Data Poisoning Attacks

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12 papers in the last four weeks, up 50% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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Jul 12, 2026cs.CR

Distributed Denial of Science: How Indirect Data Poisoning of AI Systems Can Industrialize Scientific Fraud

Scientific fraud is the instrument of doubt that malicious entities can use to establish controversy in science. Historically, it required the resources of a company: deep pockets, ghostwritten articles, and corrupt academics. Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly automating scientific research, so we ask: Can a remote adversary weaponize the honest use of AI in science to compromise scientific integrity? We envision and empirically evaluate a new attack, indirect data poisoning, in which an adversary corrupts an open dataset and uploads the poisoned variant to a public repository. Autonomous research agents may independently retrieve and process this data, turning honest scientists into the unpaid and unwitting distributors of fraud at scale. Across five socially-salient topics, from hiring discrimination to the safety of autonomous vehicles, three widely used frontier AI systems (Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.7, Codex with GPT-5.5, Gemini CLI with Gemini 3.1 Pro), and 450 ethically contained experimental runs, we find that poisoning succeeds in 49.56% of runs, while the rate of poisoning detection is only 6.0%. The attack requires no topic-specific trigger-words, agent access, indirect prompt injection, or fabricated papers, only the open data ecosystem and misleading metadata. To mitigate the attacks, we propose and evaluate two measures: a scientist persona and a data provenance audit with five checks (referencing papers, social markers, statistical anomalies, related datasets, poisoning caution). We find that the persona still leaves 16.67% of runs with a poisoned conclusion, but provenance auditing reduces attack success rate to zero. Our results suggest that indirect data poisoning may enable scientific fraud at unprecedented scale, but these attacks can be mitigated with suitable auditing by agents during data retrieval.

Bálint Gyevnár, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, Nihar B. Shah

Institute for Complex Social Dynamics, Carnegie Mellon University · Departments of Philosophy & Software and Societal Systems, Carnegie Mellon University · Machine Learning and Computer Science Departments, Carnegie Mellon University

AI-Assisted Scientific Research Data Poisoning Attacks

Jul 7, 2026cs.CR

Assessing the Operational Impact of Poisoning Attacks over Augmented 3D Point Cloud Public Datasets for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles

Poisoning attacks against public datasets lead to major concerns, such as (i) misclassification of perceived objects when the poisoned data is used for training and (ii) embedding of backdoors that may eventually be triggered later on, when specific conditions in the system apply over the learned models. Its impact over data augmentation models is unclear. While data augmentation reduces the likelihood of poisoning attack success, some valid questions remain. Is data augmentation affecting the impact of poisoning attacks? can it increase the number of poisoned samples or injected backdoors? We explore in this paper some of these questions. We assess the effects of augmenting poisoned 3D point cloud datasets and validate that poisoning is able to evade the sanitizing nature of augmentation techniques when using the concrete case of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) techniques to exemplify the case of data augmentation processing. We also validate that poisoning propagates over the augmented datasets and perturbs the decision made by general-purpose classifiers, in the end. All the experimental material (including tools, datasets, and classifiers) is publicly available, to facilitate reproducibility and to foster further research in the topic.

Marwan Lazrag, Badis Hammi, Lorena Gonzalez-Manzano +1

SAMOVAR, Télécom SudParis, Institut Polytechnique de Paris Palaiseau, France · Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Leganes, Spain

Autonomous Driving Datasets Data Augmentation Backdoor Attacks Data Poisoning Attacks

Jul 7, 2026cs.LG

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Learning the Backdoor to Remove the Backdoor

The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning. In light of the observation that a model learns poisonous samples responsible for the backdoor easier than benign samples, these approaches either use a fixed threshold of the training loss for splitting or iteratively learn a reference model as an oracle for identifying benign samples. In particular, the latter has proven effective for anti-backdoor learning. Our method, HARVEY, leverages a similar yet crucially different technique: learning an oracle for poisonous rather than benign samples. Learning a backdoored reference model is significantly easier than learning a reference model on benign data. Consequently, we can identify poisonous samples much more accurately than related work identifies benign samples. This crucial difference enables near-perfect backdoor removal as we demonstrate in our evaluation. HARVEY substantially outperforms related approaches across attack types, datasets, and architectures, lowering the attack success rate to the very minimum at a negligible loss in natural accuracy. The figure below shows an overview of our methods working principle.

Qi Zhao, Christian Wressnegger

KASTEL Security Research Labs · Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)

Backdoor Attacks Backdoor Detection Backdoor Defense Data Poisoning Attacks

Jul 6, 2026cs.LG

Learning Only What Valid Adapters Can Express: Subspace-Constrained Adaptation Against Fine-Tuning Poisoning

Parameter-efficient fine-tuning still leaves a broad space of behavior-changing updates reachable, so a poisoned objective can be represented and optimized. We study an alternative: adaptation constrained to the subspace estimated from a trusted pool of existing task adapters. On flan-t5-large with 196 public LoRA adapters, we show that (1) the functionally relevant content of an adapter lies in a low-dimensional shared subspace, 30 to 38 percent of its weight norm being redundant under the evaluated task distributions; (2) gradient adaptation restricted to 128 coordinates on this subspace matches full LoRA fine-tuning on clean classification data, while under targeted label inversion LoRA collapses to 3-26 percent exact match and the constrained learner keeps 62-96 percent on the tasks the pool covers; (3) the constrained learner cannot fit corrupted data, its adaptation loss separating clean from garbage by two orders of magnitude (120x), an out-of-distribution signal without an extra detector; and (4) against an adaptive backdoor attacker who optimizes within the subspace, the attack is blocked (8 percent success versus 100 for LoRA) on the task where its target behavior is unlike anything in the pool, and only partially blocked (85 percent) when the target coincides with a common pool behavior. On these two tasks the outcome is consistent with how close the target is to the pool's directions, which suggests but does not establish a pool-relative boundary. The mechanism trades peak plasticity for these properties: on tasks the pool covers poorly, unconstrained fine-tuning wins, and the protection assumes the pool itself is trusted. Code and data are public.

