DICE: Entropy-Regularized Equilibrium Selection for Stable Multi-Agent LLM Coordination
Authors: Yi Xie, Zhanke Zhou, Chentao Cao, Bo Liu, Bo Han
Organizations: Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721-0104, USA · Department of Computer Science Hong Kong Baptist University Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR
Abstract
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often fail to reliably outperform a single strong model equipped with best-of-N sampling. We argue that a core source of this instability is ill-posed equilibrium selection: current systems specify what information agents share, but not which coordination convention should be selected. We formalize a broad class of such systems as discounted incomplete-information Markov games and show that two common pathologies, oscillation between competing conventions and drift across them, can both induce unstable learning and linear Bayesian regret. To obtain a well-posed target, we introduce the Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (HQRE), an entropy-regularized equilibrium concept with agent- and state-dependent temperatures. Under a monotonicity condition, HQRE is unique, admits linearly convergent mirror updates, and yields bounded Bayesian regret; the same condition yields rollout-measurable stability diagnostics. We instantiate this objective in two algorithms: DICE-PC, which coordinates frozen models through prompt-control actions, and DICE-FT, which performs parameter-efficient mirror fine-tuning. Across eleven benchmarks in four domains, DICE improves accuracy-cost trade-offs over strong within-class baselines; on reasoning and planning tasks, DICE-PC improves by 4.3 percentage points on average and DICE-FT by 8.5 points.
Large language model agents deployed without a central controller are often assumed to require communication to coordinate their actions. We ask what remains possible without it: when independent instances of the same model cannot communicate, can they still reason about their counterparts well enough to exceed the standard game-theoretic baseline for uncoordinated play? We introduce a benchmark of one-shot, no-communication games in which each of thirteen language models is told only that its counterparts are running the same model and is evaluated against the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. In two-player matrix games spanning seven archetypes and two to ten actions per player, two frontier-hosted models consistently exceed their Nash benchmark, approaching the optimal joint outcome in several archetypes, while most open-weight models achieve only partial gains that vary sharply by game structure. Performance degrades substantially in team-based games with four or more interchangeable agents, particularly as the action space grows, suggesting that whatever capability drives self-play gains in dyadic games does not transfer to larger multi-agent teams.
Multi-agent LLM systems have shown promise for complex reasoning, yet recent evaluations reveal they often underperform single-model baselines. We identify a structural failure mode in sequential fine-tuning of shared-context teams: updating one agent shifts the team's context distribution, and when subsequent updates are evaluated on cached rollouts, this mismatch compounds. We formalize this as the compounding occupancy shift and prove that stale-occupancy evaluation incurs a penalty that scales quadratically with the number of agents. In contrast, intermediate-occupancy evaluation reduces this to linear scaling. We propose TeamTR, a trust-region framework that resamples trajectories after each component update and enforces per-agent divergence control, yielding rigorous per-update and per-stage improvement lower bounds. Experiments show that TeamTR outperforms single-agent and sequential baselines with 7.1% on average, mitigates coordination regressions, and supports plug-and-play component replacement. Code is available at https://github.com/Yydc/TeamTR.
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often rely on a controller to coordinate a pool of heterogeneous models, yet existing controllers are typically limited to one-shot routing: they select a model once and return its output directly. Such routing-only designs provide no mechanism to critique intermediate drafts or support iterative refinement. To address this limitation, we propose a critique-and-routing controller that casts multi-agent coordination as a sequential decision problem. At each turn, the controller evaluates the current draft, decides whether to stop or continue, and, if needed, selects the next agent for further refinement. We formulate this process as a finite-horizon Markov Decision Process (MDP) with explicit agent-utilization constraints, design a composite reward for controller decisions across turns, and optimize the controller via policy gradients under a Lagrangian-relaxed objective. Extensive experiments across multiple heterogeneous multi-agent systems and seven reasoning benchmarks show that our method consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines and substantially narrows the gap to the strongest agent, while using it for fewer than 25% of total calls.