Adversarial Prompting

Video-language models and video agents can produce hallucinations that conflict with spatiotemporal evidence. Existing benchmarks mainly evaluate model hallucinations, and heterogeneous mechanisms make detector reliability difficult to compare. We introduce VidHalLoc, a benchmark that evaluates hallucination detection methods under a unified diagnostic evaluation protocol using 2,000 adversarial hallucination samples across Video Question Answering and Video Captioning tasks, spanning Ontology and Dynamic hallucination categories. To construct VidHalLoc efficiently, we introduce VideoHALO, a Harness Engineering-informed multi-agent workflow that decomposes data construction into four executable stages supported by a memory system and a communication protocol. Evaluation of fifteen methods reveals that the four dedicated detectors peak at an Overall accuracy of only 34.63%, indicating limited reliability across video hallucination types [Dataset Repository: https://huggingface.co/datasets/wesfggfd/VidHalLoc].

Existing research on object hallucination in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) predominantly attributes the problem to language priors such as over-reliance on textual co-occurrence statistics. We challenge this view by presenting quantitative evidence for a complementary, under-explored cause: visual-origin hallucination, where hallucinations arise from incorrect visual feature extraction and misalignment between image and text embeddings. Through cosine similarity analysis and Smooth Grad-CAM entropy measurements, we show that hallucinated samples exhibit systematically lower image-text similarity (average 0.158 vs. -0.122) and inverted attention patterns, where attention is dispersed when the target object is present but wrongly concentrated when it is absent. Guided by this diagnosis, we propose Adversarial Contrastive Fine-Tuning (ACFT). ACFT uses an Adversarial Hallucination Attribute Flipping (AHAF) procedure, involving minimal, targeted adversarial perturbations that flip an image's hallucination attribute, to construct perfectly aligned positive-negative pairs, which are then used for contrastive fine-tuning. AHAF simultaneously serves as a diagnostic probe, revealing that MLLM visual representations lie dangerously close to hallucination decision boundaries. Requiring only 0.9% of the COCO dataset and adding zero inference overhead, ACFT achieves state-of-the-art performance on POPE, MME, and four description-level hallucination benchmarks across LLaVA, MiniGPT-4, and Qwen2.5-VL. Code is available at https://github.com/zxp555/ACFT_MM

Picture books and comics have long been used to disseminate hateful narratives because they are easily understood even by children, as exemplified by the notorious Nazi propaganda picture book \emph{Der Giftpilz}. Recently, frontier text-to-image (T2I) systems such as Gemini and GPT-Image have enabled conversational generation with consistent characters and scenes across turns, making hateful visual stories, namely ordered image groups that collectively convey hateful narratives, cheap and scalable to produce. Although prior work has studied hateful content generation by T2I systems, it focuses on individual images, leaving group-level hateful meaning largely unexplored. We aim to address the gap. Concretely, we introduce \texttt{HatefulStoryPrompts}, comprising 330 multi-turn configurations from 55 hateful stories across two languages and three visual styles, and evaluate five frontier models over 4,950 attempts. Every model completes over 80% of the stories, with the strongest reaching 99.0%. We further evaluate existing moderation systems on \texttt{HatefulVisualStory}, a human-labeled dataset of 969 hateful image sets and 990 benign controls, and find that they frequently miss group-level hateful meaning: dedicated safety models achieve at most 34.9% recall, while a strong vision-language model reaches 67.5%. Finally, we propose complementary proactive and post-generation defenses. An interaction-aware monitor achieves 97.3% recall for prompt-only sessions and 92.6% when the user supplies the first image, while post-generation methods jointly analyzing completed image groups reach 80.2%. Our work shows that, as image generation evolves from isolated outputs to coherent visual narratives, safety must evolve accordingly, from per-image moderation to stateful reasoning over interactions and image relationships.