Fabien Polly

Independent researcher

LLM Backdoor Attacks Low-Rank Adaptation Data Poisoning Attacks Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning

Jun 29, 2026cs.LG

Theory of Continual Learning Against Data Poisoning Attacks

Continual learning (CL), where a model is trained on a sequence of data tasks, is increasingly being adopted across key fields such as large language models and image recognition, yet it remains highly vulnerable to data poisoning that triggers learning divergence or severe excess risk. Despite these threats, a principled theoretical foundation in CL for understanding attack and defense remains lacking. In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to analyze strategic attacks and defenses in regularization-based CL, a cornerstone of recent CL theory. By framing the adversary-defender interaction as an online zero-sum game, we first establish a fundamental performance limit: no defense succeeds when an adversary poisons a linear proportion of tasks by injecting unbounded noise or pattern shifts in regularization-based CL. We then analyze two possibly defensible scenarios: infrequent attacks and bounded noise per attack. For the former regime, we propose a task-to-task verification mechanism to detect data poisoning and reduce cumulative bias for learning convergence. For the latter regime, we derive a robust defense that minimizes the model's sensitivity to poisoned features, provably accelerating the convergence rate. Extensive experiments on realistic tasks further validate our theoretical results.

Yiting Hu, Lingjie Duan

Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou), Guangzhou, China.

Continual Learning Adversarial Robustness Online Continual Learning Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 27, 2026cs.LG

A Novel Latent-Class Attack and its Detection by Class Subspace Orthogonalization

Deep learning, which in general relies on voluminous amounts of training data, is vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, including error-generic attacks and backdoors (Trojans). In this work, we propose a new data poisoning attack we dub a latent class attack. Here, all poisoned examples are from a class that is novel (unknown) for the given classification domain and are mislabeled to one of the known classes (the target class) of the domain, so that the model learns to recognize the novel class as a sub-class of the target class. Such attacks could be used e.g. to defeat AI-based access control systems, or could cause a "foe" to be classified as a "friend". We also propose a post-training defense to detect this attack, without any access to the training set. This detection approach builds on "class subspace orthogonalization" (CSO), a plug-and-play paradigm demonstrated to improve existing backdoor detectors. Here, CSO is used to seek an input (a putative unknown class instance) whose internal representation is not aligned with any of the known classes, and yet which is classified with confidence to one of these classes. Finally, specific to image classification domains, we propose a method for visualizing the estimated unknown class instance, providing explainability to our latent class detections.

Guangmingmei Yang, David J. Miller, George Kesidis

CSE & EE Depts, Penn State, University Park, PA, 16802 · Anomalee Inc., State College, PA, 16803

Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 27, 2026cs.IR

Fairness Attacks on Recommender Systems

The unfairness of recommender systems has become a topic of concern due to its significant social and ethical implications. Although existing works have shown the effectiveness of attacks on the performance of recommender systems (e.g., promotion and demotion attack), the study of fairness attacks on recommender systems remains largely under-explored. To this end, we propose a novel structure-aware reinforcement learning-based fairness attack method designed to exacerbate the unfairness of target recommender systems. Specifically, we first employ a graph-based structure encoder to model the structural dependencies among the generated fake user-item interactions and the original user-item interactions. Then, we model the sequential dependency of the injected fake items using a recurrent neural network. Based on the learned structure-aware and sequence-aware representations of the fake user and item, the item selection policy attentively decides the next injected fake item. Since the target recommender system may employ fairness-aware training and leverage the user's sensitive attribute information, such as gender, we further designed a gender selection policy to decide the gender of the entire fake user profile. Both the item selection and gender selection policy are learned jointly in our proposed method. Finally, experimental results on four types of target recommendation models and two real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack method in exacerbating the unfairness of recommender systems.

Yanan Wang, Yong Ge

Department of Information Systems and Operations Management, College of Business, The University of Texas at Arlington · Department of Management Information Systems, Eller College of Management, the University of Arizona

Adversarial Attacks Algorithmic Fairness Recommender Systems Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 27, 2026cs.SD

Clustering Unsupervised Representations as Defense against Poisoning Attacks on Speech Commands Classification System

Poisoning attacks entail attackers intentionally tampering with training data. In this paper, we consider a dirty-label poisoning attack scenario on a speech commands classification system. The threat model assumes that certain utterances from one of the classes (source class) are poisoned by superimposing a trigger on it, and its label is changed to another class selected by the attacker (target class). We propose a filtering defense against such an attack. First, we use DIstillation with NO labels (DINO) to learn unsupervised representations for all the training examples. Next, we use K-means and LDA to cluster these representations. Finally, we keep the utterances with the most repeated label in their cluster for training and discard the rest. For a 10% poisoned source class, we demonstrate a drop in attack success rate from 99.75% to 0.25%. We test our defense against a variety of threat models, including different target and source classes, as well as trigger variations.

