Adversarial Robustness of Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success but remain highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks, in which adversarial prompts coerce models into generating harmful, unethical, or policy-violating outputs. Such attacks pose real-world risks, eroding safety, trust, and regulatory compliance in high-stakes applications. Although a variety of attack and defense methods have been proposed, existing evaluation practices are inadequate, often relying on narrow metrics like attack success rate that fail to capture the multidimensional nature of LLM security. In this paper, we present a systematic taxonomy of jailbreak attacks and defenses and introduce Security Cube, a unified, multi-dimensional framework for comprehensive evaluation of these techniques. We provide detailed comparison tables of existing attacks and defenses, highlighting key insights and open challenges across the literature. Leveraging Security Cube, we conduct benchmark studies on 13 representative attacks and 5 defenses, establishing a clear view of the current landscape encompassing jailbreak attacks, defenses, automated judges, and LLM vulnerabilities. Based on these evaluations, we distill critical findings, identify unresolved problems, and outline promising research directions for enhancing LLM robustness against jailbreak attacks. Our analysis aims to pave the way towards more robust, interpretable, and trustworthy LLM systems. Our code is available at Code.

As LLMs enter conflict monitoring, understanding systematic distortions in their outputs is critical for humanitarian accountability. We evaluate four vanilla open-weight models Gemma 3 4B, Llama 3.2 3B, Mistral 7B, and OLMo 2 7B and two domain-adapted models, AfroConfliBERT and AfroConfliLLAMA, on Nigeria and Cameroon conflict-event classification against ACLED, a gold-standard dataset with multi-stage verification. We find a bifurcated divergence in normative directionality. Open-weight models exhibit statistically significant False Illegitimation bias: Gemma misclassifies to 18.29% of legitimate battles as civilian-targeted violence while making zero False Legitimation errors. By contrast, AfroConfliBERT and AfroConfliLLAMA achieve near-directional neutrality, with Legitimization Bias differences indistinguishable from zero. Yet domain adaptation does not eliminate actor-based selection bias. Both adapted models show statistically significant actor bias comparable to vanilla LLMs; in Nigeria, state actors are legitimized 36.5% more often than non-state actors in identical tactical contexts. Open-weight outputs are also fragile to geography-specific lexical framing: delegitimizing phrases produce flip rates up to 66.7% in Cameroon and 34.2% in Nigeria, while perturbations salient in one context may not matter in another. Error trace profiling shows models mask normative bias through unfaithful rationale confabulations. In contrast, AfroConfliBERT and AfroConfliLLAMA are largely robust, with near-zero flip rates across perturbation categories. Overall, current models are not ready for unsupervised deployment in conflict monitoring. We call for fairness-aware fine-tuning to reduce actor-based selection bias, mandatory adversarial robustness evaluation against lexical manipulation, and context-specific human-in-the-loop oversight calibrated to regional difficulty.

Large language models (LLMs) employ safety mechanisms to prevent harmful outputs, yet these defenses primarily rely on semantic pattern matching. We show that encoding harmful prompts as coherent mathematical problems -- using formalisms such as set theory, formal logic, and quantum mechanics -- bypasses these filters at high rates, achieving 46%--56% average attack success across eight target models and two established benchmarks. Crucially, the effectiveness depends not on mathematical notation itself, but on whether a helper LLM deeply reformulates the harmful content into a genuine mathematical problem: rule-based encodings that apply mathematical formatting without such reformulation perform no better than unencoded baselines. We introduce a novel Formal Logic encoding that achieves attack success comparable to Set Theory, demonstrating that this vulnerability generalizes across mathematical formalisms. Additional experiments with repeat post-processing confirm that these attacks are robust to simple prompt augmentation. Notably, newer models (GPT-5, GPT-5-Mini) show substantially greater robustness than older models, though they remain vulnerable. Our findings highlight fundamental gaps in current safety frameworks and motivate defenses that reason about mathematical structure rather than surface-level semantics.