State-of-the-art toxicity detectors for text-to-image generation adopt a one-size-fits-all approach: a single universal model applying fixed safety guidelines to all users. Our empirical evidence shows that these detectors fail to shield marginalized communities: approximately 35% of generated images labeled safe are considered harmful by disability communities. In this position paper, we argue for community-specific toxicity detection (CTD). To demonstrate its feasibility, we collaborate with disability experts to develop safety guidelines for two communities: dwarfism and blind/low vision. Using a dataset of 2,400 annotated T2I-generated images we demonstrate that both large vision-language models and existing general-purpose toxicity detectors catastrophically fail to recognize harmful content under these guidelines in zero-shot settings with F1 score lower than random guessing (F1 0.32 and 0.37). Promisingly, prompt-based adaptation methods (ICL, VQA) substantially improve harm detection performance (GPT-4o: F1 0.50 and 0.78), while parameter-efficient fine-tuning improves smaller models (0.5b-7b with best F1 0.48 and 0.59) with less than 100 demonstrations, but remains sensitive to evolving guidelines. Despite these gains, CTD performance remains far below F1 $\approx 0.9$ achieved for general-purpose toxicity detection, highlighting the challenge and the need for sustained research effort.

Text-to-Image (T2I) generative models have achieved remarkable progress in synthesizing high-quality visual content, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial misuse, particularly in generating Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) images. Most existing jailbreak attacks primarily rely on heuristic prompt engineering or black-box optimization, treating model feedback as a binary signal (success or failure). This coarse-grained paradigm overlooks the rich information embedded in diverse failure modes, such as textual refusal, visual blocking, and semantic sanitization, resulting in inefficient exploration and severe semantic collapse. In this paper, we propose MIND, a cognitive jailbreak framework that reframes adversarial prompt generation as a belief-state inference problem over latent defense mechanisms. Instead of blindly searching for bypass prompts, MIND actively models the target system's latent defense mechanisms by interpreting multi-modal feedback as high-density signals. Specifically, the framework integrates three core components: (1) a Multi-modal Judge for fine-grained feedback decomposition, (2) a Defense Profiler for iterative belief updating, and (3) a Meta-Memory module for retrieving historically effective attack strategies. These components are unified within a reasoning-driven evolutionary optimization process, enabling adaptive and semantically consistent jailbreak generation. Extensive experiments on the I2P benchmark demonstrate the effectiveness of MIND. Under six representative pre-processing and post-processing defense settings applied to the Stable Diffusion v1.5 model, MIND achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 95.62%, significantly outperforming existing methods. Additionally, the effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated across four widely used commercial T2I systems, achieving the highest ASR of 91.58% on Wan-2.5.

Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially Generative AI (GenAI), adoption has increased in industries significantly in recent years. However, the use of these models may also expose systems to new forms of cyberattacks by different malicious actors -- adversarial prompt attack (APA) being one of the most prominent examples of such threats. This paper presents the implementation of an Adversarial Prompting Framework (APF) for a comprehensive assessment of AI safety. The framework systematically evaluates the resilience of the AI model through the generation of structured adversarial prompts at multiple sophistication levels, from direct harmful requests to advanced encoding-based attacks. Our implementation demonstrates the practical application of this methodology in enterprise environments, providing automated testing capabilities with quantitative security assessment metrics. The results indicate significant variations in the model vulnerabilities across different attack vectors, with encoded prompts presenting the highest success rates in bypassing safety mechanisms.

