Tamper Localization
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4 papers in the last four weeks, down 20% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.
Latest papers 36
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used for AI-generated image (AIGI) detection, providing natural-language explanations for authenticity judgments. However, their ability to interpret text within images may also expose these judgments to misleading semantic cues. We systematically evaluate typographic attack strategies across detection-oriented, open-weight, and commercial VLMs, considering both real-to-fake and fake-to-real attacks. Our results show that reasoning modes generally exhibit greater vulnerability than direct modes and that attack effectiveness exhibits pronounced directional asymmetry. Moreover, larger models tend to exhibit higher clean detection accuracy but also higher attack success rates. We further examine attack robustness under image and text transformations and investigate whether overlays indicating the correct class can aid error correction. Together, these analyses characterize how typographic attacks influence authenticity judgments and expose limitations of current VLM-based AIGI detection systems.
From Sharp Eyes to Expert Mind: Internalizing Expert Knowledge in MLLMs for Tampered Text Detection
Tampered Text Detection (TTD) is essential for safeguarding document authenticity in security-critical workflows. Existing expert models are effective at capturing subtle manipulation traces but often generalize poorly across diverse document domains, while Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) offer stronger semantic understanding and transferability yet remain insensitive to fine-grained forensic artifacts. This complementarity motivates us to investigate how expert forensic perception can be internalized into an MLLM rather than merely accessed through an external module. We identify a fundamental Double Mismatch that hinders this goal: a Spatial Precision Mismatch between coarse visual tokens and tiny tampered regions, and a Perceptual Granularity Mismatch between semantics-oriented pre-training and low-level forensic perception. To address these challenges, we propose Expert Knowledge Internalization (EKI), a progressive two-stage framework that transfers forensic expertise into the MLLM itself. In Stage 1, Text-Focused and Image-Focused strategies establish precise spatial focus on small text regions. In Stage 2, the proposed Forensic-General Representation Alignment (FGRA) loss aligns shallow LLM representations with those of a pre-trained forensic expert, enabling the model to acquire fine-grained artifact perception before such cues are diluted by deeper semantic abstraction. Extensive experiments on multiple in-domain and cross-domain benchmarks demonstrate that EKI achieves state-of-the-art performance and stronger generalization than existing expert-model-based and MLLM-based methods. Moreover, the expert is required only during training, allowing the resulting MLLM to maintain inference efficiency nearly identical to the vanilla model without relying on any external expert at inference.
DGF-Bench: A Benchmark for Simulating and Auditing Deception Against Multi-Agent Governance Boards
Tool-using language-model agents can review enterprise projects as governance boards do: they read the evidence, apply written rules and decide whether the project may proceed. Part of that evidence comes from suppliers and project members with a stake in the decision. DGF-Bench is a benchmark in which a board of agents (specialist gates and a General gate that consolidates their decisions) reviews synthetic dossiers while an attacker plants deceptive content in evidence the organization does not vouch for. Dossiers are generated from canonical facts under 61 executable rules, with 42 authoritative records and 32 narrative documents; every gate is certified decidable from those records. Attacks never change an authoritative value, so an attacked dossier keeps the reference decisions of its clean copy. A success is attributable only when the agent receives the injection and takes the exact injected action, which it does not take on the paired clean dossier; the DGF score is the share of applicable fixed attacks a model blocks. Reading documents and records themselves, five of six models were outcome-strict (disposition, findings, actions and authorization all correct) on 82 to 85 of 85 gates. Over 2,622 attacked gate runs, seven direct-order, false-data and false-authority attacks obtained one attributable success against these five, whereas task-aligned attacks imitating the organization's own process passed against four of them: a record note citing a fake review procedure lowered GPT-6 Luna Pro from 34 to 6 outcome-strict gates and DeepSeek V4 Pro from 33 to 7. DGF scores ranged from 96.2 to 26.9, and a policy-aware adaptive attacker writing in records succeeded against five of six models. The approval tool executed no forged approval, yet deceived agents submitted approvals that the rules forbid. The open-source package dgf-bench computes the DGF score with one command.
Predictive Likelihood Ratios for Language Model Watermark Detection
Keyed watermark detection tests dependence between observed tokens and pseudorandom variables reconstructed from a secret key. Building on the pivotal framework of Li et al. (2025), we construct predictive likelihood ratios that average over uncertain probability deficits and residual-tail distributions. The aim is robust detection power across alternative specifications without requiring a single signal-strength tuning. A mixture prior combines tail shape and effective width; hierarchical extensions allow within-document variation in deficit or width. The test maximizes prior-averaged power at a fixed size, but is not generally uniformly most powerful or minimax. Under the exact conditional pivot null, normalized predictive alternatives selected before each observation yield a Bayes factor that is also a test martingale: Type I error control is unaffected by alternative misspecification and remains valid under optional stopping. This guarantee does not cover violations of the conditional null, and the interpolated implementation has no certified anytime guarantee. Gumbel marginal likelihoods are evaluated by fixed quadrature. Across the evaluated tail-shape and tail-width alternatives and three horizons, the union-tail mixture has maximum observed Type II error regret .0080, compared with .0962 for the equal-tail mixture, relative to the best tested rule. On temperature-matched outputs from two open models, it improves AUC over the equal-tail baseline in all eight non-saturated model-temperature cells, although the leading reference score generally has higher AUC. Supplementary experiments show retained power under independent null-like replacement and smaller changes from hierarchical dependence modeling. The evidence supports robustness across the evaluated alternatives, not uniform power guarantees or resistance to arbitrary text edits.
