Do System One Decisions Add Up? A Study of Probabilistic Coherence

The appearance of Jev marked the era of System One Models, foundation models that return structured decisions with probability distributions rather than text. Aside from low cost and great speed, Jev's central promise is that these probabilities are calibrated: such claim is not backed by any public test and available external benchmarks evaluate confidence calibration, not whether every returned option probability has the right numerical meaning. To tackle this issue, we introduce Sys1Cal-v1, a dataset of True/False questions about a proposition $A$ for which the exact probability $P(A)$ is known by construction. Each item is queried through the three Jev primitives - Noul, Choice and Score - and evaluated by total variation distance from the ground-truth distribution, which can be used to estimate a soft accuracy of System One Models. We showcase the utility of Sys1Cal-v1 as a benchmark dataset by evaluating Jev and SemIf, an open-source Choice-style baseline. In this work, however, we focus even more deeply on Jev, by studying the calibration of its Score and Choice answers. In particular, we discover a peculiar behaviour that can be explained by assuming that Jev suppresses a third truth value, going beyond True and False. In other words, in \texttt{Choice} answers, $P(A)$ and $P(\neg A)$ are presented as if $P(A)+P(\neg A)=1$, while a term $P(U)\neq0$ is missing in the sum. Recovering $P(U)$ leads to an improvement of median soft accuracy in \texttt{Choice} answers from $0.771$ to $0.978$, suggesting that, even in binary decisions, Jev wants to answer with a third option:``I don't know''.

The shipped Laya Typed-Decisions checkpoint, a 421M-parameter ModernBERT-large assessor that answers typed choice/noul/score questions over workflow state, is uniformly under-confident. The signed confidence-accuracy gap is $-0.214$, every occupied reliability bin's accuracy exceeds its confidence, and that sign uniformity collapses every binned ECE variant to the same value, $0.214$. The card frames the risk as over-confidence; the measured direction is the opposite, and the direction decides which way a confidence-gated cascade fails. A single disjointly fitted temperature ($T=0.469$, sharpening) removes most of the miscalibration (held-out ECE $0.204$ to $0.037$) and outperforms the shipped per-option-count table. The frozen selection rule instead chose isotonic regression, which overfit and failed its held-out NLL contrast on both tracks, so hypothesis H2 is not supported. Re-running the released checkpoint on its full official test split reproduces the card's headline accuracy ($0.767$ vs. $0.766$). The retrospective E1 reproduction preceded the analysis freeze; E2-E8 were prospectively preregistered, and 20 of 22 executed confirmatory tests reject under Benjamini-Hochberg FDR at $q=0.05$ (two descoped). The frozen gate beats random escalation but misses its 10% accepted-set error target on both tracks, an exploratory out-of-distribution probe finds no zero-shot transfer (accuracy $0.617$), and every score measures agreement with a synthetic teacher whose self-agreement ceiling ($0.735$) the specialist exceeds. Per-decision predictions, run manifests, and the frozen preregistration are in the ancillary files. The author has no affiliation with the model's publisher, the dataset's publisher, or TypeSafe.

Confidence is an estimate of the probability that a chosen answer is correct. Verbal confidence reports are widely used as uncertainty measures in large language models, but whether they are best understood as estimates of correctness is unclear. We test this with a two-stage abstention paradigm from the neuroscience of perceptual decision making: a model first answers and reports its confidence, then decides whether to commit it to a user or abstain. Across four non-reasoning models, prompt framings, and confidence formats, verbal confidence predicted the commit/abstain decision substantially better than whether the answer was correct. Calibrated token log-probabilities showed the opposite profile, with abstention-prediction coupled to correctness discrimination, the signature of an answer-evidence signal. After removing the variance verbal confidence shared with log-probabilities, the residual stayed aligned with commitment while its link to correctness fell to near chance. The dissociation generalised to four reasoning models across four benchmarks of varying difficulty, from hard multiple-choice to frontier-level freeform questions. Mechanistic analyses in Gemma 3 and 4 were convergent: a post-answer state known to causally support verbal-confidence generation already encoded the future abstention decision before the abstention prompt, organised mainly by that decision rather than by correctness, the two lying in approximately orthogonal directions in activation space. Steering along a verbal-confidence-specific direction causally shifted abstention. Verbal and log-probability confidence are thus not interchangeable: log-probabilities track answer evidence and correctness, whereas verbal confidence is better understood as a behaviour-facing readout of an internal commit-readiness state, challenging the practice of treating verbal reports as proxies for reliability.