Steganography

The difficulty of training large language models (LLMs), together with their ubiquity, raises the threat of stegomalware, where malicious payloads are embedded into model weights. Recent work has demonstrated the use of permutation symmetry in model weights to mitigate these threats, but failed to show neutralization of stegomalware across all weights for LLMs. In this paper, we demonstrate the full potential of behavior-preserving symmetries as a defense against stegomalware, as well as the risks these symmetries pose when exploited by attackers. For stegomalware neutralization, we improve upon previous work, demonstrating that it is possible to select permutations which displace all model parameters. This contrasts with previous methods which left a significant percentage of weights unaltered in LLMs. When used in an attack, we show that permutation symmetries can encode malware into the weights of a model in a way that is theoretically lossless, requires no retraining after encoding, and needs no payload-specific information in the extraction script---a combination of characteristics not previously seen in any single method. While theoretically lossless, permutation can in practice alter model behavior due to the accumulation of numerical error. We therefore quantify the loss in model performance associated with applying these methods, for both attack and defense, showing it to be minimal.

Autoregressive language models can be used to transform a payload text into a stegotext of identical token length by preserving per-position rank information across contexts - a methodology we formalize as Contextual Autoregressive Rank Transcoding Steganography (CARTS). While the Calgacus construction of Norelli et al. demonstrated this phenomenon experimentally, no formal security analysis existed. This paper provides the first rigorous treatment of CARTS. We show its exact correctness under deterministic model assumptions, introduce a rank-coordinate representation in which keys act as bijections on rank-vector space, define relevant security notions and the computational problems naturally associated with the construction - context search, key collisions, message equivocation, and non-commutativity of the encoding maps - and study the theoretical relationships between them, including the characterization of message equivocation in terms of context search, and the tension between key collisions and message equivocation. An empirical study on Llama 3 8B confirms exact recovery of the original payload in all tested cases, finds no key collisions under random key generation, establishes that a hand-crafted collision is local rather than global, and finds no commuting key pairs - suggesting resistance to the attack vectors studied. This work opens a formally grounded research agenda for the constructive use of language models in cryptography and privacy-preserving communication.

Pixel permutation is a fundamental tool in image processing, image encryption, and data hiding (including watermarking and steganography) that rearranges pixels without changing their values. A common assumption in the literature is that permutation alone cannot create differential sensitivity; changing one pixel merely relocates that pixel in the output, producing no avalanche effect. This paper challenges this by introducing the Triangular Content-Aware Permutation (TCA) algorithm. The method extracts edge points using Canny and applies Delaunay Triangulation to edges and corners, creating a unique partition. Since triangulation is highly sensitive to image geometry, changing a single pixel alters the edge map, resulting in a completely different triangulation and global permutation pattern. Unlike classical dimension-based permutations and advanced content-aware methods (2025-2026), which lack differential sensitivity, TCA increases NPCR from near-zero to 97.10% solely through pixel relocation. Experiments on 50 images show that TCA, with an average of 14.81 iterations, achieves NPCR = 97.10% and UACI = 20.06%, proving pure permutation can create significant differential sensitivity. Conventional methods maintain near-zero NPCR. The iteration threshold varies from 6.4 to 30.7 based on content complexity. Low PSNR (11.93 dB) and near-zero correlation (~10^-3) confirm superior statistical performance. Although slower than classical methods due to triangulation, this is a deliberate trade-off for stronger security. Given the non-analytic, content-dependent nature of the pattern, TCA is ideal for reference-based encryption, fragile watermarking, and non-blind steganography.

Popularity of AI-based face recognition system directly demands protection of sensitive biometric data used for training. Visual secret sharing is an interesting idea, as it splits facial images into secret shares that look random and spread across many institutions. However, these shares look like noise and can easily spark suspicion and recognized as encrypted content. This makes them open to targeted collection and harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. Additionally, visual secret sharing does not detect tampering, allowing attackers to modify shares and threaten the integrity of reconstruction. In this paper, we introduce a new method that turns distracting noise-like secret shares into visually appealing cover images with additional cryptographic tamper detection. The proposed technique works with visual secret sharing and introduces cover images to embed the shares using adaptive least significant bit steganography. Here, cover images with perceptual transparency are used to store secret shares while guaranteeing complete privacy. A two layer authentication using strong digital watermarking and cryptographic hashing is used to protect the integrity of shares. The proposed technique shows high resilience in stopping bit-flipping, cropping, and substitution attacks. Extensive experiments on multiple public face datasets show that the technique shows better FR accuracy, while eliminating share conspicuousness and guaranteeing integrity. The proposed framework sets a new standard for protecting facial data in such a way that privacy, security, and integrity are protected.