Scoring Without the Engine: Validating a Deterministic, Manipulation-Resistant Content Score for Generative Engines, End to End
How do you validate a cheap, deterministic proxy for an oracle that is expensive, rate-limited, and non-stationary? We present a protocol built on adversarial falsification gates (negative control, dose response, bounded amplification, duplication penalty, length neutrality) that define and select the proxy, fitted on a training split and confirmed held-out; around them it bounds what the proxy can never resolve, and re-measures external causal evidence on the current oracle rather than assuming it. We demonstrate it end to end on Generative Engine Optimization, where the proxy is a deterministic content score, and one step fails on that domain exactly as the protocol is built to detect: re-measuring the only published causal anchors (2023 effect sizes) on ten modern engine families shows their levers move citation on none, so the anchors are an expired external check; recalibrating to the near-zero modern vector strips the score of its lever-responsive components. What survives is the gate-enforced response surface. The gates buy a measured property: on a 500-source benchmark of adversarial edits, amplifying the score's calibrated levers gains an attacker at most 6 points, and decreases with dose; single-lever amplification is provably bounded, while the cap and cross-lever sub-additivity are empirical findings consistent with it. On detection, web-spam baselines dominate and out-of-distribution attacks evade the score, so the deployable filter layers it over them. A query-conditioned skyline bounds the score's citation signal (within-query Spearman 0.11), repositioning query-agnostic scores as quality filters rather than citation predictors. A query-leakage bug in our first ranking evaluation and a failed confidence flag are disclosed and corrected; every number reproduces offline from released artifacts at zero marginal API cost.
SegWave: Wavelet-Driven Segmentation of Tampered Regions
Verifying image authenticity is increasingly difficult, posing serious risks across journalism, law enforcement, and political domains. Most existing forensic methods rely on high-level visual artifacts and treat frame detection as a simple binary task. To address this, we propose SegWave, a hybrid framework that jointly leverages spatial and frequency-domain cues for image tampering detection. SegWave integrates a transformer-based architecture with the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to capture localized, multi-scale frequency inconsistencies indicative of manipulation. To further improve localization effectiveness, we introduce an Adaptive Sub-band Attention module (ASA) that dynamically highlights the informative high-frequency wavelet components. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that SegWave consistently outperforms state-of-the-art tampering detection methods in challenging evaluation settings.
APT: Anchor-aligned Perturbations for Tamper Localization in Fully Regenerated Images
Proactive tamper localization embeds an imperceptible signal into an image prior to distribution, enabling pixel-level manipulation detection. Existing methods assume a spliced (SP) setting, where synthesized regions are composited onto the original background, leaving embedded signals intact. However, real-world diffusion-based inpainting operates in a fully regenerated (FR) setting, where the entire image undergoes denoising, disrupting background signals and rendering existing frameworks ineffective. We propose APT, a semi-fragile latent-space perturbation that embeds a dense, vector-wise localization signal. By aligning each spatial feature vector toward a fixed anchor direction, APT localizes tampering via the alignment disparity between synthesized foreground and anchor-aligned background features after inpainting. The proposed hard negative mining loss and noisy perturbation branch further enforce uniform alignment. Experiments on COCO demonstrate that APT achieves an FR IoU of 0.92, outperforming the strongest baseline (WAM, 0.84), while existing methods collapse to near-random performance (AUC 0.5), establishing APT as a practical forensic framework generalizable across tampering types unknown at test time.
Tracing Provenance and Detecting Tampering with Complementary LLM Watermarks
Watermarking LLM-generated text is an important task for tracing its provenance. Existing LLM watermarks preserve provenance under editing, but this same robustness allows an adversary to alter critical content while retaining attribution, a vulnerability known as piggyback spoofing. We introduce an innovative watermark that jointly provides provenance and tamper evidence. It co-embeds a robust signal and a fragile signal into each generated token. The signals share the same mechanism but use independent keys and different seeding windows over normalized text, making one resilient to edits and the other sensitive to reader-visible changes. Multiple rounds of unbiased tournament reweighting preserve the expected generation distribution, while a periodic round-allocation pattern controls the trade-off between the two signals. At detection, their scores form a two-dimensional space supporting three decisions: Intact, Tampered, and No-Watermark. Across two large language models and two prompt datasets, our method demonstrates the highest tamper-detection rate among the evaluated methods while maintaining competitive attribution robustness and perplexity. Ablation studies show that reliable three-state detection requires a well-defined notion of intactness, co-embedding of the two signals, and complementary sensitivity to edits.
