More Capable, Less Cooperative? When LLMs Fail At Zero-Cost Collaboration

Multi-agent systems built from large language models are deployed widely, yet how much performance is lost when two LLMs must coordinate rather than act alone remains unclear. We formulate the collaboration tax as the team-decentralisation loss of a two-player cooperative game with private information, with two propositions characterising its sign and its equivalence to a max-superadditivity violation. We operationalise this definition on 32 solo-tractable tasks grouped by source of grounding friction and measure it on 11 models from 7 providers. The tax is structured along two no-exception axes: a category ordering across every model and a monotonic decrease with capability. The proximate mechanism is not a reasoning deficit but a four-stage conversational cascade in which agents make ungrounded claims, fail to query the partner, skip integrating both views, and accept the answer without re-derivation. The tax is mechanically predictable from conversation features and partly tractable: a prompt intervention targeting all four stages closes a substantial fraction of the gap, with the dominant bottleneck differing across categories. In heterogeneous pairs the tax is pulled toward the stronger partner rather than the additive midpoint, empirically realising the max-superadditivity violation predicted by our framework. Together these results recast collaboration in LLM systems as a measurable, predictable, and partly tractable cost.

Many complex tasks require extended effort, diverse capabilities, or coordinated actions beyond what a single agent can provide. However, simply adding more agents does not guarantee better performance, as effective cooperation depends on how agents interact with each other and with task structure to satisfy evolving constraints over time. This challenge is amplified for LLM-based multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS): plans, messages, and revisions occur in natural language, whereas task progress depends on grounded environment actions. Current evaluations mostly treat cooperation as an implicit ingredient of final task success, leaving both cooperation and the effect of multi-agent interaction on task dynamics difficult to study. We introduce COOP$^2$, an evaluation framework that grounds high-level agent cooperation dynamics in LLM-MAS within task progress in the environment. COOP$^2$ then defines cooperative tasks with verifiable cooperative requirements, allowing us to analyze how cooperation unfolds over time with respect to task progress, as well as where and why cooperation breaks down. Building on this framework, we develop COOP$^2$-Repair, which predicts constraint failures from group plans and opens targeted repair channels for guided revisions. Across two environments and three communication structures, COOP$^2$-Repair improves task success and constraint satisfaction while exposing the additional decision overhead and communication load required for repair. The project web page can be found at: https://happyeureka.github.io/coop2.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper, we study LLM agent interactions in two standard games: a network resource allocation game and a Cournot competition game. Rather than converging to Nash equilibria, we find that LLM agents tend to cooperate when given multi-round prompts and non-zero-sum context. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals that fairness reasoning is central to this behavior. We propose an analytical framework that captures the dynamics of LLM agent reasoning across rounds and explains these experimental findings.