Overview

Epistemic logic represents what agents know or believe using possible-world models, with operators for individual, shared, and distributed knowledge. Dynamic methods model how announcements, messages, data exchanges, and belief updates change those states, while axiomatic and computational work studies properties such as completeness, decidability, and plan existence. Applications include privacy and information-flow policies, knowledge graphs, and tests of whether language models can track nested beliefs in theory-of-mind puzzles. A central tension is that expressive systems can capture complex interactions but may be hard to decide or reason with, while language models can still falter when agents have asymmetric or fragmented information.

Latest papers

19 papers0 papers in the last four weeks, against 1 the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Oct 8, 2026

Epistemic Disturbance in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: State-Preserving Actions, Four-Valued Assessments, and the Distinction between Capability and Intention

In the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR), a decision maker (DM) either moves the conflict to another state or does nothing. The basic definitions leave inaction implicit, so every action that leaves the state unchanged is treated as doing nothing. Yet announcements, exercises, leaks and selective disclosures are neither moves nor inaction: they leave the state unchanged but change what other DMs believe about which moves are available and which moves others would want to make. We introduce such state-preserving actions by augmenting states with the DMs' epistemic states: a physical move changes the physical state, a state-preserving action changes only the epistemic state, and inaction is the absence of a transition. Actions generate evidence through observer-specific interpretation maps. Building on a four-valued extension of GMCR from the author's earlier work, which separates evidence for and against, we show that evidence for a move can only enable perceived moves and evidence against can only disable them, that two of the four reduction operators ignore one kind of evidence, and that contradictory assessments are absorbing under monotone accumulation. With the monotonicity of stability in move sets, this fixes the direction in which any action moves a DM's stability judgements and characterizes when actions can enable provocation or deterrence. Capability assessments affect all sanction-based stability concepts, and on the DM's own side also Nash stability, whereas intention assessments affect only sequential stability. Hedging between two candidate types weakly expands or shrinks an observer's sequentially stable set according to how it reads contradiction. In the 1995 DVD format negotiation, general metarationality cannot distinguish its phases, since the computer industry group could always sanction; sequential stability, which asks whether it would, can.
Aug 8, 2026

A Minimal κκ--ττ Logic for Risk-Sensitive Abduction

Standard approaches to abductive reasoning can retain multiple candidate explanations, but they do not generally combine explicit compositional cross-hypothesis interaction with an internal, rival-sensitive commitment judgment. This paper argues that in risk-sensitive domains -- where premature commitment carries asymmetric downside costs -- the timing of commitment is itself a governed decision that the inferential apparatus should formally represent. We present a minimal κκ--ττ logical framework built on two primitives: epistemic interaction among hypotheses (κκ) and a normative commitment threshold (ττ). Hypotheses may coexist, reinforce or inhibit one another, and form emergent composite explanations, while collapse into committed conclusions is regulated by governance constraints rather than forced by inference alone. The logic is developed in two complementary modes sharing the interaction relation and the governance apparatus: a synthetic mode, in which atomic hypotheses are composed upward into emergent explanations, and an analytic mode, in which complex observed states of affairs are decomposed into causal clusters of latent factors, with commitment governed at both the cluster and the factor level. The framework provides formal machinery for domains in which the distinction between highly likely and commit-worthy is operationally consequential. The κκ--ττ logic is positioned as the symbolic governance layer of a neurosymbolic architecture: its epistemic parameters are naturally estimated by neural components -- semantic embeddings and generative models, as demonstrated in existing computational realizations -- while its normative parameters remain under explicit human governance, yielding transparent and auditable abductive reasoning for deployment in high-stakes settings.
Aug 1, 2026

Assuming You Knew: Fixing an Epistemic Semantics for Flow Policies Using Agentic AI

Many high-level security requirements are about the allowed flow of information in programs and are difficult to make precise because they involve selective downgrading. Notions from epistemic logic have emerged as a good approach to policy semantics but a robust general framework remains elusive. A paper appearing in CSF 2018, entitled ``Assuming You Know: Epistemic Semantics of Relational Annotations for Expressive Flow Policies'', attempted to provide a unifying framework---but the formalization was sketchy and a correction was announced during the conference presentation. With aid from an agentic AI coding assistant, a corrected formalization has been machine checked in the Rocq proof assistant. The simplicity and generality of the framework may help compare different policy specification styles and enforce them by leveraging existing techniques.
Jun 30, 2026

