Agent Island: A Saturation- and Contamination-Resistant Benchmark from Multiagent Games

Do next-generation LLM agents inherit the cooperative biases documented in their predecessors, or does scale and provider diversity reshape equilibrium behaviour in competitive multi-agent settings? Willis et al. established a benchmark for this question using evolutionary game theory and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), finding consistent cooperative biases in ChatGPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet. We extend this benchmark to four frontier models released in 2025-2026 - Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4 Mini - applying the identical protocol across three prompting styles (Default, Prose, Self-Refine) and four population compositions (balanced and biased, with and without noise). Cooperative bias persists across providers (H1): ten of twelve model-prompt combinations favour cooperative equilibria in balanced noiseless conditions. Cross-provider divergence is substantial (H3): Gemini 2.5 Flash reaches up to 77% aggressive equilibria under biased conditions, while GPT-5.4 Mini reaches 70% cooperative equilibria under Self-Refine. Support for aggressive capability parity is partial (H2): Self-Refine raises ICD in all models and Gemini 3.1 Pro Refine achieves the highest ICD in the dataset (0.925), but Default and Prose prompts show no systematic narrowing. Evidence on noise robustness is directionally positive but not robustly confirmed (H4): with n=500 Moran iterations per condition, average noise sensitivity is about 6 percentage points for Claude Sonnet 4.6 versus 13 pp for Claude 3.5 Sonnet, but this cross-study gap is not statistically significant once the predecessor's unreported sampling error is propagated. Provider identity, rather than model generation, is the strongest correlate of equilibrium outcomes; noise remains a universal challenge regardless of model size or vintage.

We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines auctions, hidden-offer trade challenges (TCs), bargaining, bluffing, opponent modeling, and resource allocation within a single long-horizon game lasting 50--60 turns. Unlike prior agent benchmarks that test these abilities in isolation, \textsc{Cattle Trade} evaluates whether agents integrate them across a competitive, multi-agent economic game with conflicting incentives. The benchmark logs every bid, TC offer, counteroffer, and card selection, enabling behavioural analysis beyond final scores or win rates. We evaluate seven cost-efficient language models and three deterministic code agents across 242 games. Strategic coherence, in particular spending efficiency, resource discipline, and phase-adaptive bidding, is associated with rank more strongly than spending volume or any single subskill. Two heuristic code agents outperform most tested LLMs, and behavioural traces surface recurring LLM failure modes including overbidding, self-bidding, bankrupt TC initiation, and weak opponent-state adaptation. Evaluating agentic competence requires benchmarks that test the joint deployment of multiple capabilities in multi-agent environments with conflicting incentives, uncertainty, and economic dynamics.

Large language model agents deployed without a central controller are often assumed to require communication to coordinate their actions. We ask what remains possible without it: when independent instances of the same model cannot communicate, can they still reason about their counterparts well enough to exceed the standard game-theoretic baseline for uncoordinated play? We introduce a benchmark of one-shot, no-communication games in which each of thirteen language models is told only that its counterparts are running the same model and is evaluated against the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. In two-player matrix games spanning seven archetypes and two to ten actions per player, two frontier-hosted models consistently exceed their Nash benchmark, approaching the optimal joint outcome in several archetypes, while most open-weight models achieve only partial gains that vary sharply by game structure. Performance degrades substantially in team-based games with four or more interchangeable agents, particularly as the action space grows, suggesting that whatever capability drives self-play gains in dyadic games does not transfer to larger multi-agent teams.