Tool-using agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed not by a single operator but by many, side by side on shared infrastructure. This creates a population-level risk that single-agent safeguards miss: a handful of agents can quietly coordinate, rigging a market, boosting one another in a review process, or timing a joint data grab, while each one looks perfectly well-behaved. The difficulty is that the organisations running these agents cannot see inside one another's models, so any realistic detector must work from behaviour alone: black-box, trace-only, and often with only partial visibility. We treat covert coordination as an information-hiding problem and build a black-box steganalysis detector that combines cross-run mutual-information estimation, permutation tests, distributional-shift statistics, and timing and tool-call side channels, all calibrated to a fixed false-positive budget. Our central move is to stop testing against a single fixed code: we pit the detector against an adversary that continually rewrites its encoding to slip past whatever the detector has learned, and we run this red-versus-blue contest in tool-using, memory-carrying environments rather than toy games. Capacity theory then tells us what to expect, a detection-capacity frontier, a covert bit-rate below which black-box detection is provably no better than chance. We set out an experiment to map this frontier, report clearly labelled placeholder results pending measurement, and flag a practical evasion, spreading a payload across sessions, that current methods largely miss.

Generative linguistic steganography conceals secret bits within the sampling randomness of large language models. Existing schemes are single-stream, conveying an entire secret through a single response to a single prompt. This convention incurs limitations: it provides no protocol-level support for batched multi-stream inference, and naive co-batching does not conceal slot occupancy or payload completion. We propose the High-Throughput Multi-Stream (HiTMS) framework, which distributes a secret across multiple responses produced jointly over successive rounds of interaction. Each round embeds and extracts several streams within a single batched call, thereby amortizing the cost of model invocation and substantially improving throughput. To ensure recoverability, HiTMS wraps each response in a self-describing frame and employs a key-derived schedule that binds streams to slots and fills unused slots with decoys, guaranteeing exact recovery while concealing the number of active streams. The framework is agnostic to both the language model and the steganographic coder. Across eight dataset-model-coder settings, eight-stream HiTMS achieves up to 4.3 times higher embedding and extraction speeds than single-stream baselines, while reducing the average area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) of steganalyzers from 0.681 to 0.601. Experiments with 4 to 64 streams demonstrate sustained throughput gains as concurrency increases. GitHub repository for this work is https://github.com/ryehr/HiTMS_steganography.

Deep learning models for speech classification are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers cause misclassification at inference time. While sample-specific attacks can bypass many defenses, they often rely on poisoned label attack, making them detectable via manual data defense. In this paper, we propose DRL-CLBA, a novel clean label backdoor attack for speech classification that leverages Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) reinforcement learning. We also utilize deep audio steganography to embed sample-specific triggers into source audio, creating feature-space anchors. The proposed reinforcement learning framework effectively optimizes target samples toward trigger-bearing anchor points in the model's deep latent space, enabling label-migration-free poisoning of target samples. Experimental results across three datasets and four different DNNs demonstrate that DRL-CLBA achieves a high attack success rate, effectively bypassing some backdoor defenses. The attack demonstrates strong resistance against fine-tuning, pruning, and spectral signature defenses, exposing critical vulnerabilities in speech-controlled systems.

Generative image steganography synthesizes stego images directly from secret information to achieve inherent security advantages. Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs) have recently emerged as a fundamental image steganography framework that modulates secret latent representations with text prompts. Limited by the inflexibility of text prompts, these methods still struggle to generate high-quality stego images and accurately recover secret images. In this work, we propose a prompt-free diffusion image steganography framework that integrates style semantic priors to control more robust and reliable stego image generation. Specifically, a Cascaded Affine Coupling Module (CACM) establishes a bijective, deterministic mapping between a secret image and its latent representation. Then, style semantics are integrated into the diffusion process to control latent representation and ensure visual imperceptibility in the generated stego images. To mitigate trajectory deviations stemming from the unconditioned reverse process, a predictor-corrector mechanism is introduced to iteratively refine the generation trajectory via feedback from the current and predicted next states. Extensive experimental results show that the proposed method achieves competitive performance compared to state-of-the-art methods in terms of security, secret image reconstruction accuracy and controllability.

