Cybersecurity

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Overview

Cybersecurity studies how to prevent, detect, investigate, and recover from attacks on software, networks, organizations, and cyber-physical systems. Common approaches include signature-based defenses, statistical and deep-learning intrusion detection, graph and temporal analysis, formal verification, threat-intelligence mapping, and reinforcement-learning or language-model agents. Work spans settings such as cloud and IoT networks, industrial control systems, connected vehicles, vulnerability assessment, and security operations, with benchmarks increasingly testing realistic attack chains and operational response. A central tension is that strong results on fixed datasets or simulated environments may not transfer to changing, adversarial deployments, where false alarms, safety, cost, and human oversight also matter.

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355 papers33 papers in the last four weeks, down 20% on the four weeks before. 0.2% of all new papers.

Mar 2, 2026

Assessing Crime Disclosure Patterns in a Large-Scale Cybercrime Forum

Cybercrime forums play a central role in the cybercrime ecosystem, serving as hubs for the exchange of illicit goods, services, and knowledge. Previous studies have explored the market and social structures of these forums, but less is known about the behavioral dynamics of users, particularly regarding participants' disclosure of criminal activity. This study provides the first large-scale assessment of crime disclosure patterns in a major cybercrime forum, analysing over 3.5 million posts from nearly 300k users. Using a three-level classification scheme (benign, grey, and crime) and a scalable labelling pipeline powered by large language models (LLMs), we measure the level of crime disclosure present in initial posts, analyse how participants switch between levels, and assess how crime disclosure behavior relates to private communications. Our results show that crime disclosure is relatively normative: one quarter of initial posts include explicit crime-related content, and more than one third of users disclose criminal activity at least once in their initial posts. At the same time, most participants show restraint, with over two-thirds posting only benign or grey content and typically escalating disclosure gradually. Grey initial posts are particularly prominent, indicating that many users avoid overt statements and instead anchor their activity in ambiguous content. The study highlights the value of LLM-based text classification and Markov chain modelling for capturing crime disclosure patterns, offering insights for law enforcement efforts aimed at distinguishing benign, grey, and criminal content in cybercrime forums.

Raphael Hoheisel, Tom Meurs, Jai Wientjes +3

University of Twente, Netherlands · Dutch Police, Netherlands · Université de Montréal, Montréal Complexity Science Hub, Austria

Cybersecurity
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Mar 1, 2026

ATLAS: AI-Assisted Threat-to-Assertion Learning for System-on-Chip Security Verification

This work presents ATLAS, an LLM-driven framework that bridges standardized threat modeling and property-based formal verification for System-on-Chip (SoC) security. Starting from vulnerability knowledge bases such as Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), ATLAS identifies SoC-specific assets, maps relevant weaknesses, and generates assertion-based security properties and JasperGold scripts for verification. By combining asset-centric analysis with standardized threat model templates and multi-source SoC context, ATLAS automates the transformation from vulnerability reasoning to formal proof. Evaluated on three HACK@DAC benchmarks, ATLAS detected 39/48 CWEs and generated correct properties for 33 of those bugs, advancing automated, knowledge-driven SoC security verification toward a secure-by-design paradigm.

Ishraq Tashdid, Kimia Tasnia, Alexander Garcia +2

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida · Intel Corporation

CybersecurityFormal Hardware VerificationLLMs for Cybersecurity
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Feb 26, 2026

RLShield: Practical Multi-Agent RL for Financial Cyber Defense with Attack-Surface MDPs and Real-Time Response Orchestration

Financial systems run nonstop and must stay reliable even during cyber incidents. Modern attacks move across many services (apps, APIs, identity, payment rails), so defenders must make a sequence of actions under time pressure. Most security tools still use fixed rules or static playbooks, which can be slow to adapt when the attacker changes behavior. Reinforcement learning (RL) is a good fit for sequential decisions, but much of the RL-in-finance literature targets trading and does not model real cyber response limits such as action cost, service disruption, and defender coordination across many assets. This paper proposes RLShield, a practical multi-agent RL pipeline for financial cyber defense. We model the enterprise attack surface as a Markov decision process (MDP) where states summarize alerts, asset exposure, and service health, and actions represent real response steps (e.g., isolate a host, rotate credentials, ratelimit an API, block an account, or trigger recovery). RLShield learns coordinated policies across multiple agents (assets or service groups) and optimizes a risk-sensitive objective that balances containment speed, business disruption, and response cost. We also include a game-aware evaluation that tests policies against adaptive attackers and reports operational outcomes, not only reward. Experiments show that RLShield reduces time-to-containment and residual exposure while keeping disruption within a fixed response budget, outperforming static rule baselines and single-agent RL under the same constraints. These results suggest that multi-agent, cost-aware RL can provide a deployable layer for automated response in financial security operations.