Fine-tuning safety-aligned language models for downstream tasks often leads to substantial degradation of refusal behavior, making models vulnerable to adversarial misuse. While prior work has shown that safety-relevant features are encoded in structured representations within the model's activation space, how these representations change during fine-tuning and why alignment degrades remains poorly understood. In this work, we investigate the representation-level mechanisms underlying alignment degradation. Our analysis shows that standard fine-tuning induces systematic drift in safety-relevant representations, distorts their geometric structure, and introduces interference between task optimization and safety features. These effects collectively lead to increased harmful compliance. Motivated by these findings, we introduce REFUSALGUARD, a representation-level fine-tuning framework that preserves safety-relevant structure during model adaptation. Our approach constrains updates in hidden representation space, ensuring that safety-mediating components remain stable while allowing task-specific learning in complementary directions. We evaluate REFUSALGUARD across multiple model families, including LLaMA, Gemma, and Qwen, on adversarial safety benchmarks such as AdvBench, DirectHarm4, and JailbreakBench, as well as downstream utility tasks. Our approach achieves attack success rates comparable to base safety-aligned models while maintaining competitive task performance, significantly outperforming baselines.

Large Language Models have achieved remarkable success and are increasingly deployed in critical applications involving tabular data, such as Table Question Answering. However, their robustness to the structure of this input remains a critical, unaddressed question. This paper demonstrates that modern LLMs exhibit a significant vulnerability to the layout of tabular data. Specifically, we show that semantically-invariant permutations of rows and columns - rearrangements that do not alter the table's underlying information - are sometimes sufficient to cause incorrect or inconsistent model outputs. To systematically probe this vulnerability, we introduce Adversarial Table Permutation, a novel, gradient-based attack that efficiently identifies worst-case permutations designed to maximally disrupt model performance. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that ATP significantly degrades the performance of a wide range of LLMs. This reveals a pervasive vulnerability across different model sizes and architectures, including the most recent and popular models. Our findings expose a fundamental weakness in how current LLMs process structured data, underscoring the urgent need to develop permutation-robust models for reliable, real-world applications.

Safety-aligned language models must refuse harmful requests without broad over-refusal, but it remains unclear how dynamic adversarial fine-tuning changes refusal-control carriers: Kullback--Leibler (KL)-constrained directions or small subspaces that causally modulate refusal without large safe-prompt distribution shifts. We study a 7B backbone under supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and Robust Refusal Dynamic Defense (R2D2), aligning HarmBench, StrongREJECT, and XSTest evaluations with five-anchor geometry measurements, causal interventions, and sparse adaptive stress tests. R2D2 drives fixed-source HarmBench attack success to zero at early checkpoints; however, these checkpoints also exhibit maximal XSTest refusal and fail a benign-utility audit. Later checkpoints partially recover utility-facing behavior while reopening attack success, with adaptive GCG attack success rate rising to 0.415 at step 250 and 0.613 at step 500. Internally, R2D2 preserves a late-layer admissible refusal-control carrier through step 100 and then relocates the best admissible carrier to an early layer; SFT relocates earlier yet remains less robust. Effective rank stays near 1.24, and SFT shows larger principal-angle drift, arguing against both dimensional expansion and drift magnitude as sufficient explanations. Causal interventions support a low-dimensional but utility-coupled carrier. These results support a geometry-reorganization account of R2D2 along a robustness--utility frontier, without establishing adaptive robustness.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity. We propose SafeReview, a co-evolutionary adversarial training framework for defending LLM-based peer review systems against such attacks. SafeReview jointly trains a Generator model to create sophisticated attack prompts and a Defender model to preserve review integrity under adversarial manipulation. The Generator is optimized to produce increasingly effective prompt injections, while the Defender is strengthened through preference-based training to maintain consistent reviews between clean and attacked submissions. Experimental results show that SafeReview improves robustness against adaptive prompt injection attacks, better preserves paper ranking under attack, and generalizes across attacker architectures compared with static defenses. These results demonstrate the potential of co-evolutionary training as a foundation for securing LLM-assisted peer review.

Agent Skills package SKILL.md files, scripts, reference documents, and repository context into reusable capability units, turning pre-load auditing from single-prompt filtering into cross-file security review. Existing guardrails often flag risk but recover malicious intent inconsistently under semantics-preserving rewrites. This paper formulates pre-load auditing for untrusted Agent Skills as a robust three-way classification task and introduces SkillGuard-Robust, which combines role-aware evidence extraction, selective semantic verification, and consistency-preserving adjudication. We evaluate SkillGuard-Robust on SkillGuardBench and two public-ecosystem extensions through five large evaluation views ranging from 254 to 404 packages. On the 404-package held-out aggregate, SkillGuard-Robust reaches 97.30% overall exact match, 98.33% malicious-risk recall, and 98.89% attack exact consistency. On the 254-package external-ecosystem view, it reaches 99.66%, 100.00%, and 100.00%, respectively. These results support a bounded conclusion: factorized package auditing materially improves frozen and public-ecosystem robustness, while harsher external-source transfer remains an open challenge.