Better Understanding, Understanding Better

"Any fool can know; the point is to understand." A well-known remark often attributed to Einstein captures a widely shared intuition: understanding is more than merely knowing. Yet epistemic logic has paid relatively little attention to understanding, despite its central role in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and recent debates about AI. A recurring theme in the philosophical literature is that, unlike knowledge, understanding comes in degrees: one may understand something more or less well, and one's understanding may be better than another's. We introduce a comparative epistemic logic of understanding with level-indexed understanding modalities and a comparative connective for saying that one agent understands why a proposition better than another agent does. Semantically, we enrich multi-agent epistemic models with agent-indexed graded explanation structures and a justification-style term algebra. This yields a unified framework for representing minimal, ordinary, more demanding, and ideal understanding, together with comparisons between agents with respect to the same formula at issue. We distinguish a finitary bounded-level calculus from an infinitary full-language companion system. We establish soundness and strong completeness, and show that each fixed finite-level fragment is decidable.
Jun 30, 2026

Analytic Cut in Epistemic Logics with Distributed Knowledge

Distributed knowledge is a notion of group knowledge studied in multi-agent epistemic logic. Semantically, the distributed knowledge of a group is interpreted via an accessibility relation given by the intersection of the epistemic accessibility relations of the agents in that group. This paper investigates sequent calculi for epistemic logics of distributed knowledge based on K45, KD45, and S5. While cut elimination holds in existing sequent calculi for modal logics K45 and KD45, it fails in all the systems mentioned above. Instead, we establish the analytic cut property for all three systems by adapting Takano' s (2018) strategy, which restricts the cut formulas to the set of subformulas of the conclusion of the cut rule. As a corollary, the Craig interpolation theorem holds for all logics considered. We also show that all proof-theoretic results remain valid when the empty group is allowed for the distributed-knowledge operator, in which case the distributed knowledge for the empty group is interpreted as the global modality.
Jun 30, 2026

Belief Contraction in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Dynamic epistemic logic represents belief change via model transformations induced by epistemic events. Its standard formulation (Baltag, Moss, Solecki, 1998) provides a natural account of belief expansion through the elimination of possibilities, but it cannot model belief contraction about factual propositions. A classic response enriches Kripke models with plausibility orderings, representing contraction as an update that promotes certain possibilities over others. We show that this approach has expressive limitations. In particular, the approach cannot model belief that violates positive introspection and contraction dynamics in response to a hedged public announcement that phi might be false. Motivated by these considerations, we introduce a mechanism for belief contraction defined directly on standard Kripke models, without any constraints on the doxastic accessibility relation. We show that it satisfies some of the standard properties of belief contraction but not others, study the conditions under which contraction may be unsuccessful, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic via reduction axioms. We also define a more general dynamic logic that is an extension of standard DEL and accommodates belief contractions due to events such as private or semi-private announcements, and provide a complete and sound axiomatization of the general logic.
Jun 30, 2026

The Logic of Data Access and Data Exchanges

We investigate a new logic that extends Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), by combining standard epistemic modalities for (individual and distributed) propositional knowledge with operators for (conditional) non-propositional knowledge of a number (in which an agent or a group have knowledge of the value of some variable x, conditional on some additional information). We also generalize these operators, by considering formulas that express the fact that an agent or group can (conditionally) narrow down the possible values of the variable x to at most N possibilities (for some natural number N). In order to name and compare such hypothetical values, we extend the logic further with definite descriptions based on minimization operators, denoting the least of the N possible values of x (according to some fixed order) that are considered possible by the agent or group. On this static base, we consider DEL-style extensions with dynamic modalities for general 'data-exchange events' (covering private and public propositional announcements, but also secret hacking of a private database, or public sharing of one's data via open-source repositories, etc.). In such scenarios, whole 'chunks' of information may be exchanged or modified: once access to a given source is gained, all the 'data' stored at that specific location becomes available. We give complete axiomatizations for the resulting logics, and prove their decidability and co-expressivity.
Jun 18, 2026

Study on Quantitative Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Belief Revision

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call $P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call P∗P*'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within P∗P* by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in P∗P*. The last section features an analysis of P∗P*'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function ∗0*^0 originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.
Jun 13, 2026

