Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

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Black-box adversarial attacks ask how an attacker can cause an AI system to misclassify, produce unsafe output, or take an unwanted action without access to its internal parameters or gradients. Methods use feedback from model queries—such as labels, scores, or responses—with decision-boundary search, finite differences, bandits, evolutionary or reinforcement-learning optimization; others craft perturbations on surrogate models and rely on transfer to unseen targets. Work spans images and physical patches, text and jailbreak prompts, audio, graphs, malware detectors, and tool-using or multimodal agents, often under constraints such as limited queries, imperceptibility, and preserving input meaning or function. Key tensions include whether attacks transfer across architectures and real-world transformations, how to compare them under fair query budgets, and whether defenses can resist adaptive attacks without sacrificing clean performance or utility.

Latest papers

175 papers16 papers in the last four weeks, down 6% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Mar 11, 2026

Contract And Conquer: How to Provably Compute Adversarial Examples for a Black-Box Model?

Black-box adversarial attacks are widely used as tools to test the robustness of deep neural networks against malicious perturbations of input data aimed at a specific change in the output of the model. Such methods, although they remain empirically effective, usually do not guarantee that an adversarial example can be found for a particular model. In this paper, we propose Contract And Conquer (CAC), an approach to provably compute adversarial examples for neural networks in a black-box manner. The method is based on knowledge distillation of a black-box model on an expanding distillation dataset and precise contraction of the adversarial example search space. CAC is supported by the transferability guarantee: we prove that the method yields an adversarial example for the black-box model within a fixed number of algorithm iterations. Experimentally, we demonstrate that the proposed approach outperforms existing state-of-the-art black-box attack methods on ImageNet dataset for different target models, including vision transformers.

Anna Chistyakova, Mikhail Pautov

Trusted AI Research Center, RAS · AXXX

Adversarial Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Transferability

Mar 8, 2026

Models as Lego Builders: Assembling Malice from Benign Blocks via Semantic Blueprints

Despite the rapid progress of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), the integration of visual modalities introduces new safety vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit to elicit biased or malicious outputs. In this paper, we demonstrate an underexplored vulnerability via semantic slot filling, where LVLMs complete missing slot values with unsafe content even when the slot types are deliberately crafted to appear benign. Building on this finding, we propose StructAttack, a simple yet effective single-query jailbreak framework under black-box settings. StructAttack decomposes a harmful query into a central topic and a set of benign-looking slot types, then embeds them as structured visual prompts (e.g., mind maps, tables, or sunburst diagrams) with small random perturbations. Paired with a completion-guided instruction, LVLMs automatically recompose the concealed semantics and generate unsafe outputs without triggering safety mechanisms. Although each slot appears benign in isolation (local benignness), StructAttack exploits LVLMs' reasoning to assemble these slots into coherent harmful semantics. Extensive experiments on multiple models and benchmarks show the efficacy of our proposed StructAttack.

Chenxi Li, Xianggan Liu, Dake Shen +9

DAIL Tech · NLP & KG Lab, Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Adversarial Attacks on VLMs VLM Safety Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Mar 5, 2026

Beyond the Patch: Exploring Vulnerabilities of Visuomotor Policies via Viewpoint-Consistent 3D Adversarial Object

Neural network-based visuomotor policies enable robots to perform manipulation tasks but remain susceptible to perceptual attacks. For example, conventional 2D adversarial patches are effective under fixed-camera setups, where appearance is relatively consistent; however, their efficacy often diminishes under dynamic viewpoints from moving cameras, such as wrist-mounted setups, due to perspective distortions. To proactively investigate potential vulnerabilities beyond 2D patches, this work proposes a viewpoint-consistent adversarial texture optimization method for 3D objects through differentiable rendering. As optimization strategies, we employ Expectation over Transformation (EOT) with a Coarse-to-Fine (C2F) curriculum, exploiting distance-dependent frequency characteristics to induce textures effective across varying camera-object distances. We further integrate saliency-guided perturbations to redirect policy attention and design a targeted loss that persistently drives robots toward adversarial objects. Our comprehensive experiments show that the proposed method is effective under various environmental conditions, while confirming its black-box transferability and real-world applicability.