Internal Safety Collapse (ISC) is a failure mode in which frontier LLMs, when executing legitimate professional tasks whose correct completion structurally requires harmful content, spontaneously generate that content with safety failure rates exceeding 95%. Existing input-level defenses achieve a 100% failure rate against ISC, and standard system prompt defenses provide only partial mitigation. We propose SafeRedirect, a system-level override that defeats ISC by redirecting the model's task-completion drive rather than suppressing it. SafeRedirect grants explicit permission to fail the task, prescribes a deterministic hard-stop output, and instructs the model to preserve harmful placeholders unresolved. Evaluated on seven frontier LLMs across three AI/ML-related ISC task types in the single-turn setting, SafeRedirect reduces average unsafe generation rates from 71.2% to 8.0%, compared to 55.0% for the strongest viable baseline. Multi-model ablation reveals that failure permission and condition specificity are universally critical, while the importance of other components varies across models. Cross-attack evaluation confirms state-of-the-art defense against ISC with generalization performance at least on par with the baseline on other attack families. Code is available at https://github.com/fzjcdt/SafeRedirect.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to optimization-based jailbreak attacks that exploit internal gradient structure. While Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) are widely used for interpretability, their robustness implications remain underexplored. We present a study of integrating pretrained SAEs into transformer residual streams at inference time, without modifying model weights or blocking gradients. Across four model families (Gemma, LLaMA, Mistral, Qwen) and two strong white-box attacks (GCG, BEAST) plus three black-box benchmarks, SAE-augmented models achieve up to a 5x reduction in jailbreak success rate relative to the undefended baseline and reduce cross-model attack transferability. Parametric ablations reveal (i) a monotonic dose-response relationship between L0 sparsity and attack success rate, and (ii) a layer-dependent defense-utility tradeoff, where intermediate layers balance robustness and clean performance. These findings are consistent with a representational bottleneck hypothesis: sparse projection reshapes the optimization geometry exploited by jailbreak attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in education, yet their default helpfulness often conflicts with pedagogical principles. Prior work evaluates pedagogical quality via answer leakage-the disclosure of complete solutions instead of scaffolding-but typically assumes well-intentioned learners, leaving tutor robustness under student misuse largely unexplored. In this paper, we study scenarios where students behave adversarially and aim to obtain the correct answer from the tutor. We evaluate a broad set of LLM-based tutor models, including different model families, pedagogically aligned models, and a multi-agent design, under a range of adversarial student attacks. We adapt six groups of adversarial and persuasive techniques to the educational setting and use them to probe how likely a tutor is to reveal the final answer. We evaluate answer leakage robustness using different types of in-context adversarial student agents, finding that they often fail to carry out effective attacks. We therefore introduce an adversarial student agent that we fine-tune to jailbreak LLM-based tutors, which we propose as the core of a standardized benchmark for evaluating tutor robustness. Finally, we present simple but effective defense strategies that reduce answer leakage and strengthen the robustness of LLM-based tutors in adversarial scenarios.

Evaluating animal welfare reasoning in LLMs remains an open challenge despite rapid deployment in consumer and professional contexts where welfare considerations appear implicitly in everyday queries. Existing benchmarks such as AnimalHarmBench evaluate this through single-turn, explicitly framed questions, measuring whether models avoid harmful content when directly asked. This approach overlooks two failure modes: alignment degradation under sustained adversarial pressure, and moral sensitivity (whether a model spontaneously surfaces welfare stakes in everyday queries). To fill this gap, we construct MANTA, a benchmark of 1,088 five-turn conversations progressing from an implicit Turn-1 scenario through an explicit welfare prompt to three adversarial pressure rounds drawn from a five-type taxonomy: Social, Cultural, Economic, Pragmatic, and Epistemic. We score conversations on two dimensions: Animal Welfare Value Stability (AWVS, primary) and Animal Welfare Moral Sensitivity (AWMS, diagnostic). We evaluate seven frontier models: Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.5, DeepSeek V4, Llama 3.3 70B, Mistral Small, Grok 4.3, and Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite. Multi-turn evaluation captures behavior single-turn benchmarks miss: 4 of 7 models change rank relative to Turn 1 scores, including Gemini Flash Lite, which drops from fifth on AWMS to last on AWVS. AWMS and AWVS are positively but imperfectly correlated, suggesting moral-recognition tests capture a stable but incomplete component of model behavior under pressure. MANTA also enables a species-by-pressure interaction matrix unavailable to prior benchmarks, showing welfare robustness depends jointly on the animal and pressure applied; companion animals score above wild animals, which score above farmed animals and invertebrates. We release the dataset, scripted pressure plans, judge prompts, and analysis code.