Thomas Thebaud, Sonal Joshi, Henry Li +4

Center for Language and Speech Processing, Johns Hopkins University, USA · Faculty of Information Technology, Brno University of Technology, Czechia

Backdoor Attacks Automatic Speech Recognition Backdoor Defense Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 25, 2026cs.CR

ShareLock: A Stealthy Multi-Tool Threshold Poisoning Attack Against MCP

With the rapid evolution of LLM-driven agents, Model Context Protocol (MCP), an open protocol bridging LLMs with external tools, has quickly become foundational to modern agent ecosystems. However, the expanding adoption of MCP has also introduced novel security concerns such as Tool Poisoning Attack (TPA), which exploit LLM-server interactions to inject malicious prompts. Existing poisoning schemes typically adopt a monolithic plaintext embedding paradigm, which fails to withstand manual inspection or automated detectors. Current research still lacks a systematic analysis on multi-tool poisoning, where multiple tools can be exploited cooperatively to disperse detection risk. In this paper, we introduce ShareLock, a multi-tool threshold poisoning framework that utilizes Shamir's threshold scheme to ensure exceptional stealth and fault tolerance. ShareLock distributes the malicious instruction as benign-looking secret shares across multiple tool descriptions, achieving both information-theoretic secrecy and attack robustness against moderate auditing. After a covert reconstruction trigger is planted during server update, the aggregated shares reconstruct the hidden instruction, resulting in critical breaches of system assets or private data. To evaluate the realistic threat of ShareLock, we constructed a comprehensive benchmark encompassing four multi-tool scenarios and conducted extensive experiments across mainstream LLMs on two distinct MCP clients. Our results demonstrate that ShareLock significantly outperforms existing single-tool poisoning strategies in tool description-based detection while maintaining an average attack success rate exceeding 90%.

Liwei Liu, Tianzhu Han, Zijian Liu +2

Shanghai Jiao Tong University · Shanghai, China

Adversarial Attacks MCP Security LLM Security Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 25, 2026cs.CV

Full spectrum Unlearnable Examples via Spectral Equalization

Unlearnable examples (UEs) protect training data by injecting imperceptible perturbations so that models fail to extract exploitable representations. In this paper, we reveal that existing UEs exhibit a critical failure once low-pass filtering is applied, indicating that the effective perturbation signals for unlearnability concentrate predominantly in high frequencies. Hence, we argue that reliable UEs should remain effective across the full spectrum. To this end, we propose Full-spectrum Unlearnable examples via Spectral Equalization (FUSE), which aims to generate spectrum-agnostic perturbations by equalizing the contributions from different bands and enforcing cross-band consistency. Specifically, FUSE adopts a Random Spectral Masking (RSM) strategy during generator training, which randomly removes a contiguous frequency band, forcing the remaining bands to maintain unlearnability. In addition, FUSE further integrates Cross-Band Guidance (CBG), which enforces mutual consistency between high- and low-frequency components, thereby further enhancing low-frequency unlearnability and regulating high-frequency perturbations to preserve the semantic fidelity of images. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, architectures, and spectral filtering demonstrate the strong protection achieved by FUSE.

Jiale Cai, Gezheng Xu, Zhihao Li +6

Department of Computer Science, Western University, London, ON, Canada · School of Statistics and Data Science, Southeast University, Nanjing, China · Department of Mechanical, Industrial and Aerospace Engineering, Concordia University +2

Adversarial Examples Adversarial Perturbations Data Poisoning Attacks Unlearnable Examples

Jun 24, 2026cs.CR

TEMPO-Diffusion: Temporally Exposed Malicious Poisoning of Diffusion Models

Noise-based backdoor attacks on diffusion models typically rely on input-time trigger injection, untargeted activation, and out-of-distribution target generation. Such assumptions reduce both the stealthiness and the practical relevance of these attacks. In this work, we present TEMPO-Diffusion, a targeted backdoor framework that localizes the malicious distribution shift to a temporal, in-distribution exposure. TEMPO-Diffusion supports: (i) targeted attacks on and to specific classes, (ii) multiple sub-image backdoors that reconstruct specific features within multiple, different output images and at multiple locations, and (iii) in-painting with time-conditioned triggers. To study relevant, practical security concerns in leveraging backdoored diffusion models for synthetic training data, we also introduce CALISA: a balanced, region-aware traffic-sign dataset emphasizing Canadian and U.S. road signs. Across CIFAR10, GTSRB, and CALISA, our experiments show that TEMPO-Diffusion can reliably poison class-specific synthetic data generation and induce high attack success rates in downstream classifiers trained on that data.

