Belief

Robot teams that learn a common environment model exchange belief summaries and plan by the expected information gain of their actions. Under conjugate exponential-family beliefs the shared belief is counted once per robot at two points: at fusion, the product of local posteriors counts the common prior $n$ times, and at planning, every robot scores its plan under the same belief and the team converges on the same unknown. Both errors are removed by adding evidence increments to the shared natural parameter, realized increments at fusion and expected increments at planning. The expected increment of a committed teammate gives the next robot its conditional gain; corrected gains sum to the joint gain, the redundancy removed equals the total correlation of the planned observation streams, and sequential commitment keeps the $1/2$ greedy guarantee. The expected increment is exact for Gaussian beliefs with fixed sampling paths and for Dirichlet beliefs under the novelty approximation of discrete active inference, whose team objective has a closed concave form within an explicit bound of the exact mutual information, and fails for finite hypothesis classes, where a short exact enumeration replaces it. Experiments on cooperative RockSample, foraging, and field monitoring show that fusion correction leaves exploration redundancy unchanged, anticipated evidence removes it, and sequential commitment recovers most of the value of centralized joint planning at cost linear in the team size.

Social-deduction games such as Werewolf are increasingly used to evaluate LLM agents, but existing evaluations often rely on final game outcomes. We propose a belief-shift evaluation benchmark in Werewolf for analyzing communication skills through belief updating. Using LLM-played games, we annotate suspicion and accusation messages and measure how an observing village-side model's beliefs change after each message. We evaluate 40 open-weight LLM configurations on 1,224 annotated messages. Our results show that larger models better distinguish true wolves from villagers based on game history, but accusations still strongly influence their beliefs. Models become more suspicious of the accused target and less suspicious of the accuser, especially when the accuser is trusted, even if the accuser is wolf-aligned. Larger models better resist accusations from accusers they already distrust. Overall, our findings suggest that current open-weight LLMs up to 120B parameters still struggle to integrate accusation content with source trust in strategic communication. Our benchmark and code are available at https://rlg.iis.sinica.edu.tw/papers/werewolf-accusation-benchmark.

Tree-structured rollouts give critic-free reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) step-level credit: fork a chain at an intermediate point, and sibling outcome differences estimate step value. Each fork adds sampling cost, so realistic budgets typically allow only a few forks per chain. A fork placed where the outcome is already largely settled yields siblings that mostly agree and provide almost no credit signal; hence, for a given tree size, where forks are placed largely determines how much step-level RL can gain. Most existing mainstream methods place forks by structure, such as fixed lengths, midpoints, and delimiters, or by next-token entropy. We formalize fork placement as locating the \emph{pivots} of the chain's value curve, where the expected outcome turns. We propose \emph{belief-shift branching}: read the model's answer belief at candidate boundaries and fork just before the step where consecutive beliefs diverge most. Three instantiations, none needing step-level supervision, span access levels: a black-box probe, a logit-lens depth profile, and a learned activation direction, which is fit offline and therefore used only in the validation before RL training. The signal only \emph{places} forks, and the probe costs about $1\%$ of step compute on mathematics and under $5\%$ on code when it runs inside the rollout engine. In that validation, against Monte-Carlo value curves, a belief-shift signal ranks first in each of the eight model$\times$benchmark panels, ahead of entropy, structural, and LLM-judge baselines. In RL across three model families and two domains, belief-shift forking leads every mathematics aggregate, on OLMo-3-7B by $+2.6$ aggregate and $+2.9$ on AIME 2026 over the strongest baseline, and sweeps every OLMo code column, by $+6.5$ on LiveCodeBench-medium.

Truth and evidence-based communication provide important foundations for democratic governance, accountability, and collective decision-making. Prior work shows that evidence-oriented language in US congressional floor speeches has declined since the mid-1970s, alongside broader changes in legislative productivity and polarization. This study shifts the analysis from congressional sessions to individual members of Congress to examine whether epistemic orientation varies systematically across legislators and whether it relates to political behavior and legislative effectiveness. Using the Evidence-Minus-Intuition (EMI) score, we measure the relative prevalence of evidence-oriented versus intuition-oriented language in congressional floor speeches and Twitter posts. We link these measures to legislator-level data on ideology, institutional position, communication context, and Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES). The results show that more ideologically extreme members use less evidence-oriented language on the congressional floor. EMI also exhibits cross-platform consistency with members who use more evidence-oriented language in floor speeches also being more evidence-oriented on Twitter, although EMI is lower on Twitter overall. Finally, EMI in congressional speeches is positively associated with individual legislative effectiveness, even after accounting for ideology and extensive political, institutional, demographic, topical, and communication volume controls. These findings suggest that evidence-oriented language is not only an aggregate feature of congressional discourse but also a meaningful attribute of individual-level legislative communication and effectiveness.

On August 2, 2026, the obligations of Article 50 of the EU AI Act took effect, requiring generative AI providers to mark the content their systems produce and ensure it can be detected as AI-generated. Days later, Anthropic disclosed that every Claude model released after that date embeds a watermark based on SynthID-Text in all generated text, enabled by default with no user opt-out; Google has deployed SynthID-Text in Gemini since 2024. Users objected that the watermark degrades quality, particularly for code, that it secretly encodes identifying information, and, in mutual contradiction, that it is easily removable and inescapable; the vendor answered with assurances of unchanged quality, no identifying information, and robustness to light editing. In this work, we argue that neither the objections nor the assurances can currently be verified and that this unverifiability, rather than watermarking itself, is the substantive governance failure. We sort the contested assertions by what it would take to settle each and evaluate the open-source SynthID-Text implementation on two open-weight models, because no public tool can test the deployed systems. On prose, the measured effect of the watermark does not exceed that of changing the sampling seed. On code, the cost is three points of correctness on one model and below measurement on the other, while detection remains near chance, a limitation of detectability rather than quality. The remaining gaps trace to withheld access or missing institutions and we map each to a requirement: release of matched outputs, configuration disclosure, accredited audits, a shared evaluation protocol, and interoperable detection.

With the rapid spread of news on social media, understanding the propagation of misinformation is becoming increasingly important. One factor that affects individuals' vulnerability to false information is their ideological predisposition. Despite the large number of agent-based models that focus on social influence as a driver of the spread of false claims, they often fail to explicitly integrate personal ideological biases into belief formation. In this work, we explore how misinformation spreads through the interaction between individuals' ideological biases and social influence. Our model accounts for both the strength of individuals' ideological biases and the extent to which a false claim aligns with their ideology. Social influence modifies the effects of ideological intensity and false claim alignment through network interactions. Notably, the influence of neighbours' ideological intensity on belief is strongly affected by how well those neighbours are connected to one another. These results highlight the importance of considering both network structure and personal ideological biases when modelling misinformation propagation.

Large language model agents produce fluent action sequences across a wide range of tasks, yet they fail in characteristic ways once the environment becomes partially observable. Ambiguous feedback pushes them into premature commitments. A single informative observation can collapse their uncertainty onto the wrong hypothesis. Policies drift as the history grows. We trace these symptoms to a common structural cause. An LLM agent, as commonly deployed, is a history-conditioned policy with no explicit belief over hidden state. We propose an architectural fix. The Belief-State Engine (BSE) is an inference module placed outside the LLM. It maintains a Bayesian posterior over the latent states of a given POMDP (Partially Observable Markov Decision Process) model, and at each decision step it exposes only that posterior to the LLM. The raw action-observation log is not shown. We set out a minimal four-axiom specification of what a belief-consistent internal state must satisfy, and prove that the LLM paired with the BSE is a sound Markov policy on the belief MDP induced by the underlying POMDP. It therefore inherits the Bellman optimality guarantees of classical POMDP theory, provided the LLM is never exposed to the raw history. We evaluate the architecture on the Tiger POMDP and a red-team attack-graph task, against six baselines: a reactive LLM, Chain-of-Thought, ReAct, a natural-language belief tracker, QMDP, and POMCP. Across both domains, the BSE-augmented agent improves task return, belief calibration, and decision consistency. Ten targeted ablations isolate the contribution of each architectural choice confirms that the effect is not specific to any one model. Code, environment specifications, prompt templates, and seed logs accompany this paper.

