Algorithmic Accountability

Generative AI tools are increasingly entering academic peer review workflows, raising questions about fairness, accountability, and the legitimacy of evaluative judgment. While these systems promise efficiency gains amid growing reviewer overload, their use introduces new sociotechnical risks. This paper presents a convergent mixed-method study combining discourse analysis of 448 social media posts with interviews with 14 area chairs and program chairs from leading AI and HCI conferences to examine how GenAI is discussed and experienced in peer review. Across both datasets, we find broad agreement that GenAI may be acceptable for limited supportive tasks, such as improving clarity or structuring feedback, but that core evaluative judgments, assessing novelty, contribution, and acceptance, should remain human responsibilities. At the same time, participants highlight concerns about epistemic harm, over-standardization, unclear responsibility, and adversarial risks such as prompt injection. User interviews reveal how structural strain and institutional policy ambiguity shift interpretive and enforcement burdens onto individual scholars, disproportionately affecting junior authors and reviewers. By triangulating public governance discourse with lived review practices, this work reframes AI mediated peer review as a sociotechnical governance challenge and offers recommendations for preserving accountability, trust, and meaningful human oversight. Overall, we argue that AI-assisted peer review is best governed not by blanket bans or detection alone, but by explicitly reserving evaluative judgment for humans while instituting enforceable, role-specific controls that preserve accountability. We conclude with role specific recommendations that formalize the support judgment boundary.

In a previous work, we introduced the fuzzy Ethical Decision-Making framework (fEDM), a risk-based ethical reasoning architecture grounded in fuzzy logic. The original model combined a fuzzy Ethical Risk Assessment module (fERA) with ethical decision rules, enabled formal structural verification through Fuzzy Petri Nets (FPNs), and validated outputs against a single normative referent. Although this approach ensured formal soundness and decision consistency, it did not fully address two critical challenges: principled explainability of decisions and robustness under ethical pluralism. In this paper, we extend fEDM in two major directions. First, we introduce an Explainability and Traceability Module (ETM) that explicitly links each ethical decision rule to the underlying moral principles and computes a weighted principle-contribution profile for every recommended action. This enables transparent, auditable explanations that expose not only what decision was made but why, and on the basis of which principles. Second, we replace single-referent validation with a pluralistic semantic validation framework that evaluates decisions against multiple stakeholder referents, each encoding distinct principle priorities and risk tolerances. This shift allows principled disagreement to be formally represented rather than suppressed, thus increasing robustness and contextual sensitivity. The resulting extended fEDM, called fEDM+, preserves formal verifiability while achieving enhanced interpretability and stakeholder-aware validation, making it suitable as an oversight and governance layer for ethically sensitive AI systems.

This paper examines the role of public interest litigation in promoting accountability for AI and automated decision-making (ADM) in Australia. Since ADM regulation faces political and geopolitical headwinds, effective governance will have to rely on the enforcement of existing laws. Drawing on interviews with Australian public interest litigators, technology policy activists, and technology law scholars, the paper positions public interest litigation as part of a larger ecosystem for transparency, accountability and justice with respect to ADM. The paper explores the tactics and strategies of what one participant described as 'retrofitting' old laws to ADM. These go beyond creative legal argumentation, to encompass practices of community-building, collaboration on theories of change, canny selection of clients and causes of action, and aligning the interests of stakeholders in litigation. Naturally, the paper also contends with the limits of these strategies, and of the Australian legal system. Where limits are capable of being overcome, the paper presents findings on urgent needs: the enabling institutional arrangements without which effective litigation and accountability will falter. The paper is relevant to law and technology scholars, individuals and groups harmed by ADM, public interest litigators and technology lawyers, civil society and advocacy organisations, and policymakers.