and Communications Engineering, Waseda University, Japan · 3Keio Global Research Institute (KGRI), Japan

AI Accountability AI Agent Security AI Agent Governance

Apr 24, 2026cs.CY

Institutions for the Post-Scarcity of Judgment

Each major technological revolution inverts a particular scarcity and rebuilds institutions around the shift. The near-consensus diagnosis of the AI revolution holds that AI collapses the cost of prediction while judgment remains scarce. This Opinion argues the inversion has now flipped: competent-looking judgment (selecting, ranking, attributing, certifying) is produced at scale and at marginal cost approaching zero, and four complements become scarce: verified signal, legitimacy, authentic provenance, and integration capacity (the community's tolerance for delegated cognition). Because judgment is the substance of institutions, the institutions built to manufacture legitimate judgment (courts, journals, licensing bodies, legislatures) now compete with the technology for the same functional role. The piece traces the pattern across scientific institutions, professional licensing, intellectual property, democratic legitimacy, and foundation-model concentration, and closes with a three-move agenda: reframe AI policy as institutional redesign, build provenance and verification as commons, and develop the formal apparatus for institutional composition under strategic agents.

Lauri Lovén

Future Computing Group, University of Oulu, Finland

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 22, 2026cs.AI

AI Governance under Political Turnover: The Alignment Surface of Compliance Design

Governments are increasingly interested in using AI to make administrative decisions cheaper, more scalable, and more consistent. But for probabilistic AI to be incorporated into public administration it must be embedded in a compliance layer that makes decisions reviewable, repeatable, and legally defensible. That layer can improve oversight by making departures from law easier to detect. But it can also create a stable approval boundary that political successors learn to navigate while preserving the appearance of lawful administration. We develop a formal model in which institutions choose the scale of automation, the degree of codification, and safeguards on iterative use. The model shows when these systems become vulnerable to strategic use from within government, why reforms that initially improve oversight can later increase that vulnerability, and why expansions in AI use may be difficult to unwind. Making AI usable can thus make procedures easier for future governments to learn and exploit.

Andrew J. Peterson

University of Poitiers

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 20, 2026cs.CY

Regulating Artificial Intimacy: From Locks and Blocks to Relational Accountability

A series of high-profile tragedies involving companion chatbots has triggered an unusually rapid regulatory response. Several jurisdictions, including Australia, California, and New York, have introduced enforceable regulation, while regulators elsewhere have signaled growing concern about risks posed by companion chatbots, particularly to children. In parallel, leading providers, notably OpenAI, appear to have strengthened their self-regulatory approaches. Drawing on legal textual analysis and insights from regulatory theory, psychology, and information systems research, this paper critically examines these recent interventions. We examine what is regulated and who is regulated, identifying regulatory targets, scope, and modalities. We classify interventions by method and priority, showing how emerging regimes combine "locks and blocks", such as access gating and content moderation, with measures addressing toxic relationship features and process-based accountability requirements. We argue that effective regulation of companion chatbots must integrate all three dimensions. More, however, is required. Current regimes tend to focus on discrete harms, narrow conceptions of vulnerability, or highly specified accountability processes, while failing to confront deeper power asymmetries between providers and users. Providers of companion chatbots increasingly control artificial intimacy at scale, creating unprecedented opportunities for control through intimacy. We suggest that a general, open-ended duty of care would be an important first step toward constraining that power and addressing a fundamental source of chatbot risk. The paper contributes to debates on companion chatbot regulation and is relevant to regulators, platform providers, and scholars concerned with digital intimacy, law and technology, and fairness, accountability, and transparency in sociotechnical systems.