Chanmi Lee, Minsung Yoon, Woojae Kim +2

The School of Computing at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), Daejeon, 34141, Republic of Korea

Adversarial Attacks Physical Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Robustness Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Mar 4, 2026

Image-based Prompt Injection: Hijacking Multimodal LLMs through Visually Embedded Adversarial Instructions

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) integrate vision and text to power applications, but this integration introduces new vulnerabilities. We study Image-based Prompt Injection (IPI), a black-box attack in which adversarial instructions are embedded into natural images to override model behavior. Our end-to-end IPI pipeline incorporates segmentation-based region selection, adaptive font scaling, and background-aware rendering to conceal prompts from human perception while preserving model interpretability. Using the COCO dataset and GPT-4-turbo, we evaluate 12 adversarial prompt strategies and multiple embedding configurations. The results show that IPI can reliably manipulate the output of the model, with the most effective configuration achieving up to 64% attack success under stealth constraints. These findings highlight IPI as a practical threat in black-box settings and underscore the need for defenses against multimodal prompt injection.

Neha Nagaraja, Lan Zhang, Zhilong Wang +2

School of Informatics, Computing, and Cyber Systems, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, USA · Bytedance, CA, USA

Prompt Injection Attacks Adversarial Attacks on VLMs Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Mar 3, 2026

Scores Know Bobs Voice: Speaker Impersonation Attack

Advances in deep learning have enabled the widespread deployment of speaker recognition systems (SRSs), yet they remain vulnerable to score-based impersonation attacks. Existing attacks that operate directly on raw waveforms require a large number of queries due to the difficulty of optimizing in high-dimensional audio spaces. Latent-space optimization within generative models offers improved efficiency, but these latent spaces are shaped by data distribution matching and do not inherently capture speaker-discriminative geometry. As a result, optimization trajectories often fail to align with the adversarial direction needed to maximize victim scores. To address this limitation, we propose an inversion-based generative attack framework that explicitly aligns the latent space of the synthesis model with the discriminative feature space of SRSs. We first analyze the requirements of an inverse model for score-based attacks and introduce a feature-aligned inversion strategy that geometrically synchronizes latent representations with speaker embeddings. This alignment ensures that latent updates directly translate into score improvements. Moreover, it enables new attack paradigms, including subspace-projection-based attacks, which were previously infeasible due to the absence of a faithful feature-to-audio mapping. Experiments show that our method significantly improves query efficiency, achieving competitive attack success rates with on average 10x fewer queries than prior approaches. In particular, the enabled subspace-projection-based attack attains up to 91.65% success using only 50 queries. These findings establish feature-aligned inversion as a key tool for evaluating the robustness of modern SRSs against score-based impersonation threats.

Chanwoo Hwang, Sunpill Kim, Yong Kiam Tan +6

Hanyang University Seoul, Republic of Korea · I2R, A*STAR & NTU Singapore · National University of Singapore Singapore +1

Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Speaker Verification Model Inversion Attacks

Feb 28, 2026

Learning to Attack: A Bandit Approach to Adversarial Context Poisoning

Neural contextual bandits are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where subtle perturbations to rewards, actions, or contexts induce suboptimal decisions. We introduce AdvBandit, a black-box adaptive attack that formulates context poisoning as a continuous-armed bandit problem, enabling the attacker to jointly learn and exploit the victim's evolving policy. The attacker requires no access to the victim's internal parameters, reward function, or gradient information; instead, it constructs a surrogate model using a maximum-entropy inverse reinforcement learning module from observed context-action pairs and optimizes perturbations against this surrogate using projected gradient descent. An upper confidence bound-aware Gaussian process guides arm selection. An attack-budget control mechanism is also introduced to limit detection risk and overhead. We provide theoretical guarantees, including sublinear attacker regret and lower bounds on victim regret linear in the number of attacks. Experiments on three real-world datasets (Yelp, MovieLens, and Disin) against various victim contextual bandits demonstrate that our attack model achieves higher cumulative victim regret than state-of-the-art baselines.