Excess Separability: Nuisance-Controlled Residual-Stream Probing for Benchmark Contamination Detection
Benchmark contamination is diagnosed today with n-gram overlap, with likelihood-based membership inference, or with canary strings, and each needs something usually unavailable: the training corpus, a well-chosen test statistic, or foresight at dataset release. A recent alternative reads contamination off a linear probe on internal activations. We show that the natural way to do this does not work, and specify one that survives measurement. The protocol reports a zero-sum contrast on the depth profile of probe accuracy, recentred on a level-matched placebo baseline, tested against a label-permutation null, with the reference set twice the size of the suspect set. Each choice replaces a simpler alternative we measured and rejected. Reporting the level of excess separability rather than its shape makes the false positive rate track the size of the analyst's own control set, from 0.03 to 0.99 under a true null. Contrasting against a flat depth profile fails in both directions, rejecting a true null 0.72 of the time when surface decodability rises with depth and losing all power when it falls. An item bootstrap holds the fitted probe fixed and rejects up to 0.09 of the time where a permutation null that refits it holds 0.02. A half-size baseline triples the error rate. On real transformers, baseline depth profiles are measurably not flat, spanning up to 29.1 accuracy points on a temporal split, and their non-flatness tracks the surface difference between the item sets (correlation 0.87 over 6 audits), so the correction is largest exactly where it is needed. All 4 well-matched Pile arms return null, and the protocol refuses a verdict on the temporal split rather than reporting one. What this does not establish is whether transformers carry a familiarity direction at all: the only positive sits on the split where exchangeability fails. Implementation, tests and audits are released.
From Noise to Meaning: Meaningful Secret Sharing with Tamper Detection for Facial Recognition
Popularity of AI-based face recognition system directly demands protection of sensitive biometric data used for training. Visual secret sharing is an interesting idea, as it splits facial images into secret shares that look random and spread across many institutions. However, these shares look like noise and can easily spark suspicion and recognized as encrypted content. This makes them open to targeted collection and harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. Additionally, visual secret sharing does not detect tampering, allowing attackers to modify shares and threaten the integrity of reconstruction. In this paper, we introduce a new method that turns distracting noise-like secret shares into visually appealing cover images with additional cryptographic tamper detection. The proposed technique works with visual secret sharing and introduces cover images to embed the shares using adaptive least significant bit steganography. Here, cover images with perceptual transparency are used to store secret shares while guaranteeing complete privacy. A two layer authentication using strong digital watermarking and cryptographic hashing is used to protect the integrity of shares. The proposed technique shows high resilience in stopping bit-flipping, cropping, and substitution attacks. Extensive experiments on multiple public face datasets show that the technique shows better FR accuracy, while eliminating share conspicuousness and guaranteeing integrity. The proposed framework sets a new standard for protecting facial data in such a way that privacy, security, and integrity are protected.
When Is Benchmark Contamination Detectable? Information Limits and Power-Calibrated Audits
Behavioral contamination detectors can return "no evidence" either because a benchmark is clean or because the audit has little power. We formalize this distinction for a benchmark in which an unknown fraction alpha of items was seen during training. With matched clean and seen controls, the behavioral channel is the sparse mixture Q_alpha = (1 - alpha) P_0 + alpha P_1, and an exact second-moment argument shows that detectability is governed by alpha * rho * sqrt(m), where rho^2 = chi^2(P_1 || P_0) measures behavioral separability. Any scalar detector reduces to its efficacy, ef = |E_1 f - E_0 f| / sqrt(Var_0(f)) <= rho, which can be estimated from controls before the audit is run. A separate sample-split certificate lower-bounds alpha distribution-free, without requiring an orientation assumption. Our empirical finding is two-sided. Frozen calibration efficacy predicts held-out power curves, with R^2 = 0.83-0.98 across six exact-permutation channels, but the efficacy-only Gaussian budget is miscalibrated at the small sample sizes it prescribes, failing in 9/9 gate-passing channels even though efficacy itself transports. The failure is in the inversion, not the calibration. A predeclared two-stage planner that simulates the deployed test repairs the budgets, is uniformly conservative, and abstains when its probe does not transport. The certificate is valid but vacuous at audit scale, and a five-seed paired injection study recovers the mechanism ordering verbatim > paraphrase > surface, in which the apparent answer-only signal is explained by baseline drift. We report the audit contract and its failures together: a non-rejection is interpretable only alongside the efficacy, budget, and validity gates that produced it.
Stylometric Defenses Against Author Impersonation in Software Repositories
Software supply-chain attacks increasingly exploit an identity gap where compromised maintainer accounts authorize malicious changes. This work evaluates patch-level authorship verification as a behavioral defense layer, showing that stylometric analysis can operate not only on full source files but also on patch-level commits. We fine-tune a cross-modal transformer on more than 20 years of Linux kernel commit history to embed code diffs and commit messages into a unified stylometric space, achieving ROC AUC of 0.93 for open-world authorship verification. We then use these representations in a streaming anomaly detector suited to continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) settings. We validate the pipeline on two retrospective supply-chain incidents involving different patch characteristics: the 2021 PHP backdoor and the 2026 ForceMemo/GlassWorm campaign. Without retraining, the proposed detector surfaces both PHP forged commits within approximately 1% of the maintainer audit queue and ranks the 28 scoreable ForceMemo spoofs with a median per-repository review burden of 0.8%. These results indicate that cross-modal patch-level embeddings can support behavioral triage against author impersonation in real-world repositories.
Audio Cross Verification Using Dual Alignment Likelihood Ratio Test
This paper explores a way to verify that audio has not been maliciously tampered in a specific context: short viral videos taken from news recordings. Rather than trying to detect artifacts of tampering (internal inconsistency), we focus on positively verifying a query against a trusted source such as a news recording (external consistency). We propose a method for cross verifying a short audio query against a reference recording from which it was taken. Our approach is to define two hypotheses (non-tampered vs tampered), calculate the most likely alignment between query and reference for each hypothesis, and then perform a likelihood ratio test on the two alignments. We show that this method is fast to compute, much more robust than using MFCC features with Euclidean distance, and has the key benefit of explainability. Our cross verification approach provides an alternative perspective and complementary tool to existing tampering detection methods.