There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In addition to the inherent scientific interest of this question, these latent quantities are often invoked to explain the behavior of LLMs to users or to define and evaluate harmful behaviors which are relative to intent. Nevertheless, we currently lack a means to systematically test whether concepts like "belief" are well-applied to LLMs, and hence whether they are likely to be fruitful ingredients of attempts to align models with human interests. We propose an approach for empirically studying such questions, asking whether a single latent variable inferred from the LLMs' outputs -- interpreted as a degree of belief -- allows an observer to make interpretable predictions of how the LLMs' will respond to new prompts. We find that highly capable models are usefully described as holding beliefs and that, generally, the predictability of model outputs based on an inferred latent belief tracks overall trends in model capability. Building on these findings, we provide empirical strategies to study how beliefs in LLMs can be measured, the extent to which LLMs comply with instructed decision rules or payoffs, and how beliefs evolve within individual instances of an LLM over the course of reasoning.

Large language models are increasingly used to support organizational decisions, yet users often lack a principled basis for assessing whether to rely on a specific recommendation. Existing approaches typically evaluate broad model properties, such as reliability, uncertainty, or robustness, or focus on user trust, rather than the underlying basis for relying on an individual recommendation. Adapting theoretical foundations from epistemology, we introduce epistemic warrant, a decision-level construct that characterizes the stability of a model's preference and the scope over which that preference holds. We operationalize this construct through a four-tier reliance certificate for pairwise recommendations, distinguishing among unstable, context-dependent, locally supported, and broadly supported recommendations. We validate the construct using contemporary methodologies: known-groups tests successfully recover expert-prespecified warrant orderings, and stronger warrants systematically align with independent consensus from crowd workers. Furthermore, we demonstrate that epistemic warrant provides information distinct from verbalized confidence and is not readily explained by decision difficulty. Ultimately, this framework offers a theoretically grounded, implementable approach for characterizing the warrant of individual LLM recommendations when objective ground truth is unavailable.

Knowledge graphs describe reality in crisp assertions, while the systems now consuming them, foundation models and autonomous agents, reason natively in probabilities. We argue that this mismatch is why the integration of language models and knowledge graphs remains a data-feeding pipeline rather than a unified reasoning architecture. We envision Semantic Bayesian World Models (SBWMs): a Web that describes the world not as a database of facts but as a shared, evolving fabric of beliefs over knowledge graphs, where ontological axioms constrain priors, observations update beliefs by Bayesian conditioning, and actions intervene upon the world. We work through what an agent gains from such a model: a home-security agent deciding whether the figure at the gate is a courier or a burglar, an actuarial estimate aggregated by entailment rather than by string frequency, a planning task that language models reliably fail, and the estimation of quantities that no document has ever stated. We then set out what the community must build to make them possible: belief annotation over RDF~1.2, probabilistic entailment regimes, semantic calibration layers, and protocols by which agents that have never met can exchange, and disagree over, calibrated beliefs.

World models have progressed from compact latent dynamics to generative, controllable, and interactive simulators of embodied environments. However, high predictive likelihood and visual fidelity do not necessarily ensure that a model preserves the evidence required for safe decision-making. This perspective identifies three structural mismatches in current world modeling: likelihood versus risk, prediction versus intervention, and finite-horizon prediction versus accumulated consequences. We propose the Risk-Informed World Model (RIWM) as a decision-centric research direction for safety-critical embodied systems. RIWM organizes world modeling around consequences, intervention, epistemic uncertainty, and recoverability, and integrates four interdependent capabilities: decision-relevant representation, counterfactual reasoning, safety-critical episodic memory, and runtime safety assurance. It distinguishes physical, social, and operational consequences while using epistemic uncertainty to qualify the evidence supporting action. We further discuss open challenges in identifying consequential futures, validating counterfactual reasoning, maintaining revisable safety memories, translating learned consequences into executable constraints, and determining when evidence is sufficient to act. This perspective argues that future world models should move beyond predicting likely futures toward identifying which futures matter, revising judgments through experience, and recognizing when to act, revise, sense, defer, or abstain.

Reliability claims about agentic systems implicitly locate each property somewhere: in the model, or in the machinery around it. We built a system where that location is an experimental question. The subject is a persistent simulated settlement whose authoritative append-only ledger adjudicates every attempted act against world state; accepted history is the only reality. Mind, institution and world were separated before any experiment. Holding cognition fixed, we intervened on the institution's epistemic mechanisms (evidence provenance, belief availability, physical-evidence legibility); preregistered experiments refuted our central prediction twice, in opposite directions. A registered falsifier then supplied the input the geometry had denied the belief channel, a staged veridical first-hand witness, and its marginal value, non-positive throughout the witness-free phases, turned positive: 9 of 11 seeds, zero added false attribution. Holding institutional enforcement fixed, we intervened on cognition four ways: ablating the native minds' machinery, killing and resetting them mid-task, substituting a frozen frontier-LLM panel for the entire native cognition, and corrupting beliefs with trusted false testimony. Behaviour changed dramatically: one falsehood cost each trusting run about 900 futile actions and the distrusting arm none. Five pre-declared properties did not move in any tested trajectory: accepted reality stayed singular, invalid attempts were refused with typed reasons, duties outlived their processes, no work was accepted twice, and no false completion was ever accepted (2,581 substituted-panel claims, none false). Our claim is limited to this setting: measured behavioural properties were separable from substantial changes to cognition, established by intervention. One designed world, not a population of institutions; no test of an agent optimising against the institution.

Future 6G networks will rely on Large Language Model (LLM) agents to manage the Radio Access Network (RAN). However, current architectures assume inter-agent messages convey objective facts. A message is instead a \emph{trace} of the sender's reasoning: it carries a subjective conclusion, so a syntactically valid report can propagate an AI hallucination and trigger a cascading outage invisible to protocol validation. Reading such a trace requires a Theory of Mind (ToM)---before acting, the receiver must model what the peer believes, and what a peer in that position should have believed. Modeling these interactions as cognitive channels on a cellular sheaf, we obtain a unified framework for resilient multi-agent systems, from which five design principles emerge: (i) a message is evidence of the sender's hidden reasoning; (ii) trust is a continuous cognitive Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)---asserted precision over deviation from the modeled peer belief; (iii) network-wide consistency and resistance to hallucination contagion are computable via the sheaf's Laplacian; (iv) peer-modeling must halt at exactly two levels to conserve compute and survive mutual information decay; and (v) credible capacity is bounded by operational goal alignment, not link bandwidth. A signaling-storm study on locally deployed 1B-parameter telecom language models validates it: cognitive SNR isolates a hallucinating peer that three of its four neighbors agree with, where a divergence gate ranks every wrong peer above the right one; only depth two ToM recovers the correct action; and the spectral gap decides whether a topology reaches consistency inside the near-real-time budget.

We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown. We want such agents to act on our behalf so mechanisms must incentivize both honesty and obedience. A one-sided imitation structure---capabilities can be concealed but not counterfeited---yields a revelation principle, a characterization of implementable policies via nested cyclical monotonicity, and conditions under which eliciting higher-order beliefs can discipline multiple agents. We apply our framework to stylized examples of (i) sandbagging in which a more capable agent pretends to be less capable; (ii) an alignment--interpretability trade-off, where the two are substitutes in the instrument but complements in value; (iii) discipline via peer scoring; (iv) coupling rewards to induce competition among multiple agents; and (v) scalable oversight and reward shaping.