Srikumar Nayak

Incedo Inc, USA

Autonomous Cyber DefenseCybersecurityMulti-Agent Reinforcement LearningConstrained RL
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Feb 26, 2026

Cybersecurity of Teleoperated Quadruped Robots: A Systematic Survey of Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Open Defense Gaps

Teleoperated quadruped robots are increasingly deployed in safety-critical missions -- industrial inspection, military reconnaissance, and emergency response -- yet the security of their communication and control infrastructure remains insufficiently characterized. Quadrupeds present distinct security challenges arising from dynamic stability constraints, gait-dependent vulnerability windows, substantial kinetic energy, and elevated operator cognitive load. This survey synthesizes peer-reviewed literature and vulnerability disclosures (2019--2025) to provide comprehensive analysis of cybersecurity threats, consequences, and countermeasures for teleoperated quadruped systems. We contribute: (i) a six-layer attack taxonomy spanning perception manipulation, VR/AR operator targeting, communication disruption, control signal attacks, localization spoofing, and network intrusion; (ii) systematic attack-to-consequence mapping with timing characterization; (iii) Technology Readiness Level classification exposing critical maturity gaps between field-deployed communication protections (TRL 7--9) and experimental perception/operator-layer defenses (TRL 3--5); (iv) comparative security analysis of six commercial platforms; (v) pragmatic deployment guidance stratified by implementation timeline; and (vi) eight prioritized research gaps with implementation roadmaps. Limitations: Platform assessments rely on publicly available information. Attack success rates derive from cited studies under controlled conditions and require domain-specific validation.

Mohammad Sabouri

Department of Informatics, Bioengineering, Robotics and Systems Engineering (DIBRIS), University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy

CybersecurityRobot Teleoperation
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Feb 25, 2026

Explainability-Aware Evaluation of Transfer Learning Models for IoT DDoS Detection Under Resource Constraints

Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks threaten the availability of Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructures, particularly under resource-constrained deployment conditions. Although transfer learning models have shown promising detection accuracy, their reliability, computational feasibility, and interpretability in operational environments remain insufficiently explored. This study presents an explainability-aware empirical evaluation of seven pre-trained convolutional neural network architectures for multi-class IoT DDoS detection using the CICDDoS2019 dataset and an image-based traffic representation. The analysis integrates performance metrics, reliability-oriented statistics (MCC, Youden Index, confidence intervals), latency and training cost assessment, and interpretability evaluation using Grad-CAM and SHAP. Results indicate that DenseNet and MobileNet-based architectures achieve strong detection performance while demonstrating superior reliability and compact, class-consistent attribution patterns. DenseNet169 offers the strongest reliability and interpretability alignment, whereas MobileNetV3 provides an effective latency-accuracy trade-off for fog-level deployment. The findings emphasize the importance of combining performance, reliability, and explainability criteria when selecting deep learning models for IoT DDoS detection.

Nelly Elsayed

School of Information Technology, University of Cincinnati, Ohio, United States

IoT Intrusion DetectionCybersecurityTransfer LearningExplainability EvaluationEfficient Neural Network Inference
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Feb 24, 2026

"Are You Sure?": An Empirical Study of Human Perception Vulnerability in LLM-Driven Agentic Systems

Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly becoming trusted copilots in high-stakes domains like software development and healthcare. However, this deepening trust introduces a novel attack surface: Agent-Mediated Deception (AMD), where compromised agents are weaponized against their human users. While extensive research focuses on agent-centric threats, human susceptibility to deception by a compromised agent remains unexplored. We present the first large-scale empirical study with 303 participants to measure human susceptibility to AMD. This is based on HAT-Lab (Human-Agent Trust Laboratory), a high-fidelity research platform we develop, featuring nine carefully crafted scenarios spanning everyday and professional domains (e.g., healthcare, software development, human resources). Our 10 key findings reveal significant vulnerabilities and provide future defense perspectives. Specifically, only 8.6% of participants perceive AMD attacks, while domain experts show increased susceptibility in certain scenarios. We identify six cognitive failure modes in users and find that their risk awareness often fails to translate to protective behavior. The defense analysis reveals that effective warnings should interrupt workflows with low verification costs. With experiential learning based on HAT-Lab, over 90% of users who perceive risks report increased caution against AMD. This work provides empirical evidence and a platform for human-centric agent security research.

