Dynamic Epistemic Logic

We introduce Type-6 logic, a variant of dynamic epistemic logic augmented with two operators (uncertainty and recurrence), designed to model the inferential dynamics of contemporary large language model (LLM) chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. Type-6 accounts for common LLM reasoning pathologies such as unlicensed revision, enthymemes, loopbacks, and unverifiable/incorrect claims. We propose a verifier based on Type-6 logic that builds a graph out the trace, and checks it against Type-6's axioms and inference rules. We evaluate our framework on LLM-generated CoTs four splits spanning formal and informal reasoning. Our verifier detects structurally unsound reasoning steps that surface-level heuristics miss, and allows for easy visualisation of the model's reasoning process. In our corpus, our verifier shows that derived contradiction is the most common hard-fail category in CoT, and that only about 3% of the propositions of a trace have impact on the final derivation. Ablation studies show that other verification methods (LLMs-as-judges, other neurosymbolic approaches, etc.) cannot be considered interchangeable: for example, agreement between LLMs-as-judges and LINC is $κ\approx 0.034$, and this persists within a method across underlying models. Type-6, however, is the most agreed-with method amongst the ones we tested. We prove our verifier runs on average-case linear time; and release our logic specification and artefacts.

In dynamic epistemic logic, the four notions of success, self-refutation, true lies, and impossible lies have been discussed in the context of public announcements. In this paper, we introduce eventual and strong eventual versions of these notions, as well as their transfinite versions, which allow transfinite iteration of announcements. We also introduce the notions of always informativeness when true or false. For example, a formula is eventually self-refuting if, whenever initially true, it eventually becomes false at some finite stage under iterated announcements, and strong eventual self-refutation further requires the formula to remain false at all sufficiently late stages. There are two main results. The first result gives the relationship among strong eventual notions, eventual notions, and several other conditions including conditions on the limit of the truth values of the announced formula, the uniform bound condition, and the fixed-point views of the Moore sentence and the self-fulfilling sentence. The second result gives the relationship among finite and transfinite versions of the eventual and strong eventual notions and the fixed-point views.

Existing approaches to multi-agent belief combination have established mature foundations for combining uncertain beliefs under common assumptions: consensus methods use iterative averaging, logic-based methods resolve conflicting knowledge bases, and epistemic logic analyzes agents' information states. Typically, these approaches assume that the structure determining what each agent can represent remains fixed. However, in many scenarios, agents gain or lose observational capacity during execution, and what was once admissible may become structurally impossible. This paper presents a formal framework for handling such runtime changes in epistemic partitions over continuous belief profiles. A hybrid approach exploits the advantages of answer set programming in elaboration tolerance, declarative integrity constraints, and explanations, with the numerical flexibility of Python. The framework applies to domains where agents operate at heterogeneous and possibly changing levels of resolution, and provides formal guarantees of admissibility preservation under refinement, unique mass-preserving repair under coarsening, and explanation completeness. Evaluation across 100 randomly generated topology changes confirms complete violation detection and explanation coverage.

In this work we propose a dynamic turn in paraconsistency. We introduce AMLFI1, the action model extension of the paraconsistent logic LFI1. A special case is PALFI1, a paraconsistent logic of public announcements. It corresponds to another, recently published, paraconsistent public announcement logic: the differences in their axiomatizations are mutually admissible. We also introduce UMLFI1, that extends AMLFI1 with factual change. Soundness and completeness are proven for all logics, and all extend the epistemic paraconsistent logics KLFI1, KB4LFI1 and S5LFI1, known from the literature. With such dynamic epistemic paraconsistent logics we can formalize obtaining and resolving provisional contradictions.

"Any fool can know; the point is to understand." A well-known remark often attributed to Einstein captures a widely shared intuition: understanding is more than merely knowing. Yet epistemic logic has paid relatively little attention to understanding, despite its central role in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and recent debates about AI. A recurring theme in the philosophical literature is that, unlike knowledge, understanding comes in degrees: one may understand something more or less well, and one's understanding may be better than another's. We introduce a comparative epistemic logic of understanding with level-indexed understanding modalities and a comparative connective for saying that one agent understands why a proposition better than another agent does. Semantically, we enrich multi-agent epistemic models with agent-indexed graded explanation structures and a justification-style term algebra. This yields a unified framework for representing minimal, ordinary, more demanding, and ideal understanding, together with comparisons between agents with respect to the same formula at issue. We distinguish a finitary bounded-level calculus from an infinitary full-language companion system. We establish soundness and strong completeness, and show that each fixed finite-level fragment is decidable.

Dynamic epistemic logic represents belief change via model transformations induced by epistemic events. Its standard formulation (Baltag, Moss, Solecki, 1998) provides a natural account of belief expansion through the elimination of possibilities, but it cannot model belief contraction about factual propositions. A classic response enriches Kripke models with plausibility orderings, representing contraction as an update that promotes certain possibilities over others. We show that this approach has expressive limitations. In particular, the approach cannot model belief that violates positive introspection and contraction dynamics in response to a hedged public announcement that phi might be false. Motivated by these considerations, we introduce a mechanism for belief contraction defined directly on standard Kripke models, without any constraints on the doxastic accessibility relation. We show that it satisfies some of the standard properties of belief contraction but not others, study the conditions under which contraction may be unsuccessful, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic via reduction axioms. We also define a more general dynamic logic that is an extension of standard DEL and accommodates belief contractions due to events such as private or semi-private announcements, and provide a complete and sound axiomatization of the general logic.