Machine learning systems deployed for credit, hiring, and resource distribution are increasingly subject to regulatory oversight from policies such as the EU AI Act and GDPR. Current fairness governance practices rely on observational fairness metrics, post-hoc explainability, and immutable audit logs, but provide limited support for causal attribution and efficient evidentiary verification. We introduce Causal Evidentiary Governance (CEG), a framework in which regulated institutions commit to a versioned directed acyclic graph (DAG) that partitions causal pathways into allowable and disallowed groups. The Causal Harm Rate measures prediction variation attributable to disallowed causal pathways. Each decision is accompanied by a signed Decision-Evidence Packet (DEP), cryptographically binding the prediction to a digest of the published DAG and path-specific attributions. DEP digests can be appended to a Merkle tree to enable logarithmic-cost inclusion proofs. We validate CEG through a two-layer empirical methodology using demographic summaries from four years of PMA credit supervisory data to construct 10,000 synthetic credit applicants across four strategic DAG counterfactuals. Causal Harm Rate isolates injected causal effects more clearly than demographic parity or equalized odds. Cross-model validation and ablation studies assess robustness. Evaluation on the German Credit dataset shows that harm associated with specific causal pathways can be substantially understated by associational fairness metrics. Finally, a proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates operationally plausible throughput and highlights relevant performance tradeoffs.

Jailbreak robustness has become central to large language model (LLM) safety evaluation, yet prevailing methodologies rely primarily on refusal behavior, semantic resemblance, and intent-matching heuristics that emphasize linguistic plausibility rather than correctness. We identify a key limitation in existing evaluations: many jailbreak intents depend on instructional validity rather than epistemic factuality, allowing realistic-looking responses to be labeled successful despite being factually or procedurally incorrect. To address this gap, we propose Sequential Epistemic and Action-Level Validation (SEAV), a verification-centric jailbreak evaluation framework that decomposes responses into ordered steps and evaluates both validity and correctness. SEAV combines LLM-as-a-judge mechanisms for semantic interpretation with retrieval-grounded verification using external knowledge sources, assessing whether generated content is factually correct, structurally consistent, and operationally capable of advancing harmful objectives. Empirically, SEAV cuts the false-positive rate on SD-A (a curated strategic-dishonesty diagnostic) by 14.9,pp vs. the strongest baseline, and reclassifies 22.1%--51.0% of sampled prior-labeled successes as invalid across three of four public benchmarks. Together, these results show that enforcing correctness substantially reshapes measured robustness: many previously labeled jailbreak successes are reclassified as invalid, and results are stable across the tested search backends and evaluator models. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Ardor-Wu/SEAV.

Productive dialogue alignment requires distinguishing \emph{surface coordination} (acknowledgments and smooth task progression) from \emph{epistemic alignment} (convergence of belief states); standard preference-based methods typically optimize response-level preferences without explicitly modeling the latter. We operationalize Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference as a control signal within Frictive Policy Optimization by extracting, at each referring expression, a four-part belief structure: the speaker's intended referent, the addressee's interpretation, and each participant's model of the other's belief. This makes friction mechanically computable from epistemic-state comparisons, capturing \emph{silent divergence}, where both participants proceed confidently while grounding to different referents. We evaluate the signal at two levels. At the representation level, ablating the second-order channel reduces misunderstanding recall from $65\%$ to $26\%$. At the policy level, reward-shaping (FAR) and trust-region (FTR) variants improve intervention F1 and warranted-context calibration over DPO, with Brier scores independently supporting the calibration gains. Across three training runs, FAR and FTR remain substantially more stable, whereas DPO varies widely and can degrade intervention competence already present in the base policy. Thus, ToM-grounded friction provides a trainable signal for context-sensitive intervention under referential belief divergence.

Reliable uncertainty estimation is a crucial requirement for deploying large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs) in safety-critical settings, especially when the model parameters are not accessible (black-box). We propose BiG-SURE, an uncertainty estimator based on cross-temperature semantic agreement. The method samples low-temperature responses as stable semantic anchors and high-temperature responses as probes under meaning-preserving input transformations. It then constructs an anchor-probe Bipartite Graph (BiG) using NLI-based entailment scores and defines confidence through the normalized squared spectral energy of this matrix, with uncertainty given by its complement. This bipartite graph-based Semantic Uncertainty and Reliability Estimation (SURE) score measures whether high-temperature probes remain semantically aligned with the model's stable low-temperature belief or not. We evaluate BiG-SURE on text QA, multilingual QA, and multimodal QA tasks across multiple model families. In these experiments, BiG-SURE improves average abstention AUROC over prior black-box uncertainty estimators, while remaining simple, unsupervised, and applicable to black-box model settings.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as proxies for human participants in social simulations, yet whether they update their beliefs in response to persuasive arguments, as humans do, remains poorly understood. We conduct a systematic comparison using a naturally occurring online persuasion corpus in which original posters explicitly verify whether a reply changed their view. Our results show that LLMs achieve only slight agreement with humans (Cohen's kappa ranging from 0.079 to 0.178). Content-level analyses show that humans and LLMs agree on the strongest persuasion cues but diverge on finer ones: humans are more swayed by novel content and assertive language, whereas LLMs favor topical similarity and surface-level formatting. At the level of persuasion strategy, LLMs underweight emotional appeals and overweight credibility signals relative to humans, while the type of proposition under debate exerts no measurable effect on the degree of divergence. Furthermore, switching from first-person role-playing to third-person observation shifts all models toward greater resistance to persuasion, with the effect varying across persuasion strategies and textual features. These findings highlight the risk of treating LLM judgments as faithful proxies for human belief updating and point to structural differences in how LLMs and humans process persuasive discourse. Our code is available at https://github.com/tsinghua-fib-lab/LLM-belief-update-cmv.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

6G networks will not be serving as communication infrastructures only; rather, they are expected to evolve into intelligent systems, where thousands of autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents are interconnected. The agents are deployed across a wide range of platforms including low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, high-altitude platforms (HAPs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), edge servers, and terrestrial devices. These agents continuously observe their environment and exchange information. Semantic communication provides an efficient mechanism for exchanging meaningful information instead of raw data. However, its effectiveness depends on the communicating agents having sufficiently aligned beliefs to correctly interpret and decode the transmitted messages. This assumption becomes difficult to satisfy in the 6G network where heterogeneous AI models operate under diverse computational constraints and continuously acquire different knowledge from their local environments. This article presents a heterogeneity-aware belief synchronization framework for 6G AI-native networks. It uses latent translation models deployed on multi-access edge computing (MEC) servers. These models translate belief updates from one agent to agent-specific knowledge without requiring joint training and a homogeneous architecture of models. By exchanging compact belief updates through a latent translation model only when necessary, the framework preserves privacy, reduces synchronization cost, and minimizes local knowledge drift. We validate the framework through a case study on a multi-layered terrestrial/non-terrestrial network. Results demonstrate that it maintains low synchronization cost, measured by the number of parameters transmitted, and low belief alignment error across the heterogeneous agents in the case study.

LLM judges have become central infrastructure for model evaluations, online grading, and reward modeling. Judges are typically validated by accuracy on golden data, but accuracy says little about whether they are stable under re-prompting, challenge, or sustained pushback. We introduce the \emph{Wiggle Framework}, a unified stress test for epistemic stability in LLM judges. The framework decomposes judge robustness along three dimensions: Mechanical Consistency (stability under re-prompting and reframing), Single-turn Conviction (stability under a single challenge), and Multi-turn Persistence (stability under sustained or adaptive pressure). We use the framework to study 9 frontier models across 14 judging tasks spanning safety, toxicity, AI writing detection, and political-response evaluation. Every model exhibits substantial wiggle as a judge --- flipping verdicts 25--71% of the time under static pushback, and 62--91% with an adversarial LLM persuader. Critically, we find that pressure that succeeds in changing a judge's verdict is almost always net-corrupting with respect to ground truth. Beyond the framework itself, we identify baseline jury majority strength as the most effective single-shot signal for anticipating which items wiggle. Taken together, this is the first apples-to-apples cross-dataset comparison of mechanical, conformity, and persuadability tests in a judging context.

Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions. As LLMs increasingly debate, advise, and think collaboratively with humans and each other, resistance to harmful persuasion becomes a core requirement for reliable behavior. Yet we show that this requirement is far from met: a single targeted persuasive argument is enough to collapse model accuracy to near zero, even when the argument is factually false. We formalize this threat as adversarial persuasion and introduce an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that trains persuader agents to change a target model's answer in a single interaction. First, we show that optimizing persuasion strategies through trial and error exposes vulnerabilities that static prompting misses: RL-trained persuaders raise persuasion success from approximately 24% to over 93% against the training-time persuadee. Second, we find that these learned strategies transfer to unseen models, achieving 83% attack success on Qwen-14B, 79% on Llama-3.1-8B, and 25% on GPT-4o-mini. Third, we demonstrate that a curriculum that bootstraps on more persuadable open-weight models before targeting harder models further increases GPT-4o-mini attack success from 25% to 38%. Moreover, our results reveal that optimized persuaders increasingly rely on credibility-based tactics, including fabricated citations and false authoritative evidence. Together, these findings expose a critical weakness in current LLM agents: even when they initially reason correctly, they can be steered toward false conclusions by optimized natural language influence. This positions persuasion robustness as a necessary safety criterion for multi-agent and human-AI decision-making systems.

More capable agents do not necessarily form a more capable collective. A multi-agent system may jointly possess sufficient information yet fail because evidence is poorly routed, unreliable reports enter public belief, correlated claims masquerade as independent support, shared state becomes stale or strategically distorted, or useful evidence is exposed through an ineffective action interface. We ask when additional resources should improve the reasoner and when they should instead change the institutional structure through which the collective forms and acts on public information. Drawing on functional distinctions from research on group decision making and distributed cognition, we construct controlled artificial ecologies around four loci of collective failure: access and routing, admission and dependence, state maintenance and incentives, and representation and action. Across these ecologies, we separately vary model capability and institutional structure, pairing positive interventions with matched reasoning baselines and mechanism-breaking controls. The experiments reveal a consistent boundary: institutions help when they repair failures in how a collective constructs usable public state, but lose their advantage when their signals are uninformative or uncheckable, when stronger intelligence can perform the same transformation directly, or when the resulting state cannot support reliable action. Our results recast the choice between intelligence and institutions as a diagnosis of where collective reasoning fails.

Reducing the number of focal elements of a mass function is classically driven by an intrinsic distance, such as Jaccard or Jousselme, that keeps the approximation close to the original as a body of evidence. We consider instead the case where the mass function feeds a linear combinatorial optimisation problem with evidential costs. What should then be preserved is not the closeness of the two mass functions, but the quality of the decision they induce. We introduce a decision-aware approximation that targets the regret of the decision: one decides with the cheaper approximation and is evaluated under the true mass function. On a minimal shortest path, the distance-optimal approximation flips the decision while a decision-aware merge preserves it, and this occurs on a non-negligible fraction of random instances. We prove a one-point bound that localises the regret at the true optimum, turn it into an exact dynamic program for the scalar case, and extend it to an online version that prunes focal elements before the final cost is known. In experiments the decision-aware compressor flips the decision less often than representation-aware compression, for both the linear criterion and a non-linear proxy read-out.

In this paper, we study zero-sum potential team games with a supervisor network, where agents rely on supervisor-provided belief information rather than accurate common beliefs. The main challenge is that such belief information can be inaccurate because of supervisors' belief-estimation errors and the misreporting of joint actions by Byzantine teams. We propose the distributed team-orchestrating algorithm (DTOA), which combines team fictitious play with supervisor-based distributed belief learning. We prove the convergence of supervisors' belief estimates and establish that the induced learning dynamics converge to a near team-Nash equilibrium (TNE) in terms of the team-Nash gap (TNG). In the Byzantine setting, we consider a misreporting attack model and develop a Byzantine-resilient DTOA. We further provide probabilistic guarantees for Byzantine-team identification and establish an asymptotic bound on the honest TNG. Numerical experiments illustrate the theoretical findings, compare DTOA with baseline learning methods, and evaluate its performance in a Markov decision process setting.

Standard approaches to abductive reasoning can retain multiple candidate explanations, but they do not generally combine explicit compositional cross-hypothesis interaction with an internal, rival-sensitive commitment judgment. This paper argues that in risk-sensitive domains -- where premature commitment carries asymmetric downside costs -- the timing of commitment is itself a governed decision that the inferential apparatus should formally represent. We present a minimal $κ$--$τ$ logical framework built on two primitives: epistemic interaction among hypotheses ($κ$) and a normative commitment threshold ($τ$). Hypotheses may coexist, reinforce or inhibit one another, and form emergent composite explanations, while collapse into committed conclusions is regulated by governance constraints rather than forced by inference alone. The logic is developed in two complementary modes sharing the interaction relation and the governance apparatus: a synthetic mode, in which atomic hypotheses are composed upward into emergent explanations, and an analytic mode, in which complex observed states of affairs are decomposed into causal clusters of latent factors, with commitment governed at both the cluster and the factor level. The framework provides formal machinery for domains in which the distinction between highly likely and commit-worthy is operationally consequential. The $κ$--$τ$ logic is positioned as the symbolic governance layer of a neurosymbolic architecture: its epistemic parameters are naturally estimated by neural components -- semantic embeddings and generative models, as demonstrated in existing computational realizations -- while its normative parameters remain under explicit human governance, yielding transparent and auditable abductive reasoning for deployment in high-stakes settings.

Cross-View Geo-Localization (CVGL) with OpenStreetMap (OSM) performs well in structure-rich urban environments but collapses in feature-sparse scenes such as rural roads. To study this failure mode, in this work, we introduce CV-FSS, a benchmark that pairs sequential panoramas from five rural regions with aligned OSM maps, on which single-frame methods degrade drastically. We then propose SeqLoc, an online test-time sequence aggregation mechanism that recursively maintains a log-belief volume with three key components: (1) Entropy-Tempered Uncertainty (ETU) tempers each incoming pose likelihood volume by its normalized entropy; (2) Map-Guided Relocalization (MGR) mixes a map-shaped recovery distribution into the belief so that a suppressed true pose can recover; (3) Peak-Anchored Smoothing (PAS) derives the final pose at sub-grid precision. Extensive experiments on CV-FSS and CV-RHO demonstrate that SeqLoc outperforms single-frame localization by a large margin, improving both position and orientation recall by over 50%. The benchmark and source code are publicly available at https://zhengjunwei.com/publications/SeqLoc/SeqLoc.html.

The emergence of conspiracy theories in the wake of major events is a significant societal challenge. Here we test whether conversational dialogues with a large language model (LLM) can reduce belief in immediately unfolding conspiracies. In experiments conducted in the days following the July 2024 assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the September 2025 assassination of Charlie Kirk, U.S. adults (Experiment 1: N = 472; Experiment 2: N = 1035) holding conspiratorial views about the crisis event engaged in a multi-turn conversation with an LLM prompted to reduce their conspiracy belief. Compared to control participants who either discussed an irrelevant topic with an LLM or viewed a static fact sheet, participants in the LLM treatment showed significantly reduced conspiracy beliefs in both experiments. We also found evidence of downstream effects of the LLM treatment, observing reduced belief in different conspiracies one to two months later in the wake of subsequent crisis events. These results shed light on the psychology of emerging conspiracies and highlight the potential for scalable, cognitively-focused interventions to counteract misinformation in the immediate aftermath of high-profile societal events.

Hospitals are rapidly adopting artificial intelligence for triage, imaging, scheduling etc., yet most deployments remain isolated point solutions locked inside departmental silos, resulting in duplicated effort, hidden risks, and unrealized enterprise value. Despite explosive growth of AI in healthcare market and accelerating investment, an estimated 70-80% of healthcare AI pilots fail to scale, largely due to governance gaps, fragmented data, and missing integration blueprints. This research proposes a hospital-specific, compliance-first, Agentic AI architecture with multiple interoperable layers, extending existing hospital AI platform models with: (i) an Agent Orchestration Layer for multi-agent workflows across clinical, operational, and financial domains, (ii) a Compliance and Policy Layer that centralizes policy-as-code for HIPAA, GDPR, the EU AI Act, DISHA Act, India's DPDP Act, and ISO/IEC security and safety standards, and (iii) a Privacy-Preserving Data Fabric that plugs federated learning, differential privacy, and secure enclaves into real-world Hospital Information Management System (HIMS) flows. Using a synthetic but structurally realistic hospital dataset and an open, ready-to-deploy prototype implementation, this study demonstrates the end-to-end orchestration of triage risk prediction, workflow optimization, and compliance logging, achieving substantial simulated reductions in task turnaround times and manual documentation effort while maintaining policy-guarded data access. The resulting architecture offers hospital leaders a pragmatic blueprint to move from ad hoc tools to a governed, globally compliant, ROI-focused AI platform that can be tailored to on-premise, hybrid and cloud-native deployments.

