Socially-Weighted Alignment: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in interacting populations, raising the question of what such populations come to believe collectively. Whether a population aggregates genuine knowledge or collapses into a false consensus directly affects how much such systems can be trusted. Classical social-network models assume that the network itself determines how beliefs combine. This assumption breaks down for LLM agents, whose limited attention takes in only part of what they are exposed to, so these models overstate how much information a population actually pools and cannot tell genuine consensus from herding. We introduce SNLA, a framework that models how much each agent actually influences others, rather than merely how the network connects them. This influence depends on each agent's position in the network and on how sharply attention focuses. Theoretically, we show on a tractable proxy that narrow attention causes herding, where the effective sample size stays bounded regardless of population size, while wide attention recovers wisdom-of-crowds behavior only when the exposure graph is undirected and degree-regular. Empirically, a controlled testbed validates these predictions directly, and the herding-wisdom transition reproduces on operator-controlled variants of three multi-agent LLM benchmarks.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) assume that collaborating inherently improves Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning. We challenge this by demonstrating that simulated social pressure triggers an algorithmic Bystander Effect,'' inducing severe cognitive loafing. By evaluating 22,500 deterministic trajectories across 3 dataset contexts (GAIA, SWE-bench, Multi-Challenge) with 3 state-of-the-art (SOTA) models, we semantically audit internal reasoning traces against external outputs. We formalize the *Interaction Depth Limit* ($D_L$), the exact plurality threshold where an agent's logical sovereignty collapses into social compliance. Crucially, we uncover the *Sovereignty Gap*: models frequently compute the correct derivation internally but suffer Alignment Hallucinations'' -- actively subjugating empirical evidence to sycophantically appease a simulated swarm. We prove that multi-agent social load is strictly non-commutative; the "brand" identity of the ``Lead Anchor'' auditor disproportionately dictates the swarm's integrity. These findings expose architectural vulnerabilities, proving that unstructured multi-agent topologies can degrade independent reasoning.

As LLM agents increasingly collaborate on complex tasks, how to organize their interactions becomes a central design question. Existing multi-agent systems typically learn or adapt explicit roles, hierarchies, routing policies, or communication topologies. We shift the learning target to a reusable local law that can be shared across interchangeable agents and adapt coordination as populations or interaction conditions change, without redefining a global organization. We introduce Waggle, a shared anonymous policy over bounded local views that jointly selects task actions, semantic communication, and local commitment updates. Repeated execution of the same law allows coordination to form, persist, and reorganize online without explicit roles or global topology. To learn this law across interchangeable agents and evolving coordination, we develop Swarm-Consistent Distillation (SCD), combining anonymous-orbit consistency with rollout-grounded prediction of the next local coordination field, with no added inference-time components. Across diverse coordination settings, the same learned law remains effective as populations and interaction budgets change, retains over 96% of substrate-specific oracle quality, and transfers without retraining; SCD further improves reorganization after counterevidence. Together, these results show that LLM-agent organization can emerge and adapt through repeated execution of a learned local law.