Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly act as service consumers. They select operations and report whether a task is complete. In an asynchronous distributed service, an accepted call or immediate state read does not establish that the required state became observable by its deadline. We introduce execution-grounded completion contracts, which treat completion as a service-level outcome. An independent control plane observes a deadline-bound service-state predicate, admits completion, and directs recovery while the agent performs the task. We evaluate placement and deletion in a live multi-provider data service with heterogeneous models and an injected transfer delay. Across policies, some tasks that missed the deadline were accepted and some that met it were rejected. Under enforcement, accepted completions remained consistent with later observations; all included healthy tasks completed, and unresolved faulted tasks terminated as unverified. The results show that completion of these tasks can be governed by independent observation of service state rather than by the agent's self-assessment.
Figures & tables
Approach
Evidence checked
Decision point
Deadline
Attribution (agent or service)
Action after a failed check
AgentSpec [ 27 ]
The agent’s trajectory and next action
On a trigger: state change, before an action, or agent finish
No
No
Stop, ask the user, self-examine, or run a corrective action
ToolGate [ 15 ]
Tool preconditions and results against the agent’s trusted symbolic state
At each tool call
No
No
Block the call or discard its result
STRATUS [ 9 ]
Severity of the managed system’s state
After each mitigation transaction
No
No
Undo the transaction
Verify-Gated Completion [ 20 ]
Claim and evidence packets, common ground, and task state
When the agent proposes completion
No
No
Withhold completion; recovery is a separate path
This paper
A pre-specified predicate over live backend state, observed outside the agent’s session
At completion, from observations up to the deadline
Yes
Yes, from runtime evidence
Withhold completion; the deadline violation stays recorded; recovery routed by the attributed cause
Table 1: Comparison of agent-verification approaches and their verification semantics.
Figure 1: Completion-contract architecture (red: agent, non-authoritative for completion; green: contract control plane; blue: distributed service). An operator instantiates a task contract from a template. The verifier observes service state outside the agent’s context; its verdict gates completion, and the attribution informs recovery.
Placement task
Deletion task
Goal
“replicate this file to site B, and confirm it arrived”
“delete this file from everywhere — not just hidden; confirm it is fully removed”
Fulfillment condition
the file’s byte count at the target site equals the write-time expected size
the path is absent and no site retains bytes for the pre-captured file identifier
Verification
state polled every 3 s to the deadline; the service’s own status signals are diagnostic only
path-absence and per-site residue probes on the pre-captured identifier, polled to the deadline
Recovery
routed by attribution: re-invoke with the canonical target (agent) / wait (service) / terminate as unverified
same routing (Sect. 5.3 )
Table 2: Evaluated contract instances. The predicates and expected values were fixed before each run; the agent was the obligated component in both tasks.
Mode
Task
Healthy I/P
Fault I/P
Primary use
ungated
placement
56/56
56/56
RQ1; RQ2
ungated
deletion
56/56
—
RQ1; organic violations
gated
placement
56/56
56/56
RQ3
gated
deletion
50/56
—
RQ3
Table 3: Study cells used by the three RQs, reported as included/planned. A dash denotes a condition not run, not a zero outcome. Full cells hold seven models, eight runs each.
Read-back class
n (of 21)
What the recorded read showed
Read, then ignored
6
Nothing at the target; reported done anyway.
Job status, not data
5
Took the transfer job’s successful submission as arrival; the target itself still held zero bytes.
Late-but-real convergence
5
Placement genuinely converged, but only past the 30-second deadline.
Wrong signal (directory aggregate)
4
Read a nonzero parent-directory total, mistaking it for the target file.
No read-back
1
No read-back issued before reporting done.
Table 4: Recorded read-back preceding each of the 21 false completion reports in the healthy ungated placement cell. Counts sum to 21.
Completion policy
Healthy FP
Healthy FA
Fault FP
self-report
21/56 (38%)
9/56 (16%)
37/56 (66%)
call/health monitoring
14/56 (25%)
1/56 (2%)
47/56 (84%)
transcript judge
0/56
20/56 (36%)
1/56 (2%)
state at report time
1/56 (2%)
0/56
0/56
state until deadline (reference)
0/56
0/56
0/56
Table 5: Placement-policy error incidence, shown as n/56 (percentage) within each cell. Healthy placement contains 23 Violated and 33 Fulfilled reference outcomes; all 56 injected- fault outcomes are Violated.