Ray Telikani, Amir H. Gandomi

Data Science Institute, University of Technology Sydney, NSW, Australia

Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Bandits Reinforcement Learning

Feb 27, 2026

Adversarial Patch Generation for Visual-Infrared Dense Prediction Tasks via Joint Position-Color Optimization

Multimodal adversarial attacks for dense prediction remain largely underexplored. In particular, visual-infrared (VI) perception systems introduce unique challenges due to heterogeneous spectral characteristics and modality-specific intensity distributions. Existing adversarial patch methods are primarily designed for single-modal inputs and fail to account for crossspectral inconsistencies, leading to reduced attack effectiveness and poor stealthiness when applied to VI dense prediction models. To address these challenges, we propose a joint position-color optimization framework (AP-PCO) for generating adversarial patches in visual-infrared settings. The proposed method optimizes patch placement and color composition simultaneously using a fitness function derived from model outputs, enabling a single patch to perturb both visible and infrared modalities. To further bridge spectral discrepancies, we introduce a crossmodal color adaptation strategy that constrains patch appearance according to infrared grayscale characteristics while maintaining strong perturbations in the visible domain, thereby reducing cross-spectral saliency. The optimization procedure operates without requiring internal model information, supporting flexible black-box attacks. Extensive experiments on visual-infrared dense prediction tasks demonstrate that the proposed AP-PCO achieves consistently strong attack performance across multiple architectures, providing a practical benchmark for robustness evaluation in VI perception systems.

He Li, Wenyue He, Weihang Kong +1

School of Artificial Intelligence (School of Software), Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China. · Fusion Intelligence Laboratory, Department of Computer Science, University of Exeter, EX4 4RN, United Kingdom.

Adversarial Patch Attacks Adversarial Examples Multimodal Robustness Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Feb 26, 2026

Obscure but Effective: Classical Chinese Jailbreak Prompt Optimization via Bio-Inspired Search

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used, their security risks have drawn increasing attention. Existing research reveals that LLMs are highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks, with effectiveness varying across language contexts. This paper investigates the role of classical Chinese in jailbreak attacks. Owing to its conciseness and obscurity, classical Chinese can partially bypass existing safety constraints, exposing notable vulnerabilities in LLMs. Based on this observation, this paper proposes a framework, CC-BOS, for the automatic generation of classical Chinese adversarial prompts based on multi-dimensional fruit fly optimization, facilitating efficient and automated jailbreak attacks in black-box settings. Prompts are encoded into eight policy dimensions-covering role, behavior, mechanism, metaphor, expression, knowledge, trigger pattern and context; and iteratively refined via smell search, visual search, and cauchy mutation. This design enables efficient exploration of the search space, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of black-box jailbreak attacks. To enhance readability and evaluation accuracy, we further design a classical Chinese to English translation module. Extensive experiments demonstrate that effectiveness of the proposed CC-BOS, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art jailbreak attack methods.

Xun Huang, Simeng Qin, Xiaoshuang Jia +6

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore · BraneMatrix AI, China · Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China +6

LLM Jailbreak Attacks Adversarial Prompt Generation Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Feb 25, 2026

Adversarial Robustness of Deep Learning-Based Thyroid Nodule Segmentation in Ultrasound

Introduction: Deep learning-based segmentation models are increasingly integrated into clinical imaging workflows, yet their robustness to adversarial perturbations remains incompletely characterized, particularly for ultrasound images. We evaluated adversarial attacks and inference-time defenses for thyroid nodule segmentation in B-mode ultrasound. Methods: Two black-box adversarial attacks were developed: (1) Structured Speckle Amplification Attack (SSAA), which injects boundary-targeted noise, and (2) Frequency-Domain Ultrasound Attack (FDUA), which applies bandpass-filtered phase perturbations in the Fourier domain. Three inference-time mitigations were evaluated on adversarial images: randomized preprocessing with test-time augmentation, deterministic input denoising, and stochastic ensemble inference with consistency-aware aggregation. Experiments were conducted on a U-Net segmentation model trained on cine-clips from a database of 192 thyroid nodules. Results: The baseline model achieved a mean Dice similarity coefficient (DSC) of 0.76 (SD 0.20) on unperturbed images. SSAA reduced DSC by 0.29 (SD 0.20) while maintaining high visual similarity (SSIM = 0.94). FDUA resulted in a smaller DSC reduction of 0.11 (SD 0.09) with lower visual fidelity (SSIM = 0.82). Against SSAA, all three defenses significantly improved DSC after correction, with deterministic denoising showing the largest recovery (+0.10, p < 0.001), followed by randomized preprocessing (+0.09, p < 0.001), and stochastic ensemble inference (+0.08, p = 0.002). No defense achieved statistically significant improvement against FDUA. Conclusion: Spatial-domain adversarial perturbations in ultrasound segmentation showed partial mitigation with input preprocessing, whereas frequency-domain perturbations were not mitigated by the defenses, highlighting modality-specific challenges in adversarial robustness evaluation.