LLMs can be conveniently adapted to a diverse set of tasks, e.g, prediction, question-answering tasks, etc, using appropriate prompts with few-shot examples. Biased or harmful concepts, e.g. gender or bio-weapons, present in pre-trained LLMs can lead to unsafe or unethical responses for many such prompts. Removing such undesirable concepts robustly across different prompt types remains a challenging problem, since existing unlearning methods typically ignore the impact of prompt variation. In this paper, we explore a novel adversarial approach to use a joint prompt for the main task and concept task prediction. We show that fine-tuning using the ``worst prompt type'' for concept prediction (with the highest concept accuracy) improves the average unlearning performance over a fine-tuning method that uses a combination of all prompt types. Our proposed method, MPSelectTune, is a two-stage approach that minimizes the concept accuracy of the highest accuracy-prompt type, after fine-tuning using a novel multi-task loss using multiple prompt types. Experimental results on four benchmarks show $2 - 15\%$ main task accuracy improvements over recent baselines and while reducing the worst-case concept accuracy by up to $17\%$ compared to recent baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across natural language processing tasks, yet their deployment in high-stakes applications raises critical concerns regarding reliability, safety, and trustworthiness. In this paper, we present a red teaming framework that systematically uncovers vulnerabilities in LLM outputs. Our approach employs a novel multi-role architecture comprising target, attacker, and jury models. The attackers generate increasingly effective adversarial prompts while the jury rigorously evaluates response accuracy and consistency across tasks. In a case study, our strategy proved particularly effective at exposing unfaithfulness in LLM responses. Exploitative adversarial prompts increased the attack success rate by up to 7.9% in question-answering tasks, revealing weaknesses in reliability. The approach identifies how structural constraints in summarization can shape vulnerability patterns, with format limitations yielding measurable gains in faithfulness, and shows that architectural design choices typically outweigh parameter scaling in determining model safety. The framework's key strength is its adaptability across evaluation tasks, from English question-answering to Arabic summarization, enabling comprehensive comparison of model vulnerabilities. While it excels at comparing cross-model and cross-linguistic vulnerabilities, it faces challenges in fully automating adversarial prompt generation across languages. Our experiments also reveal limitations in detecting subtle forms of unfaithfulness that do not manifest as explicit factual contradictions, particularly across linguistic contexts. Overall, this architecture provides both actionable insights into current LLM vulnerabilities and a scalable methodology for ongoing safety evaluation as models evolve.

Can Large Language Models (LLMs) discern when their own outputs are misaligned with human ethics? And can they self-correct? We endow an LLM with a conscience step that reviews its own reasoning and outputs, and we extend the training loss with an alignment component using Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to steer the model away from non-ethical outputs. The result is an online technique to align models in a wide range of applications: training, fine-tuning, adversarial prompting, and zero-shot learning. It does not require a weaker or stronger judge, relying instead on a frozen copy of itself. In previous work, the Emergent Misalignment scenario showed a range of emergent unethical behaviors from fine-tuning the model to hack code. Instead, we empirically show how to achieve Emergent Alignment: a single high-level introspective question steers training toward an ethical model under the same code hacking scenario.

With the advance of generative AI, the text-to-image (T2I) model has the ability to generate various contents. However, T2I models still can generate unsafe contents. To alleviate this issue, various concept erasing methods are proposed. However, existing methods tend to excessively erase unsafe concepts and suppress benign concepts contained in harmful prompts, which can negatively affect model utility. In this paper, we focus on eliminating unsafe content while maintaining model capability in safe semantic meaning interpretation by optimizing the concept erasing reward (CER) with reinforcement learning. To avoid overly content erasure, we introduce the Safe Adapter to project partial text embedding for efficient concept regulation in cross-attention layers. Extensive experiments conducted on different datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in alleviating unsafe content generation while preserving the high fidelity of benign images compared with existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) concept erasing methods. In terms of robustness, our method outperforms counterparts against red-teaming tools. Moreover, we showcase the proposed approach is more effective in emerging image-to-image (I2I) scenarios compared with others. Lastly, we extend our method to erase general concepts, such as artistic styles and objects. Disclaimer: This paper includes discussions of sexually explicit content that may be offensive to certain readers. All images used in this work are synthesized or from public datasets.

The increasing use of large language models has raised concerns about the spread of AI-generated fake news, particularly under varying prompting strategies. Most existing detection models are trained and evaluated under a single generation setting, leaving their ability to generalize across unseen prompts unclear. In this study, we investigate cross-prompt generalization in fake news detection using three datasets of AI-generated articles produced under distinct prompts, combined with real news articles. We extract interpretable linguistic features capturing lexical diversity, readability, and emotion-based characteristics and evaluate a random forest classifier under a cross-prompt framework, where models trained on one prompt are tested on another. Across all six train-test combinations, performance remains consistently high, with AUC values ranging from 0.988 to 1.000. Analysis of feature distributions shows that AI-generated text exhibits increased lexical diversity, reduced readability, and substantially lower emotional intensity compared to the overall dataset, with variations across prompts. Despite these distributional shifts, the classifier maintains strong performance, indicating that these features capture stable properties of AI-generated text that generalize across prompting strategies. These findings suggest that feature-based approaches can provide robust detection of AI-generated fake news under prompt variability.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) replaces human preference labels with executable reward functions such as math answer checkers, JSON tool-call validators, and code unit-test harnesses. That makes the reward partly a software artifact: if the verifier is wrong, optimization can learn the bug. We study this failure mode with a lightweight verifier-fuzzing framework that generates adversarial completions, compares buggy and stricter reference verifiers, logs paired decisions, and reports false-positive, false-negative, disagreement, exploit, and uncertainty metrics.

When Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed in Chinese-language settings, a troubling pattern emerges: safety systems that work well in English break down. These systems struggle to cross linguistic and cultural bound-aries, leaving models exposed to adversarial prompts that exploit Chinese-specific evasion techniques, including Pinyin romanization, character decomposition, internet slang, and hedging tone. To address this gap, we introduce ChiSafe-PAS (Chinese Safety Pilot Annotation Set), a human-annotated benchmark of 1,897 adversarial Chinese prompts spanning four high-stakes domains: self-harm and violence, drug and illicit trade, fraud, and satire. Of these, 1,544 entries carry complete gold-standard annotations: a 3-class response label (REFUSE, SAFE-REDIRECT, RESPOND), a nine-category obfuscation taxonomy, a risk-level rating, and annotator rationale. We describe the dataset design, annotation process, and obfuscation taxonomy in detail. Our primary goal is practical: to give the research community a high-quality, culturally grounded resource for benchmarking LLM safety alignment. In doing so, we engage three broader tensions in the field: the blurring boundary between training and evaluation data, the need for domain coverage grounded in real-world risk, and the limits of scale as a substitute for cultural expertise.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial prompts that exploit semantic ambiguities to bypass safety mechanisms, resulting in harmful or inappropriate outputs. Such attacks, including jailbreaking and prompt injection, pose significant risks to the integrity and availability of LLMs in security-critical applications. This paper proposes the Adversarial Prompt Disentanglement (APD) framework, a novel defense mechanism that proactively identifies and neutralizes malicious components in input prompts before they are processed by the LLM. The APD framework integrates three key innovations: (1) a mutual information-based semantic decomposition method to isolate adversarial and benign prompt components, ensuring statistical independence; (2) a graph-based intent classification approach that leverages spectral analysis to detect malicious patterns in prompt semantics; and (3) a lightweight transformer-based classifier trained on real-world datasets of toxic and jailbreaking prompts, enabling efficient and accurate adversarial intent detection. Evaluated on diverse datasets containing adversarial prompts, APD demonstrates superior robustness, reducing harmful output generation by over 85% while maintaining negligible impact on model performance. The framework's computational efficiency supports real-time deployment, making it a practical solution for securing LLMs. Our work addresses critical challenges in machine learning security on novel attacks and integrity methods for ML systems, and offers a scalable, ethically grounded defense against prompt-based adversarial threats.

Machine unlearning aims to remove specific concepts from pretrained text-to-image diffusion models, yet several white- and black-box attacks have been introduced to make the model generate such unlearned concepts. These attacks, nevertheless, do not assume a realistic threat model, i.e. they either assume access to the model weights, or result in gibberish adversarial prompts that could be easily detected even through naive rule-based safeguarding. We aim to address this gap in this paper. We introduce BEAP, a black-box, embedding-aware adversarial prompting attack that leverages a large language model (LLM) to iteratively generate effective adversarial prompts and exploit such hidden vulnerabilities. BEAP performs an embedding-aware search in text space, combining multiple reward signals: unlearned concept presence, text-image alignment, and image quality, to refine generated prompts. Unlike previous attack methods, BEAP keeps its prompts undetectable to safety filters while producing high-quality images. Extensive experiments show that BEAP improves the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by more than 60% over prior methods, while requiring only an average of fifteen prompts per successful attack. Warning: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive or upsetting in nature.