William Aiken, Paula Branco, Guy-Vincent Jourdan +1

School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada

Backdoor Attacks Diffusion-Based Image Generation Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 24, 2026cs.CL

Detect, Unlearn, Restore: Defending Text Summarization Models Against Data Poisoning

Training-time data poisoning during fine-tuning poses a significant threat to large language models (LLMs) deployed for abstractive text summarization, where small task-specific datasets exert disproportionate influence on model behavior. In this setting, adversaries manipulate fine-tuning data to induce persistent summarization failures, such as biased or harmful summaries, while preserving standard evaluation metrics. We present a unified post-hoc defense framework for detecting and remediating fine-tuning-stage poisoning in summarization models across the machine learning supply chain. Our experiments show that in white-box settings, poisoned document-summary pairs exhibit abnormally high training influence, enabling detection via influence-function analysis with semantic consistency checks. In black-box settings, poisoned models display two to three times greater sensitivity to semantics-preserving perturbations, enabling behavioral auditing without training data access. Beyond existing poisoning formulations, we introduce novel attacks targeting factual distortion and representational bias, showing that poisoning alters summarization behavior without triggering conventional alarms. Across nine architectures and six benchmark datasets under adaptive attacks, our defenses achieve 85-92% detection precision, while gradient-ascent unlearning restores up to 96% of original behavior with minimal utility loss (less than 0.6% ROUGE degradation). These results indicate that fine-tuning-time poisoning leaves persistent structural artifacts, enabling practical detection and post-deployment recovery without full retraining.

Poojitha Thota, Shirin Nilizadeh

The University of Texas at Arlington Arlington, Texas, USA

LLM Auditing LLM Fine-Tuning Text Summarization Data Poisoning Attacks LLM Unlearning

Jun 19, 2026cs.SD

Backdoor Attacks on Speech Emotion Recognition via TTS-Generated Poisoning

Speech Emotion Recognition (SER) systems increasingly leverage self-supervised acoustic representations, yet their vulnerability to training-time attacks remains largely underexplored. This paper presents the first systematic study of poisoning-based backdoor attacks on SER, with a focus on threats enabled by text-to-speech (TTS) generated audio. We introduce a stealthy, low-energy acoustic trigger that can be embedded imperceptibly into both natural and synthetic speech, enabling scalable and consistent poisoning. Our experiments demonstrate that SER models can be reliably compromised with high attack success rates under low poisoning ratios, while maintaining near-clean performance on benign inputs. We further show that backdoor patterns exhibit strong cross-model transferability and that self-supervised representations are particularly susceptible to learning these triggers. These findings reveal that TTS technology dramatically lowers the barrier to effective backdoor attacks, exposing critical vulnerabilities in modern SER pipelines and motivating the urgent need for dedicated defenses.

Yongbin Huang, Xihao Xie, Jia Zhang

Department of Computer Science Southern Methodist University Dallas, USA

Backdoor Attacks Speech Emotion Recognition Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 17, 2026cs.LG

Stealthy World Model Manipulation via Data Poisoning

Model-based learning agents use learned world models to predict future states, plan actions, and adapt to new environments. However, the process of updating world models from collected experience creates a training-time attack surface: adversarially poisoned fine-tuning trajectories can manipulate the learned dynamics and thereby corrupt downstream planning. In this paper, we propose SWAAP, the first two-stage data poisoning framework for learned world models. In the first stage, SWAAP identifies a harmful target world model that induces low-return behavior under planning while remaining close to clean dynamics, using first-order bilevel optimization enabled by a transition-gradient theorem. In the second stage, SWAAP realizes this target through stealth-constrained gradient matching, modifying only a limited fraction of fine-tuning transition targets so that the induced training gradients steer the victim model toward the adversarial target, while a prediction-error regularizer encourages the poisoned targets to remain close to the world model's natural approximation error. To assess attack stealthiness, we evaluate defenses and detectability across three stages of the poisoning pipeline: pre-training detection of poisoned transitions, robust training during fine-tuning, and test-time monitoring of the resulting world model. Across diverse continuous-control tasks, SWAAP causes substantial performance degradation while keeping poisoned transitions close to clean data and evading the evaluated non-adaptive residual/CUSUM/TRIM-style defenses. These results reveal a practical vulnerability in world-model adaptation pipelines and highlight the need for robustness methods that protect both world-model training data and learned dynamics.

Yibin Hu, Xiaolin Sun, Zizhan Zheng

Department of Computer Science Tulane University New Orleans, LA, USA

World Model Learning Adversarial Attacks Data Poisoning Attacks Model-Based RL

Jun 15, 2026cs.CR

Loss Landscape Poisoning: Targeted Extraction of Unseen Training Data from LLMs

Large Language Models are increasingly trained on proprietary or sensitive data, from private healthcare and financial records to user conversations containing secrets. Ensuring the privacy of such data against extraction attacks has become a central concern. In this paper, we ask whether an attacker who can poison a portion of the training data can facilitate the leakage of a separate target record they have no access to. We answer in the affirmative and show that such leakage can be induced by a poisoning mechanism that reshapes the model's local loss landscape around the target completion. Our key insight is that poisoning to create a sharp loss minimum at the target, surrounded by elevated loss on nearby alternatives, forces the model to memorize the target as the unique low-loss solution in its neighborhood. The attack requires no architectural changes, and generalizes across centralized and federated learning settings. We demonstrate that the attack amplifies privacy leakage across language (up to 100% successful extraction), and vision-language models (up 90% successful extraction). We show that the attack is thwarted when the model is trained to be differentially private. However, we introduce a new attack that directly probes the loss landscape bypassing even differential privacy defenses.

