Overview

Cybersecurity studies how to prevent, detect, investigate, and recover from attacks on software, networks, organizations, and cyber-physical systems. Common approaches include signature-based defenses, statistical and deep-learning intrusion detection, graph and temporal analysis, formal verification, threat-intelligence mapping, and reinforcement-learning or language-model agents. Work spans settings such as cloud and IoT networks, industrial control systems, connected vehicles, vulnerability assessment, and security operations, with benchmarks increasingly testing realistic attack chains and operational response. A central tension is that strong results on fixed datasets or simulated environments may not transfer to changing, adversarial deployments, where false alarms, safety, cost, and human oversight also matter.

Latest papers

379 papers21 papers in the last four weeks, down 46% on the four weeks before. 0.2% of all new papers.

Nov 17, 2026

Network-Exposed Configuration Attacks on LLM-Controlled Social Robots

Large language models (LLMs) in embodied robots create security dependencies beyond inference. We investigate a network-exposed configuration attack on the Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini Lite, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to replace personality settings and the cloud LLM's system prompt through a management interface, without adversarial conversational input. Eleven prompt-injection attempts across five categories were reported as resisted, whereas both configuration-layer attack paths produced observable behavioural changes on physical hardware. We demonstrate local and network-adjacent access, mapping the weakness to CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for a Critical Function) and CWE-1327 (Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address), with a reported CVSS v3.1 score of 6.5 (Medium). A configuration endpoint also accepts cross-origin requests without a CORS preflight (CWE-352; 6.5 Medium), while the persistent-memory sink stores content without enforcing its stated restrictions. A source review of 59 public repositories identifies missing authentication in 10 of 11 source-verifiable genuine applications, or 11 of 11 including a framework-default case. These findings indicate recurrence within the sampled repositories, not prevalence in commercial products. We characterise a deployment gap between developer-oriented network assumptions and consumer-facing embodied AI security: inference-layer refusal cannot prevent unauthorised changes to model instructions. Potential consequences include surveillance through onboard cameras and microphones and social engineering of nearby users. Proof-of-concept code, evidence and the survey are available at https://bit.ly/reachypi.
Nov 17, 2026

Adaptive LLM-Driven Honeypots vs. LLM-Driven Attackers: Does Narrative Coherence Improve Deception?

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable honeypots to generate responses and deceptive artefacts on demand, yet existing approaches evaluate generated content one reply at a time and leave open whether artefacts that jointly describe a coherent event retain an attacker better than unrelated ones. This question becomes pressing as autonomous LLM-driven offensive agents emerge as realistic adversaries. This paper proposes narrative deception, a reactive strategy in which the defender maps each observed attacker command to a MITRE ATT&CK technique, selects a compatible scenario from a curated catalogue based on MITRE Engage, and deploys mutually referential artefacts (files, processes, services, and logs) on an emulated Ubuntu host while the intrusion is under way. An LLM-powered defender and an autonomous LLM attacker interact through a real SSH session, and the attacker's termination policy distinguishes abandonment due to suspected deception from abandonment due to loss of interest. A campaign of 1,150 sessions compares four conditions of increasing sophistication (Static, Same-TTP, Multi-TTP, and Chain) across four open-weight attacker models, four defender models, and three attacker skill levels. Engagement increases significantly at every step. With the same artefact budget per reaction, coherent scenarios raise the median session length of advanced attackers from 40 to 165 commands and reduce their abandonment from 86% to 52%. The effect grows with attacker skill, holds across all sixteen model pairs, and comes at comparable inference cost. Nearly all sessions ended through loss of interest rather than detection, which suggests that deception should sustain meaningful findings, not only emulator fidelity.
Nov 17, 2026

Do LLMs Understand Network Traces? A Comparative Study of Reasoning over Raw and Filtered Traffic Data

The effective delivery and monitoring of ICT services rely heavily on network traffic analysis. However, interpreting complex packet captures remains a challenging task that requires substantial technical expertise. Large language models (LLMs) offer promising opportunities to automate network traffic in- vestigation, yet their reliability in packet-level field extraction and flow-level sequence reconstruction remains an open research question. This study proposes a reproducible, question-answering- based evaluation methodology to assess the capabilities of LLMs in network trace analysis. Using real-world benign traffic from the CICIDS2017 dataset, we evaluate multiple models against a human-generated ground truth, comparing their performance on raw textual traffic dumps and protocol-filtered representations. Model responses are assessed through an automated LLM- as-a-judge pipeline, validated against human evaluations. The results demonstrate that protocol filtering significantly reduces prompt overhead while improving answer accuracy by reducing incorrect responses. These findings highlight the importance of protocol-aware traffic filtering as an effective optimization for improving the efficiency and reliability of LLM-assisted network management.
Nov 16, 2026

LLMs as Validators for Cross-Chain Bridges: Evaluating Source-Level and Transaction-Level Attack Detection on Solana

