AI Assurance

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8 papers in the last four weeks, against 1 the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Jul 13Week of Sep 28

Latest papers 54

Oct 6, 2026cs.SE

A Case Study in Assuring AI-Written Software

Software-engineering agents can enable people without formal software training to build systems they could not otherwise implement and simultaneously can produce more code than even experts can meaningfully inspect. In both cases, exhaustive code review is not reliable as the sole basis for human control. We report a case study of a production healthcare platform built through coding agents and governed by an operator without formal software-engineering training. Over time, its workflow grew into a human-led meta-agent system where one agent wrote code, other agents supervised and reviewed it, and project rules carried lessons forward. The operator found that tests, monitors and reviewing agents used to supervise the system were fallible. Some monitors measured proxies rather than outcomes, some audits failed silently, missing checks disappeared from reported results and one automated repair caused operational disruption. In this case, human control depended on keeping the intended outcome, the evidence used to judge it, the agents' permissions and the final human decision were all tied to the same underlying objective.

Lindsey Ferris, Sierra Bonilla

Independent Researcher · University College London London, United Kingdom

AI Agent Reliability AI Assurance AI Coding Agents AI Agent Monitoring Automated Code Review Human Oversight of AI

Oct 5, 2026cs.AI

Auditable Claims about AI Agents

Organizations make claims about their AI agents: a person approves every external email, every action is logged, an evaluation shows the agent is safe to deploy. Article 12 of the EU AI Act requires high-risk systems to allow the automatic recording of events but does not say which records settle a given claim. The position is one sentence: to be checked, a claim about an agent must first name its policy, its scope, the records that would settle it, and who writes them. Adapting the preconditions of an assurance engagement, we call a claim auditable when these elements and a decision rule are fixed before any verdict and the records are obtainable. This extends the Policy Checkability dimension of our Auditable Agents framework from single actions to claims. Agents add three conditions: coverage by an independent record, authorization bound to each action's arguments, and completeness beyond integrity. Under an explicit model, we prove that support is impossible without each wherever its hypotheses hold. A claim-check table applies the method to six common claims, anchored in current NIST, IETF, and OWASP drafts. A worked case follows one claim through five evidence states. We close with a practice box and steps for operators, buyers, auditors, and standard setters.

Yue Zhao, Jiate Li, Li Li +4

University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA · Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

AI Assurance AI Accountability AI Agent Auditing

Oct 1, 2026cs.AI

The AI Assessment Sandbox Configurator: A Framework to Support Technical Assessment in AI Regulatory Sandboxes

The EU's Artificial Intelligence Act requires all Member States to establish AI Regulatory Sandboxes (AIRS) by August 2027: supervised environments bringing together national Competent Authorities, technical experts, and the organisations under assessment. When AIRS engagements include structured technical testing, running such testing at scale demands dedicated infrastructure, yet the tooling ecosystem remains structurally fragmented, with heterogeneous tools producing outputs that are difficult to compare, trace, and reuse. From the procedural conditions of AIRS engagements and the AI Act obligations for high-risk systems, we derive 11 architectural and governance requirements for the infrastructure that operationalises technical testing within an AIRS. In response to these requirements, we introduce the AI Assessment Sandbox Configurator, an open-source framework combining a curated Catalogue of tests and controls accessed through a stable plug-in API, a shared data model that harmonises heterogeneous outputs, role-specific dashboards for multi-disciplinary interpretation, and audience-segmented reporting. We describe the architecture and current release, and report an early-stage pilot that exercised the harmonisation and reporting layers within a live AIRS engagement and contributed to an official Exit Report. We discuss the roadmap, the governance questions raised by the Catalogue's tiered contribution model, and the institutional pathways through which an open-source assessment ecosystem could emerge across Member States.

Alessio Buscemi, German Castignani, Daniele Pagani +2

Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST), Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg · University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

AI Assurance AI Governance

Oct 1, 2026cs.AI

A Deterministic and Auditable AI Security Risk Assessment Framework with ATLAS Aligned Executable Rules and Formal Verification

Artificial intelligence systems are increasingly deployed in high impact and safety critical settings, yet security assessment remains difficult to reproduce and defend under audit. Existing approaches often rely on narrative checklists or assessor driven scoring, and they lack an explicit, machine evaluable mapping from observable engineering artefacts to stable technique level outcomes. We present an evidence driven AI security assessment framework that operationalises assessment as a deterministic decision function. The framework normalises heterogeneous artefacts into a project independent Control ID taxonomy scored on a bounded four level ordinal scale, compiles technique level predicates from a pinned MITRE ATLAS snapshot via an explicit mitigation to control mapping, and outputs technique indexed feasibility and impact levels with traceable links back to the triggering evidence. We package all normative choices as a versioned assessment policy object to support repeatable reassessment across snapshots. To ensure semantic correctness, we formally verify boundedness, totality, ordered semantic consistency, and monotonicity of the compiled evaluator over the full declared score domain. We evaluate the framework on five public open source AI projects pinned to explicit repository snapshots, quantify before and after changes under a unified hardening intervention, and validate responsiveness to real engineering changes through fork based implementations of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) generation and Continuous integration (CI) security scanning gates. Results show consistent downward shifts in feasibility profiles under strengthened observable controls, while worst case residual feasibility persists when technique specific core controls remain absent from the evidence scope.

