The Open-Strategy Dictator Game: Cooperation Under Mutual Transparency

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper, we study LLM agent interactions in two standard games: a network resource allocation game and a Cournot competition game. Rather than converging to Nash equilibria, we find that LLM agents tend to cooperate when given multi-round prompts and non-zero-sum context. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals that fairness reasoning is central to this behavior. We propose an analytical framework that captures the dynamics of LLM agent reasoning across rounds and explains these experimental findings.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly operate as interconnected agents, a fundamental question emerges: does individual cooperation translate into collective cooperation? We investigate this question through the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), moving from dyadic interactions to homogeneous and heterogeneous networks of open-weight LLMs. Our findings reveal that cooperation is highly sensitive to model composition and seemingly minor linguistic changes. Models that cooperate with identical peers can shift toward defection in mixed populations. A simple uncertainty cue can increase or decrease cooperation, redistribute costs, and affect unexposed agents several hops away. Even reversing action-label order can dramatically alter behavior, with uncertainty framing sometimes amplifying this sensitivity. Together, these findings challenge the notion of cooperation as a stable model-level property, revealing how strategic behavior depends on interaction partners, network positions, and the language used to frame decisions.

Sequential social dilemma benchmarks capture diverse social interactions, but rarely test whether agents can infer hidden environmental rules through repeated interaction while adapting to other agents. We introduce OpenSocialJax, which extends Clean Up and Commons Harvest across an open-ended distribution of latent environment configurations, systematically varying spatial layouts and hidden rules governing tool crafting, payoffs, and resource dynamics. Each episode samples one configuration from tens of millions of possibilities and holds it fixed across five trials. We evaluate eight large language models, including three closed source models and five open source models. Our evaluation tests whether models can discover hidden rules and adapt to other agents in homogeneous and mixed teams. We find that rule discovery often improves performance but does not reliably sustain cooperation, as the cleaning burden becomes concentrated among fewer agents in OpenCleanup and every team eventually exhausts the shared resource in OpenHarvest. In our mixed arena, one cooperative agent was able to sustain the public good in OpenCleanup at a cost to its own return, but could not prevent resource depletion in OpenHarvest. Together, these results highlight the difficulty of adapting jointly to unfamiliar environmental dynamics and the changing behavior of other agents.