Cross-chain bridges have suffered substantial asset losses due to vulnerabilities in their on-chain programs. On Solana, missing validation checks can enable exploits even when the underlying blockchain operates correctly. The ability of large language models (LLMs) to diagnose these flaws from source code or transaction records, rather than merely raise alarms, remains insufficiently understood. We implement a native Rust lock-and-mint bridge on a local Solana validator with four exploitable variants: two model flaws from the Cashio and Wormhole incidents, while the other two represent vulnerability classes documented in Solana security audits. Paired vulnerable and secure programs, together with successful attacks, benign sessions, and blocked attempts, allow us to distinguish correct diagnoses from unsupported alarms. We evaluate six configurations of five open-weight models across 16,800 responses, compare source inputs with and without comments, and grade 7,200 answers on vulnerable inputs using two blinded LLM graders. The results reveal substantial differences across conditions: without comments, models diagnose 24% of vulnerable source inputs while frequently flagging the secure bridge. Transaction diagnosis is high for the missing-signer scenario but averages 6% across the other three scenarios. Original comments, some of which describe the flaw, increase source diagnosis to 60%. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing correct vulnerability diagnoses from unsupported alarms in bridge security review.
Nov 16, 2026

The CYBER-BRIDGE project: An AI-Powered Platform for Cross-Border Cybersecurity, Compliance and Forensics in the EU

Cross-border cyber attacks on European SMEs and critical-infrastructure operators expose a structural cyber-resilience gap: cybersecurity (threat sharing, detection, response), compliance (framework assessment, certification) and digital forensics (cross-jurisdictional evidence) are jointly regulated by NIS2, the CRA, GDPR and the LED, yet their tooling evolved in silos and rarely interoperates across Member States. The EU-funded CYBER-BRIDGE project integrates the three domains under one architecture and a hash-chained evidence layer: AI-driven CTI sharing with ENISA-aligned notification, multi-framework assessments with retrieval-augmented advisory, and RFC 3161-anchored custody with lawful GDPR/LED exchange, all aligned with MITRE ATT&CK. A sanitised replica of the back-end image hosts a Cyber-Range for upskilling. The contribution is not the individual tools but the reconciliation mechanism that lets one incident produce, from a single evidence record, a cross-border CTI advisory, the regulatory notifications its deadlines demand and a re-verifiable forensic pack; we set out why binding three differently regulated evidence regimes onto one record is non-trivial and how the shared evidence layer resolves the resulting tensions. This paper introduces the project's scope, requirements, pilots, architecture and toolkits; quantitative KPIs follow in later deliverables.
Nov 16, 2026

ProcReverser: Multi-Agent Black-Box Microarchitectural Reverse Engineering for Processor Vulnerability Analysis

When processor implementation details are unavailable, black-box microarchitectural reverse engineering helps security researchers identify hardware conditions related to security vulnerabilities. However, this process requires substantial manual effort to design experiments, develop test programs, and analyze results for each processor. We present ProcReverser, a multi-agent system that automates this process. ProcReverser uses execution feedback to improve experimental plans and test programs and identifies microarchitectural properties from measurements. We develop a comprehensive suite of property identification tasks focused on hardware mechanisms relevant to Spectre-class attacks, covering speculative execution, branch prediction, memory dependence, and cache behavior. We evaluate ProcReverser on the XuanTie C910, the gem5 RISC-V O3 CPU model, and the SiFive P550. ProcReverser achieves Pass@1 and Pass@5 scores of 81.3% and 93.8%, respectively, on C910, and 83.0% and 100.0% on gem5 O3. On the SiFive P550, ProcReverser further characterizes microarchitectural properties covered by the proposed task suite. These findings highlight the potential of automated microarchitectural reverse engineering to support processor vulnerability analysis and defense evaluation.
Nov 16, 2026

The Cybersecurity Dataset Observatory: Which Data for AI in Cybersecurity?

AI is increasingly used for cybersecurity tasks such as intrusion and malware detection, in enterprise, industrial, vehicular and mobile networks. Its effectiveness depends on data: models need representative network traffic, both to be trained and to be evaluated realistically. Public datasets of cybersecurity network traffic, however, are scattered across laboratory pages, repositories and aggregators, and are continuously released, corrected and withdrawn: 92 of the 234 datasets we catalog were released in 2023 or later. At this pace, surveys that list them are outdated soon after publication, since they describe the field only as it was when they were written. We present the Cybersecurity dataset observatory, a public and continuously updated catalog of cybersecurity datasets based on network traffic. New datasets are added as they are found or submitted, every record is periodically re-checked against its original source, to which it links rather than hosting the data, and every change is recorded in a public change log. This paper documents the first release: we define a traffic-centered scope and a seven-axis taxonomy, and review 234 datasets (204 original captures and 30 derivatives) across 14 domains. The review shows a field that grows quickly but unevenly, where 91 datasets distribute only processed records, a few laboratories produce a large share of the data, and UAV, wireless and V2X networks have little public evidence, while 5G has few real captures. We then relate the catalog to common uses in AI research, outline a procedure for selecting datasets, and discuss benchmark pitfalls and open gaps.
Nov 16, 2026