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are inclined explore Small Language Models (SLMs) as edge-native constitutional firewalls to vet proposals and mitigate semantic social engineering. While scaling inference-time compute (System 2) enhances formal logic, its efficacy in highly adversarial, cryptoeconomic governance environments remains underexplored. To address this, we introduce Sentinel-Bench, an 840-inference empirical framework executing a strict intra-model ablation on Qwen-3.5-9B. By toggling latent reasoning across frozen weights, we isolate the impact of inference-time compute against an adversarial Optimism DAO dataset. Our findings reveal a severe compute-accuracy inversion. The autoregressive baseline (System 1) achieved 100% adversarial robustness, 100% juridical consistency, and state finality in under 13 seconds. Conversely, System 2 reasoning introduced catastrophic instability, fundamentally driven by a 26.7% Reasoning Non-Convergence (cognitive collapse) rate. This collapse degraded trial-to-trial consensus stability to 72.6% and imposed a 17x latency overhead, introducing critical vulnerabilities to Governance Extractable Value (GEV) and hardware centralization. While rare (1.5% of adversarial trials), we empirically captured "Reasoning-Induced Sycophancy," where the model generated significantly longer internal monologues (averaging 25,750 characters) to rationalize failing the adversarial trap. We conclude that for edge-native SLMs operating under Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) constraints, System 1 parameterized intuition is structurally and economically superior to System 2 iterative deliberation for decentralized consensus. Code and Dataset: https://github.com/smarizvi110/sentinel-bench

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, yet a unified treatment of their overlapping safety challenges remains lacking. We present SafeLM, a framework that jointly addresses four pillars of LLM safety: privacy, security, misinformation, and adversarial robustness. SafeLM combines federated training with gradient smartification and Paillier encryption for privacy, integrates defenses against training and inference-time attacks, employs contrastive grounding with calibrated decoding to reduce hallucinations, and introduces alignment-aware binarized aggregation to enhance robustness while maintaining bounded reconstruction quality. Across benchmarks on factuality, toxicity, and membership inference, SafeLM achieves 98.0% harmful content detection accuracy, reduces communication by 96.9%, and lowers gradient inversion PSNR from 31.7 dB to 15.1 dB. Ablations show that each component contributes independently, whereas their integration yields a strong privacy utility efficiency trade-off for deploying trustworthy LLMs.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has increased concerns about their robustness. Vulnerabilities in perturbations of tokenisation of the input indicate that models trained with a deterministic canonical tokenisation can be brittle to adversarial attacks. Recent studies suggest that stochastic tokenisation can deliver internal representations that are less sensitive to perturbations. In this paper, we analyse how stochastic tokenisations affect robustness to adversarial attacks and random perturbations. We systematically study this over a range of learning regimes (pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, and in-context learning), data sets, and model architectures. We show that pre-training and fine-tuning with uniformly sampled stochastic tokenisations improve robustness to random and adversarial perturbations. Evaluating on uniformly sampled non-canonical tokenisations reduces the accuracy of a canonically trained Llama-1b model by 29.8%. We find that training with stochastic tokenisation preserves accuracy without increasing inference cost.

