Metacognition

As generative AI becomes increasingly integrated into higher education, its frequent errors and hallucinations, often seen as limitations, offer a unique pedagogical opportunity. By framing AI as a ``learning companion'' whose imperfect outputs prompt analysis, evaluation, and reflection, we argue that instructors can engage students in the fundamental processes of higher-order thinking. This paper presents a design-oriented study in which an AI-integrated syllabus in a \textit{database design} course deliberately leverages AI's limitations to foster critical thinking and higher-order cognitive skills aligned with Bloom's taxonomy of learning. Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine how structured interaction with AI-generated errors supports metacognitive engagement, reinforces disciplinary rigor, and relates to students' perceived AI literacy and subject-matter competency.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability (knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification) under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all $p < 2 \times 10^{-8}$, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity. This immunity does not stem from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

The relationship between brain lateralization and cognitive functions is well-documented. The left hemisphere primarily handles tasks such as language and arithmetic, while the right hemisphere is involved in creative activities like drawing and music perception. Eye-tracking technology has shown the potential to reveal cognitive states by measuring ocular metrics such as pupil diameter and fixation duration. However, the ability to distinguish lateralized brain activity using these ocular metrics remains underexplored. Here, we demonstrate that pupil diameter and fixation duration can effectively classify left and right brain hemisphere activities. We obtained a considerably high classification performance, with an F1 score of 0.894. The results suggest that ocular metrics are robust indicators of lateralized brain activity and can be applied in cognitive monitoring and neurorehabilitation. Our future work expands on this by integrating these methods into real-time applications EyeBrain, potentially broadening their use across various cognitive and neurological domains.

Aggregate metacognitive quality scores mask within-model variation across MMLU benchmark domains. We administered 1,500 MMLU items (250 per domain, under an a priori six-domain grouping) to 33 frontier LLMs from eight model families and computed Type-2 AUROC per model-domain cell using verbalized confidence (0-100). Total observations: 47,151. Every model with above-chance aggregate monitoring showed non-trivial domain-level variation. Applied/Professional knowledge was reliably the easiest benchmark domain to monitor (mean AUROC = .742, ranked top-2 in 21 of 33 models); Formal Reasoning and Natural Science were reliably the hardest (one of the two ranked bottom-2 in 27 of 33 models). The three middle domains were statistically indistinguishable (Kendall's W = .164). A subject-level coherence analysis (within-domain similarity ratio = 0.95) confirms the six-domain grouping is a pragmatic benchmark taxonomy, not a validated latent construct. Within-family profile-shape clustering is significant for Anthropic, Google-Gemini, and Qwen (permutation p < .0001) but not DeepSeek, Google-Gemma, or OpenAI. Gemma 4 31B showed a +.202 AUROC improvement over Gemma 3 27B. Three models classified Invalid on binary KEEP/WITHDRAW probes produced normal profiles under verbalized confidence, confirming probe-format specificity. Bootstrap 95% CIs on 198 cells have median width .199. Split-half aggregate stability r = .893; profile-level split-half is weaker (grand median r = .184). These results show stable benchmark-domain variation obscured by aggregate metrics, and support benchmark-stage domain screening as a step before deployment in specific application areas.

Clinical personality assessment screens response validity before interpreting substantive scales. LLM evaluation does not. We apply the validity scaling framework from the PAI and MMPI-3 to metacognitive probe data from 20 frontier models across 524 items. Six validity indices are operationalised: L (maintaining confidence on errors), K (betting on errors), F (withdrawing consensus-endorsed items), Fp (withdrawing correct answers), RBS (inverted monitoring), and TRIN (fixed responding). A tiered classification system identifies four models as construct-level invalid and two as elevated. Valid-profile models produce item-sensitive confidence (mean r = .18, 14 of 16 significant). Invalid-profile models do not (mean r = -.20, d = 2.17, p = .001). Chain-of-thought training produces two opposite response distortions. Two latent dimensions account for 94.6% of index variance. Companion papers extract a portable screening protocol (Cacioli, 2026e) and validate it against selective prediction (Cacioli, 2026f). All data and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/validity-scaling-llm

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning capabilities, and as existing approaches for enhancing LLM reasoning continue to mature, increasing attention has shifted toward meta-reasoning as a promising direction for further improvement. However, most existing meta-reasoning methods remain episodic: they focus on executing complex meta-reasoning routines within individual instances, but ignore the accumulation of reusable meta-reasoning skills across instances, leading to recurring failure modes and repeatedly high metacognitive effort. In this paper, we introduce Metacognitive Consolidation, a novel framework in which a model consolidates metacognitive experience from past reasoning episodes into reusable knowledge that improves future meta-reasoning. We instantiate this framework by structuring instance-level problem solving into distinct roles for reasoning, monitoring, and control to generate rich, attributable meta-level traces. These traces are then consolidated through a hierarchical, multi-timescale update mechanism that gradually forms evolving meta-knowledge. Experimental results demonstrate consistent performance gains across benchmarks and backbone models, and show that performance improves as metacognitive experience accumulates over time.

