AI Governance and Safety

Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong performance in automated code generation, with few-shot prompting widely used for its simplicity and effectiveness. However, few-shot methods depend on curated or manually crafted reference examples, limiting their applicability in data-free coding scenarios such as real-world data-free coding scenarios and benchmarks without training sets. Existing methods that generate reference examples via recitation or analogy cannot guarantee their authenticity or accuracy. Inspired by human metamemory, we propose a novel metamemory agent to enhance one-time code generation in data-free coding scenarios. The agent guides LLMs to recall relevant prior knowledge, evaluate confidence in recalled information, and selectively exploit reliable content for problem solving. This agent removes the need for external reference examples, improves the authenticity and accuracy of recalled knowledge, and adaptively tailors the recall&evaluation process to each task. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed metamemory agent significantly improves one-time code generation quality across data-free coding scenarios. The AI contribution is the metamemory agent, which makes self-recalled examples reliable through confidence evaluation and selection; the engineering application is data-free automated code generation, validated on eight public benchmarks.

Online reviews help people make better decisions. Review platforms usually depend on typed input, where leaving a good review requires significant effort because users must carefully organize and articulate their thoughts. This may discourage users from leaving comprehensive and high-quality reviews, especially when they are on the go. To address this challenge, we developed Vocalizer, a mobile application that enables users to provide reviews through voice input, with enhancements from a large language model (LLM). In a longitudinal study, we analysed user interactions with the app, focusing on AI-driven features that help refine and improve reviews. Our findings show that users frequently utilized the AI agent to add more detailed information to their reviews. We also show how interactive AI features can improve users self-efficacy and willingness to share reviews online. Finally, we discuss the opportunities and challenges of integrating AI assistance into review-writing systems.

How diverse are the outputs of large language models when diversity is desired? We examine the diversity of responses of several language models to questions with multiple possible answers, comparing them with human responses. Our findings suggest that models' responses are highly concentrated, reflecting narrow, mainstream outputs, in comparison to humans, whose responses exhibit a much longer-tail. We examine three simple and practical ways to increase output diversity: 1) increasing generation randomness via temperature sampling; 2) prompting models to answer from diverse perspectives using a single prompt; 3) aggregating outputs from several models. We find that these interventions, especially when combined, can substantially increase output diversity, although single-model outputs generally remain less diverse than the human baseline. We discuss potential implications of these findings for future work in AI policy and governance that wishes to preserve cultural diversity, an essential building block of a democratic social fabric.

To effectively address potential harms from Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, it is essential to identify and mitigate system-level hazards. Current analysis approaches focus on individual components of an AI system, like training data or models, in isolation, overlooking hazards from component interactions or how they are situated within a company's development process. To this end, we draw from the established field of system safety, which considers safety as an emergent property of the entire system. In this work, we translate System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) - a recognized system safety framework - for analyzing AI development and operation processes. We focus on systems that rely on machine learning algorithms and conduct STPA on three case studies involving linear regression, reinforcement learning, and transformer-based generative models. Our analysis explored how STPA's control and system-theoretic perspectives apply to AI systems and whether unique AI traits - such as model opacity, capability uncertainty, and output complexity - necessitate modifications to the framework. We find that the key concepts and steps of conducting an STPA apply to AI systems but require targeted adaptations to address AI-specific challenges that arise to differing degrees across three case studies. We present the Process-oriented Hazard Analysis for AI Systems (PHASE) as a guideline that adapts STPA concepts for AI. Applying and interpreting STPA using the PHASE guidelines enables four key affordances for analysts responsible for managing AI system harms: 1) detection of system-level hazards, including those from accumulation of disparate issues; 2) explicit acknowledgment of social factors contributing to algorithmic harms; 3) creation of traceable accountability chains between harms and those who can mitigate them; and 4) ongoing monitoring and mitigation of new hazards.