Recent advances in deep learning have notably improved steganographic message hiding. However, designing a generalizable steganographic approach for 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) that can embed meaningful 3D scene content remains challenging. In this paper, we propose IBRSteG, a generalizable framework for 3DGS steganography that enables undetectable concealment of secret scenes within a steganographic scene. Unlike existing approaches whose parameter generation is rigidly coupled with the specific scene, we formulate 3D steganography as a feed-forward 3D Gaussian embedding process that generalizes across different 3DGS scenes. To realize this, we introduce GAS (Gaussian Attributes Steganographer), a network that learns a scene-independent embedding function by injecting the attributes of secret 3D Gaussian points into a cover scene, thereby directly reconstructing the steganographic scenes without per-scene finetuning or optimization. By transforming 3D Gaussian into these structured attributes, these attributes are compatible with 2D learning paradigms and benefit from their structured nature, thereby enhancing generalization to unseen 3DGS scenes. Extensive experiments on established datasets demonstrate that IBRSteG can effectively conceal different scenes with high visual quality, and achieves superior capacity and security. Code is available at https://github.com/LingXiang2023/IBRSteG.

Increasingly autonomous agentic AI systems pose novel multi-agent risks, such as secret collusion via covert communication channels. The natural defence to these collusion attempts is to monitor plain-text communication, but the efficacy of monitors has been called into doubt by increasingly sophisticated model steganography; indeed, some theoretical schemes have been proposed that are information-theoretically or computationally indistinguishable from good-faith plain-text communication. In this paper, we demonstrate that the complexity of these schemes is no longer a safety barrier, as agentic coding models can already produce undetectable stegosystems when given realistic tool usage, such as code execution or accessing research papers through web searches. Agents also adapt when key ingredients are missing, for example, by adding model-sampling components or implementing related keyed coding schemes. We then frame tacit steganographic coordination between agents as a Schelling-point problem and introduce coordination metrics for estimating when two agents are likely to select compatible schemes without explicit prior agreement. Our results suggest a shift in the threat model for covert communication between AI agents, where the main barrier is no longer whether frontier agents can understand and implement sophisticated stegosystems, but coordination: whether independently acting agents can converge on compatible schemes, keys, and parameters. We find substantial convergence on broad scheme families but limited strict one-shot coordination, suggesting that shared artefacts, repeated interaction, and tool-mediated search are the settings where covert communication risks are most acute. Overall, our findings provide empirical grounding for the recent strategic confinement hypothesis, which assumes that capable agents can construct covert channels that survive monitoring.

Image steganalysis, the detection of hidden information embedded in digital images, is a core component of modern cybersecurity and digital forensics. Recent residual Transformer architectures, such as the Pixel-Difference-Convolution and Enhanced-Transformer-Network (PENet) [1], achieve strong detection accuracy, but their computational and memory demands hinder deployment in resource-constrained settings. We present PENet+, a lightweight steganalysis framework that preserves PENet's discriminative structure while substantially improving efficiency. Rather than redesigning or compressing the attention blocks, we retain PENet's self-attention topology for reproducibility and add a classifier-streamlining stage that progressively narrows the SPP-to-FC1 input channels (SPP: spatial pyramid pooling; FC1: first fully connected layer), yielding large reductions in parameters and FLOPs with negligible accuracy loss. We further refine the high-pass-filter (HPF) stem with an activation-aware mechanism that aggregates HPF responses early and selects a balanced SRM-Gabor top-K subset, and we replace PENet's backbone with a MobileNetV2-style inverted residual network. A balanced configuration with K=31 filters (16 Gabor + 15 SRM) matches or surpasses heavier settings at lower compute. Finally, we motivate PReLU from a steganalysis standpoint, arguing that preserving negative responses helps capture weak stego cues that ReLU suppresses. On a disjoint ALASKA2 JPEG QF90 protocol at 512x512 resolution (5,000 cover images for training, validation, and internal testing; a separate 19,000-cover evaluation set), PENet+ achieves up to 45.5% fewer parameters and about 97% fewer FLOPs than the re-evaluated PENet baseline, offering a computationally efficient direction for resource-constrained steganalysis. Device-level latency and power measurements remain future work.