Md Abdullah Al Mamun, Ngoc Phu Doan, Pedram Zaree +2

UC Riverside · Riverside, California, USA · Queen’s University Belfast +2

Privacy Leakage in Language Models LLM Security Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 15, 2026cs.LG

Rapid Poison: Practical Poisoning Attacks Against the Rapid Response Framework

The Rapid Response (RR) framework, deployed in production systems, including Anthropic's ASL-3 safeguards, continuously improves jailbreak-detection classifiers. When new jailbreaks emerge that bypass these classifiers, Rapid Response generates synthetic variants for training, helping the model generalize from the new attacks and quickly adapt. We reveal that prompt injection can infiltrate this pipeline to deliver poisoned samples into the classifier's training set, enabling two attack objectives: (I) targeted poisoning attacks that create false positives on harmless samples by categorizing them as a jailbreak, with a specific desired feature (e.g., certain formatting, subject, or keyword), (II) concept-based backdoor attacks that induce false negatives on jailbreak inputs, generalizing even to jailbreaks from attack strategies the defender explicitly trained against, when the backdoor trigger is present. Importantly, our threat model restricts adversaries to modifying only jailbreak samples (not benign data or labels), a constraint unexplored by prior work that makes the second objective particularly challenging. We address this with Omission Attack, which exploits a new phenomenon: when training on concept-absent unsafe samples, the classifier misassociates that concept's presence with the safe label. Both attacks cause substantial and in some cases near-complete label flipping at only a 1% poisoning rate, achieving up to 100% false positive rates and up to 96% false negative rates.

David Huang, Jaewon Chang, Avidan Shah +2

Princeton University · Anthropic · UC Berkeley +2

LLM Backdoor Attacks Prompt Injection Attacks Jailbreak Detection Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 11, 2026cs.CL

One Polluted Page Is Enough: Evaluating Web Content Pollution in Generative Recommenders

Search-augmented LLMs increasingly mediate everyday consumer recommendations by retrieving live web content. This creates a new risk: generative recommenders may consume polluted web content, such as fake reviews and promotional pages crafted to mislead recommendations. We ask: to what extent do search-augmented LLMs become unwitting promoters of fake products when consuming polluted retrieval results? To answer this, we introduce FORGE (Fake Online Recommendations in Generative Environments), a benchmark for measuring fake-product promotion under controlled web-content pollution. Given an upstream search result, FORGE locally rewrites real products in retrieved web pages into fake ones to simulate web-content pollution, and measures how often the LLM recommends the fake product. FORGE covers 225 real-world products across 15 categories and 5 consumer scenarios. Across 12 commercial and open-weights LLMs, all models are vulnerable: a single polluted page yields fooled rates of up to 27%, while the full top-3 replacement raises this to 73.8%. Vulnerability varies substantially across categories, increasing when models lack stable prior knowledge of the relevant products. Reasoning does not mitigate this vulnerability; instead, it often generates spurious social proof to justify false recommendations. We evaluate three defenses: skepticism prompting and consensus filtering (over model priors or cross-document evidence). Skepticism can exacerbate vulnerability, much like reasoning, while filtering risks suppressing legitimate products. We release FORGE at https://github.com/leoluolol/forge-benchmark.

Minghao Luo, Liang Chen

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

LLM Evaluation RAG Security Large Language Model-Based Recommendation Data Poisoning Attacks Generative Recommendation

Jun 9, 2026cs.CR

When Poison Fails After Retrieval: Revisiting Corpus Poisoning under Chunking and Reranking Pipelines

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate downstream model outputs through malicious knowledge injection. Existing studies mainly evaluate poisoning under simplified retrieval settings, overlooking practical RAG pipelines involving document chunking, dense retrieval, reranking, and grounded generation. In this paper, we revisit corpus poisoning under realistic multi-stage retrieval pipelines and show that many existing attacks substantially degrade after reranking despite achieving high retrieval-stage relevance. We identify retrieval granularity mismatch as a key reason for this failure: document-level adversarial signals are often fragmented during chunking, while rerankers favor locally coherent and answer-bearing passages rather than globally optimized semantic similarity. Based on this observation, we propose Chunk-aware and Rerank-Consistent Poisoning (CRCP), a poisoning framework that jointly optimizes retrieval relevance, reranker consistency, and chunk-boundary robustness. CRCP explicitly models chunking transformations during optimization to generate locally self-contained adversarial passages that remain effective under varying chunking configurations. Experiments on standard RAG benchmarks with multiple retrievers and rerankers show that existing poisoning methods are highly sensitive to chunk size and reranking strategies, whereas CRCP achieves substantially higher attack success rates and stronger robustness across realistic retrieval pipelines. Our findings highlight an important realism gap in current RAG security evaluation and suggest that poisoning in modern RAG systems should be studied as a multi-stage retrieval consistency problem rather than a retrieval-only problem.

Xi Nie, Hongwei Li, Shenghao Wu +3

School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China · School of Criminal Investigation, People’s Public Security University of China, China · School of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, Wuhan University of Technology, China

RAG Poisoning Attacks RAG Security Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 8, 2026cs.LG

Safe-RULE: Safe Reinforcement UnLEarning

Offline safe reinforcement learning (Safe RL) enables policy learning without online interactions, making it suitable for safety-critical systems such as robotics systems. However, its reliance on static datasets exposes offline Safe RL to data poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious samples that compromise safety and induce unsafe policy behavior. In this work, we propose a new learning paradigm, named safe reinforcement unlearning (Safe-RULE), used as a defense framework to remove the influence of poisoned data without retraining from scratch or requiring access to the original training environment. We further extend reinforcement unlearning to offline Safe RL by explicitly accounting for both task performance and safety constraints during the unlearning process. Experiments across benchmark Safe RL tasks demonstrate that our approach effectively enhances safety performance against data poisoning attacks.

