Evolutionary Game Theory

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Evolutionary game theory examines how strategies change in populations and networks, helping explain cooperation, competition, social norms, and collective decisions. Researchers use replicator dynamics, invasion tests for evolutionarily stable strategies, and models with mutation, noisy choice, or imitation, alongside simulations of finite and spatial populations. Applications include public-goods and prisoner’s dilemma games, traffic, decentralized learning, and interactions among AI agents. A central challenge is that a strategy stable under evolutionary dynamics may be difficult for actual learning agents to discover, while incentives that increase cooperation do not always improve social welfare.

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31 papers2 papers in the last four weeks, down 33% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Bayesian Replicator Dynamics and the Inversion of Strict Dominance in Bimatrix Games
Oct 26, 2026Jaime Ruiz-Serra, Nihat Ay, Michael HarréGame Theory Replicator Dynamics
Centre for Complex Systems, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia · Institute for Data Science Foundations, Hamburg University of Technology, Hamburg, Germany
An evolutionary origin of collective decision making in humans and machines
Oct 5, 2026Guocheng Wang, Qi Su, Joshua B. PlotkinMulti-Agent Systems Evolutionary Game Theory
Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA · School of Automation and Intelligent Sensing, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China · Meiji Institute for Advanced Study of Mathematical Sciences, Meiji University, Nakano, Tokyo 164-8525, Japan
Agent-Based Evolutionary Dynamics for Mixed Autonomy Weaving Ramps
Sep 29, 2026Sheryl Paul, Kexin Wang, Ruolin Li +1Intelligent Transportation Systems Agent-Based Modeling
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
Evolutionary Stability Does Not Guarantee Learning Accessibility: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Perspective on Cooperation Emergence
Sep 23, 2026Yijie WangEmergent Behavior in Multi-Agent Systems Cooperative MARL
Liupanshui Normal University Liupanshui, Guizhou, China
Tapes Together Strong: The Co-evolution of Computation and Cooperation
Sep 9, 2026Kunal Jha, Francesco Cicala, Blaise Agüera y Arcas +4Artificial Life Evolutionary Game Theory
Dept. of Computer Science, University of Washington. · Google Paradigms of Intelligence. · School of Computer Science, McGill University; Mila. +1
Entropic Risk-Sensitive Evolutionary Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games
Sep 8, 2026Solaleh Mohammadi, Xiang Gao, Kaiqing ZhangDynamical Systems Game Theory
University of Maryland, College Park. · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.
The Open-Strategy Dictator Game: Cooperation Under Mutual Transparency
Aug 14, 2026Michael GlassGame Theory Evolutionary Game Theory
Emergence of Reputation-Based Cooperation in LLM Agents
Aug 5, 2026Kazuya Horibe, Kenji Itao, Wataru ToyokawaCooperative Game Theory Multi-Agent LLMs
RIKEN · RIKNE
Reputation-driven Cooperation in Lattice-based Decentralized Federated Learning through Evolutionary Game Theory
Aug 2, 2026Phuc Hoang Truong Huynh, Dung Tran Vinh, Khoa Duc Anh Lam +9Mechanism Design Evolutionary Game Theory
Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam · Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. · School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom +1
Co-evolution of social reward and punishment under institutional interventions
Aug 2, 2026Van An Nguyen, Vuong Khang Huynh, Hoai Thuong Nguyen +14Social Dilemmas Mechanism Design
Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Vietnam · Vietnam National University - Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM), Vietnam · School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University,2026 United Kingdom +1
Evolutionary dynamics of collective decision-making with local social influence on static and dynamic networks
Jul 23, 2026Yuyuan Liu, Xiaojie ChenOpinion Dynamics Computational Social Science
School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 611731, China
Radial Interaction Tomography: Recognizing Non-Transitive Evolutionary Games from One Range-Expansion Image
Jul 1, 2026Faruk Alpay, Baris BasaranEvolutionary Game Theory Image Inverse Problems
Department of Computer Engineering, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Türkiye
Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment
May 29, 2026Van An Nguyen, Vuong Khang Huynh, Huu Loi Bui +8Social Dilemmas Mechanism Design
Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Vietnam · 2Vietnam National University - Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM), Vietnam · School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University,2026 United Kingdom +1
Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in Next-Generation LLM Agent Systems: A Cross-Provider Empirical Extension
May 28, 2026Francisco León Zúñiga BolívarMulti-Agent LLM Systems LLM Agent Evaluation
Institución Universitaria Colegio Mayor del Cauca · Institución Universitaria Colegio Mayor del Cauca Popayán, Colombia
Constitutional Arms Races in the Public Goods Game: Co-Evolving LLM Constitutions Under Cooperation-Defection Pressure
May 26, 2026Ujwal Kumar, Arth Singh, Hershraj Niranjani +5LLM Red Teaming Multi-Agent LLMs
Shibaura Institute of Technology · NIT Agartala · UC Berkeley +2
Adaptive Punishment for Cooperation in Mixed-Motive Games
May 23, 2026Min Tang, Fanqi Kong, Linyuan Lü +1Evolutionary Game Theory Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China · State Key Laboratory of General Artificial Intelligence, BIGAI, Beijing, China
The Dynamics of Policy Gradient in Social Dilemmas with Partner Selection
May 18, 2026Benedict Russell, Chin-wing Leung, Paolo TurriniSocial Dilemmas Policy Gradient
Mathematics Institute Warwick University · Department of Computer Science Warwick University
The fitness landscape of social norms in social dilemmas
May 13, 2026Maximilian Puelma TouzelSocial Dilemmas Game Theory
Mila - Quebec AI Institute Montréal, Canada
A general classification of the replication dynamics with a unique fixed point in the interior of simplex $S_N$
May 11, 2026Hongju Daisy Chen, Bin Yi, Zhanshan Sam MaDynamical Systems Game Theory
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guilin University of Technology, Guilin, Guangxi, China · Guangxi Colleges and Universities Key Laboratory of Applied Statistics, Guilin, Guangxi, China · Computational Biology and Medical Ecology Lab Biostatistics and Image Genetics Lab Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Kunming, China +2
Modeling Decision-Making with Will for Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
May 9, 2026Yizhe Huang, Bin Ling, Song-Chun Zhu +1Social Dilemmas Evolutionary Game Theory
School of Intelligence Science and Technology, Peking University · State Key Laboratory of General Artificial Intelligence, BIGAI · Law School, Peking University
Evolution of Lane-Changing Behavior in Mixed Traffic: A Quantum Game Theory Approach
Apr 17, 2026Sungyong Chung, Tina Radvand, Alireza TalebpourHuman Behavior Simulation Autonomous Driving Planning
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Evolutionarily Stable Stackelberg Equilibrium
Mar 19, 2026Sam GanzfriedGame Theory Stackelberg Games
Ganzfried Research, Cornell University
Agent-based imitation dynamics can yield efficiently compressed population-level vocabularies
Mar 16, 2026Nathaniel Imel, Richard Futrell, Michael Franke +1Information Bottleneck Evolutionary Game Theory
Department of Psychology, New York University · Department of Language Science, University of California, Irvine · Department of Linguistics, University of Tübingen
Exploration enhances cooperation in the multi-agent communication system
Mar 2, 2026Zhao Song, Chen Shen, Zhen Wang +1Multi-Agent Communication Emergent Behavior in Multi-Agent Systems
School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK · Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan · School of Cybersecurity, and School of Artificial Intelligence, OPtics and ElectroNics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, China
The Replicator-Optimization Mechanism: A Scale-Relative Formalism for Persistence-Conditioned Dynamics with a Conditional Consent-Friction Instantiation
Jan 10, 2026Murad FarzullaDynamical Systems Replicator Dynamics
Dissensus, London, UK · King’s College London, London, UK
Computing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Imperfect-Information Games
Dec 11, 2025Sam GanzfriedImperfect-Information Games Game Theory
Ganzfried Research, Cornell University · Cornell University
The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Three Principles of Strategic Replicators
Dec 5, 2025Kevin VallierSelf-Evolving Agents Evolutionary Game Theory
Institute of American Constitutional Thought and Leadership University of Toledo
Computing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Multiplayer Games
Nov 25, 2025Sam GanzfriedGame Theory Evolutionary Game Theory
Ganzfried Research, Cornell University
Unbeatable imitation of a friend
Jul 22, 2025Masahiko UedaGame-Playing Agents Game Theory
Graduate School of Sciences and Technology for Innovation, Yamaguchi University, 1677-1, Yoshida, Yamaguchi, 753-8511, Japan.
Serious Games: Human-AI Interaction, Evolution, and Coevolution
May 22, 2025Nandini Doreswamy, Louise HorstmanshofHuman-AI Interaction Human-AI Decision Making
Southern Cross University, Lismore, New South Wales, Australia · National Coalition of Independent Scholars · National Coalition of Independent Scholars (NCIS)