Nicholas Dietrich, David McShannon

Temerty Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada · Faculty of Engineering, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

Adversarial Robustness Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Ultrasound Image Segmentation Medical Image Segmentation

Feb 19, 2026

Pushing the Frontier of Black-Box LVLM Attacks via Fine-Grained Detail Targeting

Black-box adversarial attacks on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are challenging due to missing gradients and complex multimodal boundaries. Prior state-of-the-art transfer-based approaches such as M-Attack match local crops between source and target images, but this induces high-variance, nearly orthogonal gradients across iterations. We attribute this instability to (i) ViT translation sensitivity, which yields spike-like gradients, and (ii) a structural asymmetry between source and target crops. We reformulate local matching as an asymmetric expectation over source transformations and target semantics, and introduce M-Attack-V2 based on this formulation. Multi-Crop Alignment (MCA) averages gradients from multiple local views per iteration, while Auxiliary Target Alignment (ATA) replaces aggressive target augmentation with a small set of semantically correlated auxiliary images. Patch Momentum replays historical crop gradients, and a patch-diverse surrogate ensemble (PE+) strengthens transferable directions. M-Attack-V2 raises attack success rates over M-Attack from 40% to 61% on GPT-6.1 Sol, from 40% to 60% on GPT-6 Astra, and from 85% to 97% on Claude Sonnet 5.5. Code and data are publicly available at: https://github.com/VILA-Lab/M-Attack-V2.

Xiaohan Zhao, Zhaoyi Li, Yaxin Luo +2

VILA Lab, Department of Machine Learning, MBZUAI

Adversarial Attacks on VLMs Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Transfer-Based Adversarial Attacks Large Vision-Language Models

Feb 18, 2026

Demonstration-Guided Observation Attacks on Black-Box Safe Reinforcement Learning Controllers for Robotic Systems

Safe reinforcement learning (Safe RL) learns robotic controllers that optimize task rewards under safety constraints, yet observation perturbations can induce safety violations. Existing safety-directed attacks often require access to victim networks, gradients, critics, or explicit specifications -- assumptions rarely met once a controller is deployed as a black box. We propose a demonstration-guided observation attack for analyzing unknown Safe RL controllers. The framework recovers a state constraint and a surrogate policy through inverse constrained reinforcement learning, and learns dynamics from demonstration transitions. Their composed gradient generates bounded observation perturbations without victim parameters, gradients, or queries; demonstrations are the only victim-specific information. Across four Bullet tasks and one MetaDrive map with three budgets per victim, the attack exceeds every same-access baseline in 12 of 15 environment-budget conditions, and in 7 of those 12 it also exceeds the privileged reference attacks with access to the victim's reward and cost critics. Demonstrations released to support safe learning thus provide an attack surface for deployed black-box controllers. A defense study shows that state-adversarial regularization reduces attack cost, whereas the tested adversarial-training and demonstration-contamination schemes provide inconsistent protection.

Jialiang Fan, Shixiong Jiang, Mengyu Liu +1

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA. · Washington State University Tri-Cities, Richland, WA, USA.

Adversarial Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Robotic RL Safe RL Constrained RL

Feb 17, 2026

Intent Laundering: AI Safety Datasets Are Not What They Seem

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used adversarial safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three defining properties: being driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from adversarial attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results show that current adversarial safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world adversarial behavior due to their overreliance on triggering cues. Once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7/4. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90.00% to 100.00%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how existing datasets evaluate model safety and how real-world adversaries behave.

Shahriar Golchin, Marc Wetter

Applied Machine Learning Research

LLM Safety Evaluation LLM Safety Benchmarks LLM Jailbreak Attacks Adversarial Text Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Feb 17, 2026

ER-MIA: Black-Box Adversarial Memory Injection Attacks on Long-Term Memory-Augmented Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with long-term memory systems to overcome finite context windows and enable persistent reasoning across interactions. However, recent research finds that LLMs become more vulnerable because memory provides extra attack surfaces. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of black-box adversarial memory injection attacks that target the similarity-based retrieval mechanism in long-term memory-augmented LLMs. We introduce ER-MIA, a unified framework that exposes this vulnerability and formalizes two realistic attack settings: content-based attacks and question-targeted attacks. In these settings, ER-MIA includes an arsenal of composable attack primitives and ensemble attacks that achieve high success rates under minimal attacker assumptions. Extensive experiments across multiple LLMs and long-term memory systems demonstrate that similarity-based retrieval constitutes a fundamental and system-level vulnerability, revealing security risks that persist across memory designs and application scenarios.

