Sharing is caring: data sharing in multi-agent supply chains

We study collaborative learning in multi-agent Bayesian bandit problems, where strategic agents collectively solve the same bandit instance. While multiple agents can accelerate learning by sharing information, strategic agents might prefer to free-ride and avoid exploration. We consider a setting with persistent agents that participate in multiple time periods. This is in contrast to most previous works on incentives in multi-agent MAB, which assume short-lived agents, namely each agent has a single decision to make and optimizes their expected reward in that single decision. As in the multi-agent MAB model with incentives, our model does not have monetary transfers, and the only incentives are through information sharing. We propose CAOS, a mechanism that sustains collaboration as a Nash equilibrium while achieving strong regret guarantees. Our results demonstrate that collaborative exploration can be sustained purely through information sharing, achieving performance close to that of fully cooperative systems despite strategic behavior.

Multi-agent coordination under partial observability requires agents to share complementary private information. While recent methods optimize messages for intermediate objectives (e.g., reconstruction accuracy or mutual information), rather than decision quality, we introduce SeqComm-DFL, unifying the sequential communication with decision-focused learning for task performance. Our approach features value-aware message generation with sequential Stackelberg conditioning: messages maximize receiver decision quality and are generated in priority order, with agents conditioning on their predecessors. The guidance potential determined by their prosocial ordering. We extend Optimal Model Design to communication-augmented world models with QMIX factorization, enabling efficient end-to-end training via implicit differentiation. We prove information-theoretic bounds showing that communication value scales with coordination gaps and establish $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$ convergence for the bilevel optimization, where $T$ denotes the number of training iterations. On collaborative healthcare and StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC) benchmarks, SeqComm-DFL achieves four to six times higher cumulative rewards and over 13% win rate improvements, enabling coordination strategies inaccessible under information asymmetry.

This paper studies the performance and reliability of autonomous generative AI agents in multi-echelon supply chains using the MIT Beer Game. We examine how model choice, operational guardrails, centralized data sharing, and prompt design affect system performance. In our best-performing configuration, GenAI agents reduce total supply-chain costs by up to 80% relative to human teams. Despite strong average performance, autonomous agents can exhibit substantial run-to-run instability, generating volatile procurement decisions and large tail costs. We characterize this phenomenon as agent bullwhip, the amplification of decision instability in autonomous multi-agent systems. We show that this instability can propagate across echelons and compound over time, even when the underlying demand path is held fixed. We then evaluate two approaches for improving reliability: reinforcement-learning post-training and operational guardrails. Both reduce tail events and mitigate agent bullwhip, but they operate through different mechanisms and require different levels of information and model access. Reinforcement-learning post-training delivers the largest gains in reliability and system performance when system-level feedback is available, while guardrails provide a simple training-free alternative for constraining extreme decisions.