Oct 26, 2026J/K move · Enter open · S save

Bayesian Replicator Dynamics and the Inversion of Strict Dominance in Bimatrix Games

Jaime Ruiz-Serra, Nihat Ay, Michael Harré

Centre for Complex Systems, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia · Institute for Data Science Foundations, Hamburg University of Technology, Hamburg, Germany

Game Theory Replicator Dynamics Evolutionary Game Theory

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Replicator dynamics, the central model of evolutionary game theory, describe populations evolving under selection and agents learning by trial and error. They also admit a third use: continuous-time Bayesian inference, in which an agent planning against an opponent accumulates evidence for each candidate strategy. Here we show that this use divides all two-player games into two classes. With the standard expected-utility payoff, the dynamics can be expressed as Bayesian updating only in games (with any number of actions) where no player has a dominant strategy. The logarithmic payoff of Ay and Erb admits the Bayesian representation in every game. Coordination, anti-coordination, and cyclic games share qualitative dynamics under both payoff definitions, with equilibria displaced and selection thresholds shifted. In contrast, the flows of every game with a dominant strategy are reversed between the payoff definitions, with the strictly dominant strategy eliminated under logarithmic payoffs. Cooperation therefore emerges in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and games of common interest converge to mutual defection. For two-action games the classification is complete and rests on an exact Hamiltonian structure shared by both payoff definitions. The structure gives a behavioural test: cycles in the classic Matching Pennies game have amplitude-independent period (isochronous) under logarithmic payoffs, but not under expected utility. Logarithmic evidence integration thus determines which strategic outcomes dynamical selection can reach, wherever learning approximates Bayesian updating.