Xinfeng Li, Shenyu Dai, Kelong Zheng +4

Nanyang Technological University · KTH · William & Mary

AI Agent SecurityCybersecurityTrust in AI
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Feb 24, 2026

A Systematic Review of Algorithmic Red Teaming Methodologies for Assurance and Security of AI Applications

Cybersecurity threats are becoming increasingly sophisticated, making traditional defense mechanisms and manual red teaming approaches insufficient for modern organizations. While red teaming has long been recognized as an effective method to identify vulnerabilities by simulating real-world attacks, its manual execution is resource-intensive, time-consuming, and lacks scalability for frequent assessments. These limitations have driven the evolution toward auto-mated red teaming, which leverages artificial intelligence and automation to deliver efficient and adaptive security evaluations. This systematic review consolidates existing research on automated red teaming, examining its methodologies, tools, benefits, and limitations. The paper also highlights current trends, challenges, and research gaps, offering insights into future directions for improving automated red teaming as a critical component of proactive cybersecurity strategies. By synthesizing findings from diverse studies, this review aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how automation enhances red teaming and strengthens organizational resilience against evolving cyber threats.

Shruti Srivastava, Kiranmayee Janardhan, Shaurya Jauhari

Responsible AI Office, Infosys Limited, India.

Automated Red TeamingCybersecurity
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Feb 23, 2026

BioEnvSense: A Human-Centred Security Framework for Preventing Behaviour-Driven Cyber Incidents

Modern organizations increasingly face cybersecurity incidents driven by human behaviour rather than technical failures. To address this, we propose a conceptual security framework that integrates a hybrid Convolutional Neural Network-Long Short-Term Memory (CNN-LSTM) model to analyze biometric and environmental data for context-aware security decisions. The CNN extracts spatial patterns from sensor data, while the LSTM captures temporal dynamics associated with human error susceptibility. The model achieves 84% accuracy, demonstrating its ability to reliably detect conditions that lead to elevated human-centred cyber risk. By enabling continuous monitoring and adaptive safeguards, the framework supports proactive interventions that reduce the likelihood of human-driven cyber incidents

Duy Anh Ta, Farnaz Farid, Farhad Ahamed +4

School of Computer, Data and Mathematical Sciences Western Sydney University · School of Social Sciences Western Sydney University

Cybersecurity
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Feb 19, 2026

DAVE: A Policy-Enforcing LLM Spokesperson for Secure Multi-Document Data Sharing

In current inter-organizational data spaces, usage policies are enforced mainly at the asset level: a whole document or dataset is either shared or withheld. When only parts of a document are sensitive, providers who want to avoid leaking protected information typically must manually redact documents before sharing them, which is costly, coarse-grained, and hard to maintain as policies or partners change. We present DAVE, a usage policy-enforcing LLM spokesperson that answers questions over private documents on behalf of a data provider. Instead of releasing documents, the provider exposes a natural language interface whose responses are constrained by machine-readable usage policies. We formalize policy-violating information disclosure in this setting, drawing on usage control and information flow security, and introduce virtual redaction: suppressing sensitive information at query time without modifying source documents. We describe an architecture for integrating such a spokesperson with Eclipse Dataspace Components and ODRL-style policies, and outline an initial provider-side integration prototype in which QA requests are routed through a spokesperson service instead of triggering raw document transfer. Our contribution is primarily architectural: we do not yet implement or empirically evaluate the full enforcement pipeline. We therefore outline an evaluation methodology to assess security, utility, and performance trade-offs under benign and adversarial querying as a basis for future empirical work on systematically governed LLM access to multi-party data spaces.

René Brinkhege, Prahlad Menon

Fraunhofer ISST Dortmund, Germany · Fraunhofer CMA Riverdale Park, MD, USA

CybersecurityLLM SecurityPrivacy-Preserving Language Models
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Feb 18, 2026

A Scalable Approach to Solving Simulation-Based Network Security Games

We introduce MetaDOAR, a lightweight meta-controller that augments the Double Oracle / PSRO paradigm with a learned, partition-aware filtering layer and Q-value caching to enable scalable multi-agent reinforcement learning on very large cyber-network environments. MetaDOAR learns a compact state projection from per node structural embeddings to rapidly score and select a small subset of devices (a top-k partition) on which a conventional low-level actor performs focused beam search utilizing a critic agent. Selected candidate actions are evaluated with batched critic forwards and stored in an LRU cache keyed by a quantized state projection and local action identifiers, dramatically reducing redundant critic computation while preserving decision quality via conservative k-hop cache invalidation. Empirically, MetaDOAR attains higher player payoffs than SOTA baselines on large network topologies, without significant scaling issues in terms of memory usage or training time. This contribution provide a practical, theoretically motivated path to efficient hierarchical policy learning for large-scale networked decision problems.