Deadline T (s)
10
20
25
30 (used)
35
40
healthy late cases at T
37
22
13
4
2
1
fault passes
0
0
0
0
0
0
Table 6: Deadline sensitivity from re-scoring the same 56 healthy and 56 faulted placement trajectories at each T . “Healthy late cases” counts trajectories observed to converge within the recorded horizon, but only after T ; the 19 never-convergent healthy trajectories remain Violated but are not in that row. “Fault passes” counts faulted trajectories satisfied by T .
Completion policy
FP incidence
FP among Violated
self-report
12/56 (21%)
12/16 (75%)
call/health monitoring
11/56 (20%)
11/16 (69%)
transcript judge
0/56
0/16
state at report time
9/56 (16%)
9/16 (56%)
state until deadline (reference)
0/56
0/16
Table 7: Deletion false passes as trial incidence and conditional on the 16 Violated among 56 ungated trials. The transcript judge also false-alarmed on all 40 Fulfilled.
Attribution quantity
Observed result
ground-truthable against injected cause
55/56 (98%)
evidence observable
37/55 (67%)
shadowed by missing valid operation
18/55 (33%)
agreement when evidence observable
37/37 (100%)
Table 8: Attribution accounting for the 56 injected-fault placement trials. One truth- neither trial lies outside the injected-cause denominator; shadowed trials remain in the ground-truthable denominator.
Gate outcome
Healthy (56)
Fault (56)
verified completions
56
53
later-contradicted completions
0
0
unverified terminations (explicit)
0
3
trials recovered after a failed first attempt
29 (52%)
53 (95%)
runtime-activity index per verified completion (mean)
17.88
32.58
Table 9: Outcomes of the 112 gated placement trials. “Recovered” means the first attempt failed and a later attempt was verified; it does not revise the first verdict.
Model
Rescued (/8)
By re-invoke
By re-check
Qwen3-Coder-30B
6
6
0
Llama-3.3-70B
5
5
0
GLM-4.7-Flash
4
4
0
GLM-5.2-FP8
4
0
4
claude-sonnet-5
8
1
7
claude-haiku-4-5
2
0
2
Table 10: First-attempt failures recovered by mechanism in the 56 healthy gated placement trials. Each model contributes eight trials.
Runtime-activity index
Model
Healthy
Injected delay
gemma-4-31B
9.12
28.00
claude-haiku-4-5
11.88
24.00
GLM-5.2-FP8
15.50
31.71
Llama-3.3-70B
19.25
50.50
claude-sonnet-5
20.50
20.12
Table 11: Unweighted runtime-activity index per verified placement completion. Each entry sums verifier probes, agent invocations, and gate retries, divides by the number of verified completions, and gives the three event types equal weight.
Ungated
Gated
Model
Condition
in time
USD
reached
USD
Spend change
claude-haiku-4-5
healthy
8 / 8
0.2532
8 / 8
0.2826
+11.6%
fault
0 / 8
0.3343
8 / 8
0.3518
+5.2%
claude-sonnet-5
healthy
5 / 8
1.5733
8 / 8
1.8380
+16.8%
fault
0 / 8
1.8811
8 / 8
2.0627
+9.7%
Table 12: Recorded model charges (USD) in eight-trial cells for the two SDK-billed models, with and without the gate. Ungated counts completions within the deadline; gated counts trials that reached the predicate, including after recovery. Service and infrastructure costs are excluded: the federation is shared, and its cost cannot be reliably attributed to individual tasks; the verifier’s cost is reported as its probe count.
Figure 1: Experimental setup. The Onedata services run on Kubernetes (k3s) and are installed from the public Helm charts; each Oneprovider serves POSIX storage. The harness host runs the agent loop, the onedata-mcp tool server, the verifier, and the gate.
Path
Content
recordings/
779 files: one JSON record per trial, grouped by study population, and the runs of the verifier-overhead benchmark
1X-LANCE Lab, School of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China · 2Shanghai Innovation Institution, Shanghai, China · 3Jiangsu Key Lab of Language Computing, Suzhou, China
School of Cyber Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China · School of Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University · SWJTU-Leeds Joint School, Southwest Jiaotong University