Yixuan Huang, Basel Halak, Boojoong Kang

University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

AI Assurance AI Risk Management

Sep 28, 2026cs.AI

An Empirical Study and Assessment of EU AI Act Compliance Checkers

The EU AI Act introduces extensive compliance requirements for organizations that develop, deploy, or integrate AI systems. Many of these requirements are directly relevant to security and privacy, while also addressing closely related issues such as data governance, transparency, accuracy, and robustness. However, stakeholders such as small-to-medium businesses and individual developers often lack the legal expertise required to interpret these obligations and translate them into engineering and governance practices. This disconnect creates challenges for implementing the EU AI Act and may lead to missing safeguards or misdirected development and deployment efforts. To address this, various automated EU AI Act compliance checkers (AIACCs) have emerged, claiming to streamline compliance assessments and provide practical guidance. In this paper, we present the first empirical study and assessment of AIACCs. We characterize 12 mainstream AIACCs across multiple dimensions, evaluate their legal coverage and alignment, and analyze checker-generated compliance reports for structure, determinacy, and actionability. We find that the quality of AIACCs varies significantly and that they currently can only serve as early-stage orientation tools. Specifically, we observe inconsistent interaction modes and user-friendliness, a tendency to overly simplify or omit key obligations, and a failure to provide determinate, actionable guidance. As a result, reliance on the current generation of AIACCs may foster a false sense of compliance. With our study, we provide a critical baseline of the current AIACC landscape. We further offer design principles for the implementation of more reliable compliance-support tools.

Zhen Tao, Alize Kahraman, Shidong Pan +4

Technical University of Munich, Germany · New York University, USA · CSIRO’s Data61, Australia

AI Assurance AI Governance

Sep 16, 2026cs.AI

Building Trust in Artificial Intelligence: A Necessity for Railway Applications

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is currently only applied to non-safety critical applications due to the strict standards and regulations for railway industries. We propose to review the three main fields necessary to increase trust in data science and AI algorithms and reach compliance: robustness, Operational Design Domain (ODD), and explainability. Robustness is the ability of an AI system to maintain its level of performance under any circumstances (ISO24029). ODDs allow the explicit definition of operating conditions under which a system is intended to operate, according to the recently published DIN DKE SPEC 99004. Explainability is the property of an AI system to express important factors influencing the AI system results in a way that humans can understand. Those 3 domains of research are already well investigated by nonrailway actors, with algorithms and methods ready to use for railway applications. A system view is necessary to ensure all trustworthy requirements interact continuously in a safe MLOps environment thereby fostering acceptance from regulators, operators and the public. Beyond safeguarding safety-critical applications, we aim to show that fostering deep trust in AI, as now required by regulatory frameworks worldwide, will unlock its full potential and transform the pace of adoption across mission-critical domains.

Lefebvre Renard Clément, Lébé Vincent, Da Silva Ribeiro Pereira Ricardo +4

Alstom - Mobility Data Science and AI, Madrid, Spain · Alstom - Mobility Data Science and AI, Saint-Ouen, France · Alstom - Safety Engineering, Stockholm, Sweden +1

AI Assurance Trust in AI

Sep 16, 2026cs.AI

Who Audits Whom, on What Substrate, with What Evidence? An Independence-Graded Audit Protocol for Agentic AI

Agentic AI systems plan, invoke tools and act with limited supervision; they are now both the subject of audits and, increasingly, the auditor. Independence, the foundation of assurance,is still applied to them as a binary. We argue that it must be graded along three orthogonal axes: principal independence (who controls the auditor), substrate independence (an auditor sharing the auditee's foundation-model family, toolchain or guardrails fails with it) and evidence independence (whether evidence is attestable rather than self-reported). Each axis has precedent; the contribution is to grade all three on a single audit, aggregate them by the weakest link, and apply the same rubric when the auditor is itself an agent. We give the model a formal basis by transplanting the beta-factor model of common-cause failure from reliability engineering, a seven-step protocol whose outputs a third party can verify, a structural detectability analysis of a procurement-controls agent audited at three grades, and a Monte Carlo study of the model in which a conventional internal audit of an agent-a real audit team, a second agent, provider logsp-surfaces 5.9% of the faults it could in principle see and none at all in half the fault classes. We map the triple to the EU AI Act as amended, ISO/IEC 42006, UK public-sector risk-management guidance and audit-regulator practice.

Mohamed Chahine Ghanem

Keele University, School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Keele, United Kingdom · University of Liverpool, Cybersecurity Institute, Liverpool, United Kingdom

AI Assurance AI Agent Auditing

Sep 15, 2026cs.AI

Making AI-Assisted Claims Independently Challengeable: Publication Authority and a Protocol for Falsifiable Publication Records