Clean-Reference Streaming Detection of Lens Occlusion and Photometric Transitions for Camera Tamper Monitoring
A surveillance camera is an image sensor whose silent physical degradation invalidates every downstream consumer of its data. In-situ integrity alarms for such vision sensors require low false-alarm rates, bounded computation, and diagnosable behavior under nuisance illumination changes. This paper studies a deliberately narrow streaming integrity monitor for two low-cost sensor-fault signatures: texture-collapsing lens occlusion and abrupt photometric scene transition. The detector compares sampled luminance and local-gradient statistics with a clean-only sliding reference, applies coarse-grid structured-light rejection and mode/rapid-brightness suppression, and emits at most one notification per tamper episode. We formalize the decision predicates and derive a consistency rule for when rapid-brightness suppression makes the scene-transition path unreachable. On 320 in-scope controlled sequences, the default state machine attains 0.800 F1 and 0.822 balanced accuracy (significantly better paired correctness than the strongest baseline, though the F1 margin is not statistically resolved); on a magnitude-swept public audit it attains the highest partial AUC under a 5% false-alarm budget, and a separate extended-stress FPR-constrained sweep reaches 0.925 recall at 0.025 false-positive rate. Public Xiph, Bremen IoT, and UHCTD diagnostics show the fixed predicates preserve low false alarms while recall concentrates inside the declared envelope (UHCTD in-scope covered recall 0.667 versus 0.016 out of scope), and a 9.09-camera-hour verified-negative public audit records zero false alarms. The method is best interpreted as an auditable sensor-health subsystem rather than a universal camera-tamper classifier.
Video Transformer for Remote Identity Document Hologram Detection
Remote identity authentification using Identification Documents has been a major challenge for several years. DeepFakes advent and the development of AI-guided tools helps fraudsters creating counterfeit ID Documents. Ensuring the authenticity of ID Documents has become a real clue in the seurization of remote authentification. This need is all the more pressing given the increasing digitization of administrative and transactional processes. To ensure widespread accessibility, the system should rely solely on video captured via mobile devices. In this specific context, confirming the authenticity of ID is a real challenge as many security features needs specific device like infrared sensor for instance. Among underutilized but promising security features, holographic printings hold a special place. Difficult to counterfeit, they produce distinctive visual effects according enlightment, making them both detectable in a video captured by a smartphone camera and difficult to imitate. In this paper, we propose a Remote Identity Document Verification System (RIDVS) and an approach based on a video transformer for detecting holograms in simple videos captured by smartphones. Our system is designed for a smartphone-based capture process, followed by a server-side verification. The hologram detection method builds on a robust model previously validated in a related research domain. We demonstrate that it outperforms existing SotA methods, achieving near-perfect accuracy even when trained on medium- to small-sized datasets. In particular, we report improvements of +26.86% in Recall and +17.93% in accuracy over the best MIDV-Holo baseline. This study includes several experiments that evaluate the model adaptation to frugality, both for training samples and computational resources.
Observation-Level Watermarking and Detection for Tabular Data
With the development of generative AI, watermarking techniques have been widely used to detect the authenticity of AI-generated data and protect the rights of users and creators. While it is already well applied in data types including imaging and text data, watermarking tabular data is still under-explored. Existing methods primarily focus on numerical data, leaving discrete, categorical, and mixed data less studied. In this work, we propose STAMP (Single-observation Tabular Attribution and Marking Procedure), a novel framework for watermarking tabular data that can accommodate and preserve a wide range of distributions. We also develop a corresponding detection mechanism, which can reliably identify watermarks even when the sample size is as small as one. We establish theoretical guarantees for asymptotic consistency and detection accuracy. Finally, through extensive simulation studies and two real-data applications, we demonstrate that the proposed method is effective and robust to subsetting, while maintaining data fidelity and a high detection rate.
Has This Checkpoint Been Abliterated? A Two-Signal Audit and Its Failure Map
Can a platform tell, before deployment, whether an open-weight checkpoint has had its refusal mechanism stripped? Runtime guards cannot: they score generations, not the artifact. We combine two cheap internal signals, a reference-anchored activation refusal-gap and a weight-recovery energy of the base-to-candidate weight difference, into a threshold-free checkpoint audit. The two are negatively correlated and label-complementary: the gap supplies refusal-specificity and the weight energy supplies recall. On a 273-checkpoint registry spanning Qwen, DeepSeek-distilled Qwen, Llama, and Gemma, their z-sum separates 57 public abliterations from 37 benign fine-tunes, merges, and instruction-tunes at AUROC 0.95, significantly above either signal alone (0.84, 0.90), and a Youden-calibrated threshold transfers to held-out families at balanced accuracy 0.89 (FPR 0.11), missing only 4 of 57. We then map two failures, in order of severity: a spoofed reference evades both axes with no training (ΔW=0, \r{ho}=1 by construction), and a white-box owner trains a checkpoint past the threshold while it stays guard-unsafe and coherent. The audit is effective triage, not tamper-proofing: it presumes an attested reference, and its claims are bounded by the registry we evaluate it on.