Jailbreak attacks expose a persistent gap between the intended safety behavior of aligned large language models and their behavior under adversarial prompting. Existing automated methods are increasingly effective but each commits to a single attack family (e.g., one refinement loop, one tree search, one mutation space, or one strategy library) and no single family dominates: the best-performing method shifts across target models and harm categories, suggesting complementary strengths that per-prompt composition could exploit. We introduce LASH (LLM Adaptive Semantic Hybridization), a black-box framework that treats outputs from multiple base attacks as reusable seed prompts and adaptively composes them for each target request. Given a seed pool, LASH searches over seed subsets and softmax-normalized mixture weights; a composition module synthesizes a single candidate prompt, and a derivative-free genetic optimizer updates the weights using black-box target feedback and a two-stage fitness function combining keyword-based refusal detection with LLM-judge scoring. On JailbreakBench, which contains 100 harmful prompts across 10 categories, we evaluate LASH on six common target models. LASH achieves an average attack success rate of 84.5% under keyword-based evaluation and 74.5% under two-stage evaluation, where responses are first filtered for refusals and then scored by an LLM judge for whether they substantively fulfill the original harmful request. LASH outperforms five state-of-the-art baselines on both metrics with only 30 mean target queries. LASH also remains competitive under three defense mechanisms and induces more success-like internal representations. These results suggest that adaptive composition across heterogeneous jailbreak strategies is a promising direction for black-box red-teaming.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance across many tasks but remain vulnerable to hallucinations, making it important to systematically evaluate their reliability under realistic adversarial inputs. We formulate hallucination elicitation as a constrained optimization problem, where the goal is to find semantically coherent adversarial prompts that are equivalent to benign user prompts. Existing attack methods remain limited: discrete prompt-based attacks preserve semantic equivalence and coherence but search only over a limited set of prompt variations, while continuous latent-space attacks explore a richer space but often decode into prompts that are no longer valid rephrasings. To address these limitations, we propose REALISTA, a realistic latent-space attack framework. REALISTA constructs an input-dependent dictionary of valid editing directions, each corresponding to a semantically equivalent and coherent rephrasing, and optimizes continuous combinations of these directions in latent space. This design combines the optimization flexibility of continuous attacks with the semantic realism of discrete rephrasing-based attacks. Experiments demonstrate that REALISTA achieves superior or comparable performance to state-of-the-art realistic attacks on open-source LLMs and, crucially, succeeds in attacking large reasoning models under free-form response settings, where prior realistic attacks fail. Code is available at https://github.com/Buyun-Liang/REALISTA.

Automated red-teaming for LLMs often discovers narrow attack slices, missing diverse real-world threats, and yielding insufficient data for safety fine-tuning. We introduce Persona-Conditioned Adversarial Prompting (PCAP), which conditions adversarial search on diverse attacker personas (e.g., doctors, students, malicious actors) and strategy sets to explore realistic attack scenarios. By running parallel persona-conditioned searches, PCAP discovers transferable jailbreaks across different contexts and generates rich defense datasets with automatic metadata tracking. On GPT-OSS 120B, PCAP increases attack success from 57% to 97% while producing 2-6$\times$ more diverse prompts covering varied real-world scenarios. Critically, fine-tuning lightweight adapters on PCAP-generated data significantly improves model robustness (recall: 0.36 $\rightarrow$ 0.99, F1: 0.53 $\rightarrow$ 0.96) with minimal false positives, demonstrating a practical closed-loop approach from vulnerability discovery to automated alignment.

Recent developments in AI safety research have called for red-teaming methods that effectively surface potential risks posed by generative AI models, with growing emphasis on how red-teamers' backgrounds and perspectives shape their strategies and the risks they uncover. While automated red-teaming approaches promise to complement human red-teaming through larger-scale exploration, existing automated approaches do not account for human identities and rarely incorporate human inputs. In this work, we explore persona-driven red-teaming to advance both automated red-teaming and human-AI collaboration. We first develop PersonaTeaming Workflow, which incorporates personas into the adversarial prompt generation process to explore a wider spectrum of adversarial strategies. Compared to RainbowPlus, a state-of-the-art automated red-teaming method, PersonaTeaming Workflow achieves higher attack success rates while maintaining prompt diversity. However, since automated personas only approximate real human perspectives, we further instantiate PersonaTeaming Workflow as PersonaTeaming Playground, a user-facing interface that enables red-teamers to author their own personas and collaborate with AI to mutate and refine prompts. In a user study with 11 industry practitioners, we found that PersonaTeaming Playground enabled diverse red-teaming strategies and outputs that practitioners perceived as useful, and that AI-generated suggestions in the PersonaTeaming Playground encouraged out-of-the-box thinking even when practitioners did not follow them strictly. Together, our work advances both automated and human-in-the-loop approaches to red-teaming, while shedding light on interaction patterns and design insights for supporting human-AI collaboration in generative AI red-teaming.