Henry Fraser, Jessica M. Szczuka, Raffaele F. Ciriello

Queensland University of Technology · School of Law · ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society (ADM+S) +3

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance

Apr 20, 2026cs.AI

The implicated scientist: on the role of AI researchers in the development of weapons systems

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are increasingly used in modern weapons systems. Notably, these systems have recently been involved in mass killings and destruction at scale. Furthermore, there is currently a strong interest and competition among powerful players to accelerate the proliferation of weapons with automated or AI-based components, a phenomenon known as AI arms race. This competition poses a risk of causing even more deaths and devastation in the future, as well as increased power and wealth inequality. In this work, we aim to shed light on the role of AI researchers as implicated subjects in the harms caused by weapons enabled by AI technologies. We investigate and discuss the specifics of this implication and explore ways to transfigure this position of implication into one of differentiated, long-distance solidarity with the victims of technologically fortified injustices.

Alexandra Volokhova, Alex Hernandez-Garcia

Universit´e de Montr´eal, Mila – Quebec AI Institute Montreal, QC, Canada

AI Accountability Responsible AI

Apr 20, 2026cs.CR

Position: No Retroactive Cure for Infringement during Training

As generative AI faces intensifying legal challenges, the machine learning community has increasingly relied on post-hoc mitigation -- especially machine unlearning and inference-time guardrails -- to argue for compliance. This paper argues that such post-hoc mitigation methods cannot retroactively cure liability from unlawful acquisition and training, because compliance hinges on data lineage, not the outputs. Our argument has three parts. First, unauthorized copying/ingestion can be a legally complete completed act, and model weights may operate as fixed copies that retain training-derived expressive value, making later filtering beside the point for infringement. Second, contract and tort/unfair-competition rules -- via licenses, terms of service, and anti-free-riding principles -- can independently restrict access and use, often bypassing copyright defenses (e.g., fair use or TDM exceptions). Third, since value from protected inputs can persist in weights, remedies such as unjust enrichment and disgorgement may require stripping gains and, in some cases, reaching the model itself. We therefore argue for a shift from Post-Hoc Sanitization to verifiable Ex-Ante Process Compliance.

Satoru Utsunomiya, Masaru Isonuma, Junichiro Mori +1

The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan · NII LLMC, Tokyo, Japan · Tohoku University, Miyagi, Japan +1

AI Accountability AI Governance

Apr 17, 2026cs.CY

Reckoning with the Political Economy of AI: Avoiding Decoys in Pursuit of Accountability

The Project of AI is a world-building endeavor, wherein those who fund and develop AI systems both operate through and seek to sustain networks of power and wealth. As they expand their access to resources and configure our sociotechnical conditions, they benefit from the ways in which a suite of decoys animate scholars, critics, policymakers, journalists, and the public into co-constructing industry-empowering AI futures. Regardless of who constructs or nurtures them, these decoys often create the illusion of accountability while both masking the emerging political economies that the Project of AI has set into motion, and also contributing to the network-making power that is at the heart of the Project's extraction and exploitation. Drawing on literature at the intersection of communication, science and technology studies, and economic sociology, we examine how the Project of AI is constructed. We then explore five decoys that seemingly critique - but in actuality co-constitute - AI's emergent power relations and material political economy. We argue that advancing meaningful fairness or accountability in AI requires: 1) recognizing when and how decoys serve as a distraction, and 2) grappling directly with the material political economy of the Project of AI. Doing so will enable us to attend to the networks of power that make 'AI' possible, spurring new visions for how to realize a more just technologically entangled world.

Janet Vertesi, danah boyd, Alex Taylor +1

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ USA · Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA · University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK +1

AI Accountability Algorithmic Accountability AI Governance

Apr 17, 2026cs.CY

Governance by Design: Architecting Agentic AI for Organizational Learning and Scalable Autonomy

Agentic AI systems - systems that can pursue goals through multi-step planning and tool-mediated action with limited direct supervision - are moving from experimental prototypes to enterprise deployments. This transition introduces tensions in implementation, scaling, and governance: organizations seek scalable autonomy for knowledge and coordination work, yet must preserve accountability, safety, cost control, and responsibility as systems initiate actions, access enterprise data, and evolve through iterative updates. Building on an in-depth qualitative case of a large IT services company's 2025 development and staged rollout of an agentic system integrated with enterprise tools; we show that governance is implemented through concrete architectural and working arrangements that determine what the system is allowed to do, which tools and data it can use, how memory is handled, and how performance improvements are introduced over time. We then distill seven lessons that explain how to build effective governance into agentic AI during operationalization and scaling.