MASTA: A Feedback-Scheduled Multi-Agent System for End-to-End Tamarin Modeling and Analysis

Tamarin-based formal verification of security protocols requires expert-authored multiset rewriting rules and temporal-logic lemmas. Translating a natural-language protocol description into a complete formal model with an LLM is hard because syntactic, reachability, and property-level errors compound across the multi-step modeling process, and a single agent that both authors and self-evaluates cannot reliably localize them. We present MASTA, a multi-agent system that addresses these difficulties through three innovations. First, an operational--evaluative role decomposition assigns rule modeling to an Architect, property modeling to an Auditor, and pure dispatch to a dedicated Arbiter that holds no authoring duties. Second, the Arbiter implements a Tamarin-anchored scheduler that dispatches the next agent based on the latest verifier verdict and routes problem-tagged fixes through a modification list, with a six-class problem taxonomy and an LLM deduplication check preventing routing deadlock. Third, we construct a benchmark of 10 protocols paired with 139 mutation variants and five fine-grained metrics that jointly assess model correctness (M1M_1--M3M_3) and completeness (M4M_4--M5M_5). On this benchmark, MASTA on Qwen 3.5-plus improves over OpenCode on the same backbone by up to +0.27+0.27 on individual metrics and ranks first on both the correctness and completeness averages, surpassing Codex (GPT-5.5) and Claude Code (Opus 4.7) despite using a weaker LLM. Ablations on five protocols confirm that removing the Arbiter collapses property and verification scores to zero.
Nov 14, 2026

VAST: Compiling Grounded Vulnerability Scenarios into Verifiable, Multi-Step Environments for Evaluating LLM Red-Team Agents

Evaluating Large Language Model (LLM) security agents requires reproducible environments whose workflow difficulty can be varied and whose failures can be diagnosed. We present VAST (Verifiable Adversarial Scenario Training & Evaluation), a declarative range compiler separating vulnerability scenarios from a compiler-introduced workflow-hardening layer. Following a post-hoc code and AST audit across all topics, the main benchmark retains 109 seed edges (45 with strict upstream CVE annotations), 72 family identifiers (62 under shared-HMAC relay grouping), 81 topic configurations (76 core plus 5 bounded execution models), and 1,387 instances (359 canonical four-gate-revalidated specs plus 1,028 seed variants) in a 42:39 partition. On the TopicServer compiler stratum, a budget-matched 270-episode prompt contrast across 10 compiled mechanism-family clusters (30 P2/P3/P4 instances, 40 turns, temperature 0.0) shows that glm-5.3, grok-4.7, and deepseek-v4-pro solve 12/90 instances under contract_only and 14/90 under generic_hint (cluster sign p=1.00), whereas supplying the shared workflow protocol in full_guide lifts completion to 76/90 (28/30, 23/30, 25/30; cluster sign p<=0.00391). On the separate ranges_v2 ledger, a 126-episode evaluation across 6 non-TopicServer workflows and multi-container Docker/Linux stacks solves 88/126 (69.8%) (28/42, 31/42, 29/42), while an 18-episode intervention on asynchronous Redis worker chaining (v2_02) lifts solves from 0/18 to 18/18 (100%) in 4-6 turns when installed worker modules are disclosed in GET /sched/directory. Finally, a three-seed (s in {42, 1024, 2025}) LoRA recipe comparison on Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct across 37 lineage-disjoint families (231 episodes on 33 held-out instances) yields 0/33 for Base, 1.67 +/- 2.89 / 33 for Golden SFT, and 4.67 +/- 2.31 / 33 for Header-Recovery SFT, with all solves on v2_03.
Nov 12, 2026

Look Here, Then Decide: Small Decision Models in a Harness Find Memory-Safety Vulnerabilities at Scale on Commodity GPUs