AI-assisted claims can appear authoritative when evidence, analysis, human authorization, presentation, and correction history refer to different states. Provenance, attestation, and transparency expose history but alone do not specify the publication transition examined here. We develop Publication Authority as an exact-state, non-transferable, single-use publication capability and instantiate it in PAC-2026 (Publication-Accountability Calculus), a machine-readable AIJIM Protocol candidate. We evaluate its fourth bounded semantic freeze (SF-4), a fixed-profile specification designed for replaceable bindings. Six obligations govern evidence, runs and artifacts, measurement disclosure, authorization, surface correspondence, and lifecycle continuity. Each yields a target-bound witness, localized counterexample, or localized unverifiability; none can compensate for another. Only a fresh, complete all-pass record derives the permit consumed by one atomic publication transition. We use identity vectors, adversarial cases, finite models, and historical implementations. Ten models explored 110,764 safe reachable states; 76 unsafe configurations produced the expected violation or observer countermodel. A reader surface passing its correspondence check cannot authorize publication unless the accepted record admits that surface. SF-4 separates evidence horizon from verification time and rejects an authentic but causally invalid authorization. A historical predecessor path reproduced 17 frozen authorization-successor outcomes. A later in-house, instance-blind test of known case classes matched all 183 scored expectations; same-host package execution reproduced its 240 archived observations. Results support internal coherence, bounded safety, fault sensitivity, and limited constructibility, but not factual truth, general refinement, blind interoperability, field efficacy, or standards status.

Torsten Olivi Tiltack, Yifei Dong, Kun Yu +5

Data Science Institute, University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW, Australia · Global Big Data Technologies Centre, University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW, Australia · School of Computer Science, University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW, Australia

AI Assurance AI Accountability Data Provenance Formal Verification

Sep 14, 2026cs.SE

AI Safety: Not Optional, Not Later

Incidents show that AI safety failures often arise across multiple layers. We present a safety-by-design assurance architecture combining model-level supervision, such as Scientist AI, with system-level controls over scaffolds and harnesses, independent verification, monitoring, and evidence infrastructure, supported by governance for accountability and evidence interoperability.

Qinghua Lu, Yoshua Bengio

CSIRO, Australia · LawZero, Canada · Université de Montréal, Canada +1

AI Assurance AI Accountability LLM Safety Alignment AI Agent Monitoring AI Governance AI Safety

Sep 10, 2026cs.CR

Compute-Bounded Security Assurance - Coverage, Verification, and Response under Resource Constraints

Additional inference compute can increase the number of correctly resolved security-assurance tasks, but repeated success, unique coverage, accepted evidence, and operational protection are different quantities. We develop a resource-constrained framework that separates them. For repeated conditionally independent attempts with latent success probability

\Theta

, coverage is

C_n = 1 - E[(1-\Theta)^n]

, and its limiting value is

1 - P(\Theta = 0)

. Positive pairwise outcome correlation does not by itself imply a ceiling below one: we construct two models with the same mean success and pairwise correlation but different limiting coverage. We distinguish this result from the effective sample size used to estimate a mean, and show why finite-budget observations cannot generally identify an asymptotic support ceiling. We then connect coverage to fallible evidence checking, proper scoring of factual grounding, complete resource accounting, service capacity, and a response model that includes mitigation delay. A conceptual defensive architecture separates evidence analysis, adjudication, and operational authority. An evaluation protocol specifies held-out tasks, paired comparisons, negative cases, and uncertainty reporting. The contribution is a consistent theoretical synthesis and a set of counterexamples to invalid extrapolations, rather than an empirical scaling law. All numerical illustrations are analytic; no model-parity result, hardware benchmark, or general attacker-defender equilibrium is claimed.

Jithin VG, Ditto PS

Bud Ecosystem

AI Assurance Evidence-Grounded Reasoning

Aug 12, 2026cs.CR

Non-Degenerate Risk Certification for Automated Security Decisions: A Decision-Contract Theory with ATT&CK-Aligned Triage as a Worked Instance

An unconditional risk bound on automated decisions can be satisfied without automating anything, since a selector that never acts drives the bound to zero. We show this is structural: any risk certificate is defined over a decision contract, the inputs a system acts on plus the semantic relation under which an output counts correct, and weakening either hides base-classifier error. We develop a decision-contract theory: an error-conservation law showing error is only reassigned among harmful automation, human deferral, and semantic masking; a label-free singleton capacity certifying structural incapacity, with a risk-feasible refinement separating recoverable threshold misalignment from risk-constrained incapacity; and a non-degenerate actionability certificate excluding all-abstain solutions by construction. We instantiate this on ATT&CK-aligned alert triage for LLM-based intrusion detection, the setting that exposed the vacuity failure. Across 3 IDS datasets, 6 LLMs, and 4 error-rate thresholds, empirical false-attribution risk stays at or below target in 90.3% of configurations, with 83.4% mean correct automation. The capacity diagnostic explains every low-utility configuration; its refinement separates genuine misalignment from risk-constrained incapacity, confirmed by an exhibited alternative threshold; a training-stability re-run finds no confirmed structural-incapacity instance; and real fine-grained attack-subtype labels confirm the coarsening-transfer identity under a genuine many-to-one map, with small but non-zero masking mass.