Nelly Dux, Cristina Alaimo, Philippe Roussiere +1

ESSEC Business School · Accenture Research

AI Accountability AI Agent Safety AI Agent Governance Agentic AI

Apr 10, 2026cs.CY

Post-Deployment Accountability in AI Governance: A Cross-Regulatory Empirical Analysis of AI Incidents

Post-deployment accountability has become central to AI governance, yet little empirical evidence shows whether monitoring, incident reporting, and impact assessment obligations are visible when AI systems fail. This study analyzes real-world AI incidents from the AI Incident Database (2020--2026) and codes them against nine post-deployment provisions from the EU AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the GDPR. The findings show substantial accountability gaps: 77.1% of incidents lack evidence of EU AI Act post-market monitoring, and 99.6% lack documented Data-Protection Impact Assessment evidence. Governance gaps are also systemic, with 9.8% of incidents simultaneously non-compliant under two or more regimes. Incidents detected through internal monitoring show much higher compliance than externally detected incidents (87.5% vs 5.3% under the EU AI Act; 95.8% vs 58.1% under NIST), suggesting that monitoring capacity is a key condition for effective post-deployment governance. Building on these findings, the paper proposes the Proactive AI Governance Compliance Framework (PAGCF), a four-phase lifecycle for pre-deployment assessment, continuous monitoring, incident preparedness, and cross-framework verification.

Ummara Mumtaz, Summaya Mumtaz

AI Accountability AI Governance Responsible AI

Apr 7, 2026cs.AI

Auditable Agents

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

Yi Nian, Aojie Yuan, Haiyue Zhang +7

University of Southern California · Arizona State University · University of Tennessee, Knoxville +1

AI Accountability AI Agent Auditing LLM Auditing AI Agent Security

Mar 6, 2026cs.AI

Distributed Legal Infrastructure for a Trustworthy Agentic Web

The agentic web marks a structural transition from a human-centered information network to a digital environment populated by artificial intelligence (AI) agents that perceive, decide, and act autonomously. As delegated action unfolds at machine speed, exceeds discrete moments of human judgment, and distributes decision-making across non-human actors, existing legal frameworks face growing strain, creating an urgent need for new mechanisms capable of sustaining legality in this emerging order. A trustworthy agentic web therefore depends on the infrastructuring of legality through interoperable protocols that organize identity, delegation, and accountability across systems, enabling coherent governance beyond isolated platforms. Towards this end, this article advances a distributed legal infrastructure (DLI), a governance paradigm composed of five interlocking layers: (1) self-sovereign, soulbound agent identities; (2) cognitive AI logic and constraint systems; (3) decentralized adjudication mechanisms for dispute resolution; (4) bottom-up agentic market regulation to mitigate information asymmetries and network effects, including insurance-based models; and (5) portable institutional frameworks that enable legal interoperability while preserving plural sources of authority. This reference framework contributes to emerging research on embedding legality within agentic web infrastructure, aligning distributed technical systems with accountability, contestability, and rule-of-law principles.

Tomer Jordi Chaffer, Victor Jiawei Zhang, Sante Dino Facchini +6

Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. · Institute for Technoscience and Society. · Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, Berkeley, California, USA. +9

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance

Mar 4, 2026cs.CY

No Certificate, No Categorical Speech Act: A Brouwerian Assertibility Constraint for Public Reason