Current LLM safety benchmarks are predominantly English-centric and often rely on translation, failing to capture country-specific harms. Moreover, they rarely evaluate a model's ability to detect culturally embedded sensitivities as distinct from universal harms. We introduce XL-SafetyBench. a suite of 5,500 test cases across 10 country-language pairs, comprising a Jailbreak Benchmark of country-grounded adversarial prompts and a Cultural Benchmark where local sensitivities are embedded within innocuous requests. Each item is constructed via a multi-stage pipeline that combines LLM-assisted discovery, automated validation gates, and dual independent native-speaker annotators per country. To distinguish principled refusal from comprehension failure, we evaluate Attack Success Rate (ASR) alongside two complementary metrics we introduce: Neutral-Safe Rate (NSR) and Cultural Sensitivity Rate (CSR). Evaluating 10 frontier and 27 local LLMs reveals two key findings. First, jailbreak robustness and cultural awareness do not show a coupled relationship among frontier models, so a composite safety score obscures per-axis variation. Second, local models exhibit a near-linear ASR-NSR trade-off (r = -0.81), indicating that their apparent safety reflects generation failure rather than genuine alignment. XL-SafetyBench enables more nuanced, cross-cultural safety evaluation in the multilingual era.

The proliferation of large language models (LLMs) in educational settings has paradoxically undermined the cognitive processes they purport to support. Students increasingly outsource critical thinking to AI assistants that generate polished text on demand, resulting in measurable cognitive debt and diminished argumentative reasoning skills. We present Prober.ai, a web-based writing environment that inverts the conventional AI-tutoring paradigm: rather than generating or rewriting student text, the system constrains an LLM (Gemini 3 Flash Preview) through persona-specific system prompts and structured JSON output schemas to produce only targeted, inquiry-based questions about argumentative weaknesses. A two-phase interaction architecture -- Challenge and Unlock -- implements a pedagogical friction mechanism whereby revision suggestions are gated behind mandatory student reflection. The system's design is grounded in Toulmin's argumentation theory, research on peer feedforward questioning mechanisms, and evidence on AI-supported feedback in writing instruction. A functional prototype was developed in 36 hours during the NY EdTech Hackathon (March 2026), where it was awarded second place. We describe the system architecture, the prompt engineering methodology for constraining LLM output to pedagogically aligned JSON schemas, and discuss implications for scalable, cognition-preserving AI integration in writing education.

Text-to-Video (T2V) models have demonstrated remarkable capability in generating temporally coherent videos from natural language prompts, yet they also risk producing unsafe content such as violence or explicit material. Existing prompt-level defenses are largely inherited from text-to-image safety and operate on the lexical surface of the input, making them vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that disguise harmful intent through rephrasing or adversarial prompting. Moreover, T2V generation introduces a distinctive challenge overlooked by prior work: temporally emergent risk, where a seemingly benign prompt leads to unsafe content through the generator's temporal extrapolation toward narrative coherence. We propose \method{}, a training-free, inference-time defense framework that reformulates T2V safety as a causal intervention in a temporally structured semantic space. TrajShield handles explicit unsafe prompts, jailbreak attacks, and temporally emergent risks in a unified manner by simulating the implied trajectory of a prompt, localizing the causal origin of potential risk, and applying a minimally invasive rewrite that neutralizes the risk while preserving safety-irrelevant semantics. Experiments on T2VSafetyBench across 14 safety categories and multiple T2V backends demonstrate that TrajShield achieves state-of-the-art defenseive performance while maintaining high semantic fidelity, substantially outperforming existing defenses, with an average ASR reduction of 52.44%.

