Network Intrusion Detection

In sixth-generation (6G) networks, billions of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) - autonomous vehicles, smart grids, industrial robots, and remote-surgical equipment - will run over ultra-reliable low-latency slices, collapsing the gap between a remote breach and physical harm to milliseconds, a budget perimeter firewalls and centralised security operations centres cannot meet. This survey reframes 6G CPS security as a closed-loop, AI-native pipeline that senses at the multi-access edge computing (MEC) tier, using minute-scale call-detail records (CDRs) for baseline learning and sub-millisecond RAN/Open-RAN (O-RAN) telemetry for the latency-critical path. It decides locally with compressed deep models, mitigates network-wide via SDN, NFV, and O-RAN controllers, and retrains through federated learning (FL) and digital-twin (DT) replay. We formalise a per-slice, tail-bounded latency contract on the sense, detect, and mitigate stages, enforced at a slice-dependent tail percentile (p99 for safety-critical URLLC slices). Organising 128 peer-reviewed studies (2017-2026) under a PRISMA 2020 protocol, we (i) map the 6G/CPS threat surface to MITRE ATT&CK and a CDR-observable feature space; (ii) unify edge anomaly detection and DDoS classification across twelve datasets and statistical, graph, and transformer models; (iii) synthesise SDN/NFV/O-RAN primitives into one closed-loop reference architecture; (iv) treat FL, large language models (LLMs), DT, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), zero-trust architecture (ZTA), and explainable AI as cross-cutting enablers, not parallel pillars; and (v) consolidate open problems into five directions spanning data, latency, trust, standardisation, and evaluation.

Adversarial attacks pose a serious and growing threat to Machine Learning (ML)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), where imperceptible perturbations to network flow features can systematically mislead classifiers into accepting malicious traffic as benign. The IDS-Anta framework partially addresses this through Z-score normalization, Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), and Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) classifier selection with Thompson Sampling, yet its classifier pool lacks sufficient structural diversity for robust adversarial resistance. This work introduces IDS-Anta++, which incorporates XGBoost and LightGBM gradient boosting models into the ensemble and wraps the extended pool in a three-layer black-box defense: Isolation Forest anomaly screening, median feature smoothing, and six-way majority voting. Experiments conducted on CIC-IDS-2017, CEC-CIC-IDS-2018, and CIC-DDoS-2019 under both Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO) attacks confirm detection accuracy above 99% on clean data, with measurable robustness gains under adversarial conditions relative to the baseline IDS-Anta configuration.

Rule-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) offer precise attack detection as well as mitigation, however their manually crafted, signature-driven rules limit adaptability to emerging and zero-day threats. Additionally, existing public datasets (e.g., CICIDS2017, UNSW-NB15) focus on traffic classification and provide little structured information to support automatic rule synthesis or prevention logic. To address this gap, we propose Generative Thread Intelligence (GenTI) \footnote{GenTI refers to the proposed framework, and GTI refers to the dataset.} an LLM-driven benchmark for automatic generation of IDPS rules targeting unseen attacks. The dataset (GTI) aggregates over 150k detection and prevention rules from Snort, Suricata, Emerging Threats, as well as 50k YARA, each annotated with protocol behavior, payload signatures, contextual relationships, mappings to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), along with actionable response types (alert, drop, reject). Moreover, on top of this corpus we design an LLM-based pipeline that transforms analyst prompts and representative payloads into deployable rules via structured prompt engineering, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, as well as a Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) loop for syntactic, semantic, and security validation. The generated rules are executed in real time on (Snort/Suricata) and evaluated by syntax accuracy, semantic similarity, CTI coverage, security effectiveness as well as unseen attacks detection. Furthermore, our GenTI instantiation achieves a composite rule-quality score of 89.4%, with 94.8% CTI coverage, improving unseen attacks detection from 45% to 87.4% and reducing the false-positive rate from 8.5% to 2.3%. Overall, GenTI establishes the first large-scale benchmark that tightly couples rule-level CTI with LLM-based automation, enabling adaptive, self-evolving IDPS.

With the rapid proliferation of IoT devices, security concerns have dramatically escalated and intrusion detection systems have become critical for protecting networked environments. This paper presents an improved CNN-LSTM based intrusion detection model that combines multi-class classification, dataset integration, and temporal feature learning to enhance detection performance in IoT networks. Using network traffic data, the proposed approach is evaluated on intrusion detection tasks and achieves an accuracy of approximately 97%. Experimental results demonstrate that the model effectively detects multiple attack categories while maintaining stable training and validation performance. The integration of convolutional and recurrent neural network components enables the framework to capture both spatial and temporal characteristics of network traffic, improving overall intrusion detection capability in IoT environments.

