Disclosures

Artificial intelligence systems are increasingly integrated into writing processes, challenging traditional notions of authorship, responsibility, and intellectual contribution. Current disclosure practices usually indicate whether AI was used, but rarely explain how it was used, where it intervened, or how its output was reviewed. This paper proposes a faceted model for representing AI-assisted text production at the levels of documents, chapters, sections, and paragraphs. The proposal introduces a core model based on Form, Generation, and Evaluation, and an extended model that adds Intent, Control, and Traceability. The model is positioned as a minimal operational baseline with extensibility toward higher-fidelity representations. A worked example based on the production of this article demonstrates applicability.

The TRUST democratic discourse analysis pipeline exposes its large language model (LLM) components to peer model identity through multiple structural channels -- a design feature whose bias implications have not previously been empirically tested. We provide the first systematic measurement of identity-dependent scoring bias across all active identity exposure channels in TRUST, crossing four model families with two anonymization scopes across 30 political statements. The central finding is that single-channel anonymization produces near-zero bias effects, because individual channels act in opposite directions and cancel each other out -- a result that would lead an evaluator to conclude that identity bias is absent when it is not. Only full-pipeline anonymization reveals the true pattern: homogeneous ensembles amplify identity-driven sycophancy when model identity is fully visible, while the heterogeneous production configuration shows the reverse. Model choice matters independently: one tested model exhibits baseline sycophancy two to three times higher than the others and near-zero deliberative conflict on ideological topics, making it structurally unsuitable for pipelines where genuine inter-role disagreement is the intended quality mechanism. Three practical conclusions follow. First, heterogeneous model ensembles are structurally more robust than homogeneous ones, achieving higher consensus rates and lower identity amplification. Second, full-pipeline anonymization is required for valid bias measurement -- partial anonymization is insufficient and actively misleading. Third, these findings have direct implications for the validation of multi-agent LLM systems in quality-critical applications: a system validated under partial anonymization or with a homogeneous ensemble may pass validation while retaining structural identity bias invisible to single-channel measurement.

Existing research typically treats privacy policies as flat, uniform text, extracting information without regard for the document's logical hierarchy. Disregard for structural cues of section headings designed to guide the reader, often leads automated methods to entangle distinct data practices, particularly when linking sensitive data items to their specific purposes. To address this, we introduce PrivSTRUCT, a novel and systematic encoder and decoder combined framework that to untangle complex privacy disclosures. Benchmarking against the state-of-the-art tool PoliGrapher reveals that PrivSTRUCT robustly extracts more than x2 the number of data item and purpose excerpts while retaining developer-defined structural cues. By applying PrivSTRUCT to a large-scale dataset of 3,756 Android apps, we uncover a critical transparency gap: the probability of developers overstating a data purpose is 20.4% higher for first-party collection and 9.7% higher for third-party sharing when they rely on globally defined purposes rather than specific, locally scoped disclosures. Alarmingly, we find that sensitive third-party data flows such as sharing financial data for analytics are frequently diluted and entangled into generic or unrelated categories, highlighting a persistent failure in the current purpose disclosure landscape.

The increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in higher education has raised important questions regarding students' transparency in reporting AI-assisted work. This study investigates the psychological mechanisms underlying university students' willingness to disclose AI use by applying the Cognition--Affect--Conation (CAC) framework. A sequential explanatory mixed-methods design was employed. In the quantitative phase, survey data were collected from 546 university students and analysed using structural equation modelling to examine the relationships among cognitive perceptions, affective responses, and disclosure intention. In the qualitative phase, semi-structured interviews with 22 students were conducted to further interpret the quantitative findings. The results indicate that psychological safety significantly increases students' willingness to disclose AI use and is positively shaped by perceived fairness, perceived teacher support, and perceived organisational support. Conversely, evaluation apprehension reduces disclosure intention and psychological safety, and is strengthened by perceived stigma, perceived uncertainty, and privacy concern. Qualitative findings further reveal that institutional clarity and supportive instructional practices encourage openness, whereas policy ambiguity and fear of negative evaluation often lead students to adopt cautious or strategic disclosure practices. Overall, the study highlights the dual role of enabling and inhibitory psychological mechanisms in shaping AI-use disclosure and underscores the importance of supportive institutional environments and clear guidance for promoting responsible AI transparency in higher education.

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training among multiple parties without centralizing raw data. There are two main paradigms in FL: Horizontal FL (HFL), where all participants share the same feature space but hold different samples, and Vertical FL (VFL), where parties possess complementary features for the same set of samples. A prerequisite for VFL training is privacy-preserving entity alignment (PPEA), which establishes a common index of samples across parties (alignment) without revealing which samples are shared between them. Conventional private set intersection (PSI) achieves alignment but leaks intersection membership, exposing sensitive relationships between datasets. The standard private set union (PSU) mitigates this risk by aligning on the union of identifiers rather than the intersection. However, existing approaches are often limited to two parties or lack support for typo-tolerant matching. In this paper, we introduce the Sherpa.ai multi-party PSU protocol for VFL, a PPEA method that hides intersection membership and enables both exact and noisy matching. The protocol generalizes two-party approaches to multiple parties with low communication overhead and offers two variants: an order-preserving version for exact alignment and an unordered version tolerant to typographical and formatting discrepancies. We prove correctness and privacy, analyze communication and computational (exponentiation) complexity, and formalize a universal index mapping from local records to a shared index space. This multi-party PSU offers a scalable, mathematically grounded protocol for PPEA in real-world VFL deployments, such as multi-institutional healthcare disease detection, collaborative risk modeling between banks and insurers, and cross-domain fraud detection between telecommunications and financial institutions, while preserving intersection privacy.