Deep Belief Networks (DBNs) learn hierarchical generative models without class supervision. Here, we ask whether this purely unsupervised process nevertheless organizes internal representations according to the unknown data classes. We analyze successive layers of DBNs trained on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and KMNIST using the Generalized Discrimination Value (GDV), supervised probes applied only after training, a reconstruction-based measure of abstraction distance, effective dimensionality, and free sample generation. Remarkably, class-specific clustering generally increases with depth across datasets and network widths, although no label information is available during DBN training. Control experiments show that this effect depends on the learned feature structure and cannot be explained by random transformations, weight marginals, dimensionality reduction, or sigmoid saturation. The first hidden layers also frequently make class identity more accessible to linear and nonlinear probes. With greater depth, representations become increasingly compact and prototype-like as neurons acquire correlated feature directions. At the same time, GDV and probe accuracy reveal complementary aspects of class structure: improved average clustering can coexist with reduced accessibility for a few difficult class pairs. These findings demonstrate that layer-wise generative learning can spontaneously uncover and progressively amplify class-related structure in unlabeled data.

Reliable uncertainty estimates are critical in safety-sensitive applications, where understanding the sources of predictive uncertainty is essential. This often requires disentangling epistemic uncertainty from aleatoric uncertainty, yet these uncertainty types are not defined consistently across the literature, making it difficult to assess whether a method produces accurate uncertainty estimates. Evaluation is further complicated by the fact that ground-truth epistemic uncertainty is typically unavailable. Existing benchmarks therefore mostly rely on proxy tasks such as out-of-distribution detection, which do not provide complete ground-truth uncertainty targets and offer limited insight into the structure and quality of uncertainty estimates. We propose a unified definition of uncertainty as pointwise posterior risk, the expected loss of a predictor under the distribution of plausible ground-truth functions given the data. This view combines Bayesian uncertainty over functions with estimator-dependent deviations from the posterior mean, capturing effects such as misspecification and optimization error. This formulation constitutes the foundation of a theory-backed benchmark that enables direct computation of oracle epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty using semi-synthetic datasets with real covariates and known generative processes. By avoiding proxy evaluations, the benchmark enables fine-grained analysis of uncertainty estimates. Empirically, we find that accurate prediction does not guarantee reliable uncertainty disentanglement. The benchmark reveals practically useful differences between methods, identifying approaches with meaningful alignment to oracle uncertainty targets while exposing sensitivity to datasets and modeling choices.

Reinforcement learning (RL) with verifiable rewards constructs trajectory-level advantage estimates, yet it often fails to credit the few pivotal decisions that determine outcomes in long-horizon, multi-turn agentic tasks. Recent work introduces privileged self-distillation for credit assignment, providing denser supervision, but it remains unclear how such local signals should represent sequential credit. We propose AgentOPSD, a critic-free, recursive method for turn-level credit assignment in agentic reinforcement learning. AgentOPSD aggregates token-level teacher-student log-probability gaps into turn-level evidence and recursively updates a Bayesian belief state in log-odds space. This yields a principled reweighting scheme that converts sparse outcome supervision into turn-level credit signals and identifies pivotal turns through the marginal belief revision between consecutive states. The method is fully compatible with standard policy optimization and requires neither an additional critic nor extra rollouts. We evaluate AgentOPSD on ALFWorld, WebShop, and Search-QA using Qwen2.5 models at two scales (3B and 7B). AgentOPSD outperforms GRPO and strong self-distillation baselines, achieving 89.1% success on ALFWorld with Qwen2.5-7B. Ablation studies attribute the gains to turn-level aggregation and history-dependent recursive belief updates.

Safety risks of AI are becoming increasingly evident in human interactions with AI technologies. The prominent approaches to evaluating these risks favor technical methods, such as model benchmarks and LLM simulations, often sidelining empirical research with human subjects. To examine this apparent gap in the acceptance of human research, we conduct an expert survey (n=93) and expert interviews (n=17) with AI Safety & Ethics (AISE) researchers from Technical, Sociotechnical, Governance, and Normative backgrounds. Our findings suggest that although there is a consensus that human research is valuable for generating evidence for AISE, its adoption and acceptance are constrained by perceived validity issues, tangible resource barriers, epistemic and personal preferences in methods, and infrastructural constraints from the broader research community. In particular, Technical researchers tend to value human research less and collaborate across disciplines less, suggesting an epistemic tension towards human methods. We propose recommendations for establishing the epistemic fit of human research within AISE and bridging the prohibitive limitations that researchers face, while avoiding performative 'human-washing'.

This paper proposes the Bayesian Expected Uncertainty Reduction (B-EUR) model, which formalizes the value of trying a candidate design action as its expected reduction of epistemic uncertainty about action--outcome relations. The model addresses one part of the Uncertainty Driven Action (UDA) model's open question concerning how changes in uncertainty perception determine action selection. We examine two environmental properties: generalizability, or how far knowledge from one trial extends to neighboring candidates, and outcome discriminability, or how clearly differences among outcomes can be distinguished. We tested the model through simulations and human experiments using a graph-shape guessing task that isolates learning about action--outcome relations under a limited trial budget. Epistemic value followed an inverted-U-shaped relationship with generalizability and increased with outcome discriminability in the simulations. In the human experiments, the subjective value of trying and enjoyment followed inverted-U-shaped relationships with generalizability, while choice behavior reflected both properties. The B-EUR model provides a computational account of candidate-action evaluation within uncertainty-driven design activity and offers implications for constructing prototype sets, framing design problems, and organizing feedback to support informative exploration.

Generative AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes professional contexts, where their outputs shape what users believe, how they reason, and what they treat as settled. This raises a central question for responsible AI: under what conditions is reliance on generative AI outputs epistemically warranted rather than behaviourally induced? Existing frameworks largely ask whether AI outputs are accurate, fair, explainable, safe, or trusted by users. These questions remain necessary, and each can contribute to warranted reliance. However, they do not directly specify warranted reliance as a distinct evaluative target: the conditions under which users are justified in treating AI outputs as inputs into their own reasoning. We argue that this requires an account of epistemic trustworthiness: what makes a system epistemically worthy of reliance. Drawing on philosophical accounts of trustworthiness as competence and audience-orientation, we develop a constitutive normative framework comprising three jointly necessary and non-fungible conditions. First, epistemic humility requires systems to represent and communicate the limits of their competence. Second, epistemic access requires systems to enable users to inspect, question, and contest outputs in context. Third, resistance to epistemic injustice requires systems to recognise users as legitimate epistemic agents and avoid marginalising their knowledge and experience. Through real-world case analyses in legal reasoning, medical reasoning, and hiring, we show how failures of epistemic humility, epistemic access, and resistance to epistemic injustice can produce consequential harms that standard measures of accuracy, fairness, and usability do not address on their own. We conclude by outlining design and evaluation implications for GenAI systems organised around epistemically warranted reliance rather than output correctness alone.

Generative AI used as a capable servant has greatly accelerated intellectual work, but it also risks eroding human epistemic agency by encouraging uncritical acceptance of AI-generated reasoning. This creates a need for mechanisms that preserve human agency by augmenting metacognition during AI-assisted intellectual work. To address this, we propose the Synthesis-Analysis Reciprocity Model, which views intellectual construction as a reciprocal interaction between Synthesis, which combines components into an artifact, and Analysis, which critically evaluates them against objective indicators and constrains subsequent synthesis. Grounded in this model, we present the Vibe Compiler, a research-logic compiler that helps researchers transform vague ideas (Vibes) into coherent research logic. The system compiles these ideas using a research paper ontology of sixteen academic parameters. Compilation failures indicate missing logical components; rather than filling them autonomously, the system prompts researchers with reflective questions that encourage them to develop the missing reasoning. The framework characterizes structural gaps along two dimensions: cognitive function (Synthesis vs. Analysis) and executing agent (human vs. AI), yielding four origin types that identify where breakdowns arise. Our design emphasizes AI probing its own synthesized output to stimulate human metacognition, encouraging researchers to remain managers who critically direct and validate AI-generated reasoning rather than passive recipients. Experience with a prototype built on NotebookLM and Gemini suggests that effective AI-assisted reasoning depends less on sophisticated prompting than on the knowledge structure provided to the AI. This paper was developed using the proposed Vibe Compiler.