We ask whether small, open-weight decision models can support vulnerability discovery in open-source software at scale and what the surrounding system must provide. These models answer a typed question in one forward pass, returning scores for the permitted answers rather than text. Our harness selects widely packaged C and C++ projects and uses deterministic incomplete-fix miners and shape localizers to decide where to look. Intern-Decision-4B, a 4B-parameter open-weight decision model, then scores every candidate function. The scores rank the queues rather than accept or reject candidates, apart from a low reach-score floor that some queues kept. The search uses no frontier model. Alone, the model is weak: it separates vulnerable from benign functions with AUC 0.73, but a vulnerable function from its own patch with only 0.56. It is more useful for ordering candidates. On 75 public CVEs from projects without any of our findings, the fixed function reached its repository's top 25 in 21% of cases, 1.4 times as often as under random order of the same queues. Recall is bounded mainly by where the localizers look. On the campaign's own queues the model's order placed 7.5 times more confirmed findings in the top 10 than random order, an observed, selection-biased upper bound. On three GB10 systems, the harness searched more than 4,000 projects at 900-1,100 repositories per hour. The campaign confirmed 187 memory-safety findings; by worst-case CVSS v3.1, 12 are critical, 148 high, 23 medium and 4 low. The decision step runs at 4.4 decisions per second on one GB10 and 9.8 on a consumer RTX 4090 gaming PC, with matching scores. A small decision model supports vulnerability discovery through prioritization, while deterministic analysis and verification remain essential. All confirmed findings are being disclosed to maintainers under coordinated disclosure before publication.
Nov 9, 2026

Double Blind Evals: Resolving the Dual Confidentiality Dilemma in AI Safety Auditing

AI safety evaluations often involve sensitive prompts and proprietary models. Evaluators want to keep their evaluation prompts secret from model owners to prevent purposeful or incidental data leakage, ensuring longer usefulness of their benchmark. Model owners in turn wish to keep their proprietary model weights and inference code within their own secure infrastructure to protect their IP. We present a way forward for "double-blind evals", which provide cryptographic guarantees that an evaluator's prompts are not shared with the model owner, while simultaneously maintaining the confidentiality of the model weights and inference code. To accomplish this, we use secure enclaves that encrypt data in RAM at the hardware level. In a world-first pilot, we test this approach by evaluating a proprietary Google DeepMind model (Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite) against a selection of the private AILuminate benchmark corpus, using an NVIDIA H100 secure enclave on Google Cloud Platform, and using OpenMined's PySyft to maintain data and model privacy. We believe this effort marks the first use of this technology to provide mutual secrecy for one organization's frontier-class proprietary model weights and another organization's closed benchmark.
Nov 9, 2026

LEGION: Benchmarking Language Agents on Sparse-Signal Investigation Under Adversarial Noise

Autonomous language-model agents are increasingly deployed on discovery-driven tasks where signal is sparse and most retrieved information is irrelevant. Current benchmarks fail to evaluate this regime due to dense signals, cooperative environments, and ground truth typically being only a few tool calls away. We introduce Legion, a benchmark framework coupling a stochastic enterprise-telemetry simulator (Legion-Sim) with a tiered library of 74 expertly-crafted adversarial scenarios (Legion-Bench) and an evaluation protocol that scores investigation efficiency alongside detection accuracy. Scenarios are injected into freshly simulated companies, allowing independent control over confounder density and event volume. We test five agent architectures on two simulated companies and find that while recall is high (0.82-0.88) precision lags behind (0.61--0.72). They fail to find all of the indicators of compromise of the attack or mistake genuine indicators with attack related ones, which is critical in the context of cybersecurity investigation. Failures are consistent across reasoning tiers and persist across confounder density and event volume. We release Legion, the scenario library, performance on common agent architectures, and pipeline for reproducibility and extension.
Nov 7, 2026

FedSGN: Federated Sparse Grassmann Newton Learning for IoT Anomaly Detection

Anomaly detection plays a critical role in securing the Internet of things (IoT). Although existing federated principal component analysis (PCA) methods can learn the subspace of normal samples without sharing raw data, they often suffer from feature redundancy that may degrade detection performance. To address this limitation, we propose a novel and effective federated sparse Grassmann Newton (FedSGN) learning method for IoT anomaly detection. Technically, our FedSGN leverages the ℓ2,0\ell_{2,0}-norm constraint on the global projection matrix to eliminate redundancy and introduces an orthogonality penalty to preserve the intrinsic structure. Moreover, we develop an augmented Lagrangian solver integrated with a semismooth Newton scheme to enable parallel client updates and Grassmann projection for robustness. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed method achieves favorable overall detection performance while reducing communication overhead. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/xianchaoxiu/FedSGN
Nov 6, 2026

Empirical Assessment of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in TLS

Anticipating Q-day security concerns, major CDNs and cloud providers are migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While existing literature benchmarks PQC performance, empirical research evaluating real-world adoption data remains scarce. We present an empirical assessment of PQC deployment across seven critical protocols (HTTPS, LDAPS, SMTPS, IMAP-SSL, POP3-SSL, TELNETS, and RDP) using 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol. At the origin-server level, PQC algorithm support reaches 9.1% for HTTPS and 7.39% for LDAPS, while falling below 1% for all other evaluated protocols. At the entity level, PQC support is 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, while the remaining protocols have less than 5% of entities supporting PQC on the hosted servers. We further correlate these adoption trends against organizational digital and financial footprint, and industry sectors, yielding a multi-dimensional empirical assessment of PQC deployment. Finally, at the domain level, we perform a comparative analysis of PQC adoption in Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. Collectively, our findings provide critical insights into the current state of PQC readiness over Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Nov 6, 2026