CORE-BREW: LLR-Based Soft Decoding for Robust Multi-Bit LLM Watermarking
Reliable provenance for LLM outputs requires multi-bit watermarks that remain robust under editing while maintaining strict false-positive control. Existing ECC-based LLM watermarks rely largely on hard-decision decoding, discarding token-level reliability information. We propose CORE-BREW, a Constant-hit-Rate Embedding extension of block-wise BREW for robust multi-bit watermarking. CORE-BREW calibrates the watermark channel by targeting a fixed hit rate p-star, yielding closed-form per-token log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) for principled soft-decision decoding. It supports two detection modes: Strict-Safe, which preserves the bounded-distance designated-codeword acceptance region, and FPR-Calibrated, which uses likelihood-based scoring and lightweight list decoding to characterize the FPR-TPR trade-off. Experiments on open-source LLMs under token-level edits and paraphrasing demonstrate improved low-FPR discrimination and robustness over prior multi-bit watermarking baselines while maintaining comparable semantic quality.
Efficient Document Tampering Localization with Multi-Level Discrepancy Features and Unified DCT-Quantization Embedding
Localizing document tampering is extremely challenging, as manipulations are crafted to appear visually consistent and often leave only subtle traces that are nearly invisible to the human eye. In prior work, evaluation has been largely dominated by synthetic benchmarks that closely match the training distribution, and methods have shown steady progress under this setting. However, these gains often translate poorly to human-made forgeries and to cross-domain evaluation, where both the source documents and the tampering pipeline can change, leading to a distribution shift. In addition, since the introduction of the Frequency Perception Head for the discrete cosine transform (DCT) modality, it has become a standard choice, and subsequent work has largely focused on downstream modules and fusion strategies rather than revisiting the backbone itself. To help close this gap in cross-domain performance and improve the DCT backbone design, we propose \textbf{DiffNet}, a relatively simple yet effective RGB--DCT early-fusion architecture driven by two key design choices. First, to ensure that the decoder aggregates multi-scale inconsistency evidence rather than operating on raw, content-heavy activations, we apply a lightweight multi-level discrepancy transformation at the output of each backbone stage, replacing features with magnitude-only responses to learned zero-sum filters. Second, we design an efficient DCT-domain backbone that relies on a lightweight frequency-index-aware DCT--quantization joint embedding. Our approach achieves state-of-the-art performance on cross-domain and human-made document tampering localization, outperforming prior methods by around 30%, with up to higher throughput than the previous best model.
Veriphi: Attack-Guided Neural Network Verification with Dataset-Dependent Training Methods
We present Veriphi, a GPU-accelerated neural network verification system that combines fast adversarial attacks with formal bound certification using alpha,beta-CROWN methods. Through systematic experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 using three training methodologies (standard, adversarial, certified), we demonstrate that training method effectiveness is fundamentally dataset-dependent. Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) achieves 78% certified accuracy on simple MNIST (784 dimensions) but provides negligible certification performance on the more complex CIFAR-10 dataset, where PGD adversarial training dominates with 94% certification at small perturbations. We achieve 5x verification speedup through attack-guided falsification and scale our approach to production-size models (105.8M parameters) for real-world aerospace logistics optimization. Our results challenge the assumption that certified training universally outperforms adversarial training, showing context matters critically for verification strategy selection.
Signature filtering: a lightweight enhancement for statistical watermark detection in large language models
Statistical watermarks help organizations attribute large language model (LLM) outputs, yet existing detectors often struggle when watermark signals are weak, texts are repetitive, or watermarks are edited. We propose signature filtering, a detection-time module that enhances watermark detection without modifying watermark embedding and text generation. It learns a small set of ``signature'' tokens whose presence makes watermark tests unreliable, and removes these tokens before detection. The signatures are obtained by solving a mixed-integer linear program on a small training set, with constraints that maximize the true positive rate. We additionally derive finite-sample and asymptotic bounds under several attacker models (color-blind, color-adaptive, and distributionally correlated). On four well-known watermark families (Kgw, Sweet, Unigram, Exp), four benchmark corpora (C4, MBPP, HumanEval, Code-Search-Net), and six LLMs (Opt-1.3b, Opt-6.7b, Llama2-13b, Llama3.1-8b, Qwen2.5-14b, Phi-3-medium-14b), 2- and 3-gram signatures raise detection rates in weak-signal and low-entropy settings from 831% without filtering to 7899% with filtering, while keeping false positives controllable and often negligible. In stress tests where we scramble sentences and perturb 25~50% of tokens by dilution, deletions, and substitutions, 2-gram filters for Kgw-style watermarks preserve most of the clean-text detection gains, often matching or outperforming the advanced WinMax watermark detector. Signature filtering thus provides a simple, scalable, and model-agnostic add-on to strengthen watermark-based provenance checks for LLM text in information processing workflows.
AliMark: Enhancing Robustness of Sentence-Level Watermarking Against Text Paraphrasing
Existing sentence-level watermarking methods enhance robustness to paraphrasing by anchoring watermarks in sentence semantics. However, their prefix-based designs remain vulnerable to structural perturbations, such as sentence splitting and merging, which commonly arise under strong paraphrasers like DIPPER and GPT-3.5. To mitigate this issue, we propose AliMark, a framework that reformulates sentence-level watermarking as a bit sequence encoding and alignment problem between a potentially watermarked text and a secret bit sequence. Notably, our approach adopts a two-stage detection strategy: we generate multiple restructured text variants and adaptively align their extracted bit sequences with the secret bit sequence to minimize alignment cost. This multi-candidate alignment design naturally improves robustness to sentence merges and splits. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AliMark substantially outperforms state-of-the-art baselines under diverse paraphrasing attacks.