Systems that automate scientific discovery must repeatedly decide which experiment to run, which hypothesis to test, which tool to build, and when to stop. Many systems make these decisions by maximizing a myopic score such as expected information gain per unit cost or a learned plausibility score. We identify a structural limitation of this approach. Some actions are constructive: they acquire an epistemic capability (an instrument, assay, pipeline, simulator, or abstraction) whose value lies not in the information returned immediately but in the future actions it makes available. When the least-cost route to a confident answer requires a chain of such constructions, a planner that scores actions only by information obtainable within a bounded horizon cannot value the first construction: it yields no information within the horizon and is dominated by any measurement with positive information, however small. We formulate goal-directed discovery as a stochastic shortest-path problem in belief space in which constructive experiments change the downstream action graph, and prove that for every lookahead depth d there is an instance on which every myopic information-maximizing planner has an unbounded approximation ratio, and a related instance on which it never reaches the goal. The mechanism is a capability-indistinguishability lemma: within the horizon, acquiring a capability can be observationally indistinguishable from paying for a null action. This establishes capability gating as a reachability axis of difficulty distinct from curvature (submodularity) and information order (adaptivity gaps). We introduce CG-Plan, an incremental replanner with a capability-aware cost-to-go heuristic h = h_cap + h_exp. In a controlled testbed, the performance gap appears only under gating, persists for every fixed horizon, and arises when near-miss hypotheses come from a data-consistent proposer.

As "AI Scientists" emerge to drive research via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), systems relying on ephemeral scripts will fail. The sheer scale of stateful, interconnected evidence requires a machine-walkable warranty grounded in a purpose-built database architecture. Eigenius is an open-source, typed knowledge-graph DBMS built on a single premise: answering the audit question ("what do you know, and what is your warranty?") requires a unified kernel. By tightly coupling the type system, storage engine, and integration protocol, Eigenius turns data provenance into a structural invariant rather than a property reconstructed across subsystem boundaries. The kernel rests on three pillars: a dependent type theory woven through the core, institutions acting as strongly typed integration boundaries, and a content-addressed immutable storage layer. On this foundation, epistemic status (declared/observed/derived/verified) is enforced as a strict commit-time invariant. Cross-system translations (comorphisms) are checked at commit and materialized directly into the graph as durable, first-class resources. To eliminate O(N^2) polystore bottlenecks, shared on-chain intermediate representations (IRs) collapse multi-system translations to identity. Crucially, this architecture unifies both domains of scientific epistemology: it relies on justification logic for empirical science, while embedding a fast, in-process term checker to safely evaluate formal mathematical proofs (via Lean 4) without IPC overhead. In an end-to-end recomputation of a published Nature study from fragile scripts to a materialized evidence graph, all 52 derived conclusions hold from pinned data, surfacing four machine-checked discrepancies in the original study.

Biological systems must regulate competing needs under limited perceptual bandwidth, where sharpening one estimate costs the capacity to sharpen the others. Any fixed-budget system therefore has to decide where to allocate its perceptual precision. We study this in a foraging agent that must keep several bodily needs satisfied to survive, modelled with active inference. At each step it reads its own body-state beliefs, identifies the most-needed channel, and reallocates a fixed budget of interoceptive precision toward it, so that the same precision-shaped likelihood feeds both belief update and planning. In AffectWorld, a four-channel foraging gridworld, this selective allocation more than doubles learning-phase survival at matched budget against a uniform-precision agent ($0.414$ vs $0.199$ across 11 layouts, $n{=}32$ seeds each, paired cluster-bootstrap $p \leq 10^{-4}$). Two further results sharpen the mechanism. The benefit runs through planning as well as perception, since denying the shaped likelihood to the planner alone removes about half of it. It is also need-aligned, since aiming precision at the least-needed channel does worse than spreading it evenly. The attended channel additionally learns its own dynamics about twice as fast, and stays ahead even at matched observation count, a behavioural trace of the same precision routing, visible in learning speed, not survival.

Fairness in AI systems has become more important with recent regulatory demands, such as the EU AI Act. Traditional approaches often do not take into account philosophical ethics and social awareness. Variable selection processes, in particular, can introduce implicit bias, affecting equity across different subgroups. We discuss a mathematical approach that evaluates fairness in AI, aligning mathematical methodologies with ethical considerations and regulatory requirements. Our aim is to advocate for interdisciplinary collaboration to address fairness, emphasizing the importance of understanding broader ethical and societal contexts. Our approach emphasizes maintaining all potentially relevant variables to allow for more granular fairness assessments and to reduce implicit bias. The findings suggest that the exclusion of sensitive or critical variables may compromise equity between subgroups. In contrast, retaining all relevant variables could reduce implicit bias. Thus, the interdisciplinary approach could provide deeper insight into the ethical implications and compliance with regulatory standards. By integrating a mathematical approach with ethical and social awareness, we suggest more equitable outcomes and responsible AI deployment. This work underscores the necessity of interdisciplinary collaboration in effectively addressing fairness in AI systems aligned with the objectives of the European Union's AI Act, which seeks to promote trustworthy and fair AI systems.

Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise. In LLM collectives this proxy can break: agents can produce diverse-looking arguments while preserving the same conclusion. We operationalize dispersion-revision coupling: the degree to which an intervention that verifiably increases the dispersion of a collective's outputs in embedding space is accompanied by genuine revision of its epistemic stance rather than premise-preserving reformulation. The diagnostic is black-box: it operates on generated text alone and makes no claims about the internal representations of the generating models. Two channels are measured independently: an output channel, the Coherence Index (CI), verifies that the intervention changed output dispersion; an epistemic channel, per-turn stance annotation, measures whether the collective revised. We propose CI with the Meta-Predictive Clarity System (MPCS), which inserts a Re-Differentiation Protocol (RDP) when outputs over-converge, as a reusable method for estimating this coupling regime. We evaluate five-agent collectives from two configurations (gpt-4o-mini and gemini-2.5-flash; 310 paired episodes per condition). On gpt-4o-mini, conditional dissent improves false-premise recovery by +17.7 points (p<1e-6) while static persona diversity harms recovery (-8.1, p=.007). On gemini-2.5-flash, the same intervention at a comparable budget yields no gain (26.1% vs 27.1%, p=.84) despite a verified dispersion drop; the two treatment effects differ from each other (z=3.79, p<.001). Mechanism tagging shows Gemini preserves the false premise via intra-framework dissent: 94% of tagged post-RDP responses reformulate rather than concede (vs 24% on GPT). We recommend reporting per-intervention stance shift and premise-preservation rate alongside accuracy.

Large language models are being integrated into critical infrastructure and enterprise workflows at unprecedented scale,yet the lifecycle frameworks governing their development and operations were designed for operational efficiency rather than security analysis. As a result, security-relevant activities such as data provenance verification, artifact signing, agentic permission control, and decommissioning are often left implicit or assumed to receive due care. Governance frameworks, in turn, organise requirements around risk levels or management processes without clearly linking them to the lifecycle stages where they apply. This paper addresses both deficiencies. We propose a lifecycle model for LLM systems that supports security analysis by structuring it around security-relevant boundaries rather than workflow optimisation. The model comprises 32 stages across four core pipeline layers (Data, Model, Distribution, Application), supported by a 12-stage LLMOps pillar and a 9-category governance pillar. Thirteen stages are introduced here as separate units because they expose distinct security concerns that existing frameworks do not clearly distinguish. A governance mapping synthesising the NIST AI RMF, the EU AI Act, and ISO/IEC 42001 reveals a structural property of the current regulatory landscape: governance evidence concentrates at deployment-facing stages, where systems are visible to regulators, while the most consequential decisions, data selection, alignment strategy, and capability boundaries, are made at development-facing stages, where regulatory visibility is lowest.