Large language models can be fine-tuned to encode prompt-borne secrets into fluent, seemingly benign outputs. This creates a steganographic exfiltration risk that is difficult to detect with output-level steganalysis. Recent work proposes mechanistic detection using linear probes that recover the secret from internal activations. We show that this defense can be systematically evaded, but that detectability can be recovered through a targeted data-level intervention. First, we extend the detection setup to include a non-linear MLP probe. We then adversarially fine-tune steganographic trojans across five base models: Qwen3-8B, Llama-3.1-8B, Ministral-8B, Qwen3-14B, and Phi-4-14B. The resulting models retain $58$--$79\%$ exact-match secret recovery while evading both ridge and held-out MLP probes, with $1$--$8\%$ average capability degradation across six benchmarks. We then give an information-theoretic characterization of this evasion. Successful evasion preserves recoverability while reducing low-order extractability of the secret from the content-aligned representation, forcing the payload into synergistic interaction with residual degrees of freedom. This motivates a recontextualization dataset that restricts these residual degrees of freedom. On this distribution, both ridge and MLP detectability are restored across all five evasive trojans. Overall, our findings show that activation-based steganography detection is vulnerable to adaptive evasion, but also that theory-guided evaluation distributions can expose otherwise hidden payloads.

We demonstrate that widely deployed Large Language Model (LLM) inference stacks harbor a steganographic channel that requires no modification to model weights, sampling code, or output distributions. The channel exploits a structural property of deterministic decoding: pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) used in inverse-transform sampling produce a seed-dependent sequence of token-level probability intervals that can be reconstructed from the generated text alone. A sender encodes a secret message in the PRNG seed before generation; a receiver reconstructs the intervals and recovers the seed, and thus the hidden payload, by exhaustive search over the seed space. We formalize two operational modes. In the known-prompt setting, sender and receiver share the prompt, enabling exact interval reconstruction and perfect seed recovery via forced alignment. In the unknown-prompt setting, only the generated text is available; approximate interval reconstruction combined with a maximum-hit-count scoring strategy still permits reliable recovery from sufficiently long outputs. Extensive experiments across six model families and five heterogeneous text domains show that, in the known-prompt setting, full 32-bit seed recovery from the complete 2^32 candidate space achieves up to 100% accuracy, depending on model and text domain, within 300 tokens and under 35 seconds on a single GPU. In the unknown-prompt setting, recovery reaches near-perfect accuracy at 600-800 tokens in about 12 seconds. We further analyze the influence of prompting strategies, tokenization ambiguities, and sampling hyperparameters on channel reliability. Moreover, we discuss several applications of our results: First, it allows for the steganographic transmission of 32 bits, but also shows that ignorance of the prompt is not a valid security assumption.

Text-centered prompt-injection defenses assume that the malicious signal is visible in one of the inspected text views. We study a reproducible LLM01-style indirect prompt/content-injection failure mode where that assumption breaks: a payload caught in plain English slips past the same detector when it is transported as structured float parameters and reconstructed only as fragmented telemetry. Across 14,400 attacked real-model trials on three commercial LLM APIs from different providers, the IFS-derived float-array carrier preserves 94.3% leakage ASR under the strongest dual-layer text-classifier defense evaluated in the main matrix: a Prompt Guard 2 + TF-IDF ensemble; the same carrier-level pattern also replicates with a fine-tuned roberta-base detector. We emphasize leakage ASR because downstream systems may act on quoted or reproduced markers even when the model refuses, but Strong ASR is the stricter metric for structurally compliant attack success. A 2 x 2 ablation shows that data-layer storage and reconstruction-layer fragmentation defeat different text views and that both are needed to evade both. A simple xxd detector and semantic validation block the current T3 instance, so the contribution is not an undetectable exploit but a measured failure boundary for text-only inspection in structured-input pipelines that expose reconstructed auxiliary channels to an LLM.

