Epistemic Logic
Overview
Epistemic logic represents what agents know or believe using possible-world models, with operators for individual, shared, and distributed knowledge. Dynamic methods model how announcements, messages, data exchanges, and belief updates change those states, while axiomatic and computational work studies properties such as completeness, decidability, and plan existence. Applications include privacy and information-flow policies, knowledge graphs, and tests of whether language models can track nested beliefs in theory-of-mind puzzles. A central tension is that expressive systems can capture complex interactions but may be hard to decide or reason with, while language models can still falter when agents have asymmetric or fragmented information.
Latest papers
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A Minimal -- Logic for Risk-Sensitive Abduction
Assuming You Knew: Fixing an Epistemic Semantics for Flow Policies Using Agentic AI
Better Understanding, Understanding Better
Analytic Cut in Epistemic Logics with Distributed Knowledge
Belief Contraction in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
The Logic of Data Access and Data Exchanges
Study on Quantitative Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Belief Revision
$P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call '. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in . The last section features an analysis of 's revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.