Decoder-only large language models (LLMs) are increasingly replacing BERT-style architectures as the backbone for dense retrieval, achieving substantial performance gains and broad adoption. However, the robustness of these LLM-based retrievers remains underexplored. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of the robustness of state-of-the-art open-source LLM-based dense retrievers from two complementary perspectives: generalizability and stability. For generalizability, we evaluate retrieval effectiveness across four benchmarks spanning 30 datasets, using linear mixed-effects models to estimate marginal mean performance and disentangle intrinsic model capability from dataset heterogeneity. Our analysis reveals that while instruction-tuned models generally excel, those optimized for complex reasoning often suffer a ``specialization tax,'' exhibiting limited generalizability in broader contexts. For stability, we assess model resilience against both unintentional query variations~(e.g., paraphrasing, typos) and malicious adversarial attacks~(e.g., corpus poisoning). We find that LLM-based retrievers show improved robustness against typos and corpus poisoning compared to encoder-only baselines, yet remain vulnerable to semantic perturbations like synonymizing. Further analysis shows that embedding geometry (e.g., angular uniformity) provides predictive signals for lexical stability and suggests that scaling model size generally improves robustness. These findings inform future robustness-aware retriever design and principled benchmarking. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/liyongkang123/Robust_LLM_Retriever_Eval.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly exposed to adaptive jailbreaking, particularly in high-stakes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) domains. Although streaming probes enable real-time monitoring, they still make systematic errors. We identify a core issue: existing methods often rely on a few high-scoring tokens, leading to false alarms when sensitive CBRN terms appear in benign contexts. To address this, we introduce a streaming probing objective that requires multiple evidence tokens to consistently support a prediction, rather than relying on isolated spikes. This encourages more robust detection based on aggregated signals instead of single-token cues. At a fixed 1% false-positive rate, our method improves the true-positive rate by 35.55% relative to strong streaming baselines. We further observe substantial gains in AUROC, even when starting from near-saturated baseline performance (AUROC = 97.40%). We also show that probing Attention or MLP activations consistently outperforms residual-stream features. Finally, even when adversarial fine-tuning enables novel character-level ciphers, harmful intent remains detectable: probes developed for the base LLMs can be applied ``plug-and-play'' to these obfuscated attacks, achieving an AUROC of over 98.85%.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models introduce unique challenges for safety alignment due to their sparse routing mechanisms, which can enable degenerate optimization behaviors under standard full-parameter fine-tuning. In our preliminary experiments, we observe that naively applying full-parameter safety fine-tuning to MoE models can reduce attack success rates through routing or expert dominance effects, rather than by directly repairing Safety-Critical Experts. To address this challenge, we propose RASA, a routing-aware expert-level alignment framework that explicitly repairs Safety-Critical Experts while preventing routing-based bypasses. RASA identifies experts disproportionately activated by successful jailbreaks, selectively fine-tunes only these experts under fixed routing, and subsequently enforces routing consistency with safety-aligned contexts. Across two representative MoE architectures and a diverse set of jailbreak attacks, RASA achieves near-perfect robustness, strong cross-attack generalization, and substantially reduced over-refusal, while preserving general capabilities on benchmarks such as MMLU, GSM8K, and TruthfulQA. Our results suggest that robust MoE safety alignment benefits from targeted expert repair rather than global parameter updates, offering a practical and architecture-preserving alternative to prior approaches.

Large language models (LLMs) deployed in clinical decision support may acquiesce to patient requests for care that conflicts with evidence-based guidelines. We developed SycoEval-EM, a multi-agent simulation framework to evaluate LLM robustness to adversarial patient persuasion in emergency medicine. Across 19 contemporary LLMs and 1,425 simulated clinical encounters spanning three Choosing Wisely scenarios, acquiescence rates ranged from 0% to 100%, revealing a bimodal distribution. Seven models maintained near-perfect guideline adherence, while six acquiesced in the majority of encounters. Vulnerability varied substantially across clinical scenarios. Acquiescence was highest for CT imaging requests, intermediate for antibiotic prescriptions for sinusitis, and lowest for opioid prescriptions for acute back pain. Model scale, recency, and performance on static medical benchmarks did not consistently predict robustness. All five persuasion tactics produced similar acquiescence rates, with no statistically significant differences after correction for multiple comparisons, suggesting a generalized susceptibility rather than tactic-specific weaknesses. LLM-as-judge evaluation was validated against two independent physician raters across 95 matched conversations and demonstrated near-perfect agreement for the primary outcome of acquiescence (Cohens kappa = 0.957). These findings indicate that static medical benchmarks are insufficient to predict safety performance under sustained social pressure and support incorporating multi-turn adversarial testing into clinical AI evaluation. Notably, two models achieved perfect guideline adherence across all encounters, demonstrating that robustness to patient pressure is attainable without sacrificing effective clinical communication.