Empirical Study of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in SSH Infrastructure

With the anticipated arrival of Q-day, quantum computers threaten current cryptographic schemes for encryption and digital signatures. In response, major content delivery networks and cloud service providers are already adopting Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The current state-of-the-art focuses on benchmarking the operational performance of implementing PQC, but the real-world adoption status remains under-researched. This work utilizes large-scale SSH fingerprint data from a proprietary scanning tool to analyze PQC adoption across 1.52 million hosts and 27,012 entities. Our study shows that the PQC transition in the SSH protocol is underway but highly polarized: 45.2% of SSH hosts on port 22 support PQC, while 54.8% remain classical-only. At the entity level, 39.9% have enabled PQC on at least one host, whereas 60.1% have no PQC support. By correlating PQC adoption with industry, geography, and organizational size (digital and financial), this study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of PQC adoption status in SSH infrastructure.
Nov 5, 2026

A Hidden Markov Preference Model for Online Prediction of Adversary Actions

A defender anticipating an attacker needs a probability distribution over the attacker's next action from information available before that action occurs. Two structures complicate this: the attacker's behavioral regime persists and can switch within an episode, and each action combines an operation with state-dependent arguments whose feasible values change over time. We capture both with a hidden Markov model whose latent state is the active regime and whose regime-conditioned action law is defined on a feasibility-masked tree of executable actions. The same likelihood forms the next-action distribution and updates the regime belief once the action is seen, and a partially observed prefix contributes its resolved local factors. Estimation separates into convex logistic fits that Baum-Welch reuses when regimes are unlabeled. We derive a reach-weighted nodewise KL expression for regime information, a sequence-wise log-loss bound for switching regime paths, and a uniform fallback guarantee. On the CAGE 2 cyber defense benchmark the filtered latent state is worth 0.8 nats per step, and after a controller switch the loss begins to fall in three steps against ten for a recurrent baseline.
Nov 4, 2026

Does Frontier AI Strengthen Cyber Defense? Evidence from Project Glasswing

Defenders and attackers race to find the same software flaws. I use the launch of Project Glasswing, which gave a small group of large US tech firms early access to Claude Mythos Preview, a model for finding software vulnerabilities, to study how access to frontier AI affects defenders, external researchers, and attackers. Using the universe of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, I find that firms with access more than doubled their disclosures relative to Chinese and Russian tech firms without access, disclosed about 150 percent more high-impact vulnerabilities, and fixed reported flaws as quickly as before. As treated firms found more flaws themselves, external researchers, who sell their findings through bug bounties, reported about half as many vulnerabilities in treated firms' code and more in other firms' code, without leaving the market. There is no evidence that attackers exploited the additional vulnerabilities: the share exploited within a month of disclosure fell by about two thirds, mainly because a smaller share was already exploited when disclosed, while the number exploited did not change. Frontier AI helped defenders find and fix more flaws before attackers exploited them, but its restricted release creates an asymmetry in software security between firms in different countries.
Nov 4, 2026

Analysis of Local Open-Weight LLM Agents on Vulnerability-Reproduction Tasks

Open-weight language models that fit on a single consumer GPU are becoming capable on a growing range of tasks, and they matter because they can run locally without sending the code to a hosted service. Vulnerability reproduction, turning a vulnerability description into an input that crashes the vulnerable build, is a natural target for them, since it is an automated analysis task closer to test generation than to code comprehension and it runs against a build that must be executed rather than read. In order to assess whether current models can perform it, we evaluate twelve configurations of local models, spanning three generations, two architectures and three quantization levels, on ten CyberGym vulnerability-reproduction tasks, three runs each under one harness, and release the full artefact. We show that every configuration, down to the 4B model, solves most of the six easier tasks, and configurations separate only on the remaining four. For the harder tasks, the 27B model is required. Quantization did not change what the models solved in any matched pair, but it changed how fast they got there, and the mixture of experts reached the same scores in less wall clock. We also examine the agent trajectories. Almost every run we examined, including those that fail, names the vulnerable function and states the correct hypothesis, and what separates a solved task from an unsolved one is whether that hypothesis becomes a working input.
Nov 2, 2026

TrafficInstruct: A Multi-Task Network Traffic Dataset and Benchmark for Instruction Tuning