Zhenpeng Li

Guangzhou Health Science College, No. 248 Guangyuan Middle Road, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510405, China

AI Assurance Selective Prediction

Aug 7, 2026cs.AI

IntelliAudit: Using Large Language Models to Evaluate Audit Controls

IT audits require auditors to judge whether heterogeneous organizational evidence satisfies semantic security and compliance controls. This judgment is difficult to automate because relevant evidence is distributed across policies, records, spreadsheets, and operational artifacts, and because audit conclusions depend on evidentiary sufficiency rather than keyword matching. We present IntelliAudit, a retrieval-grounded multi-agent system for IT audit evidence evaluation. Given a control and an evidence corpus, IntelliAudit retrieves relevant artifacts, generates an evidence-grounded assessment, challenges adverse findings, adjudicates disagreements, and produces an auditor-facing recommendation with cited evidence, rationale, missing-evidence analysis, and remediation guidance. We instantiate IntelliAudit on ISO/IEC 27001 and evaluate it across multiple simulated organizations using expert auditor review and audit-readiness user feedback. The evaluation shows that IntelliAudit can support control interpretation, evidence-grounded reasoning, and audit-preparation workflows, while also revealing the importance of human oversight for calibrating sufficiency judgments and correcting overly permissive recommendations. These results suggest that retrieval-grounded multi-agent systems can assist audit evidence review, but should remain decision-support tools rather than autonomous certification systems.

Allison Wilson, Sina Moradi Sabet, Diar Shakimov +4

Simon Fraser University Burnaby, Canada · Amirkabir University of Technology Tehran, Iran · TELUS Vancouver, Canada +1

AI Assurance Multi-Agent Systems

Aug 7, 2026cs.SE

Towards Assurance Closure in AI-Native Large-Scale Agile Software Development

The AI-Native Manifesto envisions large-scale agile software development in which humans increasingly govern intent, risk, and exceptions while agents execute more of the engineering process. Realizing that end-state requires more than better code generation: it requires assurance closure, meaning that the system can establish what must be true, determine and obtain appropriate evidence, judge the credibility of that evidence, preserve its validity through change, and use the resulting uncertainty to bound agent authority. Existing work already provides many of the necessary mechanisms across formal methods, testing, simulation, assurance cases, digital twins, and runtime assurance. We identify six residual gaps in making the surrounding assurance reasoning sufficiently machine-operable, propose a high-level architecture with six corresponding capabilities built on a shared semantic assurance layer, and formulate four research questions to turn that architecture into dependable, human-on-the-loop, AI-native R&D.

Ricardo Britto

Ericsson, Sweden · Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden

AI Assurance Software Engineering Agents Human Oversight of AI AI-Assisted Software Development

Aug 5, 2026cs.SE

A Chain Is Only as Strong as Its Weakest Link: A Scoping Review of System Integration Audits in AI

As AI systems become increasingly integrated into diverse interfaces and applications, model-centric audits are insufficient to address risks arising from interactions among system components and deployment environments. System integration has long been central to software audits in safety-critical domains such as aerospace. However, its role in AI auditing remains underexplored. Scanning through 4,259 documents, we present a scoping review of AI audits that treat system integration as a core tenet of evaluation (n = 58). Using reflexive thematic analysis, we analyze their elements, actors, enablers, and constraints. We find that the corpus represents an emerging yet still fragmented form of AI auditing: few existing measures target integration-specific risks; large gaps remain in meeting traditional audit expectations; and access to necessary information and resources significantly influences audit design. Nonetheless, integration can be categorized across three sites (inter-component, system-environment, and multi-system), each serving the functions of risk exploration, risk determination, coordination, and procedural regularity. Deviating from other types of evaluations, these audits assess qualities specific to system integration, including compatibility, completeness, and oversight. This review calls on the AI community to prioritize system integration as a core strategy for addressing AI risk, and to develop audit practices capable of capturing failures across components, environments, and systems beyond the reach of component-level evaluation.

Leah Davis, Dominic Martin, AJung Moon

McGill University, Montr´eal, QC · Universit´e du Qu´ebec `a Montr´eal, Montr´eal, QC

AI Assurance Algorithmic Auditing

Aug 4, 2026cs.CR

A Security-Oriented Lifecycle Model for Large Language Model Systems

Large language models are being integrated into critical infrastructure and enterprise workflows at unprecedented scale,yet the lifecycle frameworks governing their development and operations were designed for operational efficiency rather than security analysis. As a result, security-relevant activities such as data provenance verification, artifact signing, agentic permission control, and decommissioning are often left implicit or assumed to receive due care. Governance frameworks, in turn, organise requirements around risk levels or management processes without clearly linking them to the lifecycle stages where they apply. This paper addresses both deficiencies. We propose a lifecycle model for LLM systems that supports security analysis by structuring it around security-relevant boundaries rather than workflow optimisation. The model comprises 32 stages across four core pipeline layers (Data, Model, Distribution, Application), supported by a 12-stage LLMOps pillar and a 9-category governance pillar. Thirteen stages are introduced here as separate units because they expose distinct security concerns that existing frameworks do not clearly distinguish. A governance mapping synthesising the NIST AI RMF, the EU AI Act, and ISO/IEC 42001 reveals a structural property of the current regulatory landscape: governance evidence concentrates at deployment-facing stages, where systems are visible to regulators, while the most consequential decisions, data selection, alignment strategy, and capability boundaries, are made at development-facing stages, where regulatory visibility is lowest.

