Elections

A Condorcet domain is a set of rankings over a given candidate set, such that every election that consists only of (an odd number of) votes from the domain has a transitive majority relation. We study outer diversity of Condorcet domains, i.e., a measure that quantifies expected swap distance from a random vote to a closest one in the domain. We numerically analyze outer diversity for maximal Condorcet domains with few candidates, and then we establish its asymptotic behavior for several special domains, mostly obtaining theoretical results.

In a district-based election, N voters are partitioned into k districts, and each voter votes for one of m candidates. Each district elects a winner using the plurality rule (i.e. the candidate getting the largest number of votes is declared the winner, breaking ties as per some fixed rule), and the overall winner is determined by applying plurality to the district winners; we assume that there is a unique winner amongst the district winners. The margin of victory of such an election is the minimum number of votes that must be altered so that the current winner ceases to be the unique district winner. We study the problem of predicting the winner of a district-based election in the query complexity model, where one has query access to individual votes. The objective is to minimise the number of queries. This setting captures exit polling, where queries correspond to interviewing voters, and is closely related to problems in query complexity and property testing. Assuming that the margin of victory of the election is at least eps N, Dey, Kar and Sanyal (AAMAS 2023) gave algorithms for the case of two candidates with error probability del and query complexity tilde{O}(1/eps^6 log^2 1/del), which improves to tilde{O}(1/eps^4 log^2 1/del) under the additional assumption that district populations are balanced. Our main result is an adaptive randomised algorithm that, for an arbitrary district-based election and any error parameter del, with probability at least 1-del, predicts the winner correctly using tilde{O}(1/eps^2 log m/del log 1/del) queries. In particular, we improve the bounds of Dey et al. for arbitrary district populations and extend their results to any number of candidates. Furthermore, for constantly many candidates, our algorithm nearly matches a lower bound of Omega(1/eps^2 log 1/del) on the query complexity that holds even for two candidates and a single district.

We study the Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule (RevSeqPAV) in approval-based committee elections. Despite its historical prominence and practical use, its properties and guarantees are much less understood than those of Sequential PAV. We analyze it along two dimensions: proportional representation (measured by Extended Justified Representation, its approximations, and proportionality degree) and approximation of the maximum PAV score of instances. We first establish strong negative results for general, unrestricted election instances and then identify settings in which the rule provides meaningful fairness and optimization guarantees.

We study the problem of computing how close a given election is to being group-separable, measuring proximity by swaps of adjacent candidates in the votes. We also consider several other domains, including caterpillar group-separable, balanced group-separable, single-peaked, and single-crossing ones. Our problem is generally intractable, but we find practical FPT algorithms parameterized by the number of candidates or swaps. For the latter case, our algorithm applies to all domains characterized by finite forbidden subelections, resolving a well-established open problem. We supplement our theoretical findings with experimental analysis.

Generative AI writing assistants and the Large Language Models (LLMs) that power them are increasingly part of how voters gather information before elections. With growing evidence that they influence users' opinions, it is increasingly important to understand the views and positions of these tools. To better understand these views, we examine the stances supplied by six LLMs on a variety of Swedish-language writing tasks ahead of the 2026 Swedish parliamentary election. We cross 107 policy propositions with 77 writing templates and neutral, positive, and negative prompt framings, producing 24,717 prompts per model and 148,302 responses. To study these, we look at the models' default stance tendencies, compare how they respond to similar issues, and compare their responses with those of each of Sweden's eight parliamentary parties on the same issue. We find that Claude, DeepSeek, Gemini, and Mistral have similar profiles; ChatGPT more often supplies neutral or ambivalent text; and Grok differs most on topics such as migration, crime, and gender. When comparing the political parties, we find that the Social Democrats are closest to all six models. Still, after correcting for multiple comparisons, none of the within-model differences in party distances remains significant. Overall, we find that no model has a clear preference, nor a clear preference for a party, but that this depends on the specific issue or task the user asks about.

Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections. Recent work has shown that an FJR committee can be found in polynomial time, but verifying whether a given committee satisfies FJR remains coNP-complete. We introduce FJR+, a strict strengthening of FJR and EJR+ that can be verified and satisfied in polynomial time. We then analyze the Residual-Budget Greedy (RBG) algorithm and prove that it selects a partial committee such that every size-$k$ completion satisfies FJR+. This freedom allows us to use sequential Phragmén to obtain a priceable completion. The resulting rule always satisfies FJR+ and the sub-core, and it is priceable whenever at least $k$ candidates receive an approval. We also obtain a Droop-quota version of FJR+. Finally, we extend FJR+ to approval-based participatory budgeting with arbitrary project costs. A project-specific version of RBG computes this property in polynomial time and can be continued to a priceable outcome satisfying a cost-based version of the sub-core.