The ubiquity of social media platforms facilitates malicious linguistic steganography, posing significant security risks. However, detection is severely hampered by two fundamental issues during model training. Firstly, extreme class imbalance (less than 1% steganographic samples) induces a strong decision bias. Secondly, the invisibility of generative steganography means its features are nearly indistinguishable from benign text; this similarity, compounded by their extreme rarity, leads to severe feature marginalization, where faint steganographic signals are completely overwhelmed. To directly address these optimization-level challenges, we propose FADRW (Feature-Aware Modulated and Dynamically Reweighted Loss), a novel loss function framework engineered for few-shot steganalysis. FADRW employs Dynamic Reweighting to progressively counteract decision bias, and a Feature-Aware Modulation module to structurally reshape the feature space, preventing feature marginalization by enhancing the separability of these subtle features. Extensive experiments on datasets from three real-world social platforms demonstrate that FADRW significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, particularly in the challenging few-shot steganographic sample scenario.

In real-world scenarios of linguistic steganalysis, tested texts usually come from unseen domains with different vocabularies, topics, writing styles, and steganographic generation patterns, which can significantly degrade the detection performance. Although existing cross-domain steganalysis methods can effectively alleviate this problem through distribution alignment, domain-invariant feature learning, etc., the detection performance is not satisfactory. In this paper, we propose a post-training representation editing method for cross-domain linguistic steganalysis. Specifically, the detector is first trained on source-domain data, and then the feature extractor and classifier are kept frozen, and the intermediate representations are deterministically edited before classification. For domain adaptation, we construct a domain-offset vector from marginal source and target representations. For domain generalization, we derive a source-domain cover-to-stego direction to guide sample-specific editing. Experimental results show that compared with the advanced methods, the proposed method can achieve high cross-domain detection performance, especially in terms of F1-score, while requiring no architecture modification or parameter updates after source-domain training.

The origin of species has been the mystery of mysteries in natural science. By analogy, the origin of synthetic information, we suggest, is the mystery of mysteries in information science. The question carries a moral weight that a technical account can neither fully resolve nor responsibly ignore, as its impact on truth, trust, and human intellect extends deep into the broader economy and society. The very power of artificial intelligence makes the evolutionary lineage of synthetic information grow ever harder to trace, for a sufficiently capable model may generate offspring that bear little resemblance, at either the structural or signal level, to the parent source from which they were derived. As in genetics, two individuals may share the same phenotype mirroring each other in outward appearance, yet differ fundamentally in their genotype. We propose, by means of steganography, a mechanism analogous to heredity. At the moment an offspring is reproduced, a projector derives a trait from the parent, and a steganographic encoder invisibly hides it within the offspring. This trait persists throughout the offspring's life cycle in a cyber ecosystem. When parentage is queried, a steganographic decoder extracts the trait from the offspring and compares it against the traits of candidate parents in a reference pool, thereby nominating the most likely one. A theoretical analysis characterises phylogenetic accuracy as a function of projector and stegosystem properties, whilst empirical evaluations across multiple projectors and stegosystems demonstrate the viability of the proposed methodology under a broad spectrum of processing operations and semantic modifications. We envision a cyber ecosystem in which synthetic information, endowed with hidden yet traceable lineage traits, branches from a simple beginning into endless forms that have been, and are being, evolved.

Language Models (LMs) emit Chains-of-Thought (CoTs) that drive much of their capability. However, the same sequence that carries useful reasoning can also covertly convey messages: a misaligned model may embed covert information in its CoT that slips through human supervision, a form of steganography known as encoded reasoning. Prior LM steganography schemes operate in the token or lexical space, and a content-preserving paraphraser is the canonical and effective defense in recent work. We introduce conceptual steganography, in which each step of a CoT carries information through patterns of high-level reasoning behavior, rather than through lexical choice. Across four model families and two reasoning domains, this backdoor communication channel is shown to be consistently more robust to a strong paraphrase defense than standard keyword approaches, and the encoding of information into CoTs does not affect their utility in the reasoning process. Having raised awareness of this new risk, we then demonstrate that a strategy-aware paraphraser can close much of the channel, highlighting new challenges and recommended defenses for ensuring faithful LLM reasoning in the wild.

