Safety-Gated Agentic Supervisory Control on a Coupled Distillation Benchmark: Regime Map, Auditable Gate, and Co-Design Findings

Recent literature shows that large language models (LLMs) are useful for general-purpose tasks yet perform poorly on specific domain ones. One reason is the difficulty of supplying narrow context to a general-purpose model and of bounding the task it is asked to perform. It is possible to hypothesise that a multi-agent reformulation under process-control principles offers a route to address those points, since control theory provides a discipline of decomposing a system into elements of contained scope, each defending one controlled variable, with conflicts resolved by structural priority: MIN/MAX selector networks for CV-CV switching and split-range (split-parallel) logic for MV-MV switching. The present work proposes such a reformulation, derived from Advanced Regulatory Control (ARC) theory. Each feedback loop in the ARC chain is mapped to one specialised LLM operator agent carrying the loop's control-theoretic context (controlled variable, setpoint, chain priority, selector kind). The chain's interaction logic (MIN/MAX selectors, override paths) is encapsulated as a single orchestrator agent. Two orchestrator variants are tested: a deterministic rule chain, and a Claude-based LLM orchestrator at a slower tier. The control principles limit each agent's task and inform how its limitations are handled. The multi-agent system inherits the safety property of the ARC chain: every constraint conflict is resolved deterministically by the orchestrator, regardless of the LLM output. Evaluated on a dairy-barn ventilation case over a 4-day mixed-season scenario, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct operator agents running offline on a 24 GB consumer GPU at a 5-minute cadence produce auditable trajectories, each paired with an operator-voice rationale that supports a control campaign logbook.

We propose an agentic Large Language Model (LLM) framework for active Fault-Tolerant Control (FTC) that transforms fault detection outputs into constraint-aware recovery actions grounded in plant-specific knowledge. The approach couples (i) a multi-agent workflow that decomposes operator duties into monitoring, planning, action synthesis, simulation, validation, and reprompting; (ii) a Digital Process Plant Twin (DPPT) that exposes plant data, models, and a simulation service for pre-execution testing; and (iii) a Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generation (Graph RAG) layer built on the CPSMod ontology, which organizes plant knowledge (structure, function, hybrid dynamics, control context, and fault semantics) into a graph that supports relation-aware, multi-hop retrieval for the agents. Corrective actions are generated as minimal-risk state-machine recovery paths and corresponding discrete commands or continuous setpoint adaptations, then validated deterministically against interlocks, envelopes, and dynamic feasibility before any actuation. If no acceptable plan is found within a bounded time window, control is handed to a safety fallback. The framework is evaluated in simulation on two representative benchmarks: a discrete batch Mixing Module and a Continuous Stirred-Tank Reactor (CSTR) under closed-loop PID regulation. Results with lightweight LLMs (GPT-4o-mini and GPT-4.1-mini) show that semantically grounded agents can derive valid recovery decisions within latency budgets compatible with the respective process dynamics, demonstrating a practical pathway from detection to validated corrective action across both discrete and continuous FTC tasks.

As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person. We argue the gate is the easy part; the hard part is the judgment - which actions to stop - which the field evaluates against two false assumptions: that there is a ground-truth notion of "risky," and that the human reviewer is a perfect, infinitely-available oracle. On a hand-labeled set of 125 adversarially-weighted agent actions we show that (i) reviewers only moderately agree on what is risky (Fleiss' kappa = 0.52), so there is no single correct label; (ii) framing the guard as selective classification under asymmetric cost makes its operating limits measurable, and on hard inputs the guard cannot safely auto-decide; and (iii) when the reviewer is modeled as endogenous (fatiguing as escalation load grows), realized safety becomes an inverted-U in the escalation rate: more human oversight can make a system less safe, and the safety-optimal guard escalates below full escalation - a setting a load-aware policy also uses to resist a flooding attack that slips a malicious action past a fatigued reviewer. Agent oversight, framed this way, is not only a classification problem but a resource-allocation one: human attention is finite, and the guard's escalation policy spends it. We claim none of these mechanisms as novel - fatigue-aware learning-to-defer (FALCON), cost-sensitive deferral under workload constraints (DeCCaF), trajectory-level guarding, and reviewer-fatigue/flooding attacks are all prior art we cite. Our contribution is an open-source agent-oversight system that operationalizes and measures them in the LLM-agent action-gating setting, turning "is my guard good?" from a guess into a curve. The inverted-U and the flooding attack are modeling results that motivate a human study.