Mitchell Piehl, Zhaohan Xi, Zuobin Xiong +2

Department of Computer Science, The University of Iowa · School of Computing, State University of New York at Binghamton · Department of Computer Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas +1

Adversarial Attacks on LLMs LLM Security Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Memory-Augmented Language Models Agent Memory Poisoning

Feb 16, 2026

Boundary Point Jailbreaking of Black-Box LLMs

Frontier LLMs are safeguarded against attempts to extract harmful information via adversarial prompts known as "jailbreaks". Recently, defenders have developed classifier-based systems that have survived thousands of hours of human red teaming. We introduce Boundary Point Jailbreaking (BPJ), a new class of automated jailbreak attacks that evade the strongest industry-deployed safeguards. Unlike previous attacks that rely on white/grey-box assumptions (such as classifier scores or gradients) or libraries of existing jailbreaks, BPJ is fully black-box and uses only a single bit of information per query: whether or not the classifier flags the interaction. To achieve this, BPJ addresses the core difficulty in optimising attacks against robust real-world defences: evaluating whether a proposed modification to an attack is an improvement. Instead of directly trying to learn an attack for a target harmful string, BPJ converts the string into a curriculum of intermediate attack targets and then actively selects evaluation points that best detect small changes in attack strength ("boundary points"). We believe BPJ is the first fully automated attack algorithm that succeeds in developing universal jailbreaks against Constitutional Classifiers, as well as the first automated attack algorithm that succeeds against GPT-5's input classifier without relying on human attack seeds. BPJ is difficult to defend against in individual interactions but incurs many flags during optimisation, suggesting that effective defence requires supplementing single-interaction methods with batch-level monitoring.

Xander Davies, Giorgi Giglemiani, Edmund Lau +3

UK AI Security Institute · OATML, University of Oxford

Adversarial Attacks on LLMs Jailbreak Attacks LLM Jailbreak Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Feb 4, 2026

Stage-wise Attention-Guided Region Sequencing for Adversarial Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models

Targeted adversarial attacks on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) test whether small image perturbations can steer model responses toward attacker-specified content. Under the standard L-infinity constraint, targeted attacks become a regional perturbation budget allocation problem: attack success depends not only on the perturbation objective, but also on which regions receive updates and in what order. Existing localized attacks improve over global perturbations but rely on stochastic spatial sampling, often updating weakly influential regions. We address this limitation through an attention-based analysis showing that cross-modal attention identifies adversarially sensitive regions and that perturbing high-attention hotspots induces predictable redistribution toward subsequent salient regions. These findings motivate attention-guided region sequencing, which begins from dominant hotspots and progressively moves the update support toward next-salient regions. Based on these principles, we propose Stage-wise Attention-Guided Attack (SAGA), a black-box region-sequencing framework that uses a fixed attention map from an open-source LVLM to guide perturbation updates without accessing target-model parameters, gradients, or attention maps. Across ten closed-source and open-source LVLMs, SAGA achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates and the best overall imperceptibility. The source code is available at https://github.com/jaehyun-kwak/SAGA.

Jaehyun Kwak, Nam Cao, Boryeong Cho +3

KAIST · KENTECH

Adversarial Attacks on VLMs Adversarial Attacks Large Vision-Language Models Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Attention-Based Adversarial Attacks

Nov 21, 2025

Enhancing Adversarial Transferability through Block Stretch and Shrink

Input transformation-based attacks improve adversarial transferability by aggregating gradients over transformed inputs. Existing analyses mainly explain their efficacy from image diversity, semantic preservation, attention variance or hypothesis space augmentation, yet overlook the critical role of model frontend responses. In this paper, we revisit transformation-based attacks from an implicit ensemble perspective: each transformation can be viewed as a pre-processing operator before the surrogate model, inducing a distinct frontend response for gradient aggregation. Based on this view, we propose FRO, a Frontend Response-Oriented input transformation method that enriches such responses through two complementary operators. The Local Scaling Operator perturbs local content sampling via block-wise stretch-and-shrink operations, while the Projection Operator modifies global spatial organization through coherent perspective deformation. Together, they produce structured transformed views to optimize transferable adversarial perturbations. Experiments on an ImageNet subset show that FRO consistently improves black-box transferability across diverse CNN and Vision Transformer models. We further analyze the effect of implicit ensemble size and evaluate different transformation-based methods under a unified ensemble scale, demonstrating the superiority of designing input transformations from the perspective of front-end response ensembles.