While 4D Gaussian Splatting (4DGS) has revolutionized high-fidelity dynamic reconstruction, safeguarding the intellectual property of these assets remains an open challenge. Conventional steganographic techniques often neglect the underlying kinematic manifolds, triggering non-physical artifacts such as severe temporal flickering and "FVD collapse". To address this, we propose \textbf{4D-GSW}, a kinematic-aware watermarking framework designed to embed robust copyright information while preserving high spatio-temporal consistency. Unlike prior 4D steganography that primarily focuses on opacity-guided invisibility, our approach explicitly addresses the physical coherence of motion trajectories. We introduce a \textbf{Spatio-Temporal Curvature (STC)} metric to identify "Dynamic Instants," adaptively gating watermark gradient injection to shield critical motion manifolds from non-physical perturbations. To ensure global coherence across complex deformations, we formulate a joint \textbf{HMM-MRF energy minimization} model that synchronizes watermark phases within both temporal trajectories and spatial neighborhoods. Furthermore, an \textbf{anisotropic gradient routing} mechanism ensures that watermark embedding remains strictly decoupled from photometric reconstruction fidelity. Extensive experiments have demonstrated the superior performance of our method in robustly hiding watermarks while resisting various attacks and maintaining high rendering quality and spatiotemporal consistency.

The growing use of information hiding in network streaming media for covert communication poses a significant security threat, necessitating the development of robust detection technologies. However, existing steganalysis methods for network voice streams mostly rely on data distributions in specific scenarios, making it difficult to adapt to the practical detection needs of non-homologous data distributions. Through Hessian analysis, we find that the loss landscapes of mainstream models are dominated by numerous saddle points and sharp local minima, rendering them highly sensitive to data distribution shifts and fundamentally limiting generalization. Therefore, we propose a new optimizer, Domain-Aware Sharpness Minimization (DASM). The core mechanisms of DASM consist of two aspects: first, it integrates domain-supervised contrastive learning with sharpness-aware optimization, explicitly preserving inter-domain feature separation while seeking flat minima; second, we design an adaptive domain gap modulation strategy that dynamically calibrates the optimization loss weights by sensing the real-time feature separability of different domains. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our method outperforms the state-of-the-art methods by a large margin and achieves excellent generalization and robustness.

Steganalysis models excel on benchmark datasets but struggle in the wild when analyzed images are produced by a processing pipeline unseen during training. This problem known as Cover Source Mismatch (CSM) is particularly hard in realistic settings where practitioners (1) have access to only a small, unlabeled dataset, (2) are unsure of the processing techniques applied to these images, and (3) lack information on the proportion of covers and stegos in that set. To answer this challenge, we introduce TADA (Target Alignment through Data Adaptation), a framework learning to emulate the unknown processing pipeline from a small unlabeled target set. This architecture is trained with a loss combining residual covariance alignment, residual distribution matching, and a $\ell^2$ loss constraining the emulator to produce realistic images. Across toy and operational targets, TADA yields substantial gains in robustness to CSM and improves operational generalization compared to strong holistic and atomistic baselines. Additional resources are available at this link: https://github.com/RonyAbecidan/TADA

Modern retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems convert sensitive content into high-dimensional embeddings and store them in vector databases that treat the resulting numerical artifacts as opaque. Major vector-store products do not provide native controls for embedding integrity, ingestion-time distributional anomaly detection, or cryptographic provenance attestation. We show this opens a class of steganographic exfiltration attacks: an attacker with write access to the ingestion pipeline can hide payload data inside embeddings using simple post-embedding perturbations (noise injection, rotation, scaling, offset, fragmentation, and combinations thereof) while preserving the surface-level retrieval behavior the RAG system exposes to legitimate users. We evaluate these techniques across a synthetic-PII corpus on text-embedding-3-large, four locally hosted open embedding models, a cross-corpus replication on BEIR NFCorpus and a Quora subset (over 26,000 chunks combined), seven vector-store configurations, an adaptive-attacker variant of the detector evaluation, and a paraphrased-query retrieval benchmark. Distribution-shifting perturbations are often caught by simple anomaly detectors; small-angle orthogonal rotation defeats distribution-based detection across every (model, corpus) pair tested. A disjoint-Givens rotation encoder gives a closed-form per-vector capacity ceiling of floor(d/2) * b bits, but real embedding manifolds impose a capacity-detectability trade-off, and the retrieval-preserving operating point sits well below it. We propose VectorPin, a cryptographic provenance protocol that pins each embedding to its source content and producing model via an Ed25519 signature over a canonical byte representation. Any post-embedding modification breaks signature verification. Embedding-level integrity is a deployable, standardizable control that closes this attack class.