Shixiong Jiang, Taozheng Zhu, Fanxin Kong

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Notre Dame

Offline RL Safe RL Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 8, 2026cs.CV

Securing Self-supervised Data Curation for Foundation Models Robustness

Self-supervised data curation provides a pathway to scaling and improving the generalization capabilities of machine learning models. By leveraging self-supervised learning (SSL) for data curation, the demand for massive training datasets required by foundation models can be effectively met. SSL greatly alleviates the costs associated with annotation and manual dataset curation while minimizing the need for human oversight. However, the integrity of SSL-curated datasets must be rigorously checked, as reliance on anonymous and unvetted external sources can substantially increase the risk of data poisoning. In this paper, we propose a Poisoned Data Detector (PDD), an active defense mechanism designed to ensure the integrity of SSL-curated datasets prior to foundation model training. PDDs are designed using a combination of the pretrained ImageBind model and traditional classifiers, including Random Forest (RF), k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Naive Bayes (NB), and Support Vector Machines (SVM). We rigorously evaluated PDDs using 176,200 images from three diverse datasets and three different adversarial attacks encompassing both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Notably, SVM-PDD achieves superior performance for both in-distribution (Set3-Set5) and out-of-distribution (TrueFace and 140K RealFace) datasets. Our design demonstrates strong scalability and enables the rapid integration of new adversarial attack detectors through an ensemble approach.

Sandeep Gupta, Roberto Passerone

Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queen’s University Belfast, UK. · Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science, University of Trento, Italy.

Training Data Curation Adversarial Example Detection Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 8, 2026cs.RO

Targeting World Models to Compromise Robot Learning Pipelines

World models have recently seen a rapid growth in both their popularity and capability as more data efficient tools for generating robot training data or simulating real world environments, with many works proposing their integration into the robot learning pipeline. While highly practical, in this work we demonstrate that world models introduce a uniquely stealthy and effective data poisoning entry point into the robot learning supply chain that can result in the deployment of unsafe or otherwise compromised robotic policies despite training on seemingly safe ground truth training data. In contrast to traditional data poisoning techniques which directly implant dangerous trajectories into sold or uploaded datasets, our novel attack methods inject malicious prompts or compromising transition dynamics into visibly safe teleoperated datasets which are only activated once fed through a world model as input. This can result in the generation of synthetic, dangerous robot training trajectories and subsequently unsafe or compromised robot policies. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks against both state of the art action conditioned and text conditioned world models, showing a full end-to-end backdoor on a downstream DRL policy and a proof-of-concept for the VLA setting. Overall these findings necessitate research into more secure world models and reevaluating their position within the robot learning supply chain.

Ethan Rathbun, Ahmed Agha, Saaduddin Mahmud +3

Northeastern University · University of Massachusetts Amherst

Robot Policy Learning World Models for Robotics Backdoor Attacks Robot Safety Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 4, 2026cs.LG

Steering Vectors are an Adversarial Attack Surface

Activation steering has become a popular way to control Large Language Model (LLM) behavior without fine-tuning. Since the technique is plug-and-play, users share datasets and precomputed vectors to steer model activations. However, we show that a \emph{stealth data poisoning attack} silently compromises this pipeline. By substituting

4{-}6\%

of tokens in the steering dataset, an attacker can silently align the resulting vector with an anti-refusal direction. This jailbreaks the target model while preserving the intended steering effect on benign prompts. Under this threat model, a malicious actor can distribute an apparently safe bundle containing texts, vectors, and weights, alongside an equivalence certificate that the end-user can verify. We test the attack on two open-weight model families and eight model-attribute combinations, observing that poisoned vectors reach an absolute attack success rate (ASR) of

20{-}55\%

,

+19\%

to

+51\%

over a clean reference. Finally, we find that a refusal-direction orthogonalization defense can recover

{\approx}82\%

of the ASR gap without harming benign behavior.

Abzal Aidakhmetov, Donato Crisostomi, Tommaso Mencattini +3

1Sapienza University of Rome · 2EPFL

Language Model Steering Adversarial Attacks on LLMs LLM Jailbreak Attacks Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 3, 2026cs.LG

Sequential Data Poisoning in LLM Post-Training

LLM post-training proceeds through multiple stages, e.g., supervised fine-tuning (SFT) followed by reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or direct preference optimization (DPO), where each stage draws data from different, potentially untrusted sources. Existing literature assumes data poisoning attacks may occur at each training stage, but neglects the possibility of multiple attackers. To study the trustworthiness of the entire post-training pipeline, we propose the threat model of sequential data poisoning, where multiple adversaries separately poison the SFT and preference datasets. Under this threat model, we identify the single-attacker illusion: each adversary, evaluated in isolation, appears to pose a negligible threat. Yet when adversaries collaborate across stages, the true vulnerability is revealed. In the SFT

\to

DPO pipeline, their contributions are additive: splitting a fixed poison budget across stages outperforms concentrating it in either stage alone. In the SFT

\to

PPO pipeline, their contributions are complementary: neither SFT nor reward model poisoning succeeds individually, yet their combination does. These findings show that security analyses of individual post-training stages systematically underestimate compound vulnerabilities that emerge only from their interaction. Code is available at https://github.com/jcksanderson/sequential-poisoning.