Developing and certifying safe - or so-called trustworthy - AI has become an increasingly salient issue, especially in light of upcoming regulation such as the EU AI Act. In this context, the black-box nature of machine learning models limits the use of conventional avenues of approach towards certifying complex technical systems. As a potential solution, methods to give insights into this black-box - devised in the field of eXplainable AI (XAI) - could be used. In this study, the potential and shortcomings of such methods for the purpose of safe AI development and certification are discussed in 15 qualitative interviews with experts out of the areas of (X)AI and certification. We find that XAI methods can be a helpful asset for safe AI development, as they can show biases and failures of ML-models, but since certification relies on comprehensive and correct information about technical systems, their impact is expected to be limited.

AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We present the Agent Incident Registry (AIR) (Project page: https://enkryptai.com/air), a source-linked catalog containing 487 records of agent-related events disclosed from 2022 through 2026. Each record includes supporting evidence, a stable identifier, and missingness-aware labels for causal role, disclosure class, mechanism, and outcome. Among the 336 generative-system records in which the agent acted, 81 involved realized harm (24%). Realized outcomes concentrate in in-the-wild and safety-failure records, while responsible disclosures and research demonstrations are overwhelmingly demonstrated; the aggregate share therefore characterizes collection composition rather than deployment risk. After initial curation, a second human reviewer checked all 487 records and their existing labels for completeness and correctness. In a deployment-analogue audit, InjecAgent's 1,054 cases occupy three of AIR's twelve surfaces and are all attacker-triggered, whereas AIR contains 92 no-adversary safety failures. AIR supports source-grounded case retrieval and evaluation-scope auditing, not failure-rate or control-efficacy estimation.

As AI systems become increasingly persistent and personalized, they make possible a class of technologies that we call cognitive digital twins (CDTs): dynamic computational representations of a specific person's cognition, updated from behavioral, contextual, or physiological data in order to model, predict, or simulate that person's cognition, or to act as that person's communicative or decision-making proxy. CDTs combine cognitive inference with longitudinal representation, simulation, and proxy action in ways that existing governance strategies for personal assistants, autonomous agents, recommender systems, and automated decision systems only partially address. This paper makes four contributions. First, we define CDTs and distinguish them from adjacent systems. Second, we introduce a 5A governance framework organized around authority, autonomy, access and control, accountability, and availability. Third, we identify CDT-specific risks, from misrepresentation and epistemic authority shifts to shadow twins, simulated participation, proxy action, and proxy-power asymmetries. Fourth, we analyze governance gaps and propose requirements for high-risk CDTs that strengthen consent, purpose limitation, validity, traceability, contestation, independent review, and model retirement. Existing frameworks primarily regulate data processing, automated decisions, or autonomous actions; CDTs also require governance at the level of cognitive representation itself, before any final decision or external action occurs. We argue that CDTs require governance not only because they can act for people, but because they can become infrastructures through which cognition is represented, simulated, classified, and operationalized.

Embodied AI is widely discussed as a job-displacement problem. The deeper risk, however, is governance lag: the time and capability gap between a measurable change in technology deployment and an institutional response able to address its consequences. Building on the established pacing problem and the Collingridge dilemma, this article argues that embodied AI intensifies that gap through scalable models and platforms, task-level reorganization, and the separation of upstream technological control from downstream social impact. We distinguish three mutually reinforcing forms of lag, observational, institutional, and distributive, and propose a compliance architecture based on deployment visibility, stack-level accountability, trigger-based adjustment, and automatic distributional response. The central policy challenge is not automation alone, but whether governance systems can become observable, responsive, and adaptive before disruption becomes entrenched.

Generative models now write application code, harden and monitor it, and probe it for exploitable flaws, so that one family of models increasingly plays builder, defender and breaker at once. The prevailing view treats full autonomy as the natural end point of assistance. This article argues for a narrower and more defensible position than a blanket requirement for human oversight. We define the shared generative substrate as the set of upstream dependencies (training corpus, model family, alignment procedure, vendor, toolchain) that induce correlated errors, and we define independence as a measurable property of pairs of lifecycle roles rather than an attribute of any participant. A coincident-failure model in the tradition of Eckhardt and Lee shows why organisational independence, the proxy on which verification standards have relied, no longer implies statistical independence once roles share a substrate; it also shows that heterogeneous models, deterministic analysers and formal verification can restore independence for the fault classes they cover. What remains for humans is specific: authority over the specification against which every machine oracle is judged, accountability that current governance instruments do not permit to be delegated, and last-resort authority to halt. We translate this into an operational framework with five autonomy levels, three distinct human roles and five decision criteria (consequence, reversibility, time-criticality, verifiability and adversarial exposure), apply it to build, defend and test actions, and specify how independence and oversight effectiveness can be measured. The central claims are stated as testable hypotheses with a protocol for refuting them.