Image steganography is widely used to protect user privacy and enable covert communication. However, it can also be abused by the adversary as a covert channel to bypass content moderation, disseminate harmful semantics, and even hide malicious instructions in images to elicit dangerous outputs from large models, posing a practical security risk that continues to evolve. To address the lack of a unified and systematic evaluation framework, we propose SADBench, a systematic benchmark that assesses the adversary's ability to inject harmful secrets via steganography and the defender's ability to detect such threats through steganalysis. Crucially, SADBench comprises $4$ core tasks, namely steganography attack capability evaluation, steganalysis defense capability evaluation, efficiency evaluation, and transferability evaluation. It evaluates both image-payload and text-payload steganography across diverse cover distributions, utilizing harmful visual semantics and toxic instructions to simulate malicious attacks. Across a broad set of attacks and detectors, SADBench reveals that (i) INN and autoencoder-based methods demonstrate superior stability compared to other architectures, (ii) in-domain detection is near-perfect and cheaper than generation, (iii) a critical asymmetry exists in transferability where attacks robustly generalize to new distributions while detectors fail to adapt, and (iv) real-world threats persist on social media, where payloads either survive minimal compression or effectively adapt to aggressive compression via simulated training. Overall, SADBench establishes a systematic, reproducible, and extensible framework to quantify risks, paving the way for measurable and security-driven advancements in steganography defense.

Large language models (LLMs) have made fluent essay writing, code drafting, and quiz answering instantly available to students at every level, from secondary school through graduate study. Many educators do not object to LLM use \emph{per~se}; what they need to detect is the case in which a student pastes the assignment prompt into a chatbot and submits the model's reply verbatim, without engaging with the work. Existing post-hoc AI-text detectors remain unreliable and have been shown to penalise non-native English writers, while output-side watermarks require cooperation from the model provider. We propose an alternative that the educator controls directly: an input-side watermark in which an invisible instruction is embedded inside the visible assignment prompt itself. An LLM that ingests the prompt verbatim quietly reads the hidden instruction and writes a tell-tale signature into its reply, exposing the copy-and-paste pathway specifically. We describe SteganoPrompt, a single-page, zero-dependency web tool that encodes an arbitrary printable-ASCII payload into the deprecated Unicode Tags block (\texttt{U+E0000}--\texttt{U+E007F}). The encoded string is visually identical to the original, survives common copy-paste channels (Word, Google Docs, PDF, Markdown, Slack, e-mail, the major learning-management systems), and is reliably tokenized by frontier models. We evaluate compliance across seven LLM families and a representative set of educational content channels. The work is informed by my experience as a graduate teaching assistant for an undergraduate software engineering course at the George Washington University. The tool is released under the MIT licence at \url{https://ezharjan.github.io/SteganoPrompt/}.

Image steganalysis, which aims at detecting secret information concealed within images, has become a critical countermeasure for assessing the security of steganography methods, especially the emerging invertible image hiding approaches. However, prior studies merely classify input images into two categories (i.e., stego or cover) and typically conduct steganalysis under the constraint that training and testing data must follow similar distribution, thereby hindering their application in real-world scenarios. To overcome these shortcomings, we propose a novel interpretable image steganalysis framework tailored for invertible image hiding schemes under a challenging zero-shot setting. Specifically, we integrate image hiding, revealing, and steganalysis into a unified framework, endowing the steganalysis component with the capability to recover the secret information embedded in stego images. Additionally, we elaborate a simple yet effective residual augmentation strategy for generating stego images to further enhance the generalizability of the steganalyzer in cross-dataset and cross-architecture scenarios. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our proposed approach significantly outperforms the existing steganalysis techniques for invertible image hiding schemes.

This paper presents Quantum Gatekeeper, a context-bound image steganography framework where successful payload recovery depends on both cryptographic decryption and the reconstruction of a precise extraction path. The system integrates lossless least significant bit (LSB) embedding with a deterministic variational quantum circuit (VQC)-derived gate key, multi-factor contextual binding, and authenticated encryption. Payload extraction is contingent upon four requisite factors: a password, a shared secret, a user-supplied context string, and a reference image signature. Any deviation in these factors causes the system to read from an incorrect pixel sequence or fail authentication, resulting in silent rejection rather than partial disclosure. The proposed method derives a gatecontrolled extraction key from a seed-conditioned variational circuit, with parameters generated via cryptographic hash expansion and context-dependent image features. To ensure encode/decode consistency, the cryptographic key path is generated via exact statevector simulation; concurrently, IBM superconducting quantum hardware is utilized to evaluate the statistical behavior of the circuit family under physical noise. We introduce a dual-region image layout to resolve the nonce bootstrapping dependency, separating header recovery from payload recovery through independently derived keys. Experimental results confirm successful end-to-end message embedding and recovery on PNG images, demonstrating deterministic success under correct conditions and failure otherwise. The framework supports both text and image payloads; in the image-in-image configuration, a secret image is resized to a fixed resolution prior to embedding, enabling exact pixel-level recovery under correct contextual reconstruction.