We present MultiBreak, a scalable and diverse multi-turn jailbreak benchmark to evaluate large language model (LLM) safety. Multi-turn jailbreaks mimic natural conversational settings, making them easier to bypass safety-aligned LLM than single-turn jailbreaks. Existing multi-turn benchmarks are limited in size or rely heavily on templates, which restrict their diversity. To address this gap, we unify a wide range of harmful jailbreak intents, and introduce an active learning pipeline for expanding high-quality multi-turn adversarial prompts, where a generator is iteratively fine-tuned to produce stronger attack candidates, guided by uncertainty-based refinement. Our MultiBreak includes 10,389 multi-turn adversarial prompts, spans 2,665 distinct harmful intents, and covers the most diverse set of topics to date. Empirical evaluation shows that our benchmark achieves up to a 54.0 and 34.6 higher attack success rate (ASR)} than the second-best dataset on DeepSeek-R1-7B and GPT-4.1-mini, respectively. More importantly, safety evaluations suggest that diverse attack categories uncover fine-grained LLM vulnerabilities}, and categories that appear benign under single-turn can exhibit substantially higher adversarial effectiveness in multi-turn scenarios. These findings highlight persistent vulnerabilities of LLMs under realistic adversarial settings and establish MultiBreak as a scalable resource for advancing LLM safety.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into academic peer review, their vulnerability to adversarial hidden prompts, i.e., adversarial instructions embedded in submissions to manipulate outcomes, poses a critical threat to scholarly integrity. We propose SafeReview, a co-evolutionary adversarial training framework for defending LLM-based peer review systems against such attacks. SafeReview jointly trains a Generator model to create sophisticated attack prompts and a Defender model to preserve review integrity under adversarial manipulation. The Generator is optimized to produce increasingly effective prompt injections, while the Defender is strengthened through preference-based training to maintain consistent reviews between clean and attacked submissions. Experimental results show that SafeReview improves robustness against adaptive prompt injection attacks, better preserves paper ranking under attack, and generalizes across attacker architectures compared with static defenses. These results demonstrate the potential of co-evolutionary training as a foundation for securing LLM-assisted peer review.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has emerged as a simple and effective way to elicit step-by-step solutions from large language models (LLMs). However, CoT reasoning can be unstable across runs on long, multi-step problems, leading to inconsistent answers for unchanged task. Most prior work focuses on improving the forward reasoning chain within a single pass, with less attention to iterative and contrastive correction. To address this gap, we propose CAP-CoT, a Cycle Adversarial Prompt optimization framework designed to improve both CoT reasoning accuracy and stability of a single deployed solver. In each cycle, a forward solver generates candidate reasoning chains, an adversarial challenger constructs plausible but deliberately flawed chains using targeted error strategies, and a feedback agent contrasts the two chains and produces step-aligned structured feedback. This feedback closes the optimization loop in two directions, including updating the solver prompt based on errors exposed by the challenger, and updating the challenger prompt to generate increasingly targeted errors in subsequent cycles. Unlike safety-oriented adversarial prompting such as jailbreak or prompt-injection attacks, our adversarial component is task-semantic and aims to expose logical vulnerabilities in reasoning chains. Experiments across six benchmarks and four LLM backbones demonstrate that within two to three adversarial prompt optimization cycles, CAP-CoT consistently reduces variability across runs while improving reasoning accuracy and robustness to prompt perturbations.

As frontier language models attain near-ceiling performance on static mathematical benchmarks, existing evaluations are increasingly unable to differentiate model capabilities, largely because they cast models solely as solvers of fixed problem sets. We introduce MathDuels, a self-play benchmark in which models occupy dual roles: each authors math problems under adversarial prompting and solves problems authored by every other participant. Problems are produced through a three-stage generation pipeline (meta-prompting, problem generation, and difficulty amplification), and validated by an independent verifier that excludes ill-posed questions. A Rasch model (Rasch, 1993) jointly estimates solver abilities and problem difficulties; author quality is derived from the difficulties of each model's authored problems. Experiments across 19 frontier models reveal that authoring and solving capabilities are partially decoupled, and that dual-role evaluation reveals capability separations invisible in single-role benchmarks. As newer models enter the arena, they produce problems that defeat previously dominant solvers, so the benchmark's difficulty co-evolves with participant strength rather than saturating at a fixed ceiling. We host a public leaderboard that updates as new models are released.