Autonomous exploration missions require decision-making under sensor uncertainty and computational constraints, yet integrating scientific representations into POMDP planning has remained intractable due to high-dimensional observation spaces. Information-theoretic planners overcome this by assuming deterministic observations, sacrificing the principled uncertainty quantification that POMDPs provide. We introduce the Science Hypothesis Map POMDP (SHM-POMDP), which makes science-driven belief-space planning more tractable by branching on inferred physical properties rather than raw sensor data. This preserves full sensor information through learned observation models while enabling the planner to reason jointly about navigation and scientific properties under uncertainty. On an extended RockSample domain with 50-dimensional observations, SHM-POMDP achieves 18.6% higher rewards and 32.9% reduced computation time per step than continuous-observation baselines. On realistic geologic exploration using Cuprite hyperspectral data, SHM-POMDP achieves 2.5$\times$ higher information gain than the best information-theoretic baseline by maintaining beliefs and replanning adaptively---reaching 80% of oracle performance using only uniform priors. These results demonstrate that integrating hierarchical probabilistic models into belief-space planning enables tractable, principled autonomous science that outperforms both traditional POMDP methods and science-aware information-theoretic approaches.

In noisy social dilemmas, intended actions are stochastically corrupted before execution, so an observed defection may reflect hostile intent or action error. Standard Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulations treat executed actions as states, structurally precluding this distinction and causing systematic over-retaliation. We introduce a Partially Observable MDP (POMDP) formulation encoding opponent intentions as latent states and executed actions as noisy observations, solved within the active inference (AIF) framework with a cost function that decomposes into epistemic and pragmatic components that jointly address inferring current intent and learning how intent evolves. In the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with symmetric noise, we derive a critical noise threshold governing cooperation collapse, connecting it to a fixed-point condition on learned priors. Experiments reveal that the value of intention inference is context-dependent: the POMDP provides consistent advantages against conditionally cooperative opponents, but mutual intention inference under sufficient noise produces correlated belief-driven collapse. The advantage is specific to games where intent attribution is decision-relevant.

Predictive processing theories portray the brain as a hierarchical prediction engine that minimizes prediction error, yet they lack operational definitions for the structure of a "prediction," the standardized response to a prediction error, and the mechanism that maintains consistency across successive updates. Bayesian cognitive science attempts to subsume all uncertainty under probabilistic belief updating, but it presupposes a closed hypothesis space and provides no generative account of how the objects over which probabilities are distributed become discrete, identifiable referents in the first place. This paper introduces Predictive Set Theory (PST), a formal generative framework that reconstructs cognitive architecture from first principles. PST anchors cognition in a minimal set of operations---a sensor formalized as an identity function, set-theoretic state refresh, and three fundamental forms of reference chains (reference, counter-reference, and semi-reference)---and rigorously derives core cognitive functions including state sequences, demand, comparison, efficiency, and finite-horizon probabilistic planning. Rather than modeling neural mechanisms, PST constitutes a design specification for any system that must maintain internal consistency while acting under incomplete information and irreversible risk. The framework offers novel resolutions to classical problems such as Russell's paradox, the cognitive status of Gödelian incompleteness, the grounding of negative feedback, and the comprehension of film editing. The primary purpose of this paper is to establish, through the public academic record, the originality and completeness of the Predictive Set Theory framework.

When algorithms make or influence consequential decisions---about loan eligibility, hiring, or healthcare---EU law grants affected individuals a Right to Explanation. Yet whether (and how) Explainable AI (XAI) can satisfy this right in practice remains poorly understood, with direct implications for individuals' ability to contest automated decisions that affect their lives. This paper presents a systematic literature review of XAI in the context of the EU Right to Explanation, with particular focus on Art. 15(1)(h) GDPR, Art. 86 AI Act (AIA), and related instruments. We consider papers published from 2024 onwards, as the final version of the AIA was published in July 2024---with Art. 86 being added late. From 2643 initial records identified by a deliberately broad search, we review 57 full texts, of which only 19 papers demonstrate substantive integration of both legal and technical perspectives, showing gaps in the interdisciplinary synthesis of the current regulatory framework. We document three problematic patterns across the corpus: Most misidentify the GDPR legal basis; few engage with the CJEU's Dun & Bradstreet judgment (likely due to publication timing); and the distinction between explanation form (governed by addressee) and content (governed by legal purpose) is often conflated. We conceptualize this as the Addressee/Purpose Framework, propose a four-phase blueprint for operationalization, and identify six concrete open research questions. Without further progress, the Right to Explanation risks remaining a formal obligation without a technically realizable path to compliance.

Long-horizon autonomous research tasks such as machine learning engineering require systems to make interdependent decisions under a limited budget. Existing LLM-based agents typically organize candidate-solution improvement through tree, graph, or chain structures, meaning that the search process determines how information is acquired and managed. We call this design solution-centric search and propose instead the information paradigm, in which an evolving information state represents the system's understanding of the task and guides solution improvement. We instantiate this paradigm in Iris, an inquiry-revision loop. For information acquisition, Iris generates local action plans from the current information state and uses epistemic actions to probe decision-critical unknowns without modifying the retained solution. For information management, Iris synthesizes observations across experiments into task knowledge composed of revisable claims with explicit scope and status. It updates this knowledge as new evidence arrives and constructs each decision context from raw evidence, structured summaries, or task knowledge at the required level of detail. On MLE-Bench, Iris attains a 64.9% any-medal rate under a 12-hour budget, the highest among compared systems. Across four tasks spanning harness engineering and model post-training, Iris also demonstrates cross-domain generalization.

Social media affect financial markets, but public posts by financial media personas are voluntary disclosures. What is not disclosed is therefore usually unobserved. We address this measurement problem by conducting repeated, real-time interviews of "digital twins" built from monitored finfluencers' X accounts under a fixed protocol. The interviews recover stock-level public-persona belief proxies even when no public recommendation is made. Because the interviews are generated and archived before the relevant return windows, the design avoids the look-ahead bias that arises when LLMs are queried ex post. The evidence shows that information obtained from these digital-twin interviews predicts the cross section of large-cap stock returns in the expected direction. Repeated real-time interviews therefore show how selective disclosure can be turned into measurable panels of market views.

Trust is a propositional attitude of a distinctive kind: to trust is to rely on another under conditions where reliance could be disappointed, and the disappointment of trust---betrayal---differs qualitatively from the disappointment of a prediction. We treat trust as a \emph{subjunctive} epistemic state: $A$ trusts $B$'s competence when $A$ believes that \emph{were $P$ true, $B$ would know it}, and $B$'s integrity when $A$ believes that \emph{were $B$ to know $P$, he would disclose it to $A$}. We develop three representations of this state---as lexicographic \emph{assumption} as \emph{ordinal closeness} in a Lewis--Stalnaker sphere system , and as \emph{strong belief} in a conditional probability system and for each we ask whether the Brandenburger--Keisler impossibility on common belief survives when the assumption of rationality is replaced by an assumption of trustworthiness. The three representations agree that every \emph{finite} depth of common trust is realizable while the \emph{completed} common-trust fixed point is the locus of difficulty, but they differ sharply in \emph{how} the difficulty manifests, and---our organizing finding---in how each survives a concrete betrayal. W show that the same betrayal refutes an agent's \emph{level ordering} under the lexicographic representation, contaminates her \emph{closeness ordering} in proportion to the betrayer's deliberateness under the ordinal representation, and merely \emph{shifts her operative conditioning hypothesis} while leaving her belief structure coherent under the strong-belief representation.

Recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have been increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in applications such as self-reflection, retrieval-augmented generation, and scientific discovery. In these settings, agents must act based on limited observations rather than full environmental states, leading to partial observability. This introduces several key challenges: belief state inference, task objective misalignment, and planning under uncertainty. Prior approaches typically condition actions on full or summarized action-observation histories whose redundant and irrelevant information can mislead the decision making of LLM agent. Inspired by human cognition, we propose a novel neuro-symbolic fast-slow thinking (NeSyFS) framework for LLM agent, addressing the challenges introduced by partial observability in a unified approach. We use a knowledge graph (KG) to represent the belief state, providing triplets as context for every module of NeSyFS. The fast-thinking module performs reactive action, while slow-thinking conducts a new uncertainty-aware planning by following the high-level structure of twisted sequential Monte Carlo (TSMC) algorithm. To mitigate the misalignment of task objective, a reflection module is used to reflect fast-thinking actions, and also switches to the slow-thinking module whenever reactive actions repeatedly fail. Experiments on three representative benchmarks, i.e. ALFWorld, Webshop, and ScienceWorld, demonstrate significant advantages over previous methods.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Belief update concerns changes in an agent's beliefs induced by changes in the underlying world. Standard Katsuno-Mendelzon update assumes that an epistemic input can be incorporated from every initially possible world, whereas credibility-limited belief update restricts, for each source world, the successor worlds regarded as credible or reachable. Nevertheless, existing credibility-limited approaches treat the epistemic input as an indivisible whole, and therefore cannot represent cases in which only part of a compound epistemic input can be realized. We introduce selective credibility-limited belief update, in which the epistemic input is transformed, relative to each source world, into a weaker proxy before the credibility-limited transition is performed. We provide semantic and axiomatic characterizations of the resulting class of update operators. We then identify two well-behaved sub-classes; namely, consistency-preserving update operators, which require every transformed epistemic input to be credible from its source world whenever the original epistemic input is consistent, and maximal consistency-preserving update operators, which additionally require the selected proxy to be maximally informative among the credible consequences of the original epistemic input. Finally, we establish the generality of the proposed framework by showing that credibility-limited belief update is recovered as a special case, while Katsuno--Mendelzon belief update emerges when credibility restrictions are removed and the transformation functions are taken to be identities. These results demonstrate that the framework provides a unified and strictly more expressive account of belief update, encompassing established approaches while supporting source-dependent selective acceptance.

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

As generative artificial intelligence becomes one of the most significant systems of knowledge production in our society today, questions relating to who can access and shape that production grow increasingly important in our discourse. This paper argues that the existing frameworks for AI literacy, which are dominated by technical competency and responsible-use principles, are insufficient because they enforce a "consumer" orientation toward AI rather than fostering genuine epistemic agency. Based upon Foucault's concept of power-knowledge, Freire's pedagogy of critical consciousness, and scholarship of digital literacy, this paper proposes a reconceptualization of AI literacy as a critical practice that equips individuals not just to use AI systems, but to critically evaluate them, resist their structuring assumptions, and participate in their governance. The paper further argues that unequal access to AI tools in society recapitulates longstanding epistemic injustices, and that a literacy framework oriented toward empowerment must account for these structural inequities. A three-part framework of AI literacy based on the notions of contextual use, critical interrogation, and participatory governance frames this literacy as a cultivation of epistemic "agents" rather than the training of competent consumers of AI-generated information.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments. However, the processes by which beliefs form and propagate among interacting LLMs remain poorly understood. We introduce CoevolveSim, a framework for studying belief diffusion within networked LLM populations. CoevolveSim allows us to isolate and study three factors: domain specialization, social-role assignment, and social network structure. Within this framework, generalist and specialist LLM agents exchange and revise beliefs. In each round, an LLM agent observes a summary of its neighbors' beliefs before updating its own. We run 1,280 controlled simulations spanning four scenarios, two network structures, and 20 medical-indication statements. We find that persona-style role assignment and network structure reshape individual belief revision but have minimal effect on population-level consensus. In contrast, introducing (finetuned) specialist LLMs more than doubles the shift in consensus and gives rise to consistent asymmetries in exerted influence. We further show that simple persistence-based opinion-dynamics models reproduce collective outcomes in all-generalist LLM populations, whereas heterogeneous LLM populations require population-level belief composition to reproduce consensus and agent identity to predict individual belief transitions. Our results indicate that realistic simulation of belief diffusion in multi-agent LLM systems requires a diverse set of underlying LLMs, not persona prompting alone.

Comparative feedback, asking people which of two behaviors they prefer, has become a standard way to align robot and agent behavior with human intent when the reward itself cannot be specified directly. Preference-based reward learning typically casts the human teacher as a passive oracle answering learner-generated queries. We argue this forfeits the teacher's defining advantage: knowledge of the objective. A teacher who knows the target can construct training examples more efficiently than any learner-driven acquisition strategy, an advantage that widens as the reward's feature dimension grows. However, exploiting this advantage requires an accurate model of what the learner currently knows. We therefore recast preference learning as a human-autonomy team problem coupling two behavioral models: the teacher maintains a model of the learner to design an informative curriculum, and the learner maintains a second-order model of the teacher's model, emitting structured preference constraints (understanding statements) that keep the teacher's model of the learner synchronized. In simulation, an informed teacher outperforms learner-led selection; teacher-model drift under alternating teachers erodes this advantage; and understanding statements repair it, with second-order (ToM-2) statements outperforming mean-belief statements when the teacher's error about the learner is concentrated in a particular direction rather than spread evenly.

Recent advancements in Computer Go, driven by AlphaZero and MuZero, rely heavily on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to correct the errors of the neural network policy. While effective on massive computational clusters, this dependence creates a critical bottleneck on consumer-grade hardware, where the computational cost of tree management severely limits inference rates. Furthermore, without deep search, these models suffer from hallucination, proposing moves with high confidence that are strategically fatal. This paper introduces a novel Belief-Guided architecture that disentangles the Policy head from a distinct Belief head. Unlike traditional value functions, the Belief head acts as an internal simulator and independent critic, modeling epistemic uncertainty and strategic stability. By integrating memory mechanisms (Transformer/GRU) to handle long-term dependencies and the Ko rule, and utilizing a gating mechanism to filter overconfident policy errors, our model shifts the burden of intelligence from runtime search to parametric "intuition." Experimental results demonstrate that this approach significantly improves search-free win rates and reduces hallucination, enabling professional-level play on limited hardware where massive MCTS is infeasible.

Evaluation methodologies for language models increasingly combine multiple signals, from automated metrics and LLM-as-judge ratings to human assessments and benchmark suite results. When these signals are aggregated via averaging, evaluation confidence can then substantially exceed the reliability of the weakest signal: a phenomenon we call trust inflation in evaluation. We argue that evaluation scores should be treated as epistemic claims with three properties: formality (human evaluation provides stronger evidence than an automated metric), scope (a benchmark result applies to the tested distribution, not universally), and validity windows (benchmark results expire as contamination accumulates and distributions shift). Several converging research traditions (chain-of-thought analysis, possibilistic logic, and algebraic theory) establish weakest-link aggregation as the conservative endpoint of a parameterized operator family controlled by a single pessimism parameter. Drawing on those traditions, and on concrete lessons from building an evaluation harness for agentic AI, we propose that evaluation results carry explicit metadata (formality tier, scope declaration, and expiration date) to make their epistemic status transparent. We illustrate the cost of mean aggregation on the public HELM leaderboard: across 54 frontier models on ten scenarios, the top-five models ranked by mean score and by weakest-link are completely disjoint.

An AI benchmark result rarely reaches a consequential claim in one step. Evaluators generalize it to further cases, interpret it as evidence of capability, extrapolate it to new tasks, transport it to another system or site, and combine it with assumptions about human review and downstream consequences. Validity-centred approaches require evidence for each claim. This paper makes explicit and operationalizes a problem those approaches leave to the analyst: warranted links don't automatically make a warranted chain. The target of one study may not be the source of the next; system, population, outcome, or conditions may change at the interface; and shared data or model lineage may make apparently independent support dependent. Projectibility concerns whether a bounded extension from observed to unobserved cases is warranted. Goodman supplies the problem of rival extensions; argument-based validity supplies an architecture for testing them. The contribution is an interface audit for distributed AI evidence: typed source and target descriptions, and a procedure separating endpoints that never meet from endpoints that meet while warrant fails to cross. A legal-research case shows how benchmark evidence and a deployment study can each be sound while remaining parallel. A known-truth demonstration shows why aggregate stability can erase distinctions a later projection requires. The resulting projectibility audit diagnoses unsupported joins in benchmark-to-use arguments.