Game-theoretic models are increasingly used to describe multi-agent interactions in control and robotics applications. However, theoretical and computational complexity makes these models intractable in many dynamic, incomplete information scenarios. Recent work makes strong assumptions to reduce computational complexity: agents share sensor measurements with one another and maintain a common estimate of state uncertainty. Unfortunately, these assumptions enforce a degree of cooperation in generically noncooperative interactions. This paper takes the perspective of an ego agent seeking both computational tractability and robustness to unanticipated behavior of other agents due to mismatched state estimates from private---rather than shared---sensor measurements. To that end, we formulate the game theoretic planning problem in an augmented belief space with perturbed Bayesian dynamics that allows the ego to predict all agents' potentially divergent state estimates. These perturbations are chosen by a hypothetical adversary, ``nature,'' to reflect how non-ego agents' state estimates---based on measurements the ego agent will not see at runtime---may deviate from the ego's own belief. Ultimately, our approach can be understood in the spirit of classical H-infinity robust control, extended to noncooperative, stochastic dynamic games. We present a solver with polynomial-time iterations and conduct two experiments which show how robust belief space reasoning leads ego agents to proactively limit their future vulnerability to model misspecification of other agents' beliefs and actions, reducing performance degradation by over 48%.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Simplified depiction of an interaction between an autonomous car and a pedestrian. The car plans under the assumption that the pedestrian estimates a 10 ft gap to the vehicle and will yield. However, if the pedestrian believes the distance is greater (e.g. 20 ft) and attempts to cross the street, then the car is unable to slow down in time and the two collide.
Fig. 2: Here, we have two activist groups who attempt to influence 3 lawmakers’ opinions by fundraising and campaigning. In the experiment, the two causes are not directly opposed. However, as the activist groups have different informational channels, the groups may incorrectly model the other’s beliefs. Thus, in our experiment, we investigate robustness as a method to mitigate epistemic uncertainty about the information-gathering capabilities of non-robust activists.
Fig. 3: Distribution of cost difference from nominal (non-robust) incurred by the robust activist (2), across 50 Monte Carlo trials. The solid black lines denote the means of each distribution, and the baseline’s performance is the horizontal axis marked with a gray dotted line. Notice that as c decreases and activist 2 becomes more robust, its cost decreases relative to the non-robust baseline.
Fig. 4: Cost incurred by a robust activist for varying degrees of misspecified belief dynamics ( σd1 ) and Activist 2 robustness c . Solid lines and ribbons depict the means and standard deviations respectively. Robustness consistently lowers costs in unexpectedly adversarial environments ( σd1>0 ) but can increase cost in unexpectedly collaborative environments ( σd1<0 ). As c decreases, the slope of the cost-drift curve deviates from the nominal baseline; effectively, selecting c balances a tradeoff between the worst-case cost gain and the best-case cost reduction. The c=0.5 level of robustness reduces the additional incurred cost at σ^d1=0.4 by 48%, as compared to the additional cost incurred by the non-robust baseline at σ^d1=0.4 from σ^d1=0.0 .
Fig. 5: Cost change for Activist 2 under three different magnitudes of misspecified belief dynamics ( σd1 ) across different paired robustness profiles of both activists, (c1,c2) . Across all three drift mismatch grids shown, Activist 2 can reduce costs by being more robust (lower c2 ) regardless of the robustness of Activist 1. However, Activist 2 suffers a higher cost when both activists are robust in comparison to when both are non-robust (baseline NR). This trend can also be observed in Activist 1’s cost despite the lack of belief dynamics mismatch for Activist 1.
Fig. 6: Cost incurred by robust and non-robust defenders for varying inverse control cost multipliers of the attacker λ1 that the defender is not aware of: believed λ^1=1 . Solid lines and ribbons depict the means and standard deviations. The baseline’s performance is depicted with a black dashed line. As the attacker becomes more aggressive, λ1>1 , the more robust the defender, the lower cost it incurs. Even at low values where the attacker is passive, λ1<1 , the cost increase incurred by the robust defender is small.
This paper studies feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) seeking for multi-agent trajectory planning in nonlinear dynamical systems with unknown agents' objectives and state-dependent inter-agent coupling. While dynamic game theory provides a principled framework for such problems, existing approaches typically assume fully rational agents with known objectives or rely on fixed regularization, limiting their ability to capture bounded rationality and spatially varying interaction intensity in safety-critical settings. To this end, we propose a KL-regularized dynamic game with a state-dependent weight that adaptively balances optimality and behavioral priors. To infer unknown cost parameters from demonstrated behaviors, we develop a context-aware inverse game module based on maximum-entropy inverse reinforcement learning with physics-informed regularization, ensuring structural consistency with the forward game. We establish per-iteration well-posedness of the regularized local game and show that the adaptive weighting function remains Lipschitz continuous under bounded nominal-trajectory updates. Numerical simulations and multi-robot experiments on cooperative navigation and merging scenarios validate the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
Tianle Liu, Youcheng Niu, Jing Zeng +2
College of Control Science and Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
Aviation authorities worldwide expect Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) traffic management to be decentralized among service providers, requiring AAM flights to autonomously plan trajectories by predicting other flights' control inputs rather than relying on centralized coordination. Game-theoretic approaches that formulate multi-agent collision avoidance as an exact dynamic potential game can efficiently find open-loop equilibria, but they assume that agents exactly follow their equilibrium trajectories---an unrealistic assumption given uncertainties in actuation, perception, and computation. We propose a strategically robust formulation where each agent protects against a fictitious adversary that, for each timestep, perturbs other agents' control inputs within a bounded budget to minimize distance at that timestep. We show that, under reasonable assumptions on agents' distance cost and robustness levels, the strategically robust game remains an exact dynamic potential game and admits a quasi-closed-form solution to the inner adversarial problem for linear dynamics, which limits computational overhead. Experiments with up to eight agents using logarithmic distance costs show that strategic robustness selects more robust trajectories in high-collision-risk configurations while leaving low-risk trajectories nearly unchanged, with only a modest increase in runtime.
Victor L. Qin, Nicolas Lanzetti, Saverio Bolognani +1
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, MIT. · Department of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Caltech. · Automatic Control Laboratory, ETH Zurich.
This work presents a solution to nonconvex, game-theoretic motion planning problems subject to disturbances over long time horizons. The problem is posed as a partially-decoupled generalized Nash equilibrium problem, in which each agent's dynamics depend only on its own state and control, admitting fast solution methods for competitive multi-agent motion planning. An algorithm, WOLF, is developed that applies receding-horizon model predictive control to an open-loop differential games solver based on sequential convexification. In contrast to robust formulations that fix the uncertainty description offline, the robustness tube here is itself a dynamic state, co-optimized with the trajectory, and its thickness directly sets the tightening of the shared coupling constraints. A sufficient condition is derived under which a nominal trajectory satisfying constraints tightened against all agents' error bounds remains feasible for every admissible disturbance realization. The method is demonstrated on two adversarial on-orbit games with coupled translational-attitude dynamics: a stealthy co-orbital jamming game under an active detection-probability bound, and a sun-blocking game in which an adversary disables an evader by decreasing solar power
Bennet Outland, Vishala Arya
Smead Aerospace Engineering and Sciences Department University of Colorado Boulder Boulder, USA