Digital infrastructure is growing at a rapid pace in the United States, and as a result, exposure to advanced cyber threats to critical sectors including healthcare, finance, transportation, energy and government systems is growing. The traditional cybersecurity approaches, including signature-based intrusion detection systems, have become less effective against today's cyber attacks, as they are unable to detect unknown and changing attacks in real time. To overcome these constraints, this research suggests a smart cyber-defense system, which utilizes Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in the detection and prevention of cyber attacks in the U.S. digital infrastructure. This study uses the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, which is a realistic network traffic dataset, along with various cyber attack scenarios, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), brute force attacks, botnets, infiltration attacks, and web-based attacks. A number of machine learning and deep learning models such as Random Forest, XGBoost, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks are implemented and evaluated to be used in identifying malicious network behavior and boosting the accuracy of intrusion detection. The framework proposed combines data preprocessing, feature engineering, real-time traffic monitoring, intelligent threat classification with automated prevention mechanisms to build cybersecurity resilience. E

The increasing penetrations of the critical infrastructure sector in the United States with intelligent digital technologies have greatly increased exposure to advanced cyber adversaries and operational vulnerabilities. AI-powered governance and automated decision-making systems are becoming a key part of the operation of critical infrastructure systems, including energy, healthcare, transportation, financial services, and communication infrastructure, in order to improve efficiency and strategic management. The growing cyber threat environment, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) attacks, botnets, ransomware, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) pose significant challenges to infrastructure resilience, cyber security reliability, and governance trustworthiness. In a changing attack landscape and dynamic network environment, traditional cybersecurity mechanisms can often fall short of meeting the evolving needs and protecting critical systems. This study will develop a resilient cyber risk analytics and model reliability assessment framework to support intelligent governance and decision support for cyber risk exposure in the U.S. critical infrastructure environment. This study is based on the CICIDS2017 dataset for the development and testing of intrusion detection system models and cyber risk prediction models based on machine learning. Various classifiers like XGBoost, Random Forest, and Decision Tree are used to detect malicious activities on the network and determine the level of cyber risk. Furthermore, the Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) techniques are integrated to enhance transparency, interpretability, and trust in cybersecurity decision-making processes. The proposed framework presents the reliability and resilience of the model by having various performance measures such as accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, ROC-AUC, and false positive rate.

The increasing adoption of distributed infrastructure systems, cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, and edge-based architectures has significantly expanded the cybersecurity attack surface and introduced increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Conventional centralized intrusion detection approaches often face challenges related to scalability, data privacy, communication overhead, and limited transparency in artificial intelligence-driven decision-making processes. To address these limitations, this study proposes a Cognitive Threat Intelligence and Explainable Federated Security Analytics framework for distributed infrastructure systems. The proposed framework integrates Federated Learning (FL), Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), and cognitive cybersecurity analytics to enable collaborative and privacy-preserving cyber threat detection across distributed network environments. Instead of transmitting sensitive raw network traffic data to centralized servers, local security models are independently trained at distributed nodes, where only encrypted model parameters and updates are shared through a federated aggregation mechanism. This decentralized learning architecture improves privacy protection while reducing communication dependency and centralized security risks. To enhance intelligent threat analysis, the framework incorporates machine learning and deep learning algorithms including Random Forest, XGBoost, Autoencoder

Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in energy infrastructure are vulnerable to model theft attacks, which allow adversaries to create evasive traffic offline. Current defences against model extraction rely either on identity-bound query monitoring, which is ineffective against distributed attackers (Sybil), or on prediction poisoning through soft-label perturbation, which is inapplicable to hard-label IDS deployments. Therefore, we propose FlowGuard, an identity-independent defence based on flow matching that classifies incoming queries as out-of-distribution (OOD) prior to IDS processing. This approach exploits the fact that queries generated synthetically for data-free model stealing attacks occupy a lower-dimensional manifold than real network traffic. This results in measurably lower log-likelihoods when using a Continuous Normalizing Flow that has been trained on legitimate data. We evaluate our method against PRADA and FDINet using MAZE and DisGUIDE attacks in single-client and distributed (100-client Sybil) settings. While PRADA's detection rate dropped to 0% when the distribution changed, our defence maintained a stable detection rate across both settings without relying on identity information. We discuss the scope and limitations of the approach, and outline potential applications to data-dependent attacks.