Generative AI can convert uncertainty into authoritative-seeming verdicts, intensifying the hypersuasive force of automated speech and displacing the justificatory work on which democratic epistemic agency depends. As a corrective, I propose a Brouwer-inspired assertibility constraint for responsible AI: in high-stakes domains, systems may assert or deny claims only if they can provide a publicly inspectable and contestable certificate of entitlement; otherwise they must return Undetermined. This constraint yields a three-status interface semantics (Asserted, Denied, Undetermined) in which statuses mark entitlement to categorical speech rather than truth values of the underlying world-claim. The semantics cleanly separates internal entitlement from public standing while connecting them via the certificate as a boundary object. It also produces a time-indexed entitlement profile that is stable under numerical refinement yet revisable as the public record changes. I operationalize the constraint through decision-layer gating of threshold and argmax decisions, using internal witnesses (e.g., sound bounds or separation margins where available, and contestable surrogates otherwise) and an output contract with reason-coded abstentions. A design lemma shows that any total, certificate-sound binary interface yields witnessed decidability of the deployed predicate on its declared scope, so Undetermined is not a tunable reject option but a mandatory status whenever no adequate forcing witness is available. By making outputs answerable to challengeable warrants rather than confidence alone, the paper aims to preserve epistemic agency against the persuasive pull of automated speech in public justification.

Michael Jülich

aihorizon R&D, Munich, Germany.

AI Accountability Selective Prediction AI Governance Human Oversight of AI Epistemic Uncertainty

Feb 12, 2026cs.LG

Using predictive multiplicity to measure individual performance within the AI Act

When building AI systems for decision support, one often encounters the phenomenon of predictive multiplicity: a single best model does not exist; instead, one can construct many models with similar overall accuracy that differ in their predictions for individual cases. Especially when decisions have a direct impact on humans, this can be highly unsatisfactory. For a person subject to high disagreement between models, one could as well have chosen a different model of similar overall accuracy that would have decided the person's case differently. We argue that this arbitrariness conflicts with the EU AI Act, which requires providers of high-risk AI systems to report performance not only at the dataset level but also for specific persons. The goal of this paper is to put predictive multiplicity in context with the EU AI Act's provisions on accuracy and to subsequently derive concrete suggestions on how to evaluate and report predictive multiplicity in practice. Specifically: (1) We introduce the AI Act's accuracy provisions and argue that incorporating information about predictive multiplicity could serve compliance with specific provisions for providers. (2) Based on this legally rigorous analysis, we suggest individual conflict ratios and

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-ambiguity as tools to quantify the disagreement between models on individual cases and to help detect individuals subject to conflicting predictions. (3) Based on computational insights, we derive easy-to-implement rules on how model providers could evaluate predictive multiplicity in practice. (4) Ultimately, we suggest that information about predictive multiplicity should be made available to deployers under the AI Act, enabling them to judge whether system outputs for specific individuals are reliable enough for their use case.

Karolin Frohnapfel, Mara Seyfert, Sebastian Bordt +2

University of Tübingen and Tübingen AI Center, Germany · Tübingen AI Center, Germany · University of Tübingen and CZS Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Law, Germany +2

AI Accountability AI Governance Human-AI Decision Making

Nov 10, 2025cs.CY

The Journal of Prompt-Engineered (Moral) Philosophy Or: Why AI-Assisted Ethics Research Requires Process Transparency

Existing AI disclosure mandates in scholarship require that AI assistance be reported but leave transparency philosophically unspecified: they fix the duty without explaining what the duty serves. We argue that ethical inquiry is essentially contested at two independent levels -- about what it is, and about what it demands of the inquirer -- defeating output-only evaluation and welfare-economic dismissal of the transparency question, and, by extension, reproducibility framings imported from the empirical sciences. The transparency duty is grounded instead in agent-integrity: the legibility, before a community of inquiry, of the identity-constituting commitments that the author's mode of philosophising expresses. Because the standards for evaluating such work are not communally settled, the achievable goal for transparency is not evaluation against agreed criteria but tracking -- accumulating the evidentiary record that lets each tradition assess the work on its own terms and makes future normative judgments possible. We develop a documentation-adequacy framework that operationalises Meaningful Human Control through five transparency elements -- declaration, navigation, documentation account, process documentation, and development records -- demonstrated by the paper itself, whose full documentation record is archived at a persistent identifier. The framework is a first iteration subject to revision, not a settled standard.