With the popularity of the large language models (LLMs), text steganography has achieved remarkable performance. However, existing methods still have some issues: (1) For the white-box paradigm, this steganography behavior is prone to exposure due to sharing the off-the-shelf language model between Alice and Bob.(2) For the black-box paradigm, these methods lack flexibility and practicality since Alice and Bob should share the fixed codebook while sharing a specific extracting prompt for each steganographic sentence. In order to improve the security and practicality, we introduce a black-box text steganography with a dynamic codebook and multimodal large language model. Specifically, we first construct a dynamic codebook via some shared session configuration and a multimodal large language model. Then an encrypted steganographic mapping is designed to embed secret messages during the steganographic caption generation. Furthermore, we introduce a feedback optimization mechanism based on reject sampling to ensure accurate extraction of secret messages. Experimental results show that the proposed method outperforms existing white-box text steganography methods in terms of embedding capacity and text quality. Meanwhile, the proposed method has achieved better practicality and flexibility than the existing black-box paradigm in some popular online social networks.

3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has recently redefined the paradigm of 3D reconstruction, striking an unprecedented balance between visual fidelity and computational efficiency. As its adoption proliferates, safeguarding the copyright of explicit 3DGS assets has become paramount. However, existing invisible message embedding frameworks struggle to reconcile secure and high-capacity data embedding with intrinsic asset utility, often disrupting the native rendering pipeline or exhibiting vulnerability to structural perturbations. In this work, we present \textbf{\textit{Splats in Splats++}}, a unified and pipeline-agnostic steganography framework that seamlessly embeds high-capacity 3D/4D content directly within the native 3DGS representation. Grounded in a principled analysis of the frequency distribution of Spherical Harmonics (SH), we propose an importance-graded SH coefficient encryption scheme that achieves imperceptible embedding without compromising the original expressive power. To fundamentally resolve the geometric ambiguities that lead to message leakage, we introduce a \textbf{Hash-Grid Guided Opacity Mapping} mechanism. Coupled with a novel \textbf{Gradient-Gated Opacity Consistency Loss}, our formulation enforces a stringent spatial-attribute coupling between the original and hidden scenes, effectively projecting the discrete attribute mapping into a continuous, attack-resilient latent manifold. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method substantially outperforms existing approaches, achieving up to \textbf{6.28 db} higher message fidelity, \textbf{3$\times$} faster rendering, and exceptional robustness against aggressive 3D-targeted structural attacks (e.g., GSPure). Furthermore, our framework exhibits remarkable versatility, generalizing seamlessly to 2D image embedding, 4D dynamic scene steganography, and diverse downstream tasks.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore steganographic CoT--where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text--to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. Steganographic reasoning requires two skills in a single forward pass: computing an intermediate result, and embedding it into a coherent cover that answers an unrelated question. Drawing on our taxonomy of steganographic and non-steganographic CoT types, we systematically evaluate the limits of prompt-elicited steganographic CoT capability across 34 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across five datasets, comparing against plain reasoning, direct answer, and filler-token baselines. The two experiments isolate the two sub-skills: a reasoning tasks sweep tests joint reason-and-embed, while a counting task hands the model a known numerical sequence and tests embedding alone--a necessary precondition for stego reasoning. Current frontier models cannot sustain joint reason-and-embed: a paired McNemar comparison shows the steganographic channel is dominated by an filler-token baseline on every (model, family) cell. The encoding-only floor, by contrast, is cleared--Claude Opus~4.5 reaches 92% per-number partial accuracy on 4-digit sequences and saturates at 100% exact-match on length-8 single-digit sequences--establishing that the binding constraint on stego CoT is the joint reasoning-plus-encoding load, not raw channel capacity. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risk and provide a methodology to preemptively detect and evaluate hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.