The Yerkes-Dodson Curve for AI Agents: Emergent Cooperation Under Environmental Pressure in Multi-Agent LLM Simulations

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as multi-turn agents that must sustain goals, use tools, and adapt to other agents over extended interactions. However, existing research lacks auditable, multi-turn, multi-factorial experiments that quantify LLM behavior under explicit constraints, with time-resolved statistics that reveal how behavior unfolds over long horizons. To address this gap, we develop a multi-agent micro-benchmark inspired by the Stanford marshmallow experiment: ReAct agents operate minute-by-minute with a "raise a question" tool under a per-step budget, while we factorially manipulate social context (broadcast vs. isolated), personas (age, hedonic drive), and metacognitive policy (mandatory vs. optional tool use). We analyze outcomes with Kaplan-Meier (KM) survival curves and discrete-time hazard models over a long risk horizon across 19,200 agent trajectories in 64 cells. Behavior shows a sharp early "eat" impulse, and only 75.9% of agents persist to the end. In a discrete-time hazard model, isolation reduces per-minute risk relative to broadcast, whereas a must-use self-questioning policy increases risk. On average, agents ask $\approx 7.12$ questions and hit the per-step budget in $\approx 6\%$ of minutes. Questioning declines faster under broadcast than isolation. Ablation experiments demonstrated that removing hedonic drive and/or persona age increases survival and completion, narrows the broadcast/isolated gap, but leaves the must vs. may ordering intact. The combined ablation (no hedonic + no persona age) yields the highest completion (approaching $1.0$). These results establish delay-of-gratification as a compact, multi-turn interaction benchmark that captures social contagion and tool-use dynamics in LLM agents, providing a reproducible testbed and statistics for analyzing long-horizon, multi-agent behavior.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper, we study LLM agent interactions in two standard games: a network resource allocation game and a Cournot competition game. Rather than converging to Nash equilibria, we find that LLM agents tend to cooperate when given multi-round prompts and non-zero-sum context. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals that fairness reasoning is central to this behavior. We propose an analytical framework that captures the dynamics of LLM agent reasoning across rounds and explains these experimental findings.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.