We investigate a new logic that extends Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), by combining standard epistemic modalities for (individual and distributed) propositional knowledge with operators for (conditional) non-propositional knowledge of a number (in which an agent or a group have knowledge of the value of some variable x, conditional on some additional information). We also generalize these operators, by considering formulas that express the fact that an agent or group can (conditionally) narrow down the possible values of the variable x to at most N possibilities (for some natural number N). In order to name and compare such hypothetical values, we extend the logic further with definite descriptions based on minimization operators, denoting the least of the N possible values of x (according to some fixed order) that are considered possible by the agent or group. On this static base, we consider DEL-style extensions with dynamic modalities for general 'data-exchange events' (covering private and public propositional announcements, but also secret hacking of a private database, or public sharing of one's data via open-source repositories, etc.). In such scenarios, whole 'chunks' of information may be exchanged or modified: once access to a given source is gained, all the 'data' stored at that specific location becomes available. We give complete axiomatizations for the resulting logics, and prove their decidability and co-expressivity.

There are by now various epistemic modal logics with intersection modalities for distributed knowledge and intersection update modalities for dynamic phenomena like agents sharing (all their) information, agents receiving information from other agents, and full information protocols. One of those is the logic of Resolving Distributed Knowledge, by Agotnes and Wang. It has distributed knowledge modalities for arbitrary subsets of the set of all agents and it also has so-called resolution modalities for arbitrary subsets of agents sharing their knowledge. In that logic, the agents not involved in the knowledge sharing are aware of the agents sharing knowledge, agents are memory-less, and the kind of dynamics represents synchronous updates, where there is common awareness of the global clock. In contrast, in this contribution we present a logic for Resolving Asynchronous Distributed Knowledge. It is an asynchronous generalization of the synchronous logic of resolving distributed knowledge. The logical semantics is history-based: truth is not only with respect to a given world in a model, but also with respect to a given history of prior resolutions, of which each individual agent can only observe a part. In particular, an agent is unaware of resolutions for groups of agents not including her. As is to be expected, this comes with many technical complications, for example concerning the axiomatization. The synchronous axioms relating resolution to distributed knowledge are now invalid. The modelling advantages of such an asynchronous novel logic, for distributed computing and similar areas, are however substantial and a major asset.

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call $P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call $P*$'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within $P*$ by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in $P*$. The last section features an analysis of $P*$'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function $*^0$ originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.

The plan existence problem asks, given a goal in the form of a formula in modal logic, an initial epistemic state (a pointed Kripke model), and a set of epistemic actions, whether there exists a sequence of actions that can be applied to reach the goal. We prove that even in the case where the preconditions of the epistemic actions have modal depth at most 1, and there are no postconditions, the plan existence problem is undecidable. The (un)decidability of this problem was previously unknown.

Deliberative multi-agent systems allow agents to exchange messages and revise beliefs over time. While this interaction is meant to improve performance, it can also create dangerous conformity effects: agreement, confidence, prestige, or majority size may be treated as if they were evidence, producing high-confidence convergence to false conclusions. To address this, we introduce PBRC (Preregistered Belief Revision Contracts), a protocol-level mechanism that strictly separates open communication from admissible epistemic change. A PBRC contract publicly fixes first-order evidence triggers, admissible revision operators, a priority rule, and a fallback policy. A non-fallback step is accepted only when it cites a preregistered trigger and provides a nonempty witness set of externally validated evidence tokens. This ensures that every substantive belief change is both enforceable by a router and auditable after the fact. In this paper, (a) we prove that under evidential contracts with conservative fallback, social-only rounds cannot increase confidence and cannot generate purely conformity-driven wrong-but-sure cascades. (b) We show that auditable trigger protocols admit evidential PBRC normal forms that preserve belief trajectories and canonicalized audit traces. (c) We demonstrate that sound enforcement yields epistemic accountability: any change of top hypothesis is attributable to a concrete validated witness set. For token-invariant contracts, (d) we prove that enforced trajectories depend only on token-exposure traces; under flooding dissemination, these traces are characterized exactly by truncated reachability, giving tight diameter bounds for universal evidence closure. Finally, we introduce a companion contractual dynamic doxastic logic to specify trace invariants, and provide simulations illustrating cascade suppression, auditability, and robustness-liveness trade-offs.

We investigate a logic for asynchronous announcements wherein the sending of the messages by the environment is separated from their reception by the individual agents. Both come with different modalities. In the logical semantics, formulas are interpreted in a world of a Kripke model but given a history of prior announcements and receptions that already happened. An axiomatisation AA for such a logic has been given in prior work, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model before any such announcements have taken place. This axiomatisation is a reduction system wherein one can show that every formula is equivalent to a purely epistemic formula without dynamic modalities for announcements and receptions. We propose a generalisation AA* of this axiomatisation, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model given any history of prior announcements and receptions of announcements. It does not extend the axiomatisation AA, for example it is no longer valid that nobody has received any message. Unlike AA, this axiomatisation AA* is infinitary and it is not a reduction system.