Michael Lanier, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Multi-Agent Reinforcement LearningHierarchical RLCybersecurity
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Feb 16, 2026

What hackers talk about when they talk about AI: Early-stage diffusion of a cybercrime innovation

The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) is raising concerns about its potential to transform cybercrime. Beyond empowering novice offenders, AI stands to intensify the scale and sophistication of attacks by seasoned cybercriminals. This paper examines the evolving relationship between cybercriminals and AI using a unique dataset from a cyber threat intelligence platform. Analyzing more than 160 cybercrime forum conversations collected over seven months, our research reveals how cybercriminals understand AI and discuss how they can exploit its capabilities. Their exchanges reflect growing curiosity about AI's criminal applications through legal tools and dedicated criminal tools, but also doubts and anxieties about AI's effectiveness and its effects on their business models and operational security. The study documents attempts to misuse legitimate AI tools and develop bespoke models tailored for illicit purposes. Combining the diffusion of innovation framework with thematic analysis, the paper provides an in-depth view of emerging AI-enabled cybercrime and offers practical insights for law enforcement and policymakers.

Benoît Dupont, Chad Whelan, Serge-Olivier Paquette

International Centre for Comparative Criminology, Université de Montréal, Canada · Deakin Centre for Cyber Research and Innovation, Deakin University, Australia · Flare Systems, Canada

Cybersecurity
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Feb 9, 2026

Next-Gen CAPTCHAs: Leveraging the Cognitive Gap for Scalable and Diverse GUI-Agent Defense

The rapid evolution of GUI-enabled agents has rendered traditional CAPTCHAs obsolete. While previous benchmarks like OpenCaptchaWorld established a baseline for evaluating multimodal agents, recent advancements in reasoning-heavy models, such as Gemini3-Pro-High and GPT-5.2-Xhigh have effectively collapsed this security barrier, achieving pass rates as high as 90% on complex logic puzzles like "Bingo". In response, we introduce Next-Gen CAPTCHAs, a scalable defense framework designed to secure the next-generation web against the advanced agents. Unlike static datasets, our benchmark is built upon a robust data generation pipeline, allowing for large-scale and easily scalable evaluations, notably, for backend-supported types, our system is capable of generating effectively unbounded CAPTCHA instances. We exploit the persistent human-agent "Cognitive Gap" in interactive perception, memory, decision-making, and action. By engineering dynamic tasks that require adaptive intuition rather than granular planning, we re-establish a robust distinction between biological users and artificial agents, offering a scalable and diverse defense mechanism for the agentic era.

Jiacheng Liu, Yaxin Luo, Jiacheng Cui +3

Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI) · MetaAgentX · University College London

CybersecurityAI Agent SecurityAI Agent Security Benchmarks
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Feb 9, 2026

SoK: The Pitfalls of Deep Reinforcement Learning for Cybersecurity

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has achieved remarkable success in domains requiring sequential decision-making, motivating its application to cybersecurity problems. However, transitioning DRL from laboratory simulations to bespoke cyber environments can introduce numerous issues. This is further exacerbated by the often adversarial, non-stationary, and partially-observable nature of most cybersecurity tasks. In this paper, we identify and systematize 11 methodological pitfalls that frequently occur in DRL for cybersecurity (DRL4Sec) literature across the stages of environment modeling, agent training, performance evaluation, and system deployment. By analyzing 66 significant DRL4Sec papers (2018-2025), we quantify the prevalence of each pitfall and find an average of over five pitfalls per paper. We demonstrate the practical impact of these pitfalls using controlled experiments in (i) autonomous cyber defense, (ii) adversarial malware creation, and (iii) web security testing environments. Finally, we provide actionable recommendations for each pitfall to support the development of more rigorous and deployable DRL-based security systems.

Shae McFadden, Myles Foley, Elizabeth Bates +5

King’s College London · The Alan Turing Institute · University College London +3

Reinforcement LearningCybersecurity
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Jan 23, 2026

TrojanGYM: A Detector-in-the-Loop LLM for Adaptive RTL Hardware Trojan Insertion

Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework that automatically curates HT insertions to expose detector blind spots while preserving design correctness. Given high-level HT specifications, a suite of cooperating LLM agents (instantiated with GPT-4, LLaMA-3.3-70B, and Gemini-2.5Pro) proposes and refines RTL modifications that realize diverse triggers and payloads without impacting normal functionality. TrojanGYM implements a feedback-driven benchmark generation loop co-designed with HT detectors, in which constraint-aware syntactic checking and GNN-based HT detectors provide feedback that iteratively refines HT specifications and insertion strategies to better surface detector blind spots. We further propose Robust-GNN4TJ, a new implementation of the GNN4TJ with improved graph extraction, training robustness, and prediction reliability, especially on LLM-generated HT designs. On the most challenging TrojanGYM-generated benchmarks, Robust-GNN4TJ raises HT detection rates from 0% to 60% relative to a prior GNN-based detector. We instantiate TrojanGYM on SRAM, AES-128, and UART designs at RTL level, and show that it systematically produces diverse, functionally correct HTs that reach up to 83.33% evasion rates against modern GNN-based detectors, revealing robustness gaps that are not apparent when these detectors are evaluated solely on existing TrustHub-style benchmarks. Post peer-review, we will release all codes and artifacts.