We propose a federated learning-like framework, Federation over Text (FoT), that enables multiple clients solving different tasks to collectively generate a shared library of metacognitive insights by iteratively federating their local reasoning processes without sharing actual problem instances or task instructions. Instead of federation over gradients (e.g., as in distributed training), FoT operates at the semantic level without any gradient optimization or supervision signal. Iteratively, each client runs an LLM agent that does local thinking and self-improvement on their specific tasks independently, and shares reasoning traces with a central server, which aggregates and distills them into a cross-task (and cross-domain) insight library that existing and future agents can leverage to improve performance on related tasks. Experiments show that FoT improves reasoning effectiveness and efficiency across a wide range of challenging applications, including mathematical problem solving, cross-domain collaboration, real-world daily tasks, and machine learning research insight discovery. Specifically, it improves average performance scores by 25% while reducing the reasoning tokens by 4% across the first three applications. In the research insight discovery application, FoT is able to generate insights that cover over 80% of the major contributions in the subsequent papers.

As large language models (LLMs) transition into autonomous agents integrated with extensive tool ecosystems, traditional routing heuristics increasingly succumb to context pollution and "overthinking". We argue that the bottleneck is not a deficit in algorithmic capability or skill diversity, but the absence of disciplined second-order metacognitive governance. In this paper, our scientific contribution focuses on the computational translation of human cognitive control - specifically, delayed appraisal, epistemic vigilance, and region-of-proximal offloading - into a single-agent architecture. We introduce MESA-S (Metacognitive Skills for Agents, Single-agent), a preliminary framework that shifts scalar confidence estimation into a vector separating self-confidence (parametric certainty) from source-confidence (trust in retrieved external procedures). By formalizing a delayed procedural probe mechanism and introducing Metacognitive Skill Cards, MESA-S decouples the awareness of a skill's utility from its token-intensive execution. Evaluated under an In-Context Static Benchmark Evaluation natively executed via Gemini 3.1 Pro, our early results suggest that explicitly programming trust provenance and delayed escalation mitigates supply-chain vulnerabilities, prunes unnecessary reasoning loops, and prevents offloading-induced confidence inflation. This architecture offers a scientifically cautious, behaviorally anchored step toward reliable, epistemically vigilant single-agent orchestration.

This report of world models distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost human-like cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles from human and machine cognition theory. In moving towards human-like world models we present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions (i.e., memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and metacognition) and identify gaps in existing research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and metacognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions to address these gaps informed by active inference and global workspace theory. We also introduce epistemic world models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied to video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and regulate one's own reasoning, remains under-evaluated in AI benchmarking. We introduce MEDLEY-BENCH, a benchmark of behavioural metacognition that separates independent reasoning, private self-revision, and socially influenced revision under genuine inter-model disagreement. The benchmark evaluates 35 models from 12 families on 130 ambiguous instances across five domains and reports two complementary scores: the Medley Metacognition Score (MMS), a tier-based aggregate of reflective updating, social robustness, and epistemic articulation, and the Medley Ability Score (MAS), derived from four metacognitive sub-abilities. Results show a robust evaluation/control dissociation: evaluation ability increases with model size within families, whereas control does not. In a follow-up progressive adversarial analysis of 11 models, we observed two behavioural profiles, i.e., models that revise primarily in response to argument quality and models that track consensus statistics. Under within-model relative profiling (ipsative scoring), evaluation was the weakest relative ability in all 35 models, indicating a systematic knowing/doing gap. Smaller and cheaper models often matched or outperformed larger counterparts, suggesting that metacognitive competence is not simply a function of scale. These findings position MEDLEY-BENCH as a tool for measuring belief revision under social pressure and suggest that future training should reward calibrated, proportional updating rather than output quality alone.