Spiking neural networks (SNNs) are increasingly studied for network intrusion detection, but comparative evidence on how neuron models and spike encodings affect performance remains limited. Evaluation choices can influence results when preprocessing, capture structure, or scenario information crosses the train--test boundary. We evaluate nine snnTorch neuron families with three spike encodings, yielding 27 SNN configurations across four intrusion-detection benchmarks. We screen the design space and then repeat the evaluation using train-only transforms, seed-independent partitions, and capture- or scenario-aware separation. In our study, LeakyParallel/latency ranked first in both 27-configuration evaluations. The leading configurations identified during screening also remained largely consistent under confirmation, indicating that screening preserved the ordering useful for design selection even when the measured performance changed under the stricter protocol. We then examine what latency coding contributes by holding the active spike set fixed and changing only its temporal organization. At the main T=25 operating point, mapping feature magnitude to spike time improved macro-F1 on all five confirmation protocols, while spreading the same spikes through time without that mapping could either improve or reduce performance. This shows that the effect of latency coding comes from both the information carried by spike time and how those spikes interact with the temporal dynamics of the network. Finally, sparse input encoding does not directly translate into sparse internal activity, although latency coding requires fewer fanout-weighted operations than rate coding in the evaluated models. Overall, the results show that SNN design choice, evaluation protocol, spike-timing representation, and computational activity should be examined separately when applying SNNs to static network-flow data.

Traditional traffic analysis is being fundamentally challenged by the rapid adoption of encryption, tunnelling, and privacy-preserving protocols, which increasingly obscure packet payloads and limit the usefulness of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). Although machine learning has advanced encrypted traffic analysis, existing approaches often remain tied to protocol-specific header features, depend on large labelled datasets, and degrade when deployed across heterogeneous network environments. We present GETA, a protocol-agnostic framework for encrypted traffic analysis that models network flows as multivariate time series using only traffic metadata, thereby avoiding reliance on packet payloads or header semantics. GETA combines meta-learning, embedding refinement, and self-attention to support few-shot adaptation to previously unseen domains with minimal labelled data. Across nine public datasets spanning application identification, VPN traffic classification, IoT device fingerprinting, and attack detection, GETA consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines. These results show that GETA offers a practical and generalisable foundation for robust traffic analysis in modern encrypted networks.

The detection of intrusions in IoT-based networks poses challenges that cannot be overcome using traditional machine learning methods. Perhaps the biggest of them is related to the presence of a class imbalance in the side-channel dataset, where the number of samples in the normal class compared to the attacks can reach a ratio of 75,964 to 1. Such an aspect is addressed by Dominguez et al. through the proof of concept of power-based intrusion detection. Unfortunately, neither the authors attempt to cope with the problem of imbalance nor do they assess the classifier performance using a balanced training set. In the current paper, both aspects will be handled at once. First, a Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) was performed on all nine possible datasets extracted from the initial one, providing an exact imbalance ratio of 1.1 for each. Then, eight algorithms i.e. Random Forest, HistGradientBoosting, LightGBM, Extra Trees, XGBoost, k-Nearest Neighbors, Multi-Layer Perceptron, and Decision Tree were trained under identical conditions for the SMOTE balanced 6-hour dataset. Random Forest reached a micro-averaged F1 score of 0.9989 and macro F1 of 0.9794, thus outperforming the previously best micro-F1 result obtained by Time Series Forest algorithm from the base paper of 0.9983. Extra Trees provided the same performance as well, but at 10 times faster. The introduction of a macro-F1 metric explicitly in contrast to the base paper assessment reveals important class-level information missed with aggregate performance metrics. Recall rates per-class calculated with confusion matrices, F1 heatmaps, and ROC curves show that minority attack classes, especially those with combined M+L infections, are detected reliably only when using SMOTE balance. Feature importance analysis indicates the latest time steps as the most important predictor signals out of 60 steps in a power window.