Provenance-Enhanced Statements in Knowledge Graphs

Provenance-enhanced statements of the form "according to XX, φ\varphi" are pervasive in contemporary knowledge graphs, especially in domains where graph content primarily represents claims, interpretations, and hypotheses (capta) rather than observer-independent facts (data). Current provenance models can record who asserted what, but they typically treat provenance as semantically neutral, leaving underspecified how attributed claims relate to factual commitment, to one another, and to reasoning. In this paper we introduce DEC, a framework that interprets provenance predicates as indicators of epistemic stance and groups provenance-homogeneous sets of statements into cognitive worlds. Drawing on cognitive modal logics (doxastic, epistemic, and conjectural), DEC characterizes locality, rationality, and controlled permeation between cognitive worlds and a distinguished factual core ("reality"), thereby enabling principled reasoning over attributed content without collapsing disagreements into inconsistencies. We formalize a DEC interpretation for RDF datasets that is conservative over RDF~1.2 semantics, clarify the role of intensionality and identity (including the Superman paradox), and illustrate the approach on common Semantic Web representations (named graphs, quoted triples/RDF-star, and reification). Finally, we describe our prototype DEC reasoner implemented as a Fuseki dataset module, supporting controlled factualisation and explicit detection of disagreements and delusions.
Jun 10, 2026

Mind the Perspective: Let's Reason Recursively for Theory of Mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning requires inferring agents' beliefs from partial and asymmetric observations, which remains an open challenge for LLMs. Existing prompting-based approaches improve ToM reasoning through observable-event filtering or temporal belief chains, without explicitly modeling nested beliefs. We introduce RecToM, an inference-time framework for ToM reasoning that models nested beliefs via recursive perspective construction. RecToM constructs each character perspective from the preceding character perspective along the character chain specified by the question, reducing higher-order belief questions to actual-world questions within the final constructed perspective. We further provide a KD45 analysis showing that RecToM's perspective construction induces a well-formed belief modality beyond simple event filtering. Experiments on ToM benchmarks, including Hi-ToM, Big-ToM, and FanToM, across multiple LLM backbones show that RecToM consistently outperforms recent advanced approaches, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Notably, RecToM reaches 100% accuracy on Hi-ToM with GPT-5.4 and Qwen3.5, a benchmark requiring higher-order ToM reasoning.
Jun 8, 2026

History of the Muddy Children Puzzle

The Muddy Children Puzzle is a puzzle about knowledge and ignorance that has been inspiring for the development of epistemic logic. Who came up with it first? This is unclear. We trace the origin of the Muddy Children Puzzle through logical and literary publications over the past two centuries. The puzzle inspired a numerous variations such as involving numbers or coloured hats. We also present a novel hats puzzle involving self-reference.
May 22, 2026

Understanding Privacy by Formalizing It

In most of the modern societies, there is a broad consensus regarding the need for promoting privacy and thus placing restrictions on technological-including AI-developments to protect people's right to privacy. In order to meet these expectations on the algorithmic level, first we need to make the concept of privacy and the related or derived rights formally specified. However, the notion of (the right to) privacy is subject to different interpretations. In this paper, we use a multi-modal logic to provide an initial formalization of different theories, basic principles and their implications investigating the right to privacy as an epistemic right within the theory of normative positions.
Apr 24, 2026

An Undecidability Proof for the Plan Existence Problem

The plan existence problem asks, given a goal in the form of a formula in modal logic, an initial epistemic state (a pointed Kripke model), and a set of epistemic actions, whether there exists a sequence of actions that can be applied to reach the goal. We prove that even in the case where the preconditions of the epistemic actions have modal depth at most 1, and there are no postconditions, the plan existence problem is undecidable. The (un)decidability of this problem was previously unknown.
Mar 22, 2026

Beyond Memorization: Distinguishing Between Pattern-Based and Epistemic Reasoning in LLMs Using Epistemic Puzzles

Epistemic reasoning requires agents to infer the state of the world from partial observations and information about other agents' knowledge. Prior work evaluating LLMs on epistemic puzzles often frames failures as memorization rather than reasoning. We argue that this dichotomy is too coarse for newer models: memorization is a limiting case of pattern-based reasoning, where a model matches a task to a familiar template and applies the corresponding solution. We introduce a two-dimensional benchmark over Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) puzzles, separating narrative familiarity from inference complexity, which allows us to distinguish pattern-based from epistemic reasoning. We find that models are substantially more robust to surface form changes than prior work suggested, yet consistently struggle in asymmetric settings where familiar patterns no longer apply and success requires tracking fragmented epistemic states. Code, datasets, and evaluation results are available at https://github.com/adigabay84/del-puzzles-benchmark.
Mar 4, 2026

Continuous Modal Logical Neural Networks: Modal Reasoning via Stochastic Accessibility

We propose Fluid Logic, a paradigm in which modal logical reasoning, temporal, epistemic, doxastic, deontic, is lifted from discrete Kripke structures to continuous manifolds via Neural Stochastic Differential Equations (Neural SDEs). Each type of modal operator is backed by a dedicated Neural SDE, and nested formulas compose these SDEs in a single differentiable graph. A key instantiation is Logic-Informed Neural Networks (LINNs): analogous to Physics-Informed Neural Networks (PINNs), LINNs embed modal logical formulas such as (□\Box bounded) and (◊\Diamond visits_lobe) directly into the training loss, guiding neural networks to produce solutions that are structurally consistent with prescribed logical properties, without requiring knowledge of the governing equations. The resulting framework, Continuous Modal Logical Neural Networks (CMLNNs), yields several key properties: (i) stochastic diffusion prevents quantifier collapse (□\Box and ◊\Diamond differ), unlike deterministic ODEs; (ii) modal operators are entropic risk measures, sound with respect to risk-based semantics with explicit Monte Carlo concentration guarantees; (iii)SDE-induced accessibility provides structural correspondence with classical modal axioms; (iv) parameterizing accessibility through dynamics reduces memory from quadratic in world count to linear in parameters. Three case studies demonstrate that Fluid Logic and LINNs can guide neural networks to produce consistent solutions across diverse domains: epistemic/doxastic logic (multi-robot hallucination detection), temporal logic (recovering the Lorenz attractor geometry from logical constraints alone), and deontic logic (learning safe confinement dynamics from a logical specification).
Mar 2, 2026

NM-DEKL∞3^3_\infty: A Three-Layer Non-Monotone Evolving Dependent Type Logic

We present a new dependent type system, NM-DEKL∞3^3_\infty (Non-Monotone Dependent Knowledge-Enhanced Logic), for formalising evolving knowledge in dynamic environments. The system uses a three-layer architecture separating a computational layer, a constructive knowledge layer, and a propositional knowledge layer. We define its syntax and semantics and establish Soundness and Equational Completeness; we construct a syntactic model and prove that it is initial in the category of models, from which equational completeness follows. We also give an embedding into the μμ-calculus and a strict expressiveness inclusion (including the expressibility of non-bisimulation-invariant properties).
Feb 26, 2026

The logic of KM belief update is contained in the logic of AGM belief revision

For each axiom of KM belief update we provide a corresponding axiom in a modal logic containing three modal operators: a unimodal belief operator BB, a bimodal conditional operator >> and the unimodal necessity operator □\square. We then compare the resulting logic to the similar logic obtained from converting the AGM axioms of belief revision into modal axioms and show that the latter contains the former. Denoting the latter by LAGM\mathcal L_{AGM} and the former by LKM\mathcal L_{KM} we show that every axiom of LKM\mathcal L_{KM} is a theorem of LAGM\mathcal L_{AGM}. Thus AGM belief revision can be seen as a special case of KM belief update. For the strong version of KM belief update we show that the difference between LKM\mathcal L_{KM} and LAGM\mathcal L_{AGM} can be narrowed down to a single axiom, which deals exclusively with unsurprising information, that is, with formulas that were not initially disbelieved.
Feb 17, 2026

Common Belief Revisited

Contrary to common belief, common belief is not KD4. If individual belief is KD45, common belief does indeed lose the 5 property and keep the D and 4 properties -- and it has none of the other commonly considered properties of knowledge and belief. But it has another property: C(Cφ→φ)C(Cφ\rightarrow φ) -- corresponding to so-called shift-reflexivity (reflexivity one step ahead). This observation begs the question: is KD4 extended with this axiom a complete characterisation of common belief in the KD45 case? If not, what is the logic of common belief? In this paper we show that the answer to the first question is ``no'': there is one additional axiom, and, furthermore, it relies on the number of agents. We show that the result is a complete characterisation of common belief, settling the open problem.
Oct 3, 2025

Axiomatisation for an asynchronous epistemic logic with sending and receiving messages

We investigate a logic for asynchronous announcements wherein the sending of the messages by the environment is separated from their reception by the individual agents. Both come with different modalities. In the logical semantics, formulas are interpreted in a world of a Kripke model but given a history of prior announcements and receptions that already happened. An axiomatisation AA for such a logic has been given in prior work, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model before any such announcements have taken place. This axiomatisation is a reduction system wherein one can show that every formula is equivalent to a purely epistemic formula without dynamic modalities for announcements and receptions. We propose a generalisation AA* of this axiomatisation, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model given any history of prior announcements and receptions of announcements. It does not extend the axiomatisation AA, for example it is no longer valid that nobody has received any message. Unlike AA, this axiomatisation AA* is infinitary and it is not a reduction system.