Saideep Sreekumar, Zeng Wang, Akashdeep Saha +6

NYU Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, UAE · NYU Tandon School of Engineering, New York, USA

Backdoor AttacksAdversarial RobustnessCybersecurityLLMs for Cybersecurity
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Jan 6, 2026

A Hybrid Insider Threat Detection Framework Combining Multi-Agent Simulation, Layered SIEM Correlation, and Theory-of-Mind Reasoning

This paper presents a hybrid insider threat detection framework for enterprise environments, integrating multi-agent simulation, layered SIEM correlation, trust-adaptive thresholds, behavioral and communication forensics, and Theory-of-Mind reasoning. Email is treated not as a control channel but as a coordination and social-engineering evidence stream correlated with authentication, file-access, and privilege events. Four variants are evaluated: Layered SIEM-Core (LSC), Cognitive-Enriched SIEM (CE-SIEM), Evidence-Gated SIEM (EG-SIEM), and EG-SIEM-Enron with Enron-calibrated email forensics. Across ten matched runs with eight malicious insiders, actor-level F1 improves from 0.567 for LSC to 0.774 for CE-SIEM, 0.898 for EG-SIEM, and 0.944 for EG-SIEM-Enron; paired Wilcoxon tests confirm the first three differences after Holm-Bonferroni correction. Evidence gating reduces confirmed false positives from 33.7 per run under LSC and 49.3 under CE-SIEM to 0.2 and 0.0 respectively, a precision gain traded against longer confirmation time. Domain-shift evaluation shows that an Enron-trained email classifier does not transfer to a different operational email domain, although target-domain fine-tuning reaches F1 = 0.974 under grouped template-family evaluation. On CERT r4.2, the evidence-gated logic improves actor-level detection while reducing false positives, outperforming tabular anomaly detectors and a sentence-embedding baseline. Scalability tests to 1000 agents indicate stable detection quality.

Firdous Kausar, Asmah Muallem, Naw Safrin Sattar +1

Department of Computer Science and Data Science SACS, Meharry Medical College Nashville, USA

CybersecurityAnomaly Detection
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Dec 7, 2025

Effective and Efficient Threat Hunting with Small Language Models

Analysts in Security Operations Centers query massive telemetry streams using Kusto Query Language (KQL), but writing correct KQL demands specialized expertise that bottlenecks scaling security teams. We investigate how Small Language Models (SLMs) can enable accurate, cost-effective translation from natural language queries (NLQs) to KQL. We propose a three-knob framework spanning prompting, fine-tuning, and architecture. First, we adapt NL2KQL for SLMs with lightweight retrieval and introduce error-aware prompting that targets common parser failures with a handful of mined tips, at a fraction of the tokens KQL's full rule set would require. Second, we apply LoRA fine-tuning with rationale distillation augmenting each NLQ-KQL pair with a brief chain-of-thought to transfer teacher reasoning. This yields an informative negative result, as neither variant surpasses targeted prompting. Third, we propose a two-stage architecture pairing an SLM drafter with a low-cost LLM judge for schema-aware refinement. We evaluate nine models (five SLMs, four LLMs) on syntax correctness, semantic accuracy, table selection, filter precision, latency, and token cost. On Microsoft's NL2KQL Defender Evaluation dataset, our two-stage approach reaches 0.987 syntax and 0.906 schema-valid ("semantic") accuracy, exceeding every baseline we run under equivalent infrastructure, and it generalizes to independently authored queries over the same schema (0.964 syntax, 0.831 schema-valid). The only baselines within 0.05 schema-valid are NL2KQL+GPT-4o (0.878) and NL2KQL+GPT-5 (0.861), which cost USD 2.998 and USD 2.018 for 230 queries against USD 0.213 for ours, a 9.5-14x reduction at matched accuracy. These results establish SLMs as a practical foundation for natural-language querying in security operations.