Michele Loi

University of Milan

AI Accountability Human Oversight of AI

Nov 5, 2025cs.CY

Retrofitters, pragmatists and activists: Public interest litigation for accountable automated decision-making

This paper examines the role of public interest litigation in promoting accountability for AI and automated decision-making (ADM) in Australia. Since ADM regulation faces political and geopolitical headwinds, effective governance will have to rely on the enforcement of existing laws. Drawing on interviews with Australian public interest litigators, technology policy activists, and technology law scholars, the paper positions public interest litigation as part of a larger ecosystem for transparency, accountability and justice with respect to ADM. The paper explores the tactics and strategies of what one participant described as 'retrofitting' old laws to ADM. These go beyond creative legal argumentation, to encompass practices of community-building, collaboration on theories of change, canny selection of clients and causes of action, and aligning the interests of stakeholders in litigation. Naturally, the paper also contends with the limits of these strategies, and of the Australian legal system. Where limits are capable of being overcome, the paper presents findings on urgent needs: the enabling institutional arrangements without which effective litigation and accountability will falter. The paper is relevant to law and technology scholars, individuals and groups harmed by ADM, public interest litigators and technology lawyers, civil society and advocacy organisations, and policymakers.

Henry L Fraser, Zahra Stardust

Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology, School of Law; Associate Investigator, Centre for Automated Decision-Making and Society · Senior Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology, School of Communication; Associate Investigator, Centre for Automated Decision-Making and Society

AI Accountability Algorithmic Accountability

Date pendingcs.CY

The Biggest Risk of Embodied AI is Governance Lag

Embodied AI is widely discussed as a job-displacement problem. The deeper risk, however, is governance lag: the time and capability gap between a measurable change in technology deployment and an institutional response able to address its consequences. Building on the established pacing problem and the Collingridge dilemma, this article argues that embodied AI intensifies that gap through scalable models and platforms, task-level reorganization, and the separation of upstream technological control from downstream social impact. We distinguish three mutually reinforcing forms of lag, observational, institutional, and distributive, and propose a compliance architecture based on deployment visibility, stack-level accountability, trigger-based adjustment, and automatic distributional response. The central policy challenge is not automation alone, but whether governance systems can become observable, responsive, and adaptive before disruption becomes entrenched.

Shaoshan Liu

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance AI Governance Embodied AI

Date pendingcs.AI

Cognitive Digital Twins: Ethical Risks and Governance for AI Systems That Model the Mind

As AI systems become increasingly persistent and personalized, they make possible a class of technologies that we call cognitive digital twins (CDTs): dynamic computational representations of a specific person's cognition, updated from behavioral, contextual, or physiological data in order to model, predict, or simulate that person's cognition, or to act as that person's communicative or decision-making proxy. CDTs combine cognitive inference with longitudinal representation, simulation, and proxy action in ways that existing governance strategies for personal assistants, autonomous agents, recommender systems, and automated decision systems only partially address. This paper makes four contributions. First, we define CDTs and distinguish them from adjacent systems. Second, we introduce a 5A governance framework organized around authority, autonomy, access and control, accountability, and availability. Third, we identify CDT-specific risks, from misrepresentation and epistemic authority shifts to shadow twins, simulated participation, proxy action, and proxy-power asymmetries. Fourth, we analyze governance gaps and propose requirements for high-risk CDTs that strengthen consent, purpose limitation, validity, traceability, contestation, independent review, and model retirement. Existing frameworks primarily regulate data processing, automated decisions, or autonomous actions; CDTs also require governance at the level of cognitive representation itself, before any final decision or external action occurs. We argue that CDTs require governance not only because they can act for people, but because they can become infrastructures through which cognition is represented, simulated, classified, and operationalized.

Vamshi Krishna Bonagiri, Juan Nicolas Sepulveda-Arias, Abdoul Jalil Djiberou Mahamadou +1

Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI)

AI Accountability Digital Twins AI Governance