Instruction tuning for multi-task network traffic analysis requires data with clearly defined sources, supervision targets, and evaluation conditions. We introduce TrafficInstruct, a newly collected dataset comprising raw packet captures and 55,000 structured supervised fine-tuning records across ten tasks: malware traffic detection, botnet detection, malicious DNS-over-HTTPS detection, Web attack detection, advanced persistent threat detection, encrypted VPN detection, Tor behavior detection, encrypted application/service classification, website fingerprinting, and application classification under concept drift. An automated workflow captures traffic from controlled software executions, attack experiments, and application activities. Labels are supported by task-specific collection evidence, including process or socket attribution, activity records, and execution outcomes. Filtering, sanitization, and task-specific transformations produce instructions, traffic observations, and structured answers. We verify sample sources and partition the dataset by complete collection sessions, keeping all samples from the same session within one partition. The benchmark defines allowed inputs, deterministic label mappings, fixed training/validation/test partitions, and task-wise scoring rules. We evaluate majority-class, random-forest, and ET-BERT baselines, an unadapted 27B language model, and independently trained task-specific LoRA adapters on a shared frozen base. Adapters are selected using validation data and evaluated on the corresponding test sets. Task-specific adaptation improves classification performance, supporting instruction tuning across diverse traffic-analysis tasks.
Oct 30, 2026

Cyber-physical attack detection approaches in the wide-area measurement system

Improving situational awareness within the Smart Grid is an effective preventive measure to detect potential anomalies, and avoid their adverse consequences. A wide area measurement system (WAMS) based Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) can assist in improving visibility within the grid by collecting relevant measurements including magnitude, phase angle, frequency, voltage, and current, with a precise GPS-based timestamp. So far, there are more than 2500 PMUs deployed in the North American power grid, where each of which generates between 30 and 60 samples/s, roughly 1.5 TB/month of streamed data. Thus, processing such large PMU streams requires expensive computational resources and faster algorithms. This paper provides state-of-the-art cyber and physical anomalies in the WAMS and analyses their impact on the integrity and availability of the system. Next, it investigates the current anomaly detection approach in historical and streaming PMU data, including conventional machine learning and hybrid approaches, and assesses their advantages and main drawbacks. Lastly, it sheds light on the importance of handling missing PMU data and concept drifts.
Oct 30, 2026

Clinical-Protocol-Aware Cyber Resilience for Connected Clinical Technologies Under AI-Enabled Adversarial Conditions

Healthcare increasingly relies on connected medical devices, clinical information systems, cloud services, and distributed-care technologies, creating cybersecurity risks across clinical workflows. AI-enabled capabilities can accelerate vulnerability discovery and attack-path analysis, increasing the need to limit compromise propagation. This paper proposes a clinical-protocol-aware cyber-resilience framework based on bounded clinical micro-networks and controlled interconnections. The framework integrates clinical factors into cybersecurity design, management, and evaluation, covering prevention, containment, and incident response. A parameterized Monte Carlo simulation distinguishes technical cyber exposure from modeled clinical consequence. Experiments investigate architectural connectivity, adversarial capability, security controls, protocol dependency, risk alignment, communication directionality, lifecycle integration, and response timing. Under the simulation assumptions, connected architecture increases mean cyber exposure by 56.3% relative to segmented architecture, while combined prevention and containment reduce exposure by 60.1% relative to no controls. Increasing protocol dependency raises the modeled clinical-impact index from 1.021 to 7.567 without changing mean cyber exposure, demonstrating that technical exposure and clinical consequence can diverge. Risk-alignment experiments further indicate higher modeled clinical impact when greater technical risk corresponds to greater clinical significance. The findings support comparative architectural analysis, not calibrated estimates of real-world cyber risk, control effectiveness, or patient harm. The framework provides a clinical-context-aware approach to security-boundary design, control prioritization, and coordinated containment in connected healthcare environments.
Oct 29, 2026

LanG 2.0: Energy-Efficient Agentic AI for Semi-Automated Security Operations at Scale

Security operations centers (SOCs) need to turn terabytes of alerts, logs and flows into trusted, affordable decisions to unveil hidden threats. We present LanG 2.0, an agentic system that detects threats, correlates evidence and writes rules, investigating whether small local models can replace frontier models affordably and safely when structural safeguards, not model accuracy, provide the guarantees. It incorporates entity-anchored correlation, human approval of rule changes and a tamper-evident ledger. Tests span eight flow datasets from five networks, real XDR alerts and multistage campaigns. Against its predecessor, campaign correlation precision rises from 18.75% to 51.81%, and rule acceptance from at most 60.00% to 98.33%. Against Claude Opus 5.5, scoring flows against each network's normal traffic detects attacks on unseen networks at 73.42% F1 without false positives, versus 58.10% with 49.00% false positives, for at least 650 times less energy. Finetuned models statistically match it on alert classification and rule writing for 5.6 to 59 times less energy. The work demonstrates LanG's practical scalability, processing 3.33 million records in 6.4 minutes, over 30 million hourly, and its safeguards resisted prompt injection, label poisoning and ledger tampering, so small local models can carry most SOC detection affordably and safely.
Oct 26, 2026

Atomic Security Concerns: Towards a Foundational Language for Security Knowledge Representation