We study the computational complexity of winner determination problems in approval-based committee elections under Thiele voting rules. These form a class of rules parameterized by a fixed weight vector that specifies how a voter's satisfaction depends on the number of approved candidates elected. We first analyze the structure of optimal solutions based on the sets of voters who approve each candidate---that is, how voters' approval ballots induce dependencies between candidates---revealing constraints on a winning committee under any fixed Thiele voting rule. Using this, we design FPT algorithms for Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) and other Thiele rules on a natural restricted domain known as the Voter Interval (VI) domain---that is, after a suitable ordering of voters, each candidate is approved by a consecutive interval of voters. In particular, we show that every Thiele rule on VI is FPT with respect to a parameter for which the problem is NP-hard on general instances, even when the parameter takes constant values. Our results advance the understanding of the computational complexity of PAV on Voter Interval instances, which remains one of the central open questions in this area. We further resolve two open questions from the literature on PAV (and other Thiele voting rules) by providing a polynomial-time algorithm for instances where each candidate is approved by at most two voters, and an FPT algorithm parameterized by the total score of a winning committee.

As LLMs increasingly shape the political information citizens rely on, no standard exists to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens' epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary the clarity, noise, and consistency of the available evidence. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs across the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down when it is absent, vague, or contradictory, while flattening the intensity of political language throughout. These failures point to party priors, shifting with party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.

This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures. In addition, a minimal natural logic for reasoning about strict majorities is shown to be sound and complete. These developments motivate examination of associated combinatorial questions concerning incoherence in finite families of sets; partial results and a conjecture are given. Finally, the results of this paper are applied to correct a classical representation theorem for weak qualitative probability structures due to Patrick Suppes and to establish a May-type characterization for ordinary strict majority rule for social decision frames.

Electoral redistricting in Ireland's Proportional Representation Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV) system faces the challenge of selecting an optimally representative set of electoral boundaries from an enormous set of possible configurations, and where ``representative'' is a delicate balance of constitutional objectives that are often in tension with one another. We present the first computational framework for Irish electoral redistricting that systematically optimises across multiple constitutional requirements while making trade-offs explicit and quantifiable. The electoral redistricting problem is parsed using statistical physics, where constitutional objectives are considered as terms in a Potts Hamiltonian. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and simulated annealing are employed to minimise this objective function, systematically exploring this configuration space, with coupling constants as proxies for objective weightings. Multi Criterion Decision Analysis (MCDA) and Pareto Optimality is then utilised to remedy the ambiguity in choosing a certain objective weighting combination over others. With respect to proportional representation and compactness objectives evaluated in County Cork, COTHROM consistently improves on the existing legal constituency boundaries for a range of objective weightings.

Despite Japan being one of the world's largest advanced democracies, the development of election forecasting models for its national elections remains limited. This study introduces nonlinear machine-learning forecasting models, based on decision tree and ensemble learning methods, for predicting the outcomes of Japanese lower-house elections. To assess the methodological benefits of our approach, we replicated the theoretical framework and dataset of Lewis-Beck and Tien's (LBT) foundational statistical forecasting model for Japanese elections. Our models demonstrated moderately but consistently improved predictive accuracy compared to LBT's model in both in-sample and out-of-sample evaluations, suggesting that nonlinear algorithms offer an alternative approach to classical linear methods in capturing complex electoral dynamics. This study represents one of the earlier applications of nonlinear machine-learning techniques to single-country election forecasting. It offers a replicable framework that, when combined with the country-specific electoral theories of other nations, may enhance the predictive performance of forecasting models in broader national contexts.

Multi-task benchmarks have become a central pillar of machine learning research, yet their growing influence has incentivised benchmark gaming -- strategic actions taken to improve the leaderboard rank of a specific model. Treating datasets as voters and models as candidates, we consider benchmark-specific training -- the inclusion of benchmark data in training -- as a form of election manipulation. For any ordinal benchmark, the problem of choosing datasets to train on so that a target model becomes top-ranked corresponds to shift bribery, a class of manipulation problems from computational social choice. Leveraging this identification, we show that the benchmark-specific training problem is NP-hard under Borda count and mean win rate. Complementing this worst-case perspective, we introduce the instance-level robustness, the minimum number of datasets a model developer must include in training to top a given leaderboard, and derive expressions for it under arithmetic mean, median, mean win rate and pairwise majority. We evaluate these expressions on MMLU under HELM and on BIG-Bench Hard (BBH) under the Open LLM Leaderboard. Across both suites, mean win rate is hardest to manipulate: this gap is clear on BBH (24 tasks, 4507 models), where its median robustness is 22 tasks (92%), compared with 13 (54%) under arithmetic mean and 12 (50%) under median and pairwise majority.

An index is a function that given an election outputs a value between 0 and 1, indicating the extent to which this election has a particular feature. We seek indices that capture agreement, diversity, and polarization among voters in approval elections, and that are normalized with respect to saturation. By the latter we mean that if two elections differ by the fraction of candidates approved by an average voter