cs.MAOct 29, 2026

A Robust Approach to Belief Mismatch in Non-cooperative Dynamic Games

Authors: Ryan Park, Li-huan Shen, Jesse Milzman, Negar Mehr, David Fridovich-Keil

Abstract

Game-theoretic models are increasingly used to describe multi-agent interactions in control and robotics applications. However, theoretical and computational complexity makes these models intractable in many dynamic, incomplete information scenarios. Recent work makes strong assumptions to reduce computational complexity: agents share sensor measurements with one another and maintain a common estimate of state uncertainty. Unfortunately, these assumptions enforce a degree of cooperation in generically noncooperative interactions. This paper takes the perspective of an ego agent seeking both computational tractability and robustness to unanticipated behavior of other agents due to mismatched state estimates from private---rather than shared---sensor measurements. To that end, we formulate the game theoretic planning problem in an augmented belief space with perturbed Bayesian dynamics that allows the ego to predict all agents' potentially divergent state estimates. These perturbations are chosen by a hypothetical adversary, ``nature,'' to reflect how non-ego agents' state estimates---based on measurements the ego agent will not see at runtime---may deviate from the ego's own belief. Ultimately, our approach can be understood in the spirit of classical H-infinity robust control, extended to noncooperative, stochastic dynamic games. We present a solver with polynomial-time iterations and conduct two experiments which show how robust belief space reasoning leads ego agents to proactively limit their future vulnerability to model misspecification of other agents' beliefs and actions, reducing performance degradation by over 48%.

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