Spoofed Speech

Audio deepfake detectors need to transfer to languages absent from training, as multilingual speech synthesis outpaces labeled anti-spoofing resources. While detectors increasingly rely on self-supervised speech models (S3Ms), these backbones encode language-dependent structure that confounds spoof cues. We address this confound through language orthogonalization, a target-free ridge map that removes S3M variation projected onto continuous language-identification (LID) embeddings. Across six languages, six S3M backbones, and all Leave-N-Out settings, it consistently reduces EER across unseen languages. Cross-lingual EER correlates with LID-space distance, where orthogonalization yields larger gains for more distant transfers.

Audio anti-spoofing systems increasingly combine self-supervised learning, parameter-efficient fine-tuning, and graph-attention-based backends. However, performance gains in such systems are often entangled with concurrent changes in the backbone, fine-tuning strategy, and training protocol, making the independent contribution of graph attention design difficult to isolate. To address this issue, we conduct a systematic controlled study of the graph attention layer under a unified experimental setting. We decompose the layer into three independently testable design dimensions: scoring symmetry, temperature learnability, and routing granularity. These are instantiated as a concat-based scoring branch, a LearnT branch with learnable temperature, and a multi-temperature routing branch, respectively. Each dimension is implemented as an independently gated residual branch, enabling the evaluation of both individual variants and their combinations under the same experimental setting. Experiments on five evaluation sets with five random seeds show that the LearnT branch achieves the best average equal error rate (EER), yielding a 16.1% relative improvement over the baseline. In contrast, the multi-temperature routing branch does not improve average performance on its own, but substantially reduces cross-seed standard deviation when combined with the concat-based scoring branch. Moreover, two individually effective branches degrade performance when used together, resulting in a 25.6% relative deterioration compared with the baseline. This finding reveals strong non-additive interactions among graph attention design dimensions. Overall, the results suggest that, under parameter-constrained fine-tuning, improvements in graph attention layers depend more on capacity allocation and branch interaction than on simply adding more learnable parameters.

Watermarking LLM-generated text is an important task for tracing its provenance. Existing LLM watermarks preserve provenance under editing, but this same robustness allows an adversary to alter critical content while retaining attribution, a vulnerability known as piggyback spoofing. We introduce an innovative watermark that jointly provides provenance and tamper evidence. It co-embeds a robust signal and a fragile signal into each generated token. The signals share the same mechanism but use independent keys and different seeding windows over normalized text, making one resilient to edits and the other sensitive to reader-visible changes. Multiple rounds of unbiased tournament reweighting preserve the expected generation distribution, while a periodic round-allocation pattern controls the trade-off between the two signals. At detection, their scores form a two-dimensional space supporting three decisions: Intact, Tampered, and No-Watermark. Across two large language models and two prompt datasets, our method demonstrates the highest tamper-detection rate among the evaluated methods while maintaining competitive attribution robustness and perplexity. Ablation studies show that reliable three-state detection requires a well-defined notion of intactness, co-embedding of the two signals, and complementary sensitivity to edits.

Accurate Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-based localization is essential for safe and reliable autonomous driving. However, spoofing attacks can manipulate vehicle position estimates. Continuous and subtle attacks are particularly difficult to detect because individual GNSS observations may remain plausible while the inconsistency between GNSS-implied displacement and onboard vehicle motion gradually increases. Existing methods often rely on static vehicle-behavior features or a single residual signal and do not explicitly model this evolution. To address this problem, we propose a causal high-order liquid evidence framework for GNSS spoofing detection. The method first constructs a physics-guided GNSS--motion inconsistency residual by comparing GNSS-implied displacement with onboard-motion-derived displacement. It then forms separate evidence streams for the residual level and its first- and second-order discrete variations, with relevant contextual cues selected according to the evidence order. Each stream is processed by a separate adaptive liquid encoder, and the resulting temporal states are hierarchically coupled to predict spoofing at the window endpoint using only current and past observations. Experiments on three subsets of the real-world AV-GPS dataset show that the proposed method achieves the highest F1-scores among the evaluated temporal models on Dataset1 and Dataset3, reaching 0.9535 and 0.9777, respectively. On Dataset~3, it detects both labeled normal-to-attack transitions within four sampling steps. Code and datasets are publicly available at: https://github.com/pangjunbiao/GNSS_Spoofing.git.