Eleftherios Batzolis, George Drosatos, Vassilis Katsouros +1

Department of Informatics, Democritus University of Thrace, Kavala, Greece · Institute for Language and Speech Processing, Athena Research Center, Xanthi, Greece

AI Assurance LLM Security AI Governance

Jul 27, 2026cs.AI

TRACE-CTI: Auditable Post-Extraction Governance of TTP Claims with Knowledge Graphs

Security Operations Centers increasingly rely on automated mapping of Cyber Threat Intelligence reports to MITRE ATT&CK, yet extractor outputs remain fallible and are often stored without the evidence, provenance, and validation history needed to decide whether an individual mapping should be trusted. We present TRACE- CTI, a post-extraction claim-governance framework that preserves run-level Predictions, aggregates them into configuration-level GraphAssertions, materializes setup-deduplicated corroboration as ConsensusAssertions, and exposes only GraphAssertions backed by policy-compliant validation grounds. The framework retains native evidence granularity, complete extraction provenance, versioned trust decisions, and non-destructive revocation history. We evaluate TRACE-CTI on two public CTI corpora comprising 65 reports and 5,303 sentences, using a controlled 2 x 3 matrix of retrievers and generator families, incrementally ingested across six GraphVersions. All setups are incorporated without schema modification; provenance paths remain complete, operational scopes remain disjoint, and every trusted GraphAssertion has an active qualifying validation ground. Cross-generator-family setup pairs exhibit greater output diversity than same-family pairs. At the final graph state, increasing setup support from k >= 1 to six-setup unanimity raises gold-aligned precision from 25.3% to 90.6%, while recall decreases from 88.2% to 16.3%. The graph also directly answers seven questions about provenance, trust, versioning, dependency, disagreement, and review-queue that the evaluated minimal flat output cannot fully answer without enrichment or reprocessing. These results support explicit, auditable governance of extracted TTP claims; the observed corroboration trajectory is descriptive and does not establish statistical independence or a causal model-family effect.

Federico Valletta, Giacomo Longo, Enrico Russo +1

CASD – School of Advanced Defense Studies, Piazza della Rovere 83, 00165 Rome, Italy

KG Construction AI Assurance Cyber Threat Intelligence Data Provenance Cybersecurity

Jul 21, 2026cs.CY

The safety failures we are not instrumenting: a perspective on hidden safety-critical challenges in modern AI systems

Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios. That focus is incomplete. In deployed systems, many of the most consequential failures are quieter: plausible rather than spectacular, distributed across components rather than localized in a single output, and normalized by workflows before they are recognized as hazards. We argue that a central safety challenge in modern AI systems is increasingly not only whether a model emits a harmful response, but whether the broader socio-technical system preserves the conditions under which errors remain visible, contestable, containable, and recoverable. We propose a five-layer framework for diagnosing these hidden risks: (1) epistemic integrity, concerning whether evidence and uncertainty are represented honestly enough to support calibrated reliance; (2) control integrity, concerning whether authority, permissions, and action boundaries remain robust under attack and optimization; (3) temporal integrity, concerning whether safety holds across sessions, memory updates, and deployment drift; (4) organizational integrity, concerning whether institutions retain the capacity to audit, assign responsibility, and intervene effectively; and (5) ecosystem integrity, concerning whether AI systems preserve rather than erode the information environment on which future oversight depends. Across these layers, we identify under-recognized risk patterns, including overreliance, uncertainty and legitimacy laundering in retrieval, prompt injection, reward hacking, memory poisoning, evaluation deception, fictional human oversight, synthetic evidence pollution, and model collapse. We conclude with design and governance recommendations and a research agenda for shifting AI safety from model-centric evaluation toward socio-technical reliability.

Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci

Technical University of Munich

AI Assurance AI Accountability AI Governance AI Safety

Jul 20, 2026cs.AI

Engineering Trustworthy Agentic AI for Critical Systems

Agentic artificial intelligence systems, capable of autonomous perception, planning, tool use, and multi-step action, are increasingly proposed for critical engineering domains where decisions carry physical, operational, or economic consequences. This survey addresses a gap in current literature by treating trustworthiness, whether agentic behavior can be verified, audited, and trusted under the constraints that engineering practice actually requires, as a first-class engineering property, rather than evaluating agentic AI by task capability alone. The study adopts a trustworthiness model organized around five cross-cutting dimensions: safety and constraint satisfaction; robustness and reliability; transparency and interpretability; accountability and auditability; and privacy and security. This is mapped onto an agentic assurance workflow spanning perception through audit. Building on this foundation, agentic systems architectures, threats, concrete trust mechanisms, and quantitative metrics are surveyed for direct application in agentic systems development and evaluation. These principles are then examined across four constraint-bound engineering domains: power systems, autonomous vehicles/robotics/UAVs, high-performance computing, and communication networks, identifying recurring design patterns, shared failure modes, and domain-specific gaps. Synthesizing across those domains, agentic AI trustworthiness is shown to be a single problem, with a path outlined toward a reusable, cross-domain assurance framework analogous to the graded certification regimes used by mature safety-critical engineering fields.