Modern network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are caught in a structural contradiction: the protocols carrying the highest threat intelligence are precisely those encrypted under TLS 1.3 and QUIC, where payload inspection yields nothing. We ask a simpler question -- what if the attack signature is not in the bytes, but in the rhythm? -- and answer it by treating network flows as a language whose grammar is written entirely in L3/L4 packet metadata: length, inter-arrival time, TTL, TCP flags, and hashed port numbers. We present PLM-NIDS, which proves three claims in sequence. (1) The grammar exists and is learnable: a RWKV-4 state-space model trained on 344,232 unlabelled Monday flows achieves a causal LM validation loss of 0.204, demonstrating that benign traffic has predictable, statistically consistent structure. (2) Attacks violate this grammar: the per-flow perplexity score cleanly separates benign from attack flows with PR-AUC = 0.93 using zero attack labels at training time. (3) This separation is architecturally nontrivial: an LSTM trained on identical token sequences degenerates to a majority-class predictor (ROC-AUC approximately 0.50, F1 = 0.91 by always predicting "attack"), proving that RWKV's causal pre-training provides an inductive bias unavailable to direct classifiers. Supervised fine-tuning further raises PR-AUC to 0.94 and ROC-AUC to 0.75, with a precision of 97.7% at the calibrated operating threshold. The RWKV backbone's O(T) recurrent inference enables per-packet streaming without flow buffering, making PLM-NIDS operationally viable at line rate. Because it reads only IP/TCP/UDP headers, it is inherently encryption-agnostic: TLS 1.3, QUIC, and future encrypted protocols are handled transparently.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in Internet of Things (IoT) environments face significant challenges due to data heterogeneity, lack of labeled data, and limited model interpretability. Federated Learning (FL) offers a privacy-preserving solution; however, existing approaches such as SOH-FL suffer from two key limitations: reliance on a manually tuned aggregation parameter γ and lack of explainability in model predictions. In this paper, we propose XAI-SOH-FL, an enhanced framework that integrates adaptive aggregation and explainable artificial intelligence into the SOH-FL paradigm. First, we introduce a dynamic γ selection mechanism based on similarity thresholding, enabling the aggregation process to adapt to evolving data distributions. Second, Bayesian Optimization is employed to automatically determine optimal γ values, eliminating the need for manual tuning. Third, SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) is incorporated to provide feature-level interpretability for intrusion detection decisions. Experimental evaluation on the CICIDS2017 dataset demonstrates that the proposed approach achieves an accuracy of 94.12% and an F1-score of 0.92, outperforming the baseline SOH-FL model while converging in fewer communication rounds. Furthermore, SHAP-based analysis reveals that flow-level features such as Flow Duration and Packet Length significantly influence model predictions. These results indicate that XAI-SOH-FL provides an effective balance between accuracy, adaptability, and interpretability in heterogeneous IoT environments.

Modern intrusion detection systems generate thousands of alerts daily, but alert fatigue severely limits security operations effectiveness due to too many false positives or low-impact events. We address this by proposing a principled framework for alert prioritization based on subnormal Gaussian fuzzy numbers, explicitly modeling three sources of uncertainty: threat severity, detection confidence, and organizational risk attitude. Each alert is represented as a fuzzy number with the core indicating severity, spread indicating uncertainty, and height reflecting detection reliability. We apply ranking indices to prioritize alerts, allowing organizations to tune security posture through a risk-attitude parameter. Experimental validation on CIC-IDS2017 and NSL-KDD demonstrates greater robustness than baselines under detector degradation (0.9963 vs 0.8215 NDCGrel@100), with distinct differentiation in mid-confidence alerts and near-parity with baselines under robust detectors. The framework is theoretically grounded, computationally efficient, provides interpretable reasoning, and remains robust across detector families and miscalibration scenarios.

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) provides flexible and programmable network management; however, its centralized control architecture remains highly vulnerable to Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, particularly Carpet-Bombing DDoS attacks that distribute malicious traffic across multiple targets to evade conventional detection mechanisms. In this paper, a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based framework is proposed for real-time detection and mitigation of Carpet-Bombing DDoS attacks in SDN environments. The proposed framework combines interface-level traffic features representation, semantic embedding generation, FAISS-based similarity retrieval, and Large Language Model (LLM)-driven contextual inference to classify traffic behavior without requiring conventional supervised model training or retraining. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, extensive experiments were conducted under multiple Carpet-Bombing DDoS attack scenarios with different attack intensities. In addition, two traffic representation strategies, namely structured JSON-based representation and natural language-based representation (NLR), were investigated using multiple state-of-the-art LLMs. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework achieved highly accurate and stable attack detection performance, while the framework configuration utilizing the Gemma-4-31B-IT model achieved the strongest overall detection results. Furthermore, real-time experiments confirmed the capability of the proposed framework to rapidly detect and mitigate Carpet-Bombing DDoS attacks while maintaining stable SDN network operation. The obtained results highlight the effectiveness of integrating RAG mechanisms with LLM for intelligent and adaptive SDN security analysis.