Quan Liu, Feng Ye, Chenhao Lu +4

Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Perturbations Transfer-Based Adversarial Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Transferability

Nov 12, 2025

SEBA: Sample-Efficient Black-Box Attacks on Visual Reinforcement Learning

Visual reinforcement learning has achieved remarkable progress in visual control and robotics, but its vulnerability to adversarial perturbations remains underexplored. Most existing black-box attacks focus on vector-based or discrete-action RL, and their effectiveness on image-based continuous control is limited by the large action space and excessive environment queries. We propose SEBA, a sample-efficient framework for black-box adversarial attacks on visual RL agents. SEBA integrates a shadow Q model that estimates cumulative rewards under adversarial conditions, a generative adversarial network that produces visually imperceptible perturbations, and a world model that simulates environment dynamics to reduce real-world queries. Through a two-stage iterative training procedure that alternates between learning the shadow model and refining the generator, SEBA achieves strong attack performance while maintaining efficiency. Experiments on MuJoCo and Atari benchmarks show that SEBA significantly reduces cumulative rewards, preserves visual fidelity, and greatly decreases environment interactions compared to prior black-box and white-box methods. The code is available at https://github.com/tairanhuang/seba online.

Tairan Huang, Yulin Jin, Junxu Liu +2

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Hong Kong, China

Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Perturbations Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Visual RL

Sep 9, 2025

Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA): A Black-box Adversarial Attack against Voice Authentication and Anti-Spoofing Systems

Voice Authentication Systems (VAS) use unique vocal characteristics for verification. They are increasingly integrated into high-security sectors such as banking and healthcare. Despite their improvements using deep learning, they face severe vulnerabilities from sophisticated threats like deepfakes and adversarial attacks. The emergence of realistic voice cloning complicates detection, as systems struggle to distinguish authentic from synthetic audio. While anti-spoofing countermeasures (CMs) exist to mitigate these risks, many rely on static detection models that can be bypassed by novel adversarial methods, leaving a critical security gap. To demonstrate this vulnerability, we propose the Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA), a novel method that strategically manipulates inaudible frequency regions of AI-generated audio. By altering the voice in imperceptible zones to the human ear, SMIA creates adversarial samples that sound authentic while deceiving CMs. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our attack against state-of-the-art (SOTA) models across multiple tasks, under simulated real-world conditions. SMIA achieved a strong attack success rate (ASR) of at least 82% against combined VAS/CM systems, at least 97.5% against standalone speaker verification systems, and 100% against countermeasures. These findings conclusively demonstrate that current security postures are insufficient against adaptive adversarial attacks. This work highlights the urgent need for a paradigm shift toward next-generation defenses that employ dynamic, context-aware frameworks capable of evolving with the threat landscape.

Kamel Kamel, Hridoy Sankar Dutta, Keshav Sood +1

School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Australia

Audio Deepfake Detection Speaker Verification Adversarial Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks

Jun 30, 2025

Consensus-based optimization for closed-box adversarial attacks and a connection to evolution strategies

Consensus-based optimization (CBO) has established itself as an efficient gradient-free optimization scheme, with attractive mathematical properties, such as mean-field convergence results for non-convex loss functions. In this work, we study CBO in the context of closed-box adversarial attacks, which are imperceptible input perturbations that aim to fool a classifier, without accessing its gradient. Our contribution is to establish a connection between the so-called consensus hopping as introduced by Riedl et al. and natural evolution strategies (NES) commonly applied in the context of adversarial attacks and to rigorously relate both methods to gradient-based optimization schemes. Beyond that, we provide a comprehensive experimental study that shows that despite the conceptual similarities, CBO can outperform NES and other evolutionary strategies in certain scenarios.