Alignment Tampering: How Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback Is Exploited to Optimize Misaligned Biases
Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is the standard method to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences. In this work, we introduce alignment tampering, a potential vulnerability where the LLM undergoing alignment influences the preference dataset, causing RLHF to amplify undesired behaviors. This arises from core limitations of RLHF: (1) preference datasets are constructed from the LLM's own outputs, allowing it to influence them, and (2) pairwise comparisons only indicate which response is better, not why. These limitations can be exploited to cause alignment tampering. For example, if an LLM generates biased responses with higher quality, annotators will prefer them based on quality. However, preference labels do not distinguish quality from bias, and the reward model inherits this limitation. Optimizing such rewards through reinforcement learning or best-of-N sampling can amplify misaligned biases. Our experiments demonstrate amplification across diverse biases: from keyword bias to propaganda (e.g., sexism), brand promotion, and instrumental goal-seeking. Mitigation remains challenging, as existing techniques for robust RLHF fail to fully resolve alignment tampering without sacrificing response quality. These findings reveal structural vulnerabilities of current RLHF and emphasize the need to prevent this vulnerability. Project page: https://alignment-tampering.github.io/
SAMark: A Self-Anchored Text Watermarking with Paragraph-Level Paraphrase Robustness
Semantic-level watermarking (SWM) improves robustness against text modifications by treating sentences as the basic unit. However, robustness to paragraph-level paraphrasing remains difficult because such attacks globally disrupt watermark signals by changing sentence order. In this work, we propose SAMark, a self-anchored watermarking framework that removes the dependency on sentence order by establishing a step-independent green region in semantic space. To improve detectability, we introduce a multi-channel hyperbolic scoring mechanism that amplifies watermark signals while suppressing noise from weakly aligned candidates. We further propose a diversity-aware filtering strategy that combines hard filtering with soft regularization, extending beyond simple n-gram repetition filters to address semantic redundancy. Experimental results show that SAMark achieves up to 90.2% TP@FP1% under typical paragraph-level paraphrasing attacks, outperforming the strongest prior baseline by more than 30% on average, while maintaining generation quality competitive with unwatermarked text and breaking the robustness-quality trade-off that limits prior methods. Our code will be released at this URL.
Watermarks Attack Watermarks: Re-Watermarking as a Generic Removal Strategy
Watermarking combines an imperceptible change to an input image that will trigger a detector, to assert provenance and protect intellectual property. The literature has shown great interest in attacks on watermarking schemes: attackers are clearly motivated to steal copyrighted material or circumvent legislated deepfake protections. In this work, we make a simple-yet-powerful observation: that such attacks on watermarking-like watermarks themselves-seek an imperceptible change to an input image (now already watermarked) that will trigger a detector. This analogy comparing watermark attacks to watermarking itself is highly suggestive: that watermarks could be used to attack watermarks. Our first contribution validates this hypothesis. In rigorous experiments spanning 96 combinations of dataset, victim, and attack watermarks, we show that simply re-watermarking an already watermarked image reliably suppresses the original signal, without requiring gradients, surrogate models, or detection keys. Our second contribution is a simple classifier for detecting the presence and identity of an existing watermark in a given image. Surprisingly, experimental findings demonstrate outstanding overall accuracies 0.878-0.953. This result is of independent interest as a security vulnerability: research shows that method-specific attacks achieve substantially stronger removal than black-box attacks. Taken together, watermark identification combined with re-watermarking successfully reduces bit accuracy by at least 25% and up to 48%. Our work constitutes a cheap, generic, and highly effective attack pipeline, calling into question the reliability of current watermarking schemes to such a simple attack, as well as the value of existing sophisticated attacks.
TextSeal: A Localized LLM Watermark for Provenance & Distillation Protection
We introduce TextSeal, a state-of-the-art watermark for large language models. Building on Gumbel-max sampling, TextSeal introduces dual-key generation to restore output diversity, along with entropy-weighted scoring and multi-region localization for improved detection. It supports serving optimizations such as speculative decoding and multi-token prediction, and does not add any inference overhead. TextSeal strictly dominates baselines like SynthID-text in detection strength and is robust to dilution, maintaining confident localized detection even in heavily mixed human/AI documents. The scheme is theoretically distortion-free, and evaluation across reasoning benchmarks confirms that it preserves downstream performance; while a multilingual human evaluation (6000 A/B comparisons, 5 languages) shows no perceptible quality difference. Beyond its use for provenance detection, TextSeal is also ``radioactive'': its watermark signal transfers through model distillation, enabling detection of unauthorized use.
Chainwash: Multi-Step Rewriting Attacks on Diffusion Language Model Watermarks
Statistical watermarking is a common approach for verifying whether text was written by a language model. Most existing schemes assume autoregressive generation, where tokens are produced left to right and contextual hashing is well defined. Diffusion language models generate text by denoising tokens in arbitrary order, so these schemes cannot be applied directly. A recent watermark by Gloaguen et al. addresses this gap for LLaDA 8B Instruct and reports true positive detection above 99%. This paper studies what happens when watermarked text is rewritten not once but several times. Using the same watermark configuration, 1,605 watermarked completions of about 300 tokens each are produced across five WaterBench domains. Each completion is rewritten by four open weight language models, from 1.5B to 8B parameters, none of which know the watermark key. Five rewrite styles are tested: paraphrase, humanize, simplify, academic, and summarize expand. Each style is chained for up to five hops, producing 160,500 rewritten texts in total. The watermark is detected on 87.9% of the original outputs at the standard significance threshold. After a single rewrite, detection falls to between 14% and 41% depending on the rewriter and style. After five chained rewrites, detection falls to 4.86%, meaning 94.76% of the originally detected texts are no longer flagged. After three rewrites, the detector score has dropped 86% of the way from its watermarked baseline toward the null distribution. Repeated rewriting is therefore a much stronger attack than a single rewrite, and the result holds across all four rewriters tested.