The rapid proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has created an urgent demand for adaptive, resource-efficient Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) capable of handling dynamic and evolving cyber threats. This paper investigates AOC-IDS, a state-of-the-art autonomous online IDS published at IEEE INFOCOM 2024, which employs an Autoencoder (AE) with Cluster Repelling Contrastive (CRC) loss and an autonomous Gaussian-based decision module. We first successfully replicate AOC-IDS on the UNSW-NB15 benchmark, achieving 89.39% accuracy in close agreement with the published 89.19%. We then identify four key limitations: class imbalance, unreliable pseudo-label generation, limited generalization, and computational overhead for IoT deployment, and propose targeted improvements for each. Our XGBoost-BalSamp method achieves 95.45% accuracy on UNSW-NB15, a gain of 6.26% over the baseline. Our combined deep learning approach (PseudoFilter, MixupAug, and LiteAE) achieves a best-run accuracy of 90.88% (F1: 91.45%), surpassing the base paper while reducing model parameters by 55%.These results demonstrate that targeted improvements to AOC-IDS yield consistent accuracy gains while improving practical deployability on IoT edge devices.

Streaming intrusion-detection studies assemble evaluation streams from network captures by interleaving capture days, pooling captures, or replaying records round robin. We show on two benchmarks that this assembly is an uncontrolled experimental treatment changing what the evaluation measures. On CICIDS2017, reordering an identical record multiset under a fixed positional 70/15/15 split yields held-out samples sharing only 32.5% of their records, at prevalences of 68.235% and 25.2396% (42.9954 points apart), and reverses the measured ordering of the two deterministic scorers. Restricting both arms to the 78000 records both held out removes the reversal, so it is attributable to which records the assembly hands to the test set, not to the order in which the detector saw its history. That attribution assumes that history contributes no more on the records the arms do not share than on those they do. On LITNET-2020, pooling three temporally disjoint captures reports one 6.4982% operating point, the equal-weight mean of per-capture held-out prevalences from 0.176% to 15.7747%, an identity presented as an audit check. The evaluated detector's reset posterior P(r_t=0) equals the hazard rate exactly below the run-length cap, though evaluations spend nearly all their length at or beyond it, and its evaluated score is a function of P(r<=5), not of P(r=0). Its deployed max composition ranks worse than its tail term alone (0.103477 AP, 0.302658 AUC-ROC) because the auxiliary branch is inverted (AUC-ROC 0.281890) and the maximum lets it set the score wherever the tail is small. With evaluated records and fitted model fixed, changing only the accompanying batch moves the ECOD reference implementation's AUC-PR by 0.003063, so published ECOD numbers are not comparable across studies scoring different batches. Every measured value traces to an archived, hash-verified run manifest.

The detection of previously unseen network attacks remains a major challenge for intrusion detection systems. Although supervised learning methods often perform well on known attack classes, they are limited when new attack types are not represented in the training data. Unsupervised methods are more suitable for detecting zero-day attacks, as they do not require labelled attack samples, but they often suffer from high false positive rates, which limits their real-world usefulness. This paper presents UNAD+, an enhanced framework for unknown network attack detection derived from the previously proposed Unknown Network Attack Detector (UNAD). UNAD+ combines a benign-only unsupervised ensemble with Weighted Majority Voting (WMV), a supervised refinement stage trained on pseudo-labelled detections, and a post hoc explainability layer that provides both local and global explanations. The framework was evaluated on the CICIDS2017 and NSL-KDD benchmark datasets. The results show that UNAD+ improves on the original UNAD framework, achieving F1-scores above 98% across the benchmark datasets while significantly reducing false positives and enhancing transparency and deployment suitability through integrated explainability.

Network Intrusion Detection System is a critical means of ensuring cybersecurity. However, existing Genetic Algorithm-based feature selection methods face several limitations when dealing with high-dimensional redundant traffic features. For example, population diversity is difficult to maintain, and evolutionary operators lack guidance. To solve these problems, this study proposes the Multi-Population Diversity-Guided Genetic Algorithm (MPDGGA). First, we build a chained multi-population evolutionary structure. Second, we introduce a diversity-guided operator based on information gain ratio. Experiments on NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and 9 UCI datasets show that the proposed model significantly outperforms four other advanced multi-population feature selection models. Across the 11 datasets, it attains the highest accuracy on 10 datasets and at least 2.26% of the features were selected.

