Overview

Online advertising research covers auctions and real-time bidding, budget pacing, sponsored-search retrieval, ad ranking, and conversion prediction. Common approaches include online learning and control, causal experiments and attribution, reinforcement learning, and increasingly generative models for recommendations, creatives, and ads in AI-generated responses. Researchers evaluate these methods with auction benchmarks, platform logs, randomized experiments, and live A/B tests, while also studying privacy, disclosure, and effects on users. A central tension is improving revenue and campaign performance without sacrificing relevance, user welfare, reliable measurement, or safe deployment under changing market conditions.

Latest papers

96 papers10 papers in the last four weeks, up 43% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Feb 11, 2026

CADET: Context-Conditioned Ads CTR Prediction With a Decoder-Only Transformer

Click-through rate (CTR) prediction is fundamental to online advertising systems. While Deep Learning Recommendation Models (DLRMs) with explicit feature interactions have long dominated this domain, recent advances in generative recommenders have shown promising results in content recommendation. However, adapting these transformer-based architectures to ads CTR prediction still presents unique challenges, including handling post-scoring contextual signals, maintaining offline-online consistency, and scaling to industrial workloads. We present CADET (Context-Conditioned Ads Decoder-Only Transformer), an end-to-end decoder-only transformer for ads CTR prediction deployed at LinkedIn. Our approach introduces several key innovations: (1) a context-conditioned decoding architecture with multi-tower prediction heads that explicitly model post-scoring signals such as ad position, resolving the chicken-and-egg problem between predicted CTR and ranking; (2) a self-gated attention mechanism that stabilizes training by adaptively regulating information flow at both representation and interaction levels; (3) a timestamp-based variant of Rotary Position Embedding (RoPE) that captures temporal relationships across timescales from seconds to months; (4) session masking strategies that prevent the model from learning dependencies on unavailable in-session events, addressing train-serve skew; and (5) production engineering techniques including tensor packing, sequence chunking, and custom Flash Attention kernels that enable efficient training and serving at scale. In online A/B testing, CADET achieves a 11.04% CTR lift compared to the production LiRank baseline model, a hybrid ensemble of DCNv2 and sequential encoders. The system has been successfully deployed on LinkedIn's advertising platform, serving the main traffic for homefeed sponsored updates.
Dec 11, 2025

LLM-Auction: Generative Auction towards LLM-Native Advertising

The commercialization of LLM applications is the next frontier in online advertising, with LLM-native advertising emerging as a promising paradigm by integrating ads into LLM-generated content. However, classic mechanisms are no longer applicable in this setting where the auction object is shifted from discrete ad slots to distributions over LLM outputs, and existing methods are impractical in industrial scenarios due to ignored externalities or high inference costs. To address these issues, we propose LLM-Auction, the first learning-based generative auction mechanism that integrates auction and generation. By formulating the allocation as preference alignment between LLM outputs and a mechanism objective that balances advertisers' value and user experience, we optimize the LLMs to inherently model allocation externalities without extra inference cost. Theoretically, we identify the allocation monotonicity and continuity of the optimal allocation rule of LLM-Auction, and prove that a simple first-price payment rule exhibits favorable incentive properties under this allocation rule. Furthermore, we build an LLM-as-a-judge simulation environment for quantitative evaluation, and experiments demonstrate that LLM-Auction achieves the state-of-the-art allocation efficiency while approximately satisfying key mechanism properties.
Oct 17, 2025

HOB: A Holistically Optimized Bidding Strategy under Heterogeneous Bidding Environments

Optimizing a single advertising campaign across heterogeneous channels is a central challenge in industrial autobidding. Auction mechanisms vary across channels in ranking rules (pure eCPM vs. UE-augmented scoring), pricing formats (first- vs. second-price), and bidding conventions (uniform vs. non-uniform), while advertisers impose shared campaign-level constraints. We propose HOB, which makes marginal cost (MC) computable and alignable across heterogeneous channels, especially for first-price auctions (FPA) with organic-paid coexistence, where existing bidding formulations do not yield a practical aligned MC form. At the global level, HOB derives channel-specific MC forms and coordinates disparate channels through a shared MC target. At the local level, HOB models free-win probability and winning-price uncertainty with a zero-inflated exponential distribution, yielding an efficient surplus-optimal bidding strategy for non-uniform first-price auctions. We show that any interior optimum satisfies MC equalization across channels. Experiments on a controlled offline benchmark, industrial log replay, and large-scale online A/B tests demonstrate that HOB consistently delivers significant performance gains. Deployed on a large-scale commercial DSP, HOB delivers a 3.0% lift in GMV while maintaining return on advertising spend (ROAS) constraints.
May 5, 2025

Plan-Driven Adaptive Bidding for First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints under Nonstationarity

We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish a plan-to-performance decomposition for a plan-driven projected-dual policy. The policy uses any feasible expenditure plan as a soft target, learns an unknown stationary competing-bid CDF from thresholds revealed after each auction, and enforces the campaign budget on every sample path. Against a distribution-informed expected-budget fluid benchmark, the uniform-plan reward gap is O(T)+O(WT)O(\sqrt T)+O(\mathcal W_T), where WT\mathcal W_T measures heterogeneity in private-value distributions. With a supplied feasible plan, the global gap decomposes into a one-sided O(T)O(\sqrt{T}) fixed-plan execution term and a plan-mismatch term bounded by (b/2a)PlanError(b/2a)PlanError. The same analysis provides guarantees for strict and relaxed period-cap comparators, exact recovery of the global benchmark under a specific allowance vector, and separate lower bounds establishing the necessity of the temporal-heterogeneity and Plan Error terms. An upstream planner can translate forecasts or managerial priorities into a feasible spending trajectory, while the online controller adapts bids using realized thresholds and expenditures. The guarantee is modular: it evaluates the final normalized or projected plan through PlanErrorPlanError. A specific forecasting model can be linked to the guarantee by establishing how its primitive estimation errors propagate to this plan-quality metric.
May 16, 2024

Influencer Cartels

Social media influencers account for a growing share of marketing worldwide. We demonstrate the existence of a novel form of market failure in the advertising market: influencer cartels, where groups of influencers collude to increase their advertising revenue by inflating their engagement. Our theoretical model shows that influencer cartels can improve consumer welfare if they expand social media engagement to the target audience, or reduce welfare if they divert engagement to less relevant audiences. Drawing on the model's insights, we empirically examine influencer cartels using novel datasets and machine learning tools, and derive policy implications.
Feb 3, 2023

Robust Budget Pacing with a Single Sample

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in TT second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog⁡TT\log T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)O(\sqrt{T})-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt{T})-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.