Hallucination in large language models (LLMs) remains an acute concern, contributing to the spread of misinformation and diminished public trust, particularly in high-risk domains. Among hallucination types, factuality is crucial, as it concerns a model's alignment with established world knowledge. Adversarial factuality, defined as the deliberate insertion of misinformation into prompts with varying levels of expressed confidence, tests a model's ability to detect and resist confidently framed falsehoods. Existing work lacks high-quality, domain-specific resources for assessing model robustness under such adversarial conditions, and no prior research has examined the impact of injected misinformation on long-form text factuality. To address this gap, we introduce AdversaRiskQA, the first verified and reliable benchmark systematically evaluating adversarial factuality across Health, Finance, and Law. The benchmark includes two difficulty levels to test LLMs' defensive capabilities across varying knowledge depths. We propose two automated methods for evaluating the adversarial attack success and long-form factuality. We evaluate six open- and closed-source LLMs from the Qwen, GPT-OSS, and GPT families, measuring misinformation detection rates. Long-form factuality is assessed on Qwen3 (30B) under both baseline and adversarial conditions. Results show that after excluding meaningless responses, Qwen3 (80B) achieves the highest average accuracy, while GPT-5 maintains consistently high accuracy. Performance scales non-linearly with model size, varies by domains, and gaps between difficulty levels narrow as models grow. Long-form evaluation reveals no significant correlation between injected misinformation and the model's factual output. AdversaRiskQA provides a valuable benchmark for pinpointing LLM weaknesses and developing more reliable models for high-stakes applications.

Benchmarking large language models (LLMs) is critical for understanding their capabilities, limitations, and robustness. In addition to interface artifacts, prior studies have shown that LLM decisions can be influenced by directive signals such as social cues, framing, and instructions. In this work, we introduce option injection, a benchmarking approach that augments the multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) interface with an additional option containing a misleading directive, leveraging standardized choice structure and scalable evaluation. We construct OI-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 questions spanning knowledge, reasoning, and commonsense tasks, with 16 directive types covering social compliance, bonus framing, threat framing, and instructional interference. This setting combines manipulation of the choice interface with directive-based interference, enabling systematic assessment of model susceptibility. We evaluate 12 LLMs to analyze attack success rates, behavioral responses, and further investigate mitigation strategies ranging from inference-time prompting to post-training alignment. Experimental results reveal substantial vulnerabilities and heterogeneous robustness across models. OI-Bench is expected to support more systematic evaluation of LLM robustness to directive interference within choice-based interfaces.

Consumer artificial intelligence chatbots are now accessed by hundreds of millions of users seeking health information, yet systematic evaluation of their safety boundary maintenance under real-world caregiver pressure remains scarce. We evaluated PediatricSafetyBench-v2, a benchmark of 600 pediatrics health queries comprising 300 authentic caregiver queries sourced from the HealthCareMagic-100k-en physician consultation corpus and 300 matched adversarial variants incorporating six operationalized caregiver pressure patterns, across four consumer AI systems (GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash, Claude-3.5-Haiku, and Llama-3.1-8B). Safety boundary maintenance was assessed using a validated five-component Safety Composite Score (maximum 15 points; safety-appropriate threshold of 10 or above), validated against independent human raters prior to full-corpus application (mean weighted kappa 0.76; Pearson r = 0.88). The overall safety-appropriate rate was 95.5%. Safety-oriented system prompt deployment improved safety-appropriate rates by 5.9 percentage points across all four models. Counter-intuitively, adversarial caregiver pressure was associated with higher rather than lower Safety Composite Score values for all four models across all ten topic categories and severity levels. False expertise claims were the most vulnerability-inducing pressure pattern, whereas emotional escalation was associated with the highest scores. Consumer AI systems maintain safety boundaries in the large majority of pediatrics health interactions. PediatricSafetyBench-v2 is publicly released for longitudinal safety monitoring.