Gradient-based adversarial attacks subtly manipulate inputs of Machine Learning (ML) models to induce incorrect predictions. This paper investigates whether careful architectural choices alone can yield an inherently robust Deep Neural Network (DNN)-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), without any additional explicit defenses. Through thousands of experiments, around 2200, varying network depth, feature dimensionality, activation functions, and dropout across FGSM, PGD, and BIM attacks, we show that shallower networks, reduced feature sets, and ReLU activation consistently and jointly reduce adversarial vulnerability. Moreover, a simple model following this recipe outperforms deeper, fully-featured adversarially trained models, while maintaining near-perfect clean-traffic detection and lower training times. Nevertheless, while less is more, the selection of the right less is what truly matters.

Network intrusion detection systems play a vital role in protecting networks by detecting malicious network traffic which can then be investigated by a cybersecurity operations centre. State-of-the-art approaches utilise supervised machine learning methods to train a classification model to recognise known cyberattacks; however, these models require a large labelled dataset to train and show poor performance when trained on smaller datasets. In an attempt to address this shortcoming, anomaly detection models learn the distribution of benign traffic and flag non-conforming traffic as malicious. While these methods do not require malicious examples to train, they suffer from high false-positive rates rendering them impractical. As a result, networks may be particularly vulnerable when there are insufficient labelled instances of a specific attack class to train an effective classifier. This often occurs in newly established networks or when previously unseen types of attacks emerge. To address this challenge, this work proposes the use of a triplet network, utilising online triplet mining and a KNN classifier, which is able to perform few-shot classification, enabling effective intrusion detection after being trained on a limited number of malicious examples. Various online triplet mining algorithms were explored and model design choices, such as the inference algorithm and optimised distance metrics, were compared and evaluated through a series of ablation studies. The final model was compared against other state-of-the-art approaches in few-shot binary and multiclass classification, where the proposed approach was found to be competitive with existing methods when trained on as little as 10 malicious samples of each class.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is widely adopted today for its ability to detect patterns, automate tasks, and reduce time and cost across various applications. Its integration into Cybersecurity has garnered significant attention, particularly in areas such as intrusion detection, malware analysis, and phishing or spam detection. As AI and cybersecurity evolve, new methods and approaches emerge regularly. Current trends include the use of Generative AI, Natural Language Processing, Federated Learning for privacy-preserving collaborative training, and eXplainable AI to ensure interpretability and trust, which are vital in cybersecurity. This paper presents an interesting review of current AI-based cybersecurity trends, focusing on intrusion detection approaches and aiming to uncover meaningful insights through comparative analysis based on the employed AI techniques and reported performance.

The rapid evolution of digital health technologies is redefining healthcare services worldwide. The integration of wireless communication and Internet-enabled medical devices within Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) networks enables continuous, real-time patient monitoring. However, this increased connectivity raises cybersecurity and patient safety risks due to increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks. This paper proposes a novel on-device, interpretable Tsetlin Machine (TM)-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to identify various phases of cyberattacks in IoMT environments. The TM is a rule-driven and transparent machine learning (ML) approach that represents attack patterns using propositional logic. Extensive evaluations on the MedSec-25 dataset, encompassing various phases of realistic cyberattacks, show that the proposed model outperforms ML models, attaining an F1-score (macro) of 97.83%. Moreover, the proposed model offers explicit explanations of its decisions to enhance transparency using feature-level contributions, class-wise vote scores, and clause activation heatmaps. Edge deployment (Raspberry Pi) further supports real-time on-device inference and intrusion detection. The combination of interpretability and high performance makes the proposed model well-suited for IoMT healthcare, where trust, reliability, safety, and timely decision-making are critical.