Omar Al-Refai, Ibrahim Shahbaz, Adam Ali Husseinat +3

Innovations in Systems Trust and Resilience (iSTAR) Laboratory, Texas A&M University, TX, USA · Texas A&M Institute of Data Science - Security, Privacy and Resilience for Trusted AI (SPARTA) Thematic Lab., Texas A&M University, TX, USA · Texas A&M Global Cyber Research Institute (GCRI), Texas A&M University, TX, USA

AI Assurance Agent Reliability AI Agent Safety Trust in AI Agentic AI

Jul 17, 2026cs.CY

A Methodology for Auditable Trustworthiness Levels in AI Lifecycle Governance

AI governance increasingly requires judgments about whether an AI system remains adequately trustworthy over time, whether observed changes are tolerable, and how such judgments should be documented in a transparent and contestable way. Existing approaches remain either too high-level to support lifecycle monitoring and reassessment or too narrowly metric-driven to connect multidimensional trustworthiness evidence with governance decisions. We propose a lightweight methodology centered on \emph{trustworthiness level functions}: auditable rules that map measured trustworthiness profiles to governance-relevant levels. The methodology separates the underlying trustworthiness evidence from the governance rule used to interpret it and treats that rule as a lifecycle governance object. The rule may remain expert-defined or, when available evidence warrants empirical learning, be approximated by an interpretable candidate model. An AI lifecycle governance procedure embeds this choice in explicit decision gates for determining whether learning should be attempted and whether a learned candidate should become operative. The resulting rule supports lifecycle monitoring through level transitions, boundary margins, and profile drift, with explicit human responsibilities for validation, approval, and reassessment. We illustrate the methodology on synthetic AI lifecycle scenarios involving degradation, shocks, updates, heterogeneous monitoring cadences, and system comparison. Our methodology does not replace expert or legal judgment, but makes the governance interpretation of trustworthiness evidence more explicit, auditable, and contestable over time.

Andrea Ferrario

Institute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland · SUPSI, Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA), Lugano, Switzerland · ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

AI Assurance AI Governance Trust in AI

Jul 17, 2026cs.AI

Closing the AI Trust Gap: The Case for Independent Certification for Trustworthy AI

Over the past decade, responsible AI (RAI) has produced a substantial body of practice for identifying and mitigating the risks AI poses in high-stakes settings. Yet this work has not produced a market that rewards trustworthiness. Firms that invest seriously in safety, fairness, and oversight cannot consistently prove to consumers, regulators, and shareholders that their systems go beyond the bare minimum of compliance. What is missing is a way for society to recognize or compare the difference. The result is a trust gap: a structural condition in which responsible development efforts happen inside organizations but produce no external, independently recognized and verifiable signal of trustworthy outcomes. We argue this gap is sustained in part because of a focus on responsible AI (a matter of internal process) as opposed to trustworthy AI (a matter of independently verifiable real-world outcomes), and that it persists because of three compounding failures: (1) the market cannot distinguish trustworthy systems from their imitations; (2) evaluation targets models and outputs rather than deployed sociotechnical systems and their outcomes; (3) the measurement ecosystem is oriented toward avoiding harm rather than demonstrating benefit. Reviewing existing AI governance instruments and comparing them to certification regimes in healthcare, sustainability, and security, we show that none integrate a governance baseline, independently verified positive-outcome evidence, and market signaling in a single framework. We propose independent, outcome-oriented certification as the connective layer that can close the trust gap, complementing regulation and internal governance by making trustworthiness measurable, comparable, and commercially rewarded.

Trisevgeni Papakonstantinou, Cansu Canca, Farah Nanji +14

University College London · AI Ethics Lab · University of Cambridge +8

AI Assurance AI Governance Trust in AI

Jul 3, 2026cs.SE

AGL-1: The Enterprise AI Governance Layer as a Control Plane for Trusted Enterprise Intelligence

Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from isolated experimentation toward operational dependency across copilots, retrieval-augmented generation systems, autonomous agents, and AI-enabled business workflows. As this transition accelerates, the primary enterprise challenge is no longer only model access or inference scale. It is governed intelligence operations: the ability to enforce authorization, preserve contextual lineage, control persistent memory, detect stale or conflicting knowledge, constrain agentic execution, and produce audit-ready evidence across distributed AI estates. This paper introduces AGL-1, the Enterprise AI Governance Layer, as a vendor-neutral reference model for the control plane that should operate across foundation models, retrieval systems, orchestration frameworks, enterprise memory, policy engines, observability systems, tools, APIs, and business applications. Building on governed knowledge-system principles introduced in GKS-5, AGL-1 generalizes the governance problem from retrieval-specific controls to full AI execution-path governance. It identifies recurring failure modes such as unauthorized retrieval, stale grounding, unmanaged memory, weak provenance, policy drift, fragmented observability, and uncontrolled autonomous execution. It then defines seven governance domains: identity-aware retrieval, policy enforcement, provenance management, memory governance, knowledge integrity monitoring, agentic execution control, and trust observability. The central claim is that durable enterprise value from AI will increasingly depend on the ability to govern intelligence at scale. In complex enterprises, trust is not a property of the model alone. It is a property of the system around the model: identity, knowledge, policy, memory, tools, human oversight, and evidence working together as a managed control plane.