Saleha Muzammil, Rahul Reddy, Vishal Kamalakrishnan +2

University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA · Corvic, USA

CybersecuritySmall Language ModelsText-to-SQL
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Nov 19, 2025

Multi-Agent LLM Orchestration Achieves Deterministic, High-Quality Decision Support for Incident Response

Large language models (LLMs) promise to accelerate incident response in production systems, yet single-agent approaches generate vague, unusable recommendations. We present MyAntFarm.ai, a reproducible containerized framework demonstrating that multi-agent orchestration fundamentally transforms LLM-based incident response quality. Through 348 controlled trials comparing single-agent copilot versus multi-agent systems on identical incident scenarios, we find that multi-agent orchestration achieves 100% actionable recommendation rate versus 1.7% for single-agent approaches, an 80 times improvement in action specificity and 140 times improvement in solution correctness. Critically, multi-agent systems exhibit zero quality variance across all trials, enabling production SLA commitments impossible with inconsistent single-agent outputs. Both architectures achieve similar comprehension latency (approx.40s), establishing that the architectural value lies in deterministic quality, not speed. We introduce Decision Quality (DQ), a novel metric capturing validity, specificity, and correctness properties essential for operational deployment that existing LLM metrics do not address. These findings reframe multi-agent orchestration from a performance optimization to a production-readiness requirement for LLM-based incident response. All code, Docker configurations, and trial data are publicly available for reproduction.

Philip Drammeh

Independent Researcher

Multi-Agent LLM SystemsLLM Agent OrchestrationLLM Agent EvaluationCybersecurityLLM Agent Reliability
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Oct 15, 2025

Toward Cybersecurity-Expert Small Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are transforming everyday applications, yet deployment in cybersecurity lags due to a lack of high-quality, domain-specific models and training datasets. To address this gap, we present CyberPal 2.0, a family of cybersecurity-expert small language models (SLMs) ranging from 4B-20B parameters. To train CyberPal 2.0, we generate an enriched chain-of-thought cybersecurity instruction dataset built with our data enrichment and formatting pipeline, SecKnowledge 2.0, which integrates expert-in-the-loop steering of reasoning formats alongside LLM-driven multi-step grounding, yielding higher-fidelity, task-grounded reasoning traces for security tasks. Across diverse cybersecurity benchmarks, CyberPal 2.0 consistently outperforms its baselines and matches or surpasses various open and closed-source frontier models, while remaining a fraction of their size. On core cyber threat intelligence knowledge tasks, our models outperform almost all tested frontier models, ranking second only to Sec-Gemini v1. On core threat-investigation tasks, such as correlating vulnerabilities and bug tickets with weaknesses, our best 20B-parameter model outperforms GPT-4o, o1, o3-mini, and Sec-Gemini v1, ranking first, while our smallest 4B-parameter model ranks second.

Matan Levi, Daniel Ohayon, Ariel Blobstein +3

1IBM Research.

Cyber Threat IntelligenceCybersecuritySmall Language ModelsLLMs for CybersecurityInstruction Tuning
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Sep 24, 2025

Adversarial Defense in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Review of GANs for Threat Detection and Mitigation

Machine learning-based cybersecurity systems are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, while Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) act as both powerful attack enablers and promising defenses. This survey systematically reviews GAN-based adversarial defenses in cybersecurity (2021--August 31, 2025), consolidating recent progress, identifying gaps, and outlining future directions. Using a PRISMA-compliant systematic literature review protocol, we searched five major digital libraries. From 829 initial records, 185 peer-reviewed studies were retained and synthesized through quantitative trend analysis and thematic taxonomy development. We introduce a four-dimensional taxonomy spanning defensive function, GAN architecture, cybersecurity domain, and adversarial threat model. GANs improve detection accuracy, robustness, and data utility across network intrusion detection, malware analysis, and IoT security. Notable advances include WGAN-GP for stable training, CGANs for targeted synthesis, and hybrid GAN models for improved resilience. Yet, persistent challenges remain such as instability in training, lack of standardized benchmarks, high computational cost, and limited explainability. GAN-based defenses demonstrate strong potential but require advances in stable architectures, benchmarking, transparency, and deployment. We propose a roadmap emphasizing hybrid models, unified evaluation, real-world integration, and defenses against emerging threats such as LLM-driven cyberattacks. This survey establishes the foundation for scalable, trustworthy, and adaptive GAN-powered defenses.