Security in cloud computing has become a major concern due to several factors such as layered cloud architectures, dynamic environments, and exposure to unseen or zero-day attacks. Moreover, intrusion detection systems (IDS) typically operate at specific layers and rely heavily on machine learning models, which often perform well in experimental settings but fail to sustain performance in real cloud deployments. In this work, we implement a confidence-aware multilevel intrusion detection system using reinforcement learning tailored for cloud environments. The system secures three distinct layers: network, host, and hypervisor. Machine learning models at each layer detect known attack patterns, while prediction confidence distinguishes reliable decisions from uncertain outcomes. Within the multi-gate flow, low-confidence events pass through a learned-threshold confidence gate (Gate-1), followed by a Chroma memory-matching gate (Gate-2), with unresolved events escalated to a large language model (LLM) for semantic analysis and explanation. Final attack promotion at Gate-3 uses calibrated LLM confidence or weighted-fusion fallback, while uncertain events are retained in a review bucket to avoid forced classification. Generated explanations and confirmed knowledge are stored in ChromaDB to support future analysis and retraining. The approach is first evaluated using static thresholds, establishing a baseline for comparison. Results show that the proposed system learns adaptive thresholds and reduces LLM escalation by 58.78%, lowering cost while maintaining strong performance (88.68% accuracy, 85.29% precision, 84.72% recall, 85.00% F1). The network and hypervisor layers achieve 98.02% and 97.08% accuracy, demonstrating a balanced and efficient detection system.

During thDuring the last few years, the term Mechanistic Interpretability, a specific area, under the umbrella of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), has been introduced, to explain the decisions made by complex machine learning (ML) models in critical systems like UAV intrusion detection systems (UAVIDS). In this paper, we apply best-practices for data pre-processing and examine a wide range of tree-ensembles, deep neural networks, hybrid stacking models and the latest ensemble neural networks to detect intrusions in UAV, with stratified 10-fold cross validation. With our top-performing model, XGBoost, we proceed to Shapley Additive explanations (SHAP), to analyze the global and local feature importances and understand which features, each attack targets, to mimic normal traffic and where the misclassifications occur. Furthermore a distribution analysis follows, by visually comparing violin plots and the curves of kernel density estimations. With the Westfall-Young permutation test for multiple comparisons, the Bandwidth optimization of the KDEs and the selection of Jensen-Shannon Distance for the test, we discover the true causes of false predictions, observed in Wormhole and Blackhole attacks in UAVIDS-2025. The findings provide robust, reliable and explainable models for UAV intrusion detection, along with statistical insights, which capture and clarify the masked nature of the attacks, regarding the challenge of Density Support Intersection, between these attacks, in this dataset.

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems aggregate log data from heterogeneous sources to detect coordinated attacks. Traditional rule-based correlation engines struggle to classify multi-step web application attacks because they examine each event without reference to the behavioural history of the originating host. We present Smart-SIEM, an AI module for the open-source Wazuh SIEM platform with two contributions: (1) a per-source-IP behavioural context vector encoding HTTP response-status distributions, peak rule activation counts, and MITRE ATT&CK technique frequencies from the N most recent prior events; (2) a two-stage hybrid cascade combining LightGBM for binary attack detection and XGBoost for six-class attack categorisation. Evaluated on 46,454 purpose-built Wazuh security events, context features improve all tested gradient boosting algorithms from ~0.705 macro F1 to 0.947-0.967 (Stage 1) and 0.876-0.914 (Stage 2), an average gain of +0.254 and +0.324 respectively. The hybrid cascade achieves F1 of 0.967 (binary) and 0.914 (six-class). Wazuh's native rule engine detects 0% of Brute Force and Broken Authentication events; the AI module detects 100% and 98.3% respectively. A self-adaptive retraining mechanism recovers from concept drift: F1 drops from 0.905 to 0.465 when unseen attack types emerge, recovering to 0.814 after retraining on the combined corpus.

We present MambaNetBurst, a compact tokenizer-free byte-level sequence classifier for network burst classification based on a Mamba-2 backbone. In contrast to most recent strong traffic-classification and intrusion-detection approaches, our method operates directly on raw packet bytes, avoids tokenization, patching, and heavy engineered multimodal representations, and does not require any self-supervised pre-training stage. Given a packet flow, we form a fixed-length burst from the first few packets, embed the resulting byte sequence appending a learnable CLS token, and process it with a stack of residual pre-normalized Mamba-2 blocks for end-to-end supervised classification. Across six public benchmarks spanning encrypted mobile app identification, VPN/Tor traffic classification, malware traffic classification, and IoT attack traffic, MambaNetBurst achieves consistently strong results and is competitive with, or outperforms, substantially heavier and often pre-trained baselines. Our ablation study shows that preserving byte-level temporal resolution is critical, that early downsampling through striding is consistently harmful, and that moderate state sizes are sufficient for robust generalization. We further show that Mamba-2, despite its more constrained transition structure relative to Mamba-1, remains highly effective for packet-byte modeling while providing clear efficiency advantages, particularly in training speed. Overall, our results demonstrate that direct undiluted byte-to-classification learning with compact selective state space models is a practical, effective and novel direction for efficient, deployable traffic analysis that bypasses the complexity of pre-training pipelines even over highly optimized linear attention architectures.