Roopam W. Sure

Independent Researcher

AI Assurance AI Agent Monitoring AI Agent Governance AI Governance Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Jul 2, 2026cs.CY

The Eticas AI Risk Taxonomy: Open Infrastructure for Operationalizing AI Audits

The rapid deployment of AI systems across high-stakes domains has created urgent demand for standardized evaluation, yet the field remains fragmented across competing risk taxonomies that catalog risks without showing how an audit is executed. At least 74 AI risk taxonomies exist, and almost all stop at the catalog. The hard part of auditing is not naming a risk but operationalizing it: turning it into a test run against a real system, a measured value, a calibrated severity, and a defensible grade. This paper leads with that bridge. We present the operationalization layer Eticas has built and run, shown end to end on a single risk (PII leakage) against a public benchmark, and then the open taxonomy that makes the method scale. On GPT-4-0314, a disclosure risk that seven external frameworks require be controlled is measured at 0%, 51%, and 84% disclosure as adversarial conditioning increases, mapping through calibrated severity bands to a subcategory grade of E with a SYSTEMIC pattern. Around this example, the Eticas AI Risk Taxonomy v2.0.0 organizes 76 active subcategories across 10 categories and 20 sub-groups, with mappings to 18 external frameworks across compliance, reference, and academic tiers. Its category and sub-group layer is published under CC BY 4.0 as open semantic infrastructure with stable URIs and SKOS/JSON-LD distributions, and a worked subcategory example shows the operational layer down to its severity thresholds. The contribution is the demonstrated bridge from concept to graded finding, anchored by a clean separation of risks from the mechanisms by which they surface, and framed by an open-core model in which the conceptual scaffold is open and the methodology calibration is the practitioner layer. This is the infrastructure the AI auditing field needs: shared, open, and demonstrably operable.

Gemma Galdon Clavell, Pablo Accuosto, Usman Gohar

AI Assurance AI Risk Management Algorithmic Auditing

Jul 1, 2026cs.SE

Risk Architecture for AI-Native Engineering Teams: An Organizational Framework for Agentic System Governance

Engineering management research has produced mature frameworks for software risk: ownership by feature, escalation by severity, and assurance by test coverage. These frameworks implicitly assume deterministic behavior, discrete and auditable change events, and clear component-to-owner mappings. Teams that build and operate agentic AI systems violate all three assumptions at once: outputs are probabilistic, systems take autonomous multi-step actions, and the risk surface mutates silently between deployments. Existing AI risk literature addresses this from above (policy frameworks such as the NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) or below (threat taxonomies such as OWASP's agentic AI guidance), but not at the layer where an engineering manager (EM) operates: roles, decision rights, and escalation structures. This paper contributes (i) a seven-dimension profile distinguishing pure software-engineering, hybrid, and AI-native teams; (ii) a six-cluster failure-mode taxonomy including a previously unarticulated cluster, dependency-boundary determinism mismatch; and (iii) a synthetic framework-adequacy methodology scoring how well each profile's risk architecture detects, contains, and escalates a defined scenario set. Because the object of study is framework adequacy rather than human behavior, the evaluation yields derived rather than observed coverage claims. Coverage degrades as teams move from pure software engineering to AI-native operation, monotonically in the median and abruptly in the count of uncovered, high-consequence failures appearing only at the AI-native step. The degradation concentrates in specific failure-mode categories, and the most severe, least-covered failures arise not inside AI-native teams but at the organizational boundary where their probabilistic outputs are consumed by determinism-assuming dependencies.

Laxmipriya Ganesh Iyer

Independent Researcher

Agent Failure Analysis AI Assurance AI Risk Management AI Agent Governance AI Governance

Jul 1, 2026cs.LG

Auditing the Audit: Five Failure Modes in Benchmark-Validity Audits

Governance frameworks ask AI providers and auditors for documented evaluation evidence, and perturbation-based construct-validity audits are a common form of that evidence. We argue the audits are themselves fragile: their conclusions can be silently manufactured by implementation details that readers cannot see in the reported numbers. We name five classes of pipeline failure and demonstrate each in a self-audit over safety benchmarks and open-weight instruction-tuned models. Under a unified six-point due-diligence gate, every cell lands in a non-confirmatory bucket, and no cell reaches confirmatory. The evidence here is a single two-model, five-benchmark case study, and F1--F5 is an illustrative, deliberately non-exhaustive starting taxonomy -- not a comprehensive partition of audit failures. We position the gate as a withholding and disclosure protocol for assurance-grade evidence, supplementary to (not a replacement for) classical construct-validity evidence, and not as a route to benchmark-validity verdicts.

Yanhang Li, Zhichao Fan, Zexin Zhuang

Northeastern University, USA · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA · Southern Methodist University, USA

AI Assurance Benchmark Auditing AI Safety Evaluation Benchmark Validity

Jun 30, 2026cs.CY

FLARE-AI: Flaw Reporting for AI

Flaw reporting for deployed AI systems is fundamental to identifying system failures and improving AI safety. Yet the AI reporting ecosystem is fragmented: researchers who identify flaws often do not know what or where to report, and groups who receive reports rarely share them with other relevant stakeholders. As a result, good-faith reporters duplicate effort by submitting many different forms, and recipients lack standardized, triage-ready information. We audit 12 reporting systems published by AI developers, cybersecurity groups, and AI flaw aggregators, identifying five recurring design challenges spanning discoverability, scope, information collection, coordination, and guidance for strict-liability cases. Building on this analysis and feedback from 49 experts across 32 organizations representing developers, security researchers, and ecosystem coordinators, we introduce FLARE-AI, an open-source AI flaw reporting system designed for interoperability with existing systems. FLARE-AI streamlines flaw report creation by collecting triage-relevant information through conditional logic and early classification, then enables optional dissemination of standardized, machine-readable reports to multiple developers, coordinators, and incident registries from a single submission. By lowering barriers to reporting AI flaws and improving interoperability across stakeholders, FLARE-AI helps break down silos and accelerate remediation across the AI ecosystem.