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) requires robust red teaming, yet the systematic synthesis of high-quality toxic data remains under-explored. We propose Reverse Constitutional AI (R-CAI), a framework for automated and controllable adversarial data generation that moves beyond isolated jailbreak prompts. By inverting a harmless constitution into a constitution of toxicity and iteratively refining model outputs through a critique--revision pipeline, R-CAI enables scalable synthesis of multi-dimensional adversarial data without human annotation. Optimizing solely for toxicity-related rewards, however, can lead to reward hacking and degraded semantic coherence. To address this challenge, we introduce probability clamping within reinforcement learning from AI feedback, which stabilizes adversarial optimization while preserving adversarial intent. Experiments demonstrate that R-CAI generates diverse, high-quality toxic data and that probability clamping substantially improves semantic coherence (15%) without sacrificing adversarial strength. Overall, R-CAI provides a fully automated framework for red teaming data generation and systematic safety evaluation of aligned language models.

The proliferation of Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) models has democratized personalized text-to-image generation, enabling users to share lightweight models (e.g., personal portraits) on platforms like Civitai and Liblib. However, this "share-and-play" ecosystem introduces critical risks: benign LoRAs can be weaponized by adversaries to generate harmful content (e.g., political, defamatory imagery), undermining creator rights and platform safety. Existing defenses like concept-erasure methods focus on full diffusion models (DMs), neglecting LoRA's unique role as a modular adapter and its vulnerability to adversarial prompt engineering. To bridge this gap, we propose LoRAShield, the first data-free editing framework for securing LoRA models against misuse. Our platform-driven approach dynamically edits and realigns LoRA's weight subspace via adversarial optimization and semantic augmentation. Experimental results demonstrate that LoRAShield achieves remarkable effectiveness, efficiency, and robustness in blocking malicious generations without sacrificing the functionality of the benign task. By shifting the defense to platforms, LoRAShield enables secure, scalable sharing of personalized models, a critical step toward trustworthy generative ecosystems.

Vision-language Models (VLMs) are essential for contextual understanding of both visual and textual information. However, their vulnerability to adversarially manipulated inputs presents significant risks, leading to compromised outputs and raising concerns about the reliability in VLM-integrated applications. Detecting these malicious prompts is thus crucial for maintaining trust in VLM generations. A major challenge in developing a safeguarding prompt classifier is the lack of a large amount of labeled benign and malicious data. To address the issue, we introduce VLMGuard, a novel learning framework that leverages the unlabeled user prompts in the wild for malicious prompt detection. These unlabeled prompts, which naturally arise when VLMs are deployed in the open world, consist of both benign and malicious information. To harness the unlabeled data, we present an automated maliciousness estimation score for distinguishing between benign and malicious samples within this unlabeled mixture, thereby enabling the training of a binary prompt classifier on top. Notably, our framework does not require extra human annotations and is robust to realistic prompt variations, offering strong flexibility and practicality for real-world applications. Extensive experiments show that VLMGuard achieves superior detection results, improving AUROC by 5.39% on average over the state-of-the-art method. Disclaimer: This paper may contain offensive examples; reader discretion is advised. Code is available at: https://github.com/radiolab-ntu/vlmguard.

During training, Large Language Models (LLMs) learn social regularities that can lead to gender bias in downstream applications. Most mitigation efforts focus on reducing bias in generated outputs, typically evaluated on structured benchmarks, which raises two concerns: output-level evaluation does not reveal whether alignment modifies the model's underlying representations, and structured benchmarks may not reflect realistic usage scenarios. We propose a unified framework to jointly analyze intrinsic and extrinsic gender bias in LLMs using identical neutral prompts, enabling direct comparison between gender-related information encoded in internal representations and bias expressed in generated outputs. Contrary to prior work reporting weak or inconsistent correlations, we find a consistent association between latent gender information and expressed bias when measured under the unified protocol. We further examine the effect of alignment through supervised fine-tuning aimed at reducing gender bias. Our results suggest that while the latter indeed reduces expressed bias, measurable gender-related associations are still present in internal representations, and can be reactivated under adversarial prompting. Finally, we consider two realistic settings and show that debiasing effects observed on structured benchmarks do not necessarily generalize, e.g., to the case of story generation.