Jack Sanderson, Yihan Wang, Xiaoqian Lu +2

University of Chicago · Vector Institute · University of Waterloo +1

LLM Security LLM Post-Training Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 2, 2026cs.CV

Characterizing Detectability in 3DGS Poisoning: A Stage-wise Benchmark

3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has rapidly emerged as a leading representation for real-time novel view synthesis, but recent work shows it is vulnerable to diverse poisoning attacks, including illusory object injection, computation cost amplification, and post hoc model watermarking. Despite this expanding threat surface, existing studies focus mainly on attack success, while defense and detection remain underexplored. From a detection perspective, a key challenge and opportunity arise from the multi-stage nature of the 3DGS reconstruction pipeline, which produces heterogeneous intermediate representations. Forensic signals for detecting poisoning are inherently stage dependent: an attack introduced at one stage may produce signals that emerge only at later stages. This motivates a stage-wise view of detectability that goes beyond single-stage evaluation. We introduce Poison-3DGS, a benchmark for stage-wise characterization of poisoning detection in 3DGS. It exposes stage-specific artifacts, including multi-view images, geometry, training dynamics, and Gaussian parameters, across a diverse set of scenes and attacks. Using it, we conduct a systematic study of detectability across pipeline stages. Our analysis reveals several insights. First, detectability varies significantly across stages, and no single stage consistently dominates across attack types. Second, different attacks exhibit distinct stage-specific forensic signals, so detection effectiveness depends critically on where signals are observed. Third, later-stage signals such as training dynamics and Gaussian parameter statistics provide strong cues not observable at earlier stages. Overall, our work provides a principled benchmark and the first systematic characterization of stage-dependent detectability in 3DGS, offering a foundation for future research on robust and reliable 3DGS systems.

Quoc-Anh Bui-Huynh, Thanh Duc Ngo, Xue Geng +4

Temasek Laboratories, Singapore University of Technology and Design · Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City · University of Information Technology, VNU-HCM +1

3D Gaussian Splatting 3D Reconstruction Data Poisoning Attacks

Jun 1, 2026cs.LG

CANARY: Zero-Label Detection of Fine-Tuning Contamination in Language Models

Adversaries can implant latent harmful behavior by poisoning as few as 1% of fine-tuning examples. The contamination is invisible to every output-level defense: harmful behavior lies dormant in the model's hidden-state geometry and does not appear in generated text until contamination exceeds 7.5%. We introduce CANARY (Contamination Auditor via Neural Activation Representation Yield), a zero-label checkpoint auditor that detects this hidden shift directly from two forward passes over an unlabeled prompt set. CANARY projects the hidden-state difference through a Sparse Autoencoder, filtering style noise to isolate meaningful semantic drift. It achieves AUROC = 1.000 at 1% contamination (95% CI = [0.997, 1.000]; Cohen's d = 3.28) across four model architectures and two training paradigms, 7.5x below where any output-level method fires, with zero false positives on benign fine-tuning and full robustness to style-matching and gradient-noise adaptive attacks. The same SAE feature basis drives a complete governance pipeline: SAE-filtered amplification surfaces latent harm at a 5x higher rate than standard generation; score-ranked prompts yield 4.2x red-teaming lift; and suppressing a handful of contamination-specific features at inference time reduces harm from 70% to 10% with no perplexity penalty. CANARY is the first zero-label framework to detect, verify, prioritize, and remediate supply-chain contamination from hidden states alone.

Swapnil Parekh

Intuit Inc.

LLM Auditing Data Contamination in Language Models Adversarial Robustness of Language Models Data Poisoning Attacks

May 31, 2026cs.CL

DiscourseFlip: An Oblique Discourse-Level Opinion Manipulation Attack against Black-box Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are widely deployed and increasingly influential, but their reliance on external corpora exposes new security risks from poisoned retrieval content. Existing RAG attacks are largely focusing on individual queries or narrow topic-local query sets, which limits their practical reach and offers limited camouflage in real-world settings. In this paper, we introduce discourse-level opinion manipulation, a new threat model in which coordinated influence across a semantic query network induces opinion shifts over a holistic, multi-topic query space. We formalize this threat in a black-box setting and propose DiscourseFlip, an agentic, graph-guided attack that dynamically allocates a limited poisoning budget to maximize discourse-level opinion deviation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DiscourseFlip consistently induces targeted opinion shifts across the contextualized query network and significantly outperforms existing baselines in terms of coverage and effectiveness. User studies further confirm that DiscourseFlip is effective while remaining well camouflaged from user detection. Moreover, systematic analyses show that existing mitigation strategies are ineffective against discourse-level manipulation, underscoring the urgent need for more robust and adaptive defenses to address discourse-level vulnerabilities.