Cybersecurity governance, risk management, compliance, and security architecture rely on numerous concepts, including security properties, domains, controls, risks, implementation measures, capabilities, and compliance requirements. Although these concepts are widely used, they are often represented through heterogeneous abstractions and vocabularies, making relationships among them difficult to express consistently and leaving much of the associated reasoning dependent on expert knowledge. This paper introduces the concepts of Security Concerns and Atomic Security Concerns (ASCs) and explores the hypothesis that cybersecurity knowledge may be represented through a finite set of foundational concerns. Inspired by the role of atoms in chemistry, the proposed approach views cybersecurity concepts as compositions of more fundamental concerns rather than as independent abstractions. Hence, Atomic Security Concerns could be viewed as a common abstraction layer for the representation of cybersecurity concepts, independently of their domain, nature, or level of granularity. Building upon this perspective, the paper explores how Atomic Security Concerns may provide the vocabulary of a cybersecurity language and how cybersecurity concepts may be represented as concern sets supporting explicit relationships among concepts. The contribution of this work is intentionally conceptual: it introduces a framework and research hypothesis for investigating the foundations of a common language for cybersecurity knowledge representation, reasoning, and future formalization.
Oct 26, 2026

SoK: Timestamps Are Not a Time Model: Rethinking Temporal Reasoning in Host-Based Intrusion Detection

Host-based intrusion detectors order events, window audit streams and sequence attack stages by their timestamps. Every conclusion they draw therefore rests on assumptions about clocks, delivery, entity identity and the integrity of the evidence, and most of these assumptions go unstated. This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) makes them explicit. Drawing on temporal databases, stream processing and runtime verification, we distill five components of a time model, together with a checklist of evidence assumptions and four levels of guarantee, and walk through a running campaign with them. A documented search yields fifteen families of detection and investigation. For papers selected by screening role and period, plus named systems and landmarks, we check the stated assumptions in the full texts, and we assess eleven temporal knowledge representation and reasoning (KRR) formalisms and a learned baseline on nine attack patterns. Some early alert correlators stated clock and delivery assumptions, and forensics measures clock error. Current provenance-based detectors state no clock bound. Four audited papers describe input-ordering conditions or conventions, but none specifies conditions for conclusion validity across a stated class of delivery failures. In the selected provenance-based systems, campaign composition uses system-specific procedures or objectives, learned state, causal graph queries or language models, and beyond CEP-based query systems, we found no temporal rule language or stream reasoner from KRR applied to host audit data. In 28 of 38 audited provenance-era detector papers, capture or stored evidence is trusted or its manipulation is placed out of scope, and none says which conclusions survive deleted, delayed or forged records. Five open challenges follow from these gaps.
Oct 24, 2026

Sybil-Resilient Multi-Drone Exploration of Indoor and Confined Spaces

When a team of drones explores a building together, each drone tells the others which frontier it is going to and shares the map it has built. This avoids duplicated effort, but it also means that the team trusts every identity from which it receives messages. In a Sybil attack, one compromised drone creates fake identities, and these fake teammates claim frontiers and send fabricated scans, so the real drones leave parts of the building unexplored and end up with walls in their maps that do not exist. We study five such attackers, including one that seals off the openings between floors, and five levels of defence that need no security infrastructure, only the drones' own sensors and maps: an audit of received map data against what a drone sees itself, a check that a body is present where an identity claims to be, trust only for identities whose body has been seen, a quarantine for identities that no drone has observed, and a rule that binds each observed body to one identity. Tests in simulation cover 70 maps of seven kinds, from offices and tunnels to three-storey buildings and caves. Without a defence, one compromised drone leaves on average up to 25% of a map unexplored (45% in offices), and the floor-sealing attacker cuts the explored part of a three-storey building to 82.3%, or 34.6% on the worst map. The quarantine brings exploration back to the level of an unattacked team in every setting, and in most settings it also brings the false data back to that level. The exceptions are two colluding attackers, fakes placed next to real drones, three of the ten caves and a team of 16 drones, and binding bodies to identities fixes the last three. Over 2,350 missions, an honest drone was revoked by a teammate only twice.
Oct 22, 2026

SecLog-Bench: A Scalable Benchmark for Cybersecurity Log Reasoning with Scaffolded Evidence

Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong potential for cybersecurity, leading to growing interest in LLM-based automated cybersecurity log analysis. However, current datasets (1) are limited in scale; (2) rely mainly on single-source evidence; and (3) have only binary or multi-class attack labels, without dense annotations of the reasoning process. To address these limitations, SecLog-Bench has three key features. First, we build an extensible simulation platform that covers 29 attack scenarios, supports repeated execution and the integration of new scenarios, and enables scalable generation of cybersecurity logs with attack-stage labels. Second, we use multi-source logs, including audit logs, application logs, and network traffic, to jointly analyze cyber attacks. Third, we annotate each sample with the essential context for cybersecurity log reasoning and a structured step-by-step evidence chain. We evaluate eight mainstream LLMs on this benchmark for post-detection attack-progress reasoning. Results show that, when provided with scaffolded evidence, current LLMs exhibit modest capability in attack-progress reasoning, with the best model achieving only 44.44% accuracy and 45.07% Macro-F1. Their reasoning remains unreliable; i.e., the highest Stage Reasoning F1 (SRF1) score is only 54.87%. Moreover, even correct predictions may be accompanied by flawed reasoning, and reasoning quality is often misaligned with prediction accuracy.
Oct 22, 2026

