Financial Fragility in Societies of LLM Agents: Coordination Failures and Stabilizing Mechanisms

Large language model (LLM) agents already trade real capital, and builders copy a few published designs that share models and news feeds, so one shock reaches many agents at once. We present FARSIGHT (Financial Agent Robustness and Security Investigation and Global Holistic Taxonomy), a systematization that rates trading agents on robustness to market stress and on security against source manipulation, agent compromise, and agents acting as attackers, and checks the ratings against released code. Across 15 academic schemes, no paper describes a halt that skips LLM inference or combines source provenance with cross-source corroboration, and the 7 code releases enforce no stop-loss or position limit outside the LLM. Three LLMs sell whole positions on a fake headline and on real hoaxes, including the fake press release behind the 2000 Emulex crash. In a simulated market driven by these decisions, one fake headline crashes the market in all runs with 400 agents, and 400 agents that sell when prices fall nearly double a 2010-sized crash. The pause that U.S. exchanges apply to large stocks starts in no headline run, whereas automatic halts and hard loss limits outside the model remove both effects. Restated as a domain-independent threat model, FARSIGHT maps the same gaps onto agents in healthcare, law, software, and crypto, where compromised agents spread harm as worms and as cascades. We derive 14 open problems and urge deployers to corroborate sources, keep interrupts that bypass the model, and enforce loss limits outside it.

Large language models (LLMs) are being deployed at scale in consequential real-world systems, from financial markets to content moderation to hiring. We show that improving individual model capability can degrade rather than improve system-level outcomes. We hypothesize that shared training and architectures can lead more capable LLMs to behave more similarly, creating correlated actions that do not diversify away. We develop a general framework showing how this correlation creates a non-diversifiable risk floor and test its predictions in financial markets using an agent-based simulation with LLM traders of varying general-purpose capability. We find that: (1) frontier LLMs exhibit significantly correlated behavior that increases with capability; (2) when their shared reasoning is accurate, increasing agent participation reduces market-level risk; and (3) when agents share a common misinformation environment, the same correlated behavior becomes a liability. Together, these results identify a capability paradox: improving individual models does not necessarily produce better system-level outcomes. Whether the same dynamics arise in other domains is an open empirical question.

Multi-agent systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for financial analysis and decision support. However, existing coordination schemes, especially those emphasizing consensus or debate, are vulnerable to sycophancy: agents conform to peer reasoning instead of evidence, leading to premature agreement and degraded outcomes. We introduce FinCom (Financial Committee), a governed multi-agent framework and interactive system that operationalizes the Disagree-or-Commit (DoC) protocol to embed structured dissent into financial AI committees. A central Supervisor orchestrates three ReAct-enabled specialist agents: Research, Quantitative, and Risk. Each agent is equipped with role-specific tools for retrieval, computation, and stress testing. During deliberation, agents must either explicitly critique or commit to their peers' reasoning before converging on a unified recommendation. This demonstration showcases how FinCom supports committee-style financial analysis through coordinated multi-agent interaction, including structured report generation and interactive decision support. Evaluated across the most recent financial agent benchmark, in addition to 90 internal handcrafted financial tasks using an LLM-as-a-Judge protocol, DoC improves reasoning accuracy and risk awareness significantly over a consensus-seeking baseline on both an in-house and external evaluation set. By reframing disagreement as a governance primitive rather than noise, FinCom offers a lightweight, prompt-only recipe for improving accountability, transparency, and epistemic robustness in agentic financial systems.