Shayne Longpre, Elaine Zhu, Carson Ezell +15

Massachusetts Institute of Technology · Northeastern University · Harvard University +9

AI Assurance AI Accountability AI Safety

Jun 19, 2026cs.AI

The AI Evaluability Gap: The Missing Layer for Managing Risk and Sustaining Value

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

Vishal Srivastava, Tanmay Sah

Whiting School of Engineering Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD 21218 · Harrisburg University of Science and Technology Harrisburg, PA

AI Assurance AI Risk Management AI Governance

Jun 18, 2026cs.AI

Generative Responsible AI Data Evaluation Schema (GRAIDES) for AI Assurance in Local Government

Trust in the application of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) relies on well-governed measurable evidence of performance and safety. In practice, however, evaluation data is often fragmented across systems, inconsistently structured and difficult to compare. We introduce the Generative Responsible AI Data Evaluation Schema (GRAIDES) as a lightweight open-source data model for centralising AI observability across popular vendors. Practical blueprints for code, architecture and statistical evaluation are shared as guidance about how to approach generative system assurance at the organisational level. Illustrative case study results are reported from Westminster City Council's AI catalogue with a focus on measuring human-model alignment including detecting systematic disagreement between evaluators. By framing evaluations as a data modelling problem, GRAIDES provides a practical pathway toward more consistent and reproducible benchmarking, tuning and assurance activities for generative AI systems.

Ethan Knights, Christopher Conlan, Temilorun Gbolahan +2

AI Innovation Lab, Westminster City Council

AI Assurance Generative AI Evaluation

Jun 17, 2026cs.AI

AI4SE and SE4AI Exploration: A Decade Looking Back and Forward

The March 2020 INCOSE INSIGHT special issue on AI and Systems Engineering (SE) became the most downloaded issue in the publication's history and launched a research community that now draws over 250 registrants to its annual workshop. In this article, we trace the progress in AI and SE across three phases (labeled here foundational, applied, and LLM inflection) based on the authors' reading of the field's core papers, and describe our opinions of where the community has converged and where critical gaps remain. Separately, a human-AI agreement literature review leveraging both human expertise and six AI models was performed to assess the relevance of 1,712 INCOSE INSIGHT articles and 889 SERC publications. The results identify five critical research gaps and offer guidance for practitioners navigating AI adoption, assurance, and workforce transformation in SE. We share the agreement data and the AI4SE/SE4AI Explorer web application so readers can compare their own relevance judgments with the human and AI raters.

H. Sinan Bank, Daniel R. Herber, Thomas Bradley

Department of Systems Engineering Colorado State University Fort Collins, CO 80523

Jun 16, 2026cs.CR

AI Sandboxes: A Threat Model, Taxonomy, and Measurement Framework

AI systems are increasingly evaluated in bounded environments that combine isolation, simulation, instrumentation, supervision, and evidence capture. For physical AI, AIoT, and cyber-physical systems, this shift is not a matter of terminology: the system under test may sense, decide, actuate, communicate, and fail through physical processes, networked devices, and human operators. This article develops an assurance-oriented account of AI sandboxes as controlled environments for testing, evaluation, verification, and validation across digital AI, embodied autonomy, and cyber-physical deployments. We formalize the sandbox boundary and a weakest-link rule for composing per-dimension evidence into a bounded deployment claim; separate major sandbox archetypes; define a cyber-physical threat model that includes attacks on the assurance apparatus itself; and introduce a measurement framework spanning fidelity, controllability, observability, containment, reproducibility, and governance artifacts, instantiated on three worked case studies of real sandboxes. The resulting threat model, taxonomy, and measurement framework clarify what a sandbox can validly test, which risks it can contain, and what forms of evidence it can support for safety, security, and regulatory assurance.

Inderjeet Singh, Haitham Mahmoud, Andrés Murillo

Fujitsu Research of Europe, United Kingdom

Cyber-Physical Systems AI Assurance Cybersecurity AI Safety Evaluation

Jun 11, 2026cs.AI

Neuro-Symbolic Agents for Regulated Process Automation: Challenges and Research Agenda

LLM-based agents are entering regulated industries where they automate judgment intensive quality management processes. We argue that symbolic structures already embedded in these domains, including regulations, typed process models, and compliance constraints, should be treated not merely as external monitoring mechanisms but as core architectural components that shape the agent's decision-making and behavior. We propose compliance-by-construction as a complementary paradigm to guardrail-based monitoring: a structural foundation that prevents control-flow violations, while guardrails remain essential for catching semantic errors. We identify a structured set of neuro-symbolic research challenges on foundational and capability level and show that addressing them jointly enables compliance-by-construction. We call on the neuro-symbolic community to engage with regulated process automation as a high impact research domain.

Alexander Rombach, Chantale Lauer, Nijat Mehdiyev

German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Campus D3 2, 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany · Saarland University, Campus D3 2, 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany

AI Assurance Business Process Automation AI Agent Governance Neuro-Symbolic AI