SWAN: Semantic Watermarking with Abstract Meaning Representation
We introduce SWAN (Semantic Watermarking with Abstract Meaning Representation), a novel framework that embeds watermark signatures into the semantic structure of a sentence using Abstract Meaning Representation (AMR). In contrast to existing watermarking methods, which typically encode signatures by adjusting token selection preferences during text generation, SWAN embeds the signature directly in the sentence's semantic representation. As the signature is encoded at the semantic structure level, any paraphrase that preserves meaning automatically preserves the signature. SWAN is training-free: watermark injection is achieved by prompting an LLM to generate sentences guided by a selected AMR template while maintaining contextual coherence, and detection uses an off-the-shelf AMR parser followed by a simple one-proportion z-test. Empirical evaluation on the RealNews benchmark shows SWAN matches state-of-the-art detection performance on unaltered watermarked text, while significantly improving robustness against paraphrasing, increasing detection AUC by up to 13.9 percentage points compared to prior methods. These results demonstrate that SWAN's approach of anchoring watermarks in AMR semantic structures provides a simple, effective, and prompt-based method for robust text provenance verification under paraphrasing, opening new avenues for semantic-level watermarking research.
Toward Fine-Grained Speech Inpainting Forensics:A Dataset, Method, and Metric for Multi-Region Tampering Localization
Recent advances in voice cloning and text-to-speech synthesis have made partial speech manipulation - where an adversary replaces a few words within an utterance to alter its meaning while preserving the speaker's identity - an increasingly realistic threat. Existing audio deepfake detection benchmarks focus on utterance-level binary classification or single-region tampering, leaving a critical gap in detecting and localizing multiple inpainted segments whose count is unknown a priori. We address this gap with three contributions. First, we introduce MIST (Multiregion Inpainting Speech Tampering), a large-scale multilingual dataset spanning 6 languages with 1-3 independently inpainted word-level segments per utterance, generated via LLM-guided semantic replacement and neural voice cloning, with fake content constituting only 2-7% of each utterance. Second, we propose ISA (Iterative Segment Analysis), a backbone-agnostic framework that performs coarse-to-fine sliding-window classification with gap-tolerant region proposal and boundary refinement to recover all tampered regions without prior knowledge of their count. Third, we define SF1@tau, a segment-level F1 metric based on temporal IoU matching that jointly evaluates region count accuracy and localization precision. Zero-shot evaluation reveals that partial inpainting at word granularity remains unsolved by existing deepfake detectors: utterance-level classifiers trained on fully synthesized speech assign near zero fake probability to MIST utterances where only 2-7% of content is manipulated. ISA consistently outperforms non-iterative baselines in this challenging setting, and the dataset, code, and evaluation toolkit are publicly released.
Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking
Recent multi-bit watermarking methods for large language models (LLMs) prioritize capacity over reliability, often conflating decoding with detection. Our analysis reveals that existing ECC-based extractors suffer from catastrophic false positive rates (FPR), and applying rejection thresholds merely collapses detection sensitivity (TPR) to random guessing. To resolve this structural limitation, we propose BREW (Block-wise Reliable Embedding for Watermarking), a framework shifting the paradigm to designated verification. BREW employs a two-stage mechanism: (i) blind message estimation via independent block voting, followed by (ii) window-shifting verification that rigorously validates the payload against local edits. Experiments demonstrate that BREW achieves a TPR of 0.965 with an FPR of 0.02 under 10% synonym substitution, demonstrating that the high-FPR issue is not an inherent trade-off of multi-bit watermarking, but a solvable structural flaw of prior decoding-centric designs. Our framework is model-agnostic and theoretically grounded, providing a scalable solution for reliable forensic deployment.
LAVA: Layered Audio-Visual Anti-tampering Watermarking for Robust Deepfake Detection and Localization
Proactive watermarking offers a promising approach for deepfake tamper detection and localization in short-form videos. However, existing methods often decouple audio and visual evidence and assume that watermark signals remain reliable under real-world degradations, making tamper localization vulnerable to multimodal misalignment and compression distortions. Moreover, existing semi-fragile visual watermarking methods often degrade significantly under codec compression because their embedding bands overlap with compression-sensitive frequency regions. To address these limitations, we propose Layered Audio-Visual Anti-tampering Watermarking (LAVA), a calibration-aware audio-visual watermark fusion framework for deepfake tamper detection and localization. LAVA leverages cross-modal watermark fusion and calibration-aware alignment to preserve consistent and reliable tamper evidence under compression and audio-visual asynchrony, enabling robust tamper localization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LAVA achieves near-perfect detection performance (AP = 0.999), remains robust to compression and multimodal misalignment, and significantly improves tamper localization reliability over existing audio-visual fusion baselines.