An AI system's output is not the fact or world state it appears to describe, but rather an engineered representation. We propose a semantic framework to describe AI systems, to be able to examine the correctness of such representations. To do so, we distinguish what is justified by accepted domain knowledge, what reference sources say, and what the system can currently use. This allows us to give precise definitions to common failures: extrapolation, refuted or unsupported assertion, sources versus knowledge mismatch, stale or refuted source, added hypotheses, unsupported use... We hope our framework gives a useful vocabulary for specifying and checking AI systems whose outputs, citations, tool calls, and world-changing actions must be justified by reliable claims and explicit authority rather than apparent fluency.

The rapid adoption of large language models has enabled the development of clinical multi-agent systems (MAS) capable of integrating multimodal patient data and supporting increasingly complex clinical decision-making. However, the deployment of these systems in real-world healthcare settings raises critical ethical concerns related to safety, fairness, accountability, transparency, and patient trust. While numerous organizations, including the World Health Organization, the National Academy of Medicine, and the FUTURE-AI consortium, have proposed ethical frameworks and governance principles for healthcare AI, these efforts remain largely conceptual. To address this challenge, we present ETHOS (Ethics and Trust through Hierarchical Oversight System), a modular ethics framework designed as a governance meta-agent that can be integrated with any existing multi-agent system without requiring changes to its underlying architecture. ETHOS translates stakeholder-informed ethical requirements into executable runtime oversight through a layered governance approach consisting of deterministic checks, contextual reviews, and a final ethics critic. These components continuously evaluate intermediate reasoning steps and final outputs, enabling the system to identify ethical risks, request revisions, or suppress responses that fail predefined safety and trustworthiness criteria. We demonstrate ETHOS within a hepatology clinical decision-support MAS. Results show that ETHOS improves decision reliability by detecting incomplete, inconsistent, or out-of-scope evidence and appropriately increasing abstention when safe recommendations cannot be supported. By embedding ethical governance directly into system operation, ETHOS provides a practical and auditable mechanism for transforming high-level AI ethics principles into deployable safeguards.

Conversational speech reveals early signs of cognitive decline, including dementia and mild cognitive impairment (MCI). AI models show promise for speech-based screening, yet most research focuses on monolingual groups. In the UK, dementia is projected to rise fastest among Black and Asian communities, where multilingualism is common, making equity assessment critical. We recruited 1,395 participants (monolingual English speakers and multilingual speakers from Sheffield/Bradford) and collected over 263 hours of speech via the CognoMemory agent. Multilingual participants spoke English alongside Somali, Chinese, or South Asian languages (Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi, Mirpuri, Arabic). We evaluated ASR (Whisper, Wav2Vec 2.0, NeMo) and downstream AI models for cognitive classification and MMSE regression. ASR accuracy showed no significant differences across groups. However, downstream models exhibited systematic disparities: multilingual speakers were more often misclassified as impaired, especially in memory, fluency, and reading tasks. False-positive rates were substantially higher for multilingual (28 to 37%) than monolingual (12 to 16%) speakers, meaning multilingual individuals were approximately 2.5 times more likely to receive incorrect impairment labels. These biases worsened when models were trained on DementiaBank. This is the first large-scale analysis of false-positive bias in speech-based AI cognitive screening for UK multilingual ethnic minorities. Despite strong overall performance, current models show measurable disparities affecting multilingual speakers. Addressing these biases is essential for safe, equitable deployment in diverse healthcare settings.