This study presents WriteFlow, an AI voice-based writing assistant designed to support reflective academic writing through goal-oriented interaction. Academic writing involves iterative reflection and evolving goal regulation, yet prior research and a formative study with 17 participants show that writers often struggle to articulate and manage changing goals. While commonly used AI writing tools emphasize efficiency, they offer limited support for metacognition and writer agency. WriteFlow frames AI interaction as a dialogic space for ongoing goal articulation, monitoring, and negotiation grounded in writers' intentions. Findings from a Wizard-of-Oz study with 12 expert users show that WriteFlow scaffolds metacognitive regulation and reflection-in-action by supporting iterative goal refinement, maintaining goal-text alignment during drafting, and prompting evaluation of goal fulfillment. We discuss design implications for AI writing systems that prioritize reflective dialogue, flexible goal structures, and multi-perspective feedback to support intentional and agentic writing.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

Standard evaluation of LLM confidence relies on calibration metrics (ECE, Brier score) that conflate how much a model knows (Type-1 accuracy) with how well its confidence signal tracks that knowledge (Type-2 metacognitive sensitivity). We apply Signal Detection Theory (SDT) to decompose these capacities, treating token-level normalised log-probability as a graded confidence variable and answer correctness as the state to be discriminated. We characterise the Type-2 ROC of this signal, including its unequal-variance structure via z-ROC analysis, and -- because the meta-d' efficiency ratio is not well defined for open-ended QA, which lacks a two-alternative Type-1 decision -- quantify metacognitive efficiency with a model-free information measure, normalised metacognitive information (meta-I_2r). Applied to four LLMs (Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, Llama-3-8B-Base, Gemma-2-9B-Instruct) across 224,000 factual QA trials, we find: (1) metacognitive information varies more than two-fold across models and co-varies inversely with accuracy -- the least accurate model has the most informative confidence -- though with four models this ordering cannot be separated from an error-difficulty confound, so we report it as coupling, not decoupling; (2) the confidence signal has model-specific unequal-variance structure (z-ROC slopes 0.81 to 1.18) invisible to calibration metrics; (3) metacognitive information is domain-specific, strongest in Arts & Literature for every model; (4) temperature dissociates Type-1 accuracy from metacognitive information, which stays stable while accuracy shifts. All estimates carry permutation nulls and bootstrap confidence intervals. Pre-registered; code and data public.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) can exhibit step-by-step reasoning, reflection, and backtracking, but these behaviors are often unregulated, leading to overthinking. As a result, LRMs continue generating redundant reasoning even after reaching high-confidence conclusions. This increases inference cost and latency, limiting practical deployment. The root cause is the absence of an intrinsic mechanism to monitor the reasoning state and decide when to continue, backtrack, or stop. We propose MERA, a meta-cognitive reasoning framework that decouples reasoning from control to enable independent optimization of control strategies. MERA constructs high-quality reasoning-control supervision data via a takeover-based pipeline, and transforms long-horizon traces into structured reasoning-control alternating sequences for training. The model is trained with supervised fine-tuning to internalize the structured separation, and further optimized with Control-Segment Policy Optimization (CSPO), which combines segment-wise GRPO with control masking to focus learning on control segments. Experiments across reasoning benchmarks show that MERA improves both efficiency and accuracy.

Verbalized confidence, in which LLMs report a numerical certainty score, is widely used to estimate uncertainty in black-box settings, yet the confidence scale itself (typically 0--100) is rarely examined. We show that this design choice is not neutral. Across six LLMs and three datasets, verbalized confidence is heavily discretized, with more than 78% of responses concentrating on just three round-number values. To investigate this phenomenon, we systematically manipulate confidence scales along three dimensions: granularity, boundary placement, and range regularity, and evaluate metacognitive sensitivity using $meta\text{-}d'$. We find that a 0--20 scale consistently improves metacognitive efficiency over the standard 0--100 format, while boundary compression degrades performance and round-number preferences persist even under irregular ranges. These results demonstrate that confidence scale design directly affects the quality of verbalized uncertainty and should be treated as a first-class experimental variable in LLM evaluation.

The possibility of LLM self-awareness and even sentience is gaining increasing public attention and has major safety and policy implications, but the science of measuring them is still in a nascent state. Here we introduce a novel methodology for quantitatively evaluating metacognitive abilities in LLMs. Taking inspiration from research on metacognition in nonhuman animals, our approach eschews model self-reports and instead tests to what degree models can strategically deploy knowledge of internal states. Using two experimental paradigms, we demonstrate that frontier LLMs introduced since early 2024 show increasingly strong evidence of certain metacognitive abilities, specifically the ability to assess and utilize their own confidence in their ability to answer factual and reasoning questions correctly and the ability to anticipate what answers they would give and utilize that information appropriately. We buttress these behavioral findings with an analysis of the token probabilities returned by the models, which suggests the presence of an upstream internal signal that could provide the basis for metacognition. We further find that these abilities 1) are limited in resolution, 2) emerge in context-dependent manners, and 3) seem to be qualitatively different from those of humans. We also report intriguing differences across models of similar capabilities, suggesting that LLM post-training may have a role in developing metacognitive abilities.