Invariant Causal Routing for Governing Social Norms in Online Market Economies

In this paper, we explore using generative agent-based models for a classical ABM application: testing how individual-level behavioral rules produce collective phenomena. We introduce RePair, a method that calibrates simulation worlds, operationalizes candidate mechanisms as natural-language rules, estimates their effects through matched interventions, and examines behavioral traces. We assess the method by testing it in four simulation worlds grounded in established social-science models and empirical studies. Our results reveal that (1) natural-language rules can produce measurable collective effects; (2) rule comparisons can converge as configurations accumulate; and (3) behavioral traces connect collective effects to agents' actions and interactions, helping researchers evaluate the proposed causal process. Together, these findings show the feasibility of using generative agent-based models to explore causal mechanisms and provide practical guidance for producing reliable, interpretable explanations.

Online platforms increasingly rely on opinion aggregation to allocate real-world attention and resources, yet common signals such as engagement votes or capital-weighted commitments are easy to amplify and often track visibility rather than reliability. This makes collective judgments brittle under weak truth signals, noisy or delayed feedback, early popularity surges, and strategic manipulation. We propose Credibility Governance (CG), a mechanism that reallocates influence by learning which agents and viewpoints consistently track evolving public evidence. CG maintains dynamic credibility scores for both agents and opinions, updates opinion influence via credibility-weighted endorsements, and updates agent credibility based on the long-run performance of the opinions they support, rewarding early and persistent alignment with emerging evidence while filtering short-lived noise. We evaluate CG in POLIS, a socio-physical simulation environment that models coupled belief dynamics and downstream feedback under uncertainty. Across settings with initial majority misalignment, observation noise and contamination, and misinformation shocks, CG outperforms vote-based, stake-weighted, and no-governance baselines, yielding faster recovery to the true state, reduced lock-in and path dependence, and improved robustness under adversarial pressure. Our implementation and experimental scripts are publicly available at https://github.com/Wanying-He/Credibility_Governance.

By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in the environment. Such signals must have enough correlation to orchestrate mutually beneficial coordination and enough disincentivizing uncertainty about the benefits of exploiting that coordination. Evolutionary game theory of matrix games has been used to describe how, by rational agents comparing and adopting norms, a norm can evolve to become dominant in a population. Morsky & Akçay (2019) classify norms according to a set of rationality criteria. Joint player strategies that adopt norms that are consistent with optimal single-player strategies with respect to expected reward naturally satisfy a correlated, rather than Nash game theoretic equilibrium condition. Here, we present a version of this theory that clarifies the basic ingredients. We formulate it in the more general Markov game setting more commonly used in reinforcement learning theory. We illustrate the theory by mapping norms over the signal and reward space, while also giving a detailed exposition of the underlying mechanics of the approach. Finally, we give a general solution and analysis of replicator dynamics, which Morsky & Akçay (2019) propose as a means by which these norms could emerge.