Bridging Number-Theoretic Primality Testing And Algorithmic Optimization: An Adaptive Cryptographic Framework

The security of modern public-key cryptographic systems, such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC, depends entirely on the computational intractability of the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. For these asymmetric algorithms to operate, a core requirement is that the system must be capable of generating, testing, and simultaneously proving the primality of extraordinarily large numbers. To meet those requirements, this study proposes a comprehensive framework, bridging clas- sical number theory with modern machine learning models and optimization algorithms. Specifically, the paper delineates an adaptive, arbitrary-precision architecture dedicated exclusively to primality testing. Concurrently, the research deeply analyzes the theoretical foundations of testing methods (both deterministic and probabilistic), hardware-level optimization techniques, and the application of quantum-secured entropy sources, while providing rigorous mathematical proofs to guarantee security even when the prime distribution is biased.
Oct 20, 2026

A Digital Twin to Improve Cyber-Social Impact

The increasing complexity of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and their integration with IT infrastructures has significantly expanded the cyber threat landscape. Traditional cybersecurity models, primarily based on the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA triad), fail to capture the broader societal and operational impacts of cyberattacks. This paper proposes a novel framework that integrates Digital Twin technology with a Cyber-Social Security model to simulate, analyze, and quantify cyber threats in critical infrastructures. Virtualized ICS environments built with Mininet and MiniCPS are used to model attack scenarios and assess their consequences across technical and social dimensions. At the core of the framework lies the Cyber-Social Vulnerability Scoring System (CSVSS), a quantitative metric that extends CVSS with a Social Impact dimension grounded in the Entity and Place pillars, producing a single, reproducible severity score that reflects real-world consequences. Crucially, the framework does not automate risk assessment but keeps the human analyst at its center: a Large Language Model (LLM) performs a first-pass analysis, mapping vulnerabilities and drafting risk reports, while the analyst, supported by explainable AI feedback, validates the findings and retains decision authority over critical cases. Experimental results demonstrate the framework's ability to model and score cyber-social impact, while the human-in-the-loop design is presented as a conceptual principle to preserve oversight.
Oct 19, 2026

Robust Lightweight IoT Device Fingerprinting Under Network Traffic Anomalies

Accurate IoT device identification is essential for network security, yet many existing approaches rely on payload inspection, feature engineering, or long observation windows that limit scalability and often assume stable network conditions despite the inherent variability of real-world IoT traffic. We propose a lightweight IoT device identification approach based on packet headers and locality-sensitive hashing (LSH), generating compact fingerprint representations at packet- and window-level granularities. To evaluate robustness, we consider packet-level traffic anomalies including drop, perturbation, reordering, duplication, and packet injection. Experimental results show that the proposed approach achieves up to 99% accuracy while maintaining robustness under realistic traffic distortions using short bounded observation windows. Anomalies affecting global traffic structure produce the largest performance degradation, whereas window-level representations improve robustness by reducing sensitivity to localized distortions. The low computational overhead of the proposed approach enables scalable IoT device identification in resource-constrained environments.
Oct 16, 2026

HardEval: An Execution-Verified Benchmark for AI-Driven Security Hardening and Compliance Remediation

Implementing Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) controls remains a demanding operating-system administration task. Each natural-language security requirement must be translated into a precise and persistent configuration change. These changes span Secure Shell (SSH) configuration, authentication policy, audit rules, and kernel parameters. Existing benchmarks do not measure whether a model can perform this task on a live system. Code benchmarks evaluate isolated programs without persistent system state, while agent benchmarks largely focus on applications rather than operating-system configuration. In this paper, we introduce HardEval, an execution-verified benchmark for evaluating language-model-assisted security hardening. HardEval is built from Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 STIG controls that fail on an unhardened baseline system. Expert-written reference remediations and Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) checks serve as hidden ground truth for grading; they are never shown to the model, and each task states only the required security outcome while withholding the implementation. The model produces a Bash script, which is executed on a live virtual machine and graded from fail to pass using the corresponding OpenSCAP/OVAL compliance check. Evaluation of fourteen frontier and open-weight configurations reveals large and uneven capability differences across security domains. A recurring failure mode is plausible security code that does not satisfy the exact compliance condition. For four open-weight configurations, multi-run Wilson confidence intervals preserve the observed ordering. HardEval is publicly available.