Tharcisse Ndayipfukamiye, Jianguo Ding, Doreen Sebastian Sarwatt +2

Department of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology Beijing · Department of Computer Science, Blekinge Institute of Technology

Network Intrusion DetectionAdversarial RobustnessCybersecurityGenerative Adversarial Networks
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Aug 26, 2025

FALCON: Transforming Cyber Threat Intelligence into Deployable IDS Rules with Self-Reflection

Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) detect malicious activity by matching network or host events against predefined rules. Security analysts manually develop these rules from Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). As threats evolve, this manual pipeline faces two bottlenecks. Before authoring a new rule, an analyst must reconcile the incoming CTI with the existing rule base and determine whether to create, update, or retire one. This process is challenging due to the representational differences between the CTI and Rule formats. This gap limits the effectiveness of keyword- and embedding-based search, making rule reconciliation cognitively demanding and, in turn, contributing to "rule bloat". Second, automated verification of a new rule is inherently difficult as zero-day threats lack ground truth from simulated testing. Hence, standard metrics cannot prove that a rule semantically adheres to the CTI, and the use of LLMs leads to non-deterministic behavior. To address these challenges, we introduce FALCON, an agentic framework for CTI-grounded rule retrieval, generation, and validation. At its core, a novel CTI-Rule semantic scorer, quantifies the functional alignment between a CTI and a rule; the same signal drives a retriever that surfaces relevant deployed rules and a ground-truth-free validator that scores generated ones. Around it, a generation pipeline produces deployable rules from CTI in real time and refines them through self-reflective syntactic, semantic, and performance validators. Across network (Snort) and host-based (YARA) platforms on a purpose-built CTI-Rule dataset, FALCON attains a mean relevance of 0.72 (approx), with 84% inter-rater agreement among cybersecurity analysts, underscoring the promise of real-time security automation.

Shaswata Mitra, Subash Neupane, Martin Duclos +5

The University of Alabama · Meharry Medical College · The University of Texas at El Paso

Cyber Threat IntelligenceNetwork Intrusion DetectionCybersecurityLLMs for Cybersecurity
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Aug 1, 2025

Random Walk Learning and the Pac-Man Attack

Random walk (RW)-based algorithms have long been popular in distributed systems due to low overheads and scalability, with recent growing applications in decentralized learning. However, their reliance on local interactions makes them inherently vulnerable to malicious behavior. In this work, we investigate an adversarial threat that we term the ``Pac-Man'' attack, in which a malicious node probabilistically terminates any RW that visits it. This stealthy behavior gradually eliminates active RWs from the network, effectively halting the learning process without triggering failure alarms. To counter this threat, we propose the Average Crossing (AC) algorithm--a fully decentralized mechanism for duplicating RWs to prevent RW extinction in the presence of Pac-Man. Our theoretical analysis establishes that (i) the RW population remains almost surely bounded under AC and (ii) RW-based stochastic gradient descent remains convergent under AC, even in the presence of Pac-Man, with a quantifiable deviation from the true optimum. Our extensive empirical results on both synthetic and real-world datasets corroborate our theoretical findings. Furthermore, they uncover a phase transition in the extinction probability as a function of the duplication threshold. We offer theoretical insights by analyzing a simplified variant of the AC, which sheds light on the observed phase transition.

Xingran Chen, Parimal Parag, Rohit Bhagat +2

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Rutgers University, Piscataway Township, NJ 08854, USA · Department of Electrical Communication Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, Karnataka 560012, India

CybersecurityDecentralized LearningStochastic Optimization Convergence
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Jul 18, 2025

Label Unification for Cross-Dataset Generalization in Cybersecurity NER

The field of cybersecurity NER lacks standard-ized labels, making it challenging to combine datasets. We investigate label unification across four cybersecurity datasets to increase data resource usability. We perform a coarse-grained label unification and conduct pairwise cross-dataset evaluations using RoBERTa models. Qualitative analysis of predictions reveals errors, limitations, and dataset differences. To address unification limitations, we propose alternative architectures including a multi-head model and a graph-based transfer model. Under our selected mapping and training setup, unified training underperformed the corresponding single-dataset baselines on all four development sets. The multi-head model with weight sharing provides no consistent benefits over single-dataset baselines, and the graph-based transfer model shows no consistent benefits.

Maciej Jalocha, Johan Hausted Schmidt, William Michelsen

Cross-Dataset GeneralizationNamed Entity RecognitionCybersecurity
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Jun 30, 2025

Less Data, More Security: Advancing Cybersecurity LLMs Specialization via Resource-Efficient Domain-Adaptive Continuous Pre-training with Minimal Tokens