Tim Roith, Leon Bungert, Philipp Wacker

TUM School of Computation, Information and Technology and Munich Center for Machine Learning (MCML), Boltzmannstr. 3, 85748 Garching bei München, Germany · Institute of Mathematics, Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Science (CAIDAS), University of Würzburg, Emil-Fischer-Str. 40, 97074 Würzburg, Germany · School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Canterbury

Evolutionary Optimization Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Derivative-Free Optimization

Jun 8, 2025

HauntAttack: When Attack Follows Reasoning as a Shadow

Emerging Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) consistently excel in mathematical and reasoning tasks, showcasing remarkable capabilities. However, the enhancement of reasoning abilities and the exposure of internal reasoning processes introduce new safety vulnerabilities. A critical question arises: when reasoning becomes intertwined with harmfulness, will LRMs become more vulnerable to jailbreaks in reasoning mode? To investigate this, we introduce HauntAttack, a novel and general-purpose black-box adversarial attack framework that systematically embeds harmful instructions into reasoning questions. Specifically, we modify key reasoning conditions in existing questions with harmful instructions, thereby constructing a reasoning pathway that guides the model step by step toward unsafe outputs. We evaluate HauntAttack on 11 LRMs and observe an average attack success rate of over 70%, achieving up to 13 percentage points of absolute improvement over the strongest prior baseline. Our further analysis reveals that even advanced safety-aligned models remain highly susceptible to reasoning-based attacks, offering insights into the urgent challenge of balancing reasoning capability and safety in future model development.

Jingyuan Ma, Rui Li, Zheng Li +4

State Key Laboratory for Multimedia Information Processing, School of Computer Science, Peking University · StepFun · Department of Computing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University +1

Adversarial Attacks on LLMs Jailbreak Attacks LLM Safety LLM Jailbreak Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Large Reasoning Models

Feb 6, 2025

How Vulnerable Is My Learned Policy? Universal Adversarial Perturbation Attacks On Modern Behavior Cloning Policies

Imitation learning, also known as learning from demonstrations, is a popular approach to train AI models; however, the vulnerability of these models to adversarial attacks remains underexplored. We present the first systematic study of adversarial attacks, across a range of both classic and recently proposed imitation learning algorithms, including Vanilla Behavior Cloning (Vanilla BC), LSTM-GMM, Implicit Behavior Cloning (IBC), Diffusion Policy (DP), and Vector-Quantized Behavior Transformer (VQ-BET). We study the vulnerability of these methods to white-box, grey-box and black-box adversarial perturbations. Our experiments reveal that most existing methods are highly vulnerable to these attacks, including black-box transfer attacks that transfer across algorithms. White-box attacks cause at least a 65% reduction in average task success across all evaluated tasks and algorithms, while the black-box transfer attacks reduce task success by up to 88% on Lift, 99% on Can, and 100% on Square. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study and compare the vulnerabilities of different popular imitation learning algorithms to both white-box and black-box attacks. Our findings highlight the vulnerabilities of modern imitation learning algorithms, paving the way for future work in addressing such limitations. Videos and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/uap-attacks-on-bc.

Akansha Kalra, Basavasagar Patil, Guanhong Tao +1

University of Utah

Adversarial Robustness Adversarial Imitation Learning Robot Imitation Learning Behavior Cloning Adversarial Perturbations Transfer-Based Adversarial Attacks+1

Oct 2, 2024

Adversarial Robustness of AI-Generated Image Detectors in the Real World

The rapid advancement of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) capabilities is accompanied by a concerning rise in its misuse. In particular the generation of credible misinformation in the form of images poses a significant threat to the public trust in democratic processes. Consequently, there is an urgent need to develop tools to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated content. The majority of detection methods are based on neural networks that are trained to recognize forensic artifacts. In this work, we demonstrate that current state-of-the-art classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples under real-world conditions. Through extensive experiments, comprising four detection methods and five attack algorithms, we show that an attacker can dramatically decrease classification performance, without internal knowledge of the detector's architecture. Notably, most attacks remain effective even when images are degraded during the upload to, e.g., social media platforms. In a case study, we demonstrate that these robustness challenges are also found in commercial tools by conducting black-box attacks on HIVE, a proprietary online GenAI media detector. In addition, we evaluate the robustness of using generated features of a robust pre-trained model and showed that this increases the robustness, while not reaching the performance on benign inputs. These results, along with the increasing potential of GenAI to erode public trust, underscore the need for more research and new perspectives on methods to prevent its misuse.