Face recognition systems face two distinct, commonly-separated failure modes: spoofing, where an impostor presents a photograph or video of an authorized user, and disguise, where a legitimate user is rejected because their appearance differs from their enrolled template due to accessories, facial hair, illumination, or pose. This paper proposes and compares five combined feature-extraction and classification pipelines that address both problems within a single framework: PM (PCA and Minimum Euclidean Distance, MED), LPM (Local Binary Patterns with PCA and MED), HPM (Histogram of Oriented Gradients with PCA and MED), SM (Speeded-Up Robust Features with MED), and HM (Harris corner features with MED). Each pipeline follows a common two-phase process comprising pre-processing, feature extraction, feature filtering, and classification. The methods were trained on 115 subjects drawn from the FEI, Disguised Faces Database, and NUAA databases and evaluated on six test conditions covering mixed appearances, frontal faces, dark illumination, left- and right-turned poses, and photo-spoofing attempts. The HOG-based pipeline (HPM) achieved the most consistent performance across conditions, with 94.59% accuracy on mixed-appearance disguise, 81.5-93.2% across pose and illumination variants, and 91.67% on spoofing, while the LBP-based pipeline (LPM) achieved the second-highest spoofing-detection accuracy (93.2%), behind PM (96.67%), but weaker robustness to pose change. These results reveal a measurable trade-off between spoof sensitivity and disguise robustness among classical feature representations, motivating the deep-learning and cross-database extensions discussed in the concluding sections.

Backdoor attacks on Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) have primarily assumed dirty-label poisoning, in which triggered training samples are relabeled to an attacker-selected class. We study clean-label temporal poisoning, where a fixed timestamp transformation is applied only to the target-class training streams, leaving their labels unchanged. The transformation preserves the per-pixel, per-polarity event count exactly, making clean and triggered samples identical after temporal aggregation while altering the sequence processed by the SNN. Across three neuromorphic datasets and both convolutional and transformer-based victims, the attack reaches an ASR of 1.00 in the strongest configurations. We analyze the attack through poison-budget and trigger-shape ablations and evaluate established backdoor defenses adapted to spiking models. Defenses that collapse the time axis before inspection are blind by construction, while feature-space methods detect the poison only in selected settings. Our model-free detector, based on per-step event mass, detects the evaluated temporal transformations, demonstrating both the limitation of rate-collapsed defenses and the boundary of the attack's stealth. To our knowledge, this is the first clean-label backdoor attack evaluated on SNNs and neuromorphic event data.

Face anti-spoofing (FAS) is increasingly expected to provide not only bona fide/spoof decisions, but also attack semantics and image-grounded evidence for human inspection. Existing discriminative FAS models remain largely label-centric, while recent MLLM-based methods offer structured outputs but still rely mainly on supervised fine-tuning, often producing template-like rationales and weak optimization for difficult attacks. We propose FAS-R1, a two-stage reasoning-oriented MLLM framework for unified FAS prediction, covering authenticity classification, attack-type recognition and spoof-region localization. FAS-R1 first uses FAS-R1-23K, a high-quality long-CoT dataset, for cold-start supervised fine-tuning, and then performs FAS-specific GRPO post-training. Degradation-Simulated Augmentation (DSA) encourages stable spoof-cue reasoning across visual-quality shifts, while Difficulty-Aware GRPO (DA-GRPO) mitigates easy-sample dominance that may leave difficult task--attack groups under-optimized, especially for subtle or ambiguous attacks such as makeup and mask attacks. The main 3B FAS-R1 model achieves 98.75% authenticity accuracy, 93.33% attack-type accuracy, and 96.30/94.73% AP@40/AP@50 in-domain. It also outperforms the compared systems in cross-domain authenticity generalization and answer-and-rationale quality. Experiments with different base models further show favorable scaling behavior. The code will be released soon.

With the increasing diversity of spoofing attacks, there is a growing demand for unified Face Anti-Spoofing (FAS) models capable of detecting both physical and digital threats. While existing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) demonstrate high generalization in this context, they heavily rely on complex multimodal fusion and external text encoders. In this paper, we propose DINO-VPT, a lightweight, vision-only framework leveraging hierarchical visual prompt tuning. By dynamically injecting prompts conditioned on input features via a Prompt Routing Network (PRN), our method effectively disentangles diverse spoofing artifacts without requiring multimodal fusion. Evaluations on the UniAttackData benchmark demonstrate that DINO-VPT achieves higher accuracy than state-of-the-art VLM-based methods. Our results indicate that a properly structured vision-only architecture can achieve state-of-the-art performance in unified FAS without the need for multimodal supervision.

Recent studies on partial audio spoofing mainly focus on studio-recorded speech with temporal localization of spoofed segments. However, these studies often overlook realistic conditions where spoofed and bonafide segments simultaneously coexist across speech and environmental sound components. In this paper, we present PC-Mix, the first dataset for partial-component spoofing detection, where either or both audio components may be partially spoofed. In PC-Mix, bonafide and partially spoofed environmental-sound components are first constructed and mixed with speech signals from an existing partial-spoof dataset, producing audio in which either or both components may be locally manipulated. This design addresses two major gaps in existing partial spoofing benchmarks: the lack of realistic environmental sounds in speech partial spoofing scenarios and the absence of partial spoofing detection for environmental sound components. We further establish standardized evaluation protocols and design a joint learning framework to optimize spoofing detection across speech, environmental sound, and mixed audio. Experiments highlight the increased difficulty introduced by mixed conditions. The results demonstrate that training under matched target conditions is more effective than directly transferring models trained on speech or environmental sound components.

As the accuracy of speech deepfake detection improves with the use of self-supervised representations such as wav2vec 2.0 and HuBERT, understanding why the speech is classified as bona fide or deepfake remains an open challenge. In pursuit of more trustworthy and interpretable artificial intelligence, we introduce a phoneme-level analysis framework that connects model predictions to measurable phonetic units. Our post-hoc explainability method is generally applicable to a variety of speech deepfake detection systems based on convolutional neural networks since it leverages Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping in conjunction with speech recognition to generate saliency maps aligned with phonemes and pauses. This pipeline reveals statistically significant attack- and speaker-dependent phonetic cues associated with spoofed speech in terms that humans can understand. Experiments using ASVspoof 5 show comparable detection performance to similar architectures while providing linguistic interpretations across speakers and spoofing conditions.

Most spoofing countermeasures now place a light classifier on top of a self-supervised (SSL) speech encoder. A growing line of work adds handcrafted acoustic features and fuses them by cross-attention, partly because the attention weights appear to explain which cues the model relies on. Two things about such fusion remain untested: whether the handcrafted features contribute anything once a strong SSL encoder is already in place, and whether the attention map faithfully reflects what the classifier actually uses. We study both questions with MOSAIC, a single model that handles logical access (LA) and physical access (PA) attacks by projecting a 152-dimensional biophonetic vector into six query tokens attending over thirteen intermediate layers of WavLM-Large. Rather than pursuing state-of-the-art accuracy, we treat the model itself as the object of analysis and apply inference-time interventions that zero out selected components. Removing the handcrafted branch lowers the EER by 0.67 percentage points under LA, so WavLM alone is sufficient there, but raises it by 0.76 points under PA, where the branch supplies replay channel evidence the encoder does not carry. The 6x13 attention map is highly stable under resampling (bootstrap rank correlation 0.99), yet its faithfulness varies by domain: layer attention weights predict the causal importance of each layer under PA (rho = +0.62) but not under LA (rho = -0.28). The handcrafted branch and its attention-based explanation are therefore trustworthy for replay attacks and not for synthetic ones. On standard benchmarks the model is mid-range on LA and ahead of the official baselines on cross-source deepfakes (6.21% EER on ASVspoof 2021 DF). The contribution is not a new architecture but a checking procedure: verify handcrafted cues and attention maps by intervention before trusting either.

While deepfake audio detection systems achieve high performance in controlled benchmarks, their reliability often diminishes in the wild. Prior work shows that dataset-specific artifacts contribute to this gap. Yet, systematic tools to identify which acoustic properties a model exploits as shortcuts remain limited. We propose an intervention-based diagnostic framework, grounded in a directed graphical model, that formally distinguishes confound-driven shortcut dependencies from legitimate domain shift. We operationalise this through controlled acoustic perturbations targeting non-speech structure, spectral content, and signal energy, complemented by corpus-level distributional analysis. Evaluating XLS-R-300M with RawGAT-ST across ASVspoof challenges datasets, we quantify model sensitivity to specific intervention types. Results reveal that non-speech interventions produce the largest performance shifts, confirming non-speech intervals as a dominant shortcut.

Rapid advancements in generative speech technology have compromised the reliability of voice biometrics. While current spoofing detectors excel when assessed under in-domain conditions, generalisation to out-of-domain settings is often poor. We show that this can be due to linguistic bias. A reliance on linguistic cues observed in training data can then compromise robustness to cross-data. We propose a linguistic-invariant spoofing detection framework utilizing teacher-student adversarial learning. The linguistic-aware teacher model, pre-trained on linguistic content of an external dataset, guides the student detector via gradient reversal to minimize the linguistic information. To prevent the inadvertent removal of non-linguistic cues, we incorporate a Variational Information Bottleneck to enable suppression of principal cues. Across nine DF Arena datasets, our method achieves up to a 36.2% relative reduction in the EER compare to the baseline.

Poisoning attacks entail attackers intentionally tampering with training data. In this paper, we consider a dirty-label poisoning attack scenario on a speech commands classification system. The threat model assumes that certain utterances from one of the classes (source class) are poisoned by superimposing a trigger on it, and its label is changed to another class selected by the attacker (target class). We propose a filtering defense against such an attack. First, we use DIstillation with NO labels (DINO) to learn unsupervised representations for all the training examples. Next, we use K-means and LDA to cluster these representations. Finally, we keep the utterances with the most repeated label in their cluster for training and discard the rest. For a 10% poisoned source class, we demonstrate a drop in attack success rate from 99.75% to 0.25%. We test our defense against a variety of threat models, including different target and source classes, as well as trigger variations.

Large speech foundation models have shown strong potential for speech deepfake detection, but direct fine-tuning is limited by a mismatch between self-supervised pre-training objectives and spoof-specific artifacts. To address this, we propose a mix-frame post-training strategy to create localized spoof-oriented perturbations and use frame-level supervision to encourage the SSL model to learn local inconsistencies that are critical for robust spoof detection. On ASVspoof5, we achieve state-of-the-art EER 4.50% for a single model without data augmentation. On ASVspoof2021 LA/DF, it further achieves only 0.16% absolute EER gap between LA and DF, indicating strong and balanced robustness across distinct distortion conditions. These results show that supervised post-training provides an effective and practical way to adapt speech foundation models for robust deepfake detection.

Spoofed speech detection is increasingly challenged by realistic synthesis, voice conversion, and replay attacks, with cross-dataset generalization remaining a major limitation. This work we propose a Temporal Pyramid Adapter that utilize parallel temporal convolutions with varying receptive fields to capture multi-scale spoofing cues, ranging from local artifacts to global prosodic irregularities. We also integrated self-supervised XLS-R representations combined with front-end adapters, including Mel, Sinc, and a Temporal Pyramid design for multi-scale temporal modeling. The proposed model is evaluated cross multiple benchmark including ASVspoof 2017, ASVspoof 2021 (DF/LA), PartialSpoof, DiffSSD, and multilingual HQ-MPSD datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that Temporal Pyramid model obtained AUC of 99.24% and a EER of 3.87% on the PartialSpoof database, which is significantly outperforming the base model and several SOTA baseline such as LCNN-BLSTM (9.87% EER) and TRACE (8.08% EER). Additionally, multilingual evaluations confirm that while spoofing artifact are independent from language. While self-supervised representations improve robustness, performance degrades under domain and language shifts, highlighting the need for better adaptation and calibration strategies.

As Large Language Model (LLM) APIs become ubiquitous, users increasingly rely on black-box fingerprinting to verify that providers are serving the advertised premium models. However, these methods may overlook adversarial providers who manipulate model weights to cheat the fingerprint process. We introduce a novel threat termed fingerprint spoofing, where a malicious provider stealthily serves a weaker model that has been parameter-efficiently fine-tuned to mimic a stronger model, thereby evading user-side fingerprinting. We first formally prove that user-side resource constraints (i.e., finite query budgets and weak fingerprinting classifiers) make current fingerprinting vulnerable to fingerprint spoofing. Guided by this theoretical analysis, we propose GhostPrint, a cost-effective attack framework leveraging surrogate modeling, reward-ranked fine-tuning, and knowledge distillation. Extensive evaluations in both static and continual fingerprinting settings demonstrate that GhostPrint allows weak models to consistently bypass representative fingerprint methods while maintaining utility at a low fine-tuning cost, exposing a critical vulnerability in current LLM fingerprinting pipelines.

Speech deepfake detection is predominantly treated as an opaque classification task where all temporal frames are aggregated equally. This ignores that different phonetic categories carry vastly different amounts of discriminative information. To address this, we propose a phoneme-guided cross-attention framework that transforms detection into an interpretable, phonetically grounded process. We factorize the spoofing posterior $P(\text{spoofed}\mid X, W)$, conditioned on the acoustic representation $X$ and the phonetic posteriorgram $W$. The resulting factorization can be written as $P(\text{spoofed} \mid X, W) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} w_i \cdot P(\text{spoofed} \mid X, Z = z_i)$, where $M$ denotes the number of phonetic classes, $P(\text{spoofed} \mid X, Z = z_i)$ is the spoofing probability for the $i$-th phonetic class $z_i$ conditioned on $X$, and each $w_i$ is the prevalence of phonetic class $z_i$ in the utterance. Our transformer-based architecture instantiates this through a cross-attention block in which phonetic queries selectively probe information in acoustic keys and values, with softmax-normalized pooling supplying explicit phone-presence weights. Unlike prior approaches that rely heavily on post-hoc explainability methods, our framework offers phonetic-explainability-by-design. We evaluate the framework on an LJSpeech-derived corpus, ASVspoof 2019 LA, and ASVspoof 5 Track 1. Per-phone importance rankings reveal that discriminative power concentrates on articulatory categories that generative models struggle to reproduce faithfully. Stops, fricatives, affricates, nasals, and silence-boundary closures rank most discriminative, while periodic vowels and semivowels rank lower. Beyond competitive performance, our model provides structural interpretability, yielding an inspectable per-articulatory category breakdown of the final verdict.

Recent advances in speech generation have significantly improved the naturalness of synthetic speech, making spoofing detection increasingly challenging. A key limitation of current anti-spoofing systems is their limited robustness to unseen synthesis methods. In this work, we transform a self-supervised speech representation model into a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture to improve generalization. Feed-forward blocks in selected encoder layers are replaced by multiple expert networks controlled by a layer-wise gating mechanism, allowing experts to capture complementary acoustic patterns while preserving the representations learned during self-supervised pretraining. We further analyze the architectural choices affecting the performance of this MoE conversion and investigate the activation behavior of the experts. The proposed approach is evaluated on 14 spoofing datasets and reduces the macro EER from 5.46% to 4.81%, corresponding to 11.9% relative improvement over the baseline.

We present SpAArSIST, a deployment-oriented refinement of the widely used AASIST graph pooling backend for self-supervised learning (SSL) based anti-spoofing. Motivated by redundant operations in public implementations, we replace learned pooling and stack-node attention with explicit, lightweight choices: separate train and inference graph pooling ratios $(k_{\mathrm{tr}},k_{\mathrm{inf}})$, magnitude-based node scoring, and mean aggregation of graph nodes. The best overall configuration (rank 1) cuts backend compute by 20.7% (195.045M $\rightarrow$ 154.706M MACs) and model size by 4.1% (611.8k $\rightarrow$ 586.4k params), while improving out-of-domain robustness on In-the-Wild to 2.82% EER and 0.078 minDCF (from 4.64% and 0.133) and remaining competitive on ASVspoof5. We further provide a composite selection score that summarizes accuracy, calibration, and compute to support balanced deployment-oriented model choice.

Biometric systems are increasingly deployed in security applications; however, they remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in which attackers exploit counterfeit biometric data to gain unauthorized access. This research evaluates the effectiveness of state-of-the-art machine learning models, MobileNetV2, DenseNet-121, Inception-v3, and Spoof Trace Disentanglement (STD) in detecting spoofing attacks within facial recognition systems. Using the CelebA-Spoof dataset, the study evaluates model effectiveness using metrics such as accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 Score. Cross-dataset validation is carried out on the MSU-MFSD dataset to assess generalizability. The results show MobileNetV2 as the most efficient model, achieving 92% accuracy while balancing computational effectiveness, making it appropriate for real-life applications. Inception-v3 shows moderate robustness, while DenseNet-121 and STD struggle with generalization. The findings highlight the need for advances in domain adaptation and hybrid architectures to enhance biometric security systems.

Sophisticated generative speech technology can undermined the reliability of voice biometrics. While spoofing detection systems excel when assessed under in-domain conditions, generalisation to out-of-domain settings is often poor. In this paper, we show that such issues could be caused by speaker bias, where models learn individual voice traits rather than markers of manipulation or generation. We propose a teacher-student framework for speaker-invariant spoofing detection that disentangles identity without requiring speaker labels. We leverage a pre-trained speaker recognition teacher to guide a student model via a gradient reversal layer. To control the balance between suppressing cues related to voice identity with the preservation of those related to spoofing detection, we integrate a Variational Information Bottleneck. Evaluations across nine datasets show our model achieves a 25.7% relative reduction to the EER compared to the MHFA baseline.

Voice biometric systems face growing threats from spoofing attacks, yet the evaluation of detection models remains inconsistent across datasets. To investigate these unpredictable fluctuations, we conduct a comprehensive benchmark of four self-supervised learning feature extractors paired with four back-end classifiers. We compare the hierarchical local feature extraction of ResNet with the global sequence and relational modeling of attention and graph-based back-ends. Through multi-corpus training across three scenarios and six evaluation datasets, our empirical analysis yields two critical findings. First, we expose a domain bias within the ASVspoof 5 dataset, showing that naive data scaling actively degrades performance. Second, our cross-linguistic analysis reveals that fine-tuning with just 8 hours of target-language data enhances detection robustness. Together, these findings emphasize the critical need for domain-aware and language-specific adaptation in spoofing detection.

Synthetic and manipulated speech can reduce the reliability of automatic speaker verification systems, so anti-spoofing methods need to be both accurate and efficient in training and inference. This paper focuses on the ASVspoof 5 Track 1 closed condition, where standard cross-entropy training may not give enough attention to hard trials and is not directly aligned with ranking- and threshold-based evaluation metrics. We propose TFPARN, a Transformer-based focal-pairwise attentive ranking network. The system extracts log-Mel features from speech, uses a Transformer encoder to model frame-level information, applies attention pooling to obtain utterance-level representations, and is trained with a combination of focal classification loss and pairwise ranking loss. RawBoost augmentation is used during training, and test-time augmentation is applied during evaluation to improve robustness. Compared with re-implemented AASIST and RawNet2 baselines under the same protocol, TFPARN achieves the best results, with a minDCF of 0.2430 and an EER of 12.52%. Ablation experiments further show that the pairwise loss, focal loss, and attention pooling all improve performance. TFPARN also uses the lowest inference memory among the compared systems, at 1.4 GB, runs at about 0.79 ms per utterance, and reaches its best checkpoint in less training time than AASIST. These results show that TFPARN provides a good balance between detection accuracy and computational cost for logical access anti-spoofing.

The rapid advancement of generative AI has made audio deepfakes increasingly indistinguishable from authentic human vocals, posing significant threats to persons-of-interest (POI) such as public figures. Current detection systems primarily rely on generic, black-box models that fail to capture speaker-specific idiosyncratic traits and lack interpretability. In this paper, we propose Phoneme-based Voice Profiling (PVP), a novel personalized defense framework. By shifting the detection paradigm from macro-utterance analysis to micro-phonetic modeling, PVP captures the unique acoustic distributions underlying a POI's habitual articulatory patterns. Specifically, our framework models speaker-specific phonetic realizations using lightweight Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) estimated solely from bona fide reference speech. This design enables data-efficient profiling and robust generalization to previously unseen spoofing attacks without requiring heavy spoof-specific training. Furthermore, we introduce the first large-scale Chinese POI deepfake dataset to benchmark speaker-specific detection. Experimental results demonstrate that PVP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art generic detectors in POI spoofing scenarios, achieving substantial EER reductions while providing fine-grained, phoneme-level interpretability for forensic analysis. Code and data are available at: https://github.com/JunXue-tech/PVP

Mobile remote identity verification (RIdV) systems are exposed to attacks that manipulate or replace the facial video stream, including presentation attacks, real-time deepfakes, and video injection. Recent European requirements, including ETSI TS 119 461 and CEN/TS 18099, motivate evidence channels beyond camera-based presentation-attack detection. This paper studies whether passive motion traces recorded during selfie capture provide auxiliary evidence for spoof screening and user verification. We introduce CanSelfie, a dataset of 375 bona fide multi-sensor sequences collected at 50 Hz from 30 participants using a commercial mobile RIdV application, together with stationary, handheld, and temporally shifted attack-proxy scenarios. We benchmark 7 multivariate time-series classifiers and 8 whole-series anomaly detectors across sensor configurations and temporal windows. For spoof screening, accelerometer-only ROCKAD obtains 0.00% FRR and 43.8% FAR, while QUANT+3-NN obtains the lowest FAR of 32.0% at 2.37% FRR; both reject all stationary proxies. For same-device and same-session user verification, WEASEL+MUSE reaches 1.07% EER using 9 channels. Raw acceleration is the most informative modality, and closed-set accuracy alone does not imply good verification because threshold calibration depends on score distributions. The findings support selfie-capture motion as a low-friction auxiliary signal, while leaving cross-device, cross-session, and real injection-attack evaluation as necessary next steps. Code and data available at: https://github.com/Ergzar/Selfie-Motion-AD-TSC.

Face Anti-Spoofing (FAS) remains challenging due to the requirement for robust domain generalization across unseen environments. While recent trends leverage Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for semantic supervision, these multimodal approaches often demand prohibitive computational resources and exhibit high inference latency. Furthermore, their efficacy is inherently limited by the quality of the underlying visual features. This paper revisits the potential of vision-only foundation models to establish a highly efficient and robust baseline for FAS. We conduct a systematic benchmarking of 15 pre-trained models, such as supervised CNNs, supervised ViTs, and self-supervised ViTs, under severe cross-domain scenarios including the MICO and Limited Source Domains (LSD) protocols. Our comprehensive analysis reveals that self-supervised vision models, particularly DINOv2 with Registers, significantly suppress attention artifacts and capture critical, fine-grained spoofing cues. Combined with Face Anti-Spoofing Data Augmentation (FAS-Aug), Patch-wise Data Augmentation (PDA) and Attention-weighted Patch Loss (APL), our proposed vision-only baseline achieves state-of-the-art performance in the MICO protocol. This baseline outperforms existing methods under the data-constrained LSD protocol while maintaining superior computational efficiency. This work provides a definitive vision-only baseline for FAS, demonstrating that optimized self-supervised vision transformers can serve as a backbone for both vision-only and future multimodal FAS systems. The project page is available at: https://gsisaoki.github.io/FAS-VFMbenchmark-CVPRW2026/ .

Audio anti-spoofing systems are typically trained to assign one authenticity label to an entire speech utterance. This formulation becomes under-specified for transformations where the underlying speaker identity and linguistic content remain unchanged. We study this problem using benign, authenticity-preserving speech transformations, including voice quality conversion and speech restoration, applied to both bona fide and spoofed speech. Instead of treating all processed audio as spoofed, we factorise labels into source authenticity and processed status. Across SSL representations and DF-Arena fine-tuning experiments, we find that utterance processing status can transfer more reliably than source attribution: detectors can often identify that speech has been processed, while still confusing processed bona fide and processed spoofed speech. These results suggest that audio deepfake defences must move beyond the binary spoofed/authentic paradigm. Robust detection requires granular reporting on source authenticity, processing status, and precise processing localisation.

The modern generative audio models can be used by an adversary in an unlawful manner, specifically, to impersonate other people to gain access to private information. To mitigate this issue, speech deepfake detection (SDD) methods started to evolve. Unfortunately, current SDD methods generally suffer from the lack of generalization to new audio domains and generators. More than that, they lack interpretability, especially human-like reasoning that would naturally explain the attribution of a given audio to the bona fide or spoof class and provide human-perceptible cues. In this paper, we propose HIR-SDD, a novel SDD framework that combines the strengths of Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) with the chain-of-thought reasoning derived from the novel proposed human-annotated dataset. Experimental evaluation demonstrates both the effectiveness of the proposed method and its ability to provide reasonable justifications for predictions.

We introduce LRLspoof, a large-scale multilingual synthetic-speech corpus for cross-lingual spoof detection, comprising 2,732 hours of audio generated with 24 open-source TTS systems across 66 languages, including 45 low-resource languages under our operational definition. To evaluate robustness without requiring target-domain bonafide speech, we benchmark 11 publicly available countermeasures using threshold transfer: for each model we calibrate an EER operating point on pooled external benchmarks and apply the resulting threshold, reporting spoof rejection rate (SRR). Results show model-dependent cross-lingual disparity, with spoof rejection varying markedly across languages even under controlled conditions, highlighting language as an independent source of domain shift in spoof detection. The dataset is publicly available at \href{https://huggingface.co/datasets/lab260/LRLspoof}{\textbf{\underline{\textit{HuggingFace}}}} and \href{https://modelscope.cn/datasets/lab260/LRLspoof}{\textbf{\underline{\textit{ModelScope}}}}

Face Anti-Spoofing (FAS) is essential for the security of facial recognition systems in diverse scenarios such as payment processing and surveillance. Current multimodal FAS methods often struggle with effective generalization, mainly due to modality-specific biases and domain shifts. To address these challenges, we introduce the \textbf{M}ulti\textbf{m}odal \textbf{D}enoising and \textbf{A}lignment (\textbf{MMDA}) framework. By leveraging the zero-shot generalization capability of CLIP, the MMDA framework effectively suppresses noise in multimodal data through denoising and alignment mechanisms, thereby significantly enhancing the generalization performance of cross-modal alignment. The \textbf{M}odality-\textbf{D}omain Joint \textbf{D}ifferential \textbf{A}ttention (\textbf{MD2A}) module in MMDA concurrently mitigates the impacts of domain and modality noise by refining the attention mechanism based on extracted common noise features. Furthermore, the \textbf{R}epresentation \textbf{S}pace \textbf{S}oft (\textbf{RS2}) Alignment strategy utilizes the pre-trained CLIP model to align multi-domain multimodal data into a generalized representation space in a flexible manner, preserving intricate representations and enhancing the model's adaptability to various unseen conditions. We also design a \textbf{U}-shaped \textbf{D}ual \textbf{S}pace \textbf{A}daptation (\textbf{U-DSA}) module to enhance the adaptability of representations while maintaining generalization performance. These improvements not only enhance the framework's generalization capabilities but also boost its ability to represent complex representations. Our experimental results on four benchmark datasets under different evaluation protocols demonstrate that the MMDA framework outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods in terms of cross-domain generalization and multimodal detection accuracy. The code will be released soon.

Machine Learning (ML) malware detectors rely heavily on crowd-sourced AntiVirus (AV) labels, with platforms like VirusTotal serving as trusted sources of malware annotations. But what if attackers could manipulate these labels to classify benign software as malicious? We introduce label spoofing attacks, a new threat that contaminates crowd-sourced datasets by embedding minimal and undetectable malicious patterns into benign samples. These patterns coerce AV engines into misclassifying legitimate files as harmful, enabling poisoning attacks against ML-based malware classifiers trained on those data. We demonstrate this scenario by developing AndroVenom, a methodology for polluting realistic data sources and launching subsequent poisoning attacks against ML malware detectors. Experiments show that not only are state-of-the-art feature extractors unable to filter such injections, but various ML models experience Denial-of-Service (DoS) with as little as 1% poisoned samples. Additionally, attackers can flip decisions for specific unaltered benign samples by modifying only 0.015% of the training data, threatening their reputation and market share, while evading anomaly detectors operating on the training data. We conclude by raising concerns about the trustworthiness of ML training processes based on AV annotations and argue that further investigation is needed to develop more reliable labeling strategies.

Voice Authentication Systems (VAS) use unique vocal characteristics for verification. They are increasingly integrated into high-security sectors such as banking and healthcare. Despite their improvements using deep learning, they face severe vulnerabilities from sophisticated threats like deepfakes and adversarial attacks. The emergence of realistic voice cloning complicates detection, as systems struggle to distinguish authentic from synthetic audio. While anti-spoofing countermeasures (CMs) exist to mitigate these risks, many rely on static detection models that can be bypassed by novel adversarial methods, leaving a critical security gap. To demonstrate this vulnerability, we propose the Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA), a novel method that strategically manipulates inaudible frequency regions of AI-generated audio. By altering the voice in imperceptible zones to the human ear, SMIA creates adversarial samples that sound authentic while deceiving CMs. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our attack against state-of-the-art (SOTA) models across multiple tasks, under simulated real-world conditions. SMIA achieved a strong attack success rate (ASR) of at least 82% against combined VAS/CM systems, at least 97.5% against standalone speaker verification systems, and 100% against countermeasures. These findings conclusively demonstrate that current security postures are insufficient against adaptive adversarial attacks. This work highlights the urgent need for a paradigm shift toward next-generation defenses that employ dynamic, context-aware frameworks capable of evolving with the threat landscape.