Tool Access Control for LLM Agents
LLM: Large Language Model
Overview
This field studies how to ensure an LLM agent uses only the tools and permissions justified by a user's task, across settings such as APIs, browsers, coding environments, and MCP-based systems. Common approaches include task-scoped least-privilege policies, capability-based delegation, provenance and information-flow tracking, and runtime gateways that check calls before execution or commit; human approval is often reserved for consequential actions. Evidence shows that prompts and static tool allowlists can leave gaps, especially when calls change meaning across steps, permissions persist, or authorization is not bound to the exact action and current state. A central challenge is balancing strong, verifiable restrictions with useful autonomy, while evaluating both unauthorized effects and unnecessary denials in realistic, long-running workflows.
Latest papers
222 papers42 papers in the last four weeks, up 8% on the four weeks before. 0.2% of all new papers.
AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use
Hybrid Inspection and Task-Based Access Control in Zero-Trust Agentic AI
Enforcing Benign Trajectories: A Behavioral Firewall for Structured-Workflow AI Agents
Governed MCP: Kernel-Level Tool Governance for AI Agents via Logit-Based Safety Primitives
SafeHarness: Lifecycle-Integrated Security Architecture for LLM-based Agent Deployment
ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection
Beyond Static Sandboxing: Learned Capability Governance for Autonomous AI Agents
OpenKedge: Governing Agentic Mutation with Execution-Bound Safety and Evidence Chains
A Formal Security Framework for MCP-Based AI Agents: Threat Taxonomy, Verification Models, and Defense Mechanisms
ClawLess: A Security Model of AI Agents
Causality Laundering: Denial-Feedback Leakage in Tool-Calling LLM Agents
Measuring the Permission Gate: A Stress-Test Evaluation of Claude Code's Auto Mode
SentinelAgent: Intent-Verified Delegation Chains for Securing Federal Multi-Agent AI Systems
APEX: Agent Payment Execution with Policy for Autonomous Agent API Access
Evaluating Privilege Usage of Agents with Real-World Tools
A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework
AIP: Agent Identity Protocol for Verifiable Delegation Across MCP and A2A
ClawKeeper: Comprehensive Safety Protection for OpenClaw Agents Through Skills, Plugins, and Watchers
The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense
AgentWall: A Runtime Safety Layer for Local AI Agents
Before the Tool Call: Deterministic Pre-Action Authorization for Autonomous AI Agents
AC4A: Access Control for Agents
Solver-Aided Verification of Policy Compliance in Tool-Augmented LLM Agents
Herding CATs: ALARA for Agent Harness Engineering in Portable Composable Multi-Agent Teams
npcsh -- and evaluating 22 locally-hosted models from 0.6B to 35B parameters across 115 practical tasks spanning file operations, web search, multi-step scripting, tool chaining, and multi-agent delegation. We characterize which model families succeed in certain task categories and where they break down across 2500 total executions.