In what way could a data breach involving government-issued IDs such as passports, driver's licenses, etc., rival a random voluntary disclosure on a nondescript social-media platform? At first glance, the former appears more significant, and that is a valid assessment. The disclosed data could contain an individual's date of birth and address; for all intents and purposes, a leak of that data would be disastrous. Given the threat, the latter scenario involving an innocuous online post seems comparatively harmless -- or does it? From that post and others like it, a forensic linguist could stylometrically uncover equivalent pieces of information, estimating an age range for the author (adolescent or adult) and narrowing down their geographical location (specific country). While not an exact science -- the determinations are statistical -- stylometry can reveal comparable, though noticeably diluted, information about an individual. To prevent an ID from being breached, simply sharing it as little as possible suffices. Preventing the leakage of personal information from written text requires a more complex solution: adversarial stylometry. In this paper, we explore how performing homoglyph substitution -- the replacement of characters with visually similar alternatives (e.g., "h" $\texttt{[U+0068]}$ $\rightarrow$ "h" $\texttt{[U+04BB]}$) -- on text can degrade stylometric systems.

As bioinformatics software is increasingly applied across a broader range of scenarios and the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) further lowers the barriers to software use and development, the composition of the bioinformatics research community is undergoing substantial change. Consequently, a growing number of researchers require a deeper understanding of methodological details and software behavior. In this context, systematically analyzing the relationship between paper descriptions and code implementations is emerging as an important new challenge in the field. To address this challenge, we introduce paper-code consistency analysis as a new research perspective and construct BioCon, the first benchmark dataset for paper-code consistency analysis in bioinformatics. Furthermore, we develop a unified cross-modal analysis framework to systematically investigate this problem from three perspectives: sentence-level detection, cross-modal retrieval, and project-level assessment. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework can effectively model the semantic relationships between scientific publications and software implementations. Further case studies reveal that paper-code inconsistency is not a single phenomenon but arises from multiple underlying causes, among which Author-Perceived Non-Essential Details represents the most prevalent category. These findings suggest that paper-code consistency analysis is not merely a technical problem but also raises broader discussions regarding knowledge dissemination, the boundaries of code disclosure, and community norms. We hope that this work will encourage the bioinformatics community to re-examine the relationship between scientific publications and software implementations while providing a foundation for future research in paper-code consistency analysis.

Theoretical and applied research into privacy encompasses an incredibly broad swathe of differing approaches, emphases and aims. This work introduces a novel quantitative notion of privacy that is both contextual and specific. Building on and extending ideas from statistical disclosure control and differential privacy, our aim is to model the implications of a disclosure decision in an adversarial setting. Our definition relies on concepts inherent to standard Bayesian decision theory, while departing from them in several important respects. In particular, (i) inference about the data itself becomes meaningful and (ii) the party controlling the release of sensitive information should make disclosure decisions from the prior viewpoint, rather than conditional on the data, which is a feature shared with Bayesian design. Illuminating toy examples are exploited towards highlighting the specificities of the method.

Auditing information disclosure across every datapoint during the training of LLMs is challenging. We propose a principled, attack-agnostic approach that uses mutual information to measure what the final model reveals about a datapoint's training membership. We show that this final-model disclosure is upper bounded by the sum of per-iteration gradient disclosures and that, under a reasonable set of assumptions, these gradient disclosures increase with Gradient Uniqueness (GNQ), which measures how distinguishable a datapoint's gradient is relative to other gradients in the batch. While naively computing GNQ requires forming and inverting a $P\times P$ matrix for every datapoint (for a model with $P$ parameters), we introduce Batch-Space Ghost (BS-Ghost). This efficient algorithm performs all computations in a much smaller batch space and uses ghost kernels to compute GNQ "in-run" for every datapoint in the training corpus, with minimal computational and memory overhead. Our experiments show the following: (i) GNQ predicts MIA vulnerability without the need for shadow models. (ii) Beyond membership disclosure, GNQ predicts the success of reconstruction attacks. (iii) GNQ-guided removal and retraining identify datapoints that causally contribute to disclosure. (iv) GNQ outperforms counterfactual memorization in text extraction and common-knowledge discrimination without the need for additional model training. (v) For data attribution, GNQ-guided filtering reduces emergent misalignment in Qwen2.5-7B more than baselines. Further, GNQ attributes 1000 datapoints in 17 seconds---roughly $70\times$ faster than the baselines. (vi) GNQ explains how training choices affect training-set disclosure and captures how per-datapoint disclosure emerges during training.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) now act on a user's behalf across personal applications such as email, calendars, and to-do lists. This cross-application access is useful, but it also creates a privacy risk that has been largely overlooked: when an agent works in one context, it can pull in information from another that is inappropriate in that context. Hence, we introduce AgentCIBench, an evaluation harness that turns this risk into executable, deterministically scored scenarios. We target three common failure modes in CUAs: visual co-location, where the agent pulls in prohibited items that sit next to the task target in the UI; task-ambiguity overshare, where the agent dumps dense personal state in response to an under-specified prompt; and recipient misalignment, where the agent sends content to an addressee for whom it is inappropriate. We evaluate 15 frontier agents and find a surprisingly high failure rate: 11 of 15 leak on more than 50% of scenarios, with an average leakage of 67.9%, and the same failures persist when agents act end-to-end in the environment to complete the task. We release AgentCIBench to encourage the development of safer computer-use agents and position contextual disclosure testing as a pre-deployment safety check.