Who Audits the Auditor? Tamper-Proof Fraud Detection with Blockchain-Anchored Explainable ML
In enterprise fraud detection, model accuracy alone is insufficient when insiders can tamper with audit logs or bypass approval workflows. Real-world incidents show that fraud often persists not because detection algorithms fail, but because the audit trail itself is controllable by privileged operators. This exposes a fundamental trust gap: who audits the auditor? We present a tamper-evident fraud detection system that anchors both ML predictions and workflow execution to an immutable blockchain ledger. Rather than using blockchain as passive storage, we enforce the entire approval process through smart contracts, ensuring that every transaction, prediction, and explanation is atomically recorded and cannot be retroactively modified. Our detection module achieves competitive accuracy (F1 = 0.895, PR-AUC = 0.974) while providing cryptographically verifiable decision trails that support regulatory auditability requirements (e.g., GDPR Article 22). System evaluation shows sub-25 ms inference latency and economically viable deployment on Layer-2 networks at under $0.01 per transaction (validated against PolygonScan data), supporting enterprise-scale workloads of 10,000+ monthly payments.
Subject-level Inference for Realistic Text Anonymization Evaluation
Current text anonymization evaluation relies on span-based metrics that fail to capture what an adversary could actually infer, and assumes a single data subject, ignoring multi-subject scenarios. To address these limitations, we present SPIA (Subject-level PII Inference Assessment), the first benchmark that shifts the unit of evaluation from text spans to individuals, comprising 675 documents across legal and online domains with novel subject-level protection metrics. Extensive experiments show that even when over 90% of PII spans are masked, subject-level inference protection drops as low as 33%, leaving the majority of personal information recoverable through contextual inference. Furthermore, target-subject-focused anonymization leaves non-target subjects substantially more exposed than the target subject. We show that subject-level inference-based evaluation is essential for ensuring safe text anonymization in real-world settings.
Data Provenance Auditing of Fine-Tuned Large Language Models with a Text-Preserving Technique
We propose a system for marking sensitive or copyrighted texts to detect their use in fine-tuning large language models under black-box access with statistical guarantees. Our method builds digital
marks'' using invisible Unicode characters organized into (cue'', reply'') pairs. During an audit, prompts containing only cue'' fragments are issued to trigger regurgitation of the corresponding ``reply'', indicating document usage. To control false positives, we compare against held-out counterfactual marks and apply a ranking test, yielding a verifiable bound on the false positive rate. Empirically, we obtain a true positive rate of 96.7% at 0% false positive rate and reply regurgitation rates exceeding 28% per document with only 40 (4%) watermarked documents. The approach is minimally invasive, scalable across many sources, robust to standard processing pipelines, and achieves high detection power even when marked data is a small fraction of the fine-tuning corpus.Fast segmentation of watermarked texts from large language models through an epidemic change-point framework
With the growing use of large language models, concerns over content authenticity have spurred a variety of watermarking schemes. These schemes use secret keys to detect machine-generated text while remaining imperceptible to readers. Detection typically reduces to statistical hypothesis testing for the presence of watermarks, a topic that is now well studied. In contrast, the finer-grained task of localizing which segments of a text are watermarked is much less explored; existing approaches often lack scalability or guarantees robust to paraphrasing and post-editing. We bring a new perspective to this segmentation problem through the lens of epidemic change-points and, by exploiting this connection, propose WISER, a novel and computationally efficient watermark segmentation algorithm. We establish finite-sample error bounds and consistency for detecting multiple watermarked segments in a single text. Complementing these theoretical results, our extensive numerical experiments show that WISER outperforms state-of-the-art baseline methods, both in terms of computational speed as well as accuracy, on various benchmark datasets embedded with diverse watermarking schemes. Together, these theoretical and empirical results position WISER as an effective tool for watermark localization and illustrate how classical statistical ideas can yield theoretically valid and computationally efficient solutions to a modern problem of immediate importance.
CertDW: Towards Certified Dataset Ownership Verification via Conformal Calibration
Deep neural networks (DNNs) rely heavily on high-quality open-source datasets (e.g., ImageNet) for their success, making dataset ownership verification (DOV) crucial for protecting public dataset copyrights. In this paper, we find existing DOV methods (implicitly) assume that the verification process is faithful, where the suspicious model will directly verify ownership by using the verification samples as input and returning their results. However, this assumption may not necessarily hold in practice and their performance may degrade sharply when subjected to intentional or unintentional perturbations. To address this limitation, we propose the first certified dataset watermark (i.e., CertDW) and CertDW-based certified dataset ownership verification method that ensures reliable verification even under malicious attacks, under certain conditions (e.g., constrained pixel-level perturbation). Specifically, inspired by conformal prediction, we introduce two statistical measures, including principal probability (PP) and watermark robustness (WR), to assess model prediction stability on benign and watermarked samples under noise perturbations. We derive provable certification conditions relating WR to a PP-based calibration threshold, and a high-probability upper bound on the false positive rate, enabling ownership verification when a suspicious model's WR value significantly exceeds the PP values of multiple benign models trained on watermark-free datasets. If the number of PP values smaller than WR exceeds a threshold determined via conformal calibration, the suspicious model is regarded as having been trained on the protected dataset. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of our CertDW method and its resistance to potential adaptive attacks. Our codes are at \href{https://github.com/NcepuQiaoTing/CertDW}{GitHub}.