Red-teaming is becoming a central part of large language model (LLM) safety evaluation, yet current practice still relies heavily on expert-written prompts or fixed benchmark suites. This creates a gap between what is easy to test and what deployed models can actually do: failures may be rare, context-sensitive, and distributed across many threat categories. We study automated red-teaming as a constrained adversarial search problem and introduce a learning-driven framework that couples category-aware attack generation with hierarchical vulnerability detection. The method starts from curated safety seeds, expands them through meta-prompt-guided and evolutionary search, and scores the resulting prompt--response pairs with lexical, semantic, and behavioral detectors. Across six threat categories on GPT-OSS-20B, the framework discovers 47 validated vulnerabilities, including 21 high-severity cases and 12 novel attack patterns. Under matched query budgets, it achieves a 3.9$\times$ higher discovery rate than manual expert red-teaming while maintaining 89% detection accuracy and full category coverage. Ablations show that the gains do not come from more prompts alone: diversity constraints prevent template collapse, coverage constraints prevent category blind spots, and semantic detection recovers failures missed by lexical rules. These results suggest that red-teaming can be made more scalable and reproducible when treated as adaptive search rather than as a static checklist.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to their widespread adoption in daily applications. Despite their impressive capabilities, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, as even minor meaning-preserving changes such as synonym substitutions can lead to incorrect predictions. As a result, certifying the robustness of LLMs against such adversarial prompts is of vital importance. Existing approaches focused on word deletion or simple denoising strategies to achieve robustness certification. However, these methods face two critical limitations: (1) they yield loose robustness bounds due to the lack of semantic validation for perturbed outputs and (2) they suffer from high computational costs due to repeated sampling. To address these limitations, we propose CluCERT, a novel framework for certifying LLM robustness via clustering-guided denoising smoothing. Specifically, to achieve tighter certified bounds, we introduce a semantic clustering filter that reduces noisy samples and retains meaningful perturbations, supported by theoretical analysis. Furthermore, we enhance computational efficiency through two mechanisms: a refine module that extracts core semantics, and a fast synonym substitution strategy that accelerates the denoising process. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on various downstream tasks and jailbreak defense scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that our method outperforms existing certified approaches in both robustness bounds and computational efficiency.

Transformer-based transfer models now dominate Bangla sentiment classification, yet their adversarial robustness remains largely unexamined, and no prior study pairs a Bangla attack suite with a defense that measurably recovers robustness. We address this gap with destroR, a unified pipeline for evaluating and hardening Bangla text classifiers. First, we introduce three meaning-preserving Bangla attack recipes a paraphrase attack, a back-translation attack, and a one-hot word-swap attack that perturb inputs while regenerating fluent, semantically faithful sentences, inducing model prediction perplexity rather than input noise. Second, we construct a robustness benchmark that evaluates five transfer models (BanglaBERT, BanglishBERT, XLM-RoBERTa, MuRIL, and IndicBERTv2) across four datasets against five attacks, placing our recipes against two strong word-substitution baselines, TextFooler and BAE, under an identical protocol. Third, we harden every model through adversarial training and report a full robustness matrix. Our analysis yields three findings: word-substitution baselines are more potent than semantically constrained recipes (BAE reaches a 54.2% attack success rate); adversarial training on the union of all attack families lowers residual attack success for every attack; and, contrary to expectation, the Indic-multilingual MuRIL backbone is markedly more robust than the Bangla-dedicated models. All models, adversarial data, and code are released for full reproducibility.

Adversarial perturbations can reduce state-of-the-art toxicity classifiers to near-zero accuracy, yet existing defences treat models as black boxes. We apply mechanistic interpretability to toxicity classification for the first time, identifying the internal attention-head circuits responsible for both correct classification and adversarial vulnerability. Across a 2$\times$2 factorial study (BERT $\times$ RoBERTa) $\times$ (Jigsaw $\times$ ToxiGen), extended to Llama Guard~2 (8B), we show that zeroing a single attention head recovers up to 70.4 pp of adversarial accuracy for RoBERTa on Jigsaw and 37.3 pp for Llama Guard 2 on ToxiGen, at $\leq$0.6 pp clean cost. Vulnerable heads generalise to held-out examples within $\leq$1 pp, and a class-imbalance sweep confirms they act as selective toxic-class detectors. Head suppression matches or outperforms adversarial training on Jigsaw; data augmentation dominates on ToxiGen: a dataset-specific reversal explained by whether the classifier encodes a concentrated bottleneck or a distributed circuit. Demographic analysis across 20 Jigsaw and 13 ToxiGen minority groups reveals structurally unequal adversarial vulnerability, exposing mechanistically traceable fairness gaps in current toxicity classifiers.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to answer health-related questions and support healthcare workflows, yet evidence for their safety still relies heavily on static benchmarks that can rapidly become obsolete or be optimized against. Here we introduce a Dynamic, Automatic, and Systematic (DAS) red-teaming audit framework that continuously stress-tests LLMs for health across four safety-critical axes: robustness, privacy, bias/fairness, and hallucination/factual inaccuracies. Validated against board-certified clinicians with high concordance, a suite of adversarial agents autonomously mutates health-related test cases to uncover vulnerabilities in real time. Applying DAS to 15 proprietary and open-source LLMs revealed a profound gap between high static benchmark performance and low dynamic reliability--the "Benchmarking Gap". Despite median MedQA accuracy exceeding 80%, 94% of previously correct answers failed under dynamic robustness testing. This brittleness generalized to the realistic, open-ended HealthBench dataset, where top-tier models exhibited failure rates exceeding 70% and sharp shifts in model rankings across evaluations, suggesting that high scores on established static benchmarks may reflect superficial memorization. We observed similarly high failure rates across other domains: privacy leaks were elicited in 86% of scenarios, cognitive-bias priming altered recommendations in 81% of fairness tests, and hallucination rates exceeded 74% in widely used models. By converting LLM safety evaluation for health from a static checklist into a living adversarial audit, DAS provides a scalable framework for surfacing latent risks before such systems are deployed in consumer-facing health assistants, clinician-facing tools, and broader healthcare workflows. Code is available at https://github.com/JZPeterPan/DAS-Medical-Red-Teaming-Agents.