Sina Mavali, Jonas Ricker, David Pape +2

CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany · Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Robustness Black-Box Adversarial Attacks AI-Generated Image Detection Adversarial Attacks on AI-Generated Image Detectors

Apr 1, 2024

Perturbation Effects on Robustness and Individual Fairness

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations that can simultaneously degrade prediction robustness and individual fairness across diverse application settings. However, existing evaluation protocols typically assess these dimensions in isolation, thereby obscuring critical failure modes. To bridge this gap, we formalize Robust Individual Fairness (RIF): under semantic-preserving (truth-condition-preserving) perturbations, predictions should remain both correct with respect to the ground truth and invariant across semantically equivalent individuals. To surface RIF violations in practice, we introduce RIFair, a black-box adversarial framework that leverages a decoupled perturbation strategy to construct semantically preserved yet unrobust and/or unfair instance pairs. Experiments across multiple model architectures and real-world textual datasets show that robustness-only or fairness-only metrics often miss Robust Biased and Unrobust Fair behaviors. RIFair}reliably exposes these hidden vulnerabilities, supporting RIF as a necessary criterion for trustworthy model assessment. The experimental code is publicly available at https://github.com/Xuran-LI/RIFair.

Xuran Li, Hao Xue, Peng Wu +4

University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Guangzhou, China · Key Laboratory of System Software, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing, China +3

Neural Network Robustness Algorithmic Fairness Adversarial Robustness Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Adversarial Text Attacks

Feb 6, 2024

SUB-PLAY: Adversarial Policies against Partially Observed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Systems

Recent advancements in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) have opened up vast application prospects, such as swarm control of drones, collaborative manipulation by robotic arms, and multi-target encirclement. However, potential security threats during the MARL deployment need more attention and thorough investigation. Recent research reveals that attackers can rapidly exploit the victim's vulnerabilities, generating adversarial policies that result in the failure of specific tasks. For instance, reducing the winning rate of a superhuman-level Go AI to around 20%. Existing studies predominantly focus on two-player competitive environments, assuming attackers possess complete global state observation. In this study, we unveil, for the first time, the capability of attackers to generate adversarial policies even when restricted to partial observations of the victims in multi-agent competitive environments. Specifically, we propose a novel black-box attack (SUB-PLAY) that incorporates the concept of constructing multiple subgames to mitigate the impact of partial observability and suggests sharing transitions among subpolicies to improve attackers' exploitative ability. Extensive evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of SUB-PLAY under three typical partial observability limitations. Visualization results indicate that adversarial policies induce significantly different activations of the victims' policy networks. Furthermore, we evaluate three potential defenses aimed at exploring ways to mitigate security threats posed by adversarial policies, providing constructive recommendations for deploying MARL in competitive environments.

Oubo Ma, Yuwen Pu, Linkang Du +5

Zhejiang University · Xi’an Jiaotong University · Laboratory for Big Data and Decision +2

Adversarial Attacks Partially Observable RL Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Multi-Agent System Security Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Dec 4, 2023

InstructTA: Instruction-Tuned Targeted Attack for Large Vision-Language Models

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have demonstrated their incredible capability in visual question answering. However, this rich visual interaction also makes LVLMs vulnerable to adversarial examples. In this paper, we formulate a novel and practical targeted attack scenario that the adversary knows only the vision encoder of the victim LVLM, without the knowledge of its prompts and its underlying large language model. This practical setting poses challenges to the cross-prompt and cross-model transferability of targeted adversarial attack, which aims to confuse the LVLM to output a response that is semantically similar to the attacker's chosen target text. To this end, we propose an instruction-tuned targeted attack (dubbed InstructTA) to deliver the targeted adversarial attack on LVLMs with high transferability. Initially, we utilize a public text-to-image generative model to reverse the target response into a target image, and employ GPT-4 to infer a reasonable instruction

\boldsymbol{p}^\prime

from the target response. We then form a local surrogate model (sharing the same vision encoder with the victim LVLM) to extract instruction-aware features of an adversarial image example and the target image, and minimize the distance between these two features to optimize the adversarial example. To further improve the transferability with instruction tuning, we augment the instruction

\boldsymbol{p}^\prime

with instructions paraphrased from GPT-4. Extensive experiments on 6 victim LVLMs demonstrate the superiority of our proposed method in targeted attack performance and transferability. In particular, InstructTA achieves an attack success rate of 51.9% on BLIP-2, outperforming the strongest baseline by 10.5%, and consistently yields the highest attack success rates across all evaluated models. The code is available at https://github.com/xunguangwang/InstructTA.

Xunguang Wang, Pingchuan Ma, Zhenlan Ji +3

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

Adversarial Attacks on VLMs Large Vision-Language Models Transfer-Based Adversarial Attacks Black-Box Adversarial Attacks