Level-K reasoning generates a hierarchy of policies specialized to opponents with different reasoning levels. When an opponent's level is unknown, a common deployment rule estimates that level and selects the corresponding response. In a dynamic, partially-observed game, this selection is repeated, with each choice shaping subsequent states and observations. The response associated with the most likely opponent level need not maximize expected return from the current history. We formulate this deployment problem as dynamic orchestration of a fixed, pretrained policy library in a partially observable Markov game. We compare classification-based orchestrators (CBOs) trained using offline data or on-policy data aggregation with a reinforcement-learning-based orchestrator (RLBO) trained to maximize expected discounted return. In pursuit-evasion experiments, on-policy training improves classification and return, yet RLBO achieves higher return than the on-policy and offline CBOs. Given a pretrained library, RLBO also reaches performance comparable to a policy trained directly over the pursuers' action space with fewer training timesteps. These findings support treating a hierarchy of level-K policies as a resource for orchestration, not a prescription for deployment.
Figures & tables
k^t∈argmaxkqψ(k∣ht).
Fig. 1 : On-policy opponent classifier training using DAgger-style dataset aggregation.
Fig. 2 : Partially observable pursuit–evasion environment. Pink stars denote possible evader origin and destination locations. The HLP, LLP, and EDR are shown by a blue diamond, blue triangle, and red triangle, respectively. Shaded regions denote their fields of view. Gray, orange, yellow, and green cells correspond to obstacle Types I–IV.
Fig. 3 : Expected discounted return across orchestration strategies.
Fig. 4 : Expected discounted return as a function of orchestration training timesteps.
Fig. 5 : Opponent-level classification accuracy as a function of trajectory timestep.
Fig. 6 : Frequency with which RLBO selects the expert originally trained as a best response to the true opponent level. The dashed line denotes uniform random expert selection.
Fig. 7 : Expected discounted return of the Time-Delayed Oracle as a function of the opponent-level reveal time.
Fig. 8 : Pursuer win rates for different pursuer–evader policy pairs.
We study sequential decision-making in partially observable environments against strategic, adaptive opponents, modeled as partially observable Markov games (POMGs). The central challenge is to learn latent dynamics from partial observations while facing an adversary whose behavior depends on the learner's strategy, making standard regret notions inadequate. We prove that an epoch-based optimistic maximum-likelihood algorithm achieves O~(T) policy regret for fixed problem parameters, with explicit dependence on the horizon, adversary memory, confidence radius, and the aggregate Eluder dimension of the observable-operator class. The algorithm selects one policy per geometrically growing epoch using confidence sets built cumulatively from past data, which keeps the cost of comparing adversary responses across policies logarithmic in T. We also prove a lower bound matching the T and aggregate-Eluder-dimension dependence, up to problem-dependent and logarithmic factors. Finally, we extend the framework to horizon-adaptive guarantees and adversaries with geometric fading memory.
Raman Arora
Department of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA.
Lux AI Season 3 requires agents to act under partial observability, randomized episode level dynamics, and a best of five match structure that rewards both tactical execution and fast adaptation. We present HORIZON, a hierarchical agent that combines symmetry aware spatial perception, dual memory belief tracking, relic centric graph attention, information gain driven exploration, and an opponent conditioned policy mixture. HORIZON separates short horizon control from cross match meta reasoning, while auxiliary belief and world model objectives stabilize learning. Trained with PPO in a large scale JAX simulator, the resulting agent explicitly infers hidden game parameters and opponent style. Experiments show consistent gains in match win rate, episode win rate, adaptation gain, and league rating over strong recurrent and feed forward baselines.
Kowei Shih, Lu Cheng, Zeyu Wang +2
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China · Stevens Institute of Technology, New Jersey, USA · University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, USA +2
Penetration testing, the simulation of cyberattacks to identify security vulnerabilities, presents a sequential decision-making problem well-suited for reinforcement learning (RL) automation. Like many applications of RL to real-world problems, partial observability presents a major challenge, as it invalidates the Markov property present in Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). Partially Observable MDPs require history aggregation or belief state estimation to learn successful policies. We investigate stochastic, partially observable penetration testing scenarios over host networks of varying size, aiming to better reflect real-world complexity through more challenging and representative benchmarks. This approach leads to the development of more robust and transferable policies, which are crucial for ensuring reliable performance across diverse and unpredictable real-world environments. Using vanilla Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) as a baseline, we compare a selection of PPO-based variants designed to mitigate partial observability, including frame-stacking, augmenting observations with historical information, and employing LSTM or TrXL architectures. We conduct a systematic empirical analysis of these algorithms across different host network sizes. We find that this task greatly benefits from history aggregation. Converging up to four times faster than other approaches. Manual inspection of the learned policies by the algorithms reveals clear distinctions and provides insights that go beyond quantitative results.
Raphael Simon, Pieter Libin, Wim Mees
Cyber Defence Lab, CISS Department Royal Military Academy · AI Lab, Department of Computer Science Vrije Universiteit Brussel