Yuyang Gong, Miaokun Chen, Jiawei Liu +5

Wuhan University · East China Normal University · Nanyang Technological University +1

RAG Poisoning Attacks RAG Security Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Data Poisoning Attacks

May 28, 2026cs.CR

Token-Level Generalization in LoRA Adapter Backdoors: Attack Characterization and Behavioral Detection

We show that LoRA adapters, the dominant distribution format for fine-tuned LLMs, can be reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy-preserving backdoor to saturation. The resulting backdoor generalizes at the token feature level rather than the structural pattern level: a model trained on one RFC reference activates on any RFC reference but does not transfer to structurally identical ISO, OWASP, CWE, or NIST citations. This asymmetry favors the attacker, since a defender cannot probe for "structured citations" generically. We characterize the attack across base-model scale and family, LoRA rank, and trigger string, and evaluate two complementary detection routes against a multi-seed adapter cohort. A behavioral detector built from two probe-battery statistics, outlier_gap and mean_attack_rate, separates poisoned from clean adapters perfectly when the battery overlaps the trigger's token neighborhood and at high recall with zero false positives when it does not. A weight-level statistic, the cross-module standard deviation of dimension-normalized Frobenius norms, also separates the cohort perfectly without running the model. Combined, the two routes are robust to probe composition. Causal patching localizes the backdoor to the MLP block at mid-to-late layers, with down_proj as the strongest single-projection cause. Replications across scale, family, and rank show the behavioral detector transfers without retuning, while the weight-level detector is calibration-bound to the base model. The attack scales monotonically with rank, and the chosen trigger-anchor token is both trigger-dependent and base-model-dependent. Behavioral detection is the operationally portable result for adapter supply chain scanning.

Travis Lelle

LLM Backdoor Attacks Backdoor Detection Backdoor Defense in LLMs Low-Rank Adaptation Backdoor Defense Data Poisoning Attacks

May 27, 2026cs.LG

Density-aware Sample-specific Attack

Despite recent progress in backdoor attacks, existing methods remain susceptible to post-training defenses that erase the backdoor through fine-tuning or pruning. We revisit the core objectives of backdoor attacks and derive principled criteria characterizing optimal sample-specific trigger construction under a Bayes-optimal model of the victim's training. Our analysis reveals that both attack success and clean-accuracy preservation are simultaneously optimized when triggered samples are steered into low-density regions of the clean data distribution, a distributional condition that controls all moments of the poisoned distribution at once rather than a handful of input-space summary statistics. We introduce a bilevel optimization framework that estimates density ratios via conditional time-score matching and optimizes a mixture-model objective to place triggered samples in these sparse regions. Extensive evaluations on MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and TinyImageNet demonstrate that our method achieves above 99% attack success rate before defense and retains 50--85 percentage points higher post-defense ASR than the strongest baselines under fine-tuning defenses. Against neuron-pruning defenses, the method exhibits complete immunity, with zero neurons identified for removal across all pruning thresholds. These results expose a fundamental gap in current defense paradigms and underscore the need for defenses that operate beyond the support of the clean distribution.

Qiyuan Wang, Yao Li, Raymond K. W. Wong

Texas A&M University · University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Backdoor Attacks Adversarial Robustness Data Poisoning Attacks

May 26, 2026cs.CR

Backdoor Attacks on Fault Detection and Localization in Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various controllers are used in CPS to ensure the system detects and recovers from faults, such as voltage fluctuations, and to perform load balancing in distribution systems. Machine learning- and deep learning-based fault detection and localization frameworks have recently gained significant attention in CPS for their ability to identify anomalies and operational failures in real time. However, these intelligent models are vulnerable to adversarial machine learning attacks, particularly backdoor attacks. In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects malicious patterns into the training data so that the model behaves normally most of the time but produces attacker-controlled outputs when triggered by specific patterns. This paper investigates the threat of backdoor attacks against fault detection and localization mechanisms in recent ML pipelines used in modern CPS systems. We define these threats and explore how they can be realized by designing triggers and evaluating their success in the CPS domain. Our experiments show the attack is successful even with 10% of poisoning.

Abile Jean, Kuniyilh S

Cyber-Physical Systems Backdoor Attacks Data Poisoning Attacks Anomaly Detection

May 26, 2026cs.CR

Poison with Style: A Practical Poisoning Attack on Code Large Language Models

Code Large Language Models (CLLMs) serve as the core of modern code agents, enabling developers to automate complex software development tasks. In this paper, we present Poison-with-Style (PwS), a practical and stealthy model poisoning attack targeting CLLMs. Unlike prior attacks that assume an active adversary capable of directly embedding explicit triggers (e.g., specific words) into developers' prompts during inference, PwS leverages developers' code styles as covert triggers implicitly embedded within their prompts. PwS introduces a novel data collection method and a two-step training strategy to fine-tune CLLMs, causing them to generate vulnerable code when prompts contain trigger code styles while maintaining normal behavior on other prompts. Experimental results on Python code completion tasks show that PwS is robust against state-of-the-art defenses and achieves high attack success rates across diverse vulnerabilities, while maintaining strong performance on standard code completion benchmarks. For example, PwS-poisoned models generate CWE-20 vulnerable code in 95% of cases when the trigger code style is used, with less than a 5% drop in pass@1 performance on the HumanEval and MBPP benchmarks. Our implementation and dataset are here: https://github.com/khangtran2020/pws.

Khang Tran, Yazan Boshmaf, Issa Khalil +3

Department of Data Science, New Jersey Institute of Technology, New Jersey, U.S.A. · Qatar Computing Research Institute, HBKU, Doha, Qatar · Mohamed Bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

LLM Backdoor Attacks Data Poisoning Attacks Code Language Models LLM Code Generation