The increasing scale of AI workloads demands High-Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructure and training methodologies that are both scalable and sustainable. While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate exceptional natural language capabilities, general-purpose models often lack the specialized domain knowledge necessary for effective cybersecurity analysis. We investigate Domain-Adaptive Continuous Pretraining (DAP) as a scalable, resource-efficient methodology for enhancing cybersecurity understanding in pretrained LLMs, implemented through a distributed Fully Sharded Data Parallel (FSDP) pipeline across multi-node GPU clusters. We systematically adapted three decoder-based architectures -- Llama-3.1-8B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B, and Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct -- using a curated 126-million-word cybersecurity corpus from standards, academic literature, and technical documentation. Evaluation across three cybersecurity benchmarks -- CTI-MCQ, CyberMetric, and SecEval -- demonstrates consistent improvements post-adaptation. Notably, our Llama-3.3-70B-Ins-DAP model achieves state-of-the-art performance with accuracies of 0.718, 0.933, and 0.864, respectively, surpassing parameter-efficient baselines and specialized models including Llama-Primus-Base (trained on 2.77 billion tokens) and Foundation-Sec-8B (trained on 5 billion tokens), despite utilizing only 118.8 million tokens -- representing a 23-to-42-fold reduction in training data. Targeted continuous pretraining via scalable HPC infrastructure enables effective cybersecurity domain adaptation with a substantially reduced computational and energy footprint, supporting specialized AI assistants in threat analysis, vulnerability assessment, and security documentation, while advancing sustainable and responsible AI development.

Salahuddin Salahuddin, Ahmed Hussain, Jussi Löppönen +1

SSH Communications Security, Helsinki, Finland · Aalto University, Espoo, Finland · Networked Systems Security (NSS) Group, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

Language Model PretrainingDomain-Adaptive PretrainingCybersecurityLLMs for Cybersecurity
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May 23, 2025

ShIOEnv: A Command Evaluation Environment for Grammar-Constrained Synthesis and Execution Behavior Modeling

We introduce ShIOEnv, a Gymnasium-compatible Bash environment for synthesizing execution-annotated shell input traces. Datasets containing such traces are useful for training models to perform execution-free shell simulation, which in turn is useful for deploying honeypots for cyber deception. Existing datasets, such as NL2CMD and other Bash command corpora, do not include complete execution artifacts (stdout, stderr, exit status, and changes to the system's state) associated with a command's execution. ShIOEnv synthesizes shell inputs, executes them in a controlled system context, and records stdout, stderr, exit status, and structured filesystem and environment patches. Unconstrained (random) generation of shell inputs (command and arguments) results in multiple instances of arguments that are mostly redundant or result in execution errors. We introduce grammar-constrained synthesis to generate syntactically valid arguments with high input irreducibility, which we estimate through self-ablative contrasts of execution artifacts. We prepare 1.6M samples using grammar-constrained and unconstrained synthesis and collect their execution artifacts for 86 Linux/Bash utilities. Using this dataset, we train small language models (CodeT5) and evaluate their accuracy in predicting the actual execution behavior of attacker-sourced Bash commands. These models outperform commonly used rule-based simulation (Cowrie) and prompted large language models by up to 14.2 pp in output edit similarity (O-ES). We enhance the NL2CMD dataset by constructing 500K samples executable in a grounded system context along with their complete execution artifacts. We empirically demonstrate that models trained on grammar-constrained samples outperform those trained on NL2CMD samples by 22.5 pp in O-ES. ShIOEnv, command grammars, and 2.1M samples used in our primary evaluations are released for use by other researchers.

Jarrod Ragsdale, Rajendra Boppana

Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, USA.

Synthetic Data Generation for Language ModelsCybersecurityProgram SynthesisLLMs for Cybersecurity
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Jun 19, 2024

ModSec-Learn: Boosting ModSecurity with Machine Learning

ModSecurity is widely recognized as the standard open-source Web Application Firewall (WAF), maintained by the OWASP Foundation. It detects malicious requests by matching them against the Core Rule Set (CRS), identifying well-known attack patterns. Each rule is manually assigned a weight based on the severity of the corresponding attack, and a request is blocked if the sum of the weights of matched rules exceeds a given threshold. However, we argue that this strategy is largely ineffective against web attacks, as detection is only based on heuristics and not customized on the application to protect. In this work, we overcome this issue by proposing a machine-learning model that uses the CRS rules as input features. Through training, ModSec-Learn is able to tune the contribution of each CRS rule to predictions, thus adapting the severity level to the web applications to protect. Our experiments show that ModSec-Learn achieves a significantly better trade-off between detection and false positive rates. Finally, we analyze how sparse regularization can reduce the number of rules that are relevant at inference time, by discarding more than 30% of the CRS rules. We release our open-source code and the dataset at https://github.com/pralab/modsec-learn and https://github.com/pralab/http-traffic-dataset, respectively.

Christian Scano, Giuseppe Floris, Biagio Montaruli +7

University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy · Pluribus One, Cagliari, Italy · SAP Security Research, Mougins, France +3

Cybersecurity
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