The new wave of adversarial attacks that utilize gradient-related vulnerabilities in neural network-based classifiers makes Network Intrusion Detection Systems more open to such threats. Although state-of-the-art adversarial training methods have shown promising results in producing more robust classifiers, their interpretability and defense ability are limited due to their lack of understanding of how adversarial attacks propagate in different layers of network classifiers. In this paper, we present an insightful approach, called LARAR (Layer-wise Adversarial Robustness using Adaptive Regularization), that incorporates additional layer-wise vulnerability analysis and adaptive weighting in conventional adversarial training methods. Additionally, we utilize 'Auxiliary Classifiers' in our approach. LARAR provides interpretable layer-wise vulnerability scores, achieves a clean accuracy of 95.01%, and provides better robustness against adversarial attacks (FGSM, PGD, and transfer attacks) on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. Through the identification of vulnerable layers, the proposed framework reduces computational complexity and enables the early detection of adversarial samples, thus enhancing the effectiveness and interpretability of adversarial defense mechanisms in NIDS.

Detecting stealthy malicious communications from flow logs under benign-only training remains a critical challenge in network security. Malicious communications often camouflage as normal traffic like standard HTTPS flows. Conventional intrusion detectors rely strictly on known labeled attacks. Alternatively, they score flows completely independently. These approaches fail against sparse and context-dependent suspicious activity. To capture this essential context, graph anomaly detectors have been introduced to add valuable relational information to the analysis. However, existing methods fail to test the structural consistency of specific communication edges. To overcome these fundamental limitations, we present GESR, a novel graph-based framework for detecting suspicious communications and anomalous hosts under a benign-only training setting. GESR models complex network activity as attributed communication graphs. It cleverly reconstructs edge semantics entirely from local structural context rather than isolated features. This non-intuitive design forces the framework to predict expected communication patterns from neighborhood topologies. Attackers cannot easily manipulate this deep structural dependency. The model then converts the resulting structural inconsistencies into host-level anomaly scores. It utilizes robust Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) calibration for this final step. We evaluate GESR extensively on CTU-13 and CICIDS2017 datasets. These evaluations strictly impose tight false-positive operating constraints. On CICIDS2017, GESR achieves an outstanding ROC-AUC of 0.9753. It also yields a high TPR of 0.8569 at a strict 5% FPR threshold. GESR consistently outperforms existing methods across both evaluated benchmarks. The results prove that structure-conditioned edge reconstruction is a credible direction for practical intrusion detection.

Classical generative adversarial networks (GANs) have been applied to generate adversarial network traffic capable of attacking intrusion detection systems, but they suffer from shortcomings such as the need for large amounts of high-dimensional datasets, mode collapse, and high computational overhead. In this work, we propose a hybrid quantum-classical GAN (QC-GAN) framework where a variational quantum generator is used to generate synthetic network traffic flows mimicking malicious traffic using latent representations. Instead of sampling classical noise vectors, we encode the latent vector (the hidden features) as a quantum state, which is the basis for claiming more expressive latent representations and reducing computational overhead. A classical discriminator will be trained on real-world datasets (UNSW-NB15) and the proposed QC-GAN-generated fake network flows. In this configuration, the generator aims to minimize the discriminator's ability to distinguish real from fake traffic, while the discriminator aims to maximize its classification accuracy, in an iterative manner. In our attack model, we assume that the attacker is a state actor with access to limited quantum computing power, whereas the discriminator is chosen to be classical, as will likely be the case for most end users and organizations. We test the generated flows using classical intrusion detection system (IDS) models, such as a random forest classifier and a convolutional neural network-based classifier, for their ability to bypass the detection process. This work aims to highlight the possibilities of quantum machine learning as a means of generating advanced attack flows and stress testing classical IDS. Lastly, we further evaluate how hardware-based noise affects these attacks to offer a new perspective on IDS, highlighting the need for a quantum resilient defense system.