Prompt injection attacks, where untrusted data contains an injected prompt to manipulate the system, have been listed as the top security threat to AI agents. By fine-tuning on simulated prompt injections, SecAlign, a leading open defense, reports LLMs with good test-time robustness and negligible benign utility drop. By scaling up training and evaluations, however, we find that SecAlign actually suffers from significant utility degradation, especially in agentic tasks where the threat of prompt injection is prominent. Motivated by this, we propose Meta-SecAlign for utility-preserving defense by (1) randomized injection position during training to avoid shortcut learning and (2) self-generated responses as high-quality in-distribution training labels. Across general knowledge, instruction following, and agentic workflows (on tool-calling and web-navigation), Meta-SecAlign maintains almost all the undefended LLM's utility while achieving better overall security than SecAlign against various static and GCG adaptive attacks. Experiments use Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.3-70B, Llama-4-Scout, Qwen3-4B, and Qwen3.6-27B on 6 prompt injection benchmarks including AgentDojo, InjecAgent, WASP, and SEP. Below are links for the code (https://github.com/facebookresearch/Meta_SecAlign), Meta-SecAlign-70B (https://huggingface.co/facebook/Meta-SecAlign-70B), and Meta-SecAlign-8B (https://huggingface.co/facebook/Meta-SecAlign-8B) models.

Natural Language Inference (NLI) is a central task in natural language understanding with applications in fact-checking, question answering, and information retrieval. Despite its importance, current NLI systems heavily rely on supervised learning with datasets that often contain annotation artifacts and biases, limiting generalization and real-world applicability. In this work, we apply a reinforcement learning-based approach using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) for Chain-of-Thought (CoT) learning in NLI, eliminating the need for human-labeled rationales and enabling this type of training on challenging datasets such as ANLI. We fine-tune 7B, 14B, and 32B language models using parameter-efficient techniques (LoRA and QLoRA), demonstrating strong performance across standard and adversarial NLI benchmarks. At the 32B scale, GRPO-trained models generalize better than other supervised baselines in adversarial sets. With AWQ quantization, the 32B model fits within 22GB of CUDA memory. This work provides a scalable and practical framework for building robust NLI systems without sacrificing inference quality.

Neural network language models (LMs) are confronted with significant challenges in generalization and robustness. Currently, many studies focus on improving either generalization or robustness in isolation, without methods addressing both aspects simultaneously, which presents a significant challenge in developing LMs that are both robust and generalized. In this paper, we propose a bi-stage optimization framework to uniformly enhance both the generalization and robustness of LMs, termed UEGR. Specifically, during the forward propagation stage, we enrich the output probability distributions of adversarial samples by adaptive dropout to generate diverse sub models, and incorporate JS divergence and adversarial losses of these output distributions to reinforce output stability. During backward propagation stage, we compute parameter saliency scores and selectively update only the most critical parameters to minimize unnecessary deviations and consolidate the model's resilience. Theoretical analysis shows that our framework includes gradient regularization to limit the model's sensitivity to input perturbations and selective parameter updates to flatten the loss landscape, thus improving both generalization and robustness. The experimental results show that our method significantly improves the generalization and robustness of LMs compared to other existing methods across 13 publicly available language datasets, achieving state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance.