Rethinking Prospect Theory for LLMs: Revealing the Instability of Decision-Making under Epistemic Uncertainty

Large Language Models (LLMs) are predominantly governed by probabilistic frameworks in which the sum of outcome probabilities is constrained to unity. This architectural limitation, often imposed by Softmax layers, leads to a collapse of uncertainty that makes it difficult to differentiate between epistemic uncertainty, paradox, and vagueness. We present an empirical investigation of the application of Neutrosophic Logic, a framework that treats Truth (T), Indeterminacy (I), and Falsity (F) as three independent dimensions, to model epistemic states in LLMs. We conducted experiments on a family of four OpenAI GPT models across five linguistic phenomena: logical paradoxes, epistemic ignorance, vagueness, ethical contradictions, and future contingencies, under three prompting strategies: neutrosophic, probabilistic, and entropy-derived. Our findings reveal that the neutrosophic approach, by allowing T+I+F > 1, a state we term hyper-truth, provides a richer representation of a model's internal state. In 35% of evaluations, hyper-truth emerged spontaneously, predominantly under ethical contradiction and logical paradox. We demonstrate that this approach preserves truth values in fuzzy contexts and offers a robust method for identifying and quantifying internal model conflict. We conclude that the integration of neutrosophic evaluation layers is a critical step toward more transparent, reliable, and ethically aware AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as decision assistants who must reason probabilistically from available evidence under explicit decision costs. We propose a decision-theoretic framework that decomposes LLMs' decision loss into two components: forming accurate beliefs from provided evidence and translating those beliefs into actions that optimize a provided utility function. Using a synthetic benchmark with known ground truth, we apply the decomposition to characterize probabilistic reasoning in frontier and open-sourced models. We further evaluate whether RL interventions targeting beliefs, decisions, or both improve these components across three domains, whether improvements transfer across components and elicitation formats, and whether decision performance can improve without improvement in belief formation. We find that targeting one component of probabilistic reasoning redistributes decision loss, improving the target without necessarily transferring to others, and that jointly targeting belief formation and decision-making improves both but hinges on matched formats between training and evaluation.

With rapidly improving capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in many complex real-world tasks. Beyond requiring in-depth knowledge and reasoning skills, many of these tasks exhibit a high degree of subjectivity and require that the outputs of the model can be trusted. While a lot of progress has been made to train better models, decision-making algorithms have received less attention. In this work, we present and evaluate various uncertainty-aware decision-making algorithms based on Bayesian decision theory and risk-averse decision making on the tasks of tutoring and automatic peer reviewing. Concretely, we take uncertainty over tutoring strategies and review scores into account when generating a tutor response or review and use conformal prediction to provide guarantees over strategy and score. We find empirically that these algorithms can improve the utility of the generations but need to be carefully implemented when ambiguity is high. For example, risk-averse rules can degrade performance by optimizing for generic outputs, while Bayesian methods tend to perform better. Our work uses techniques from decision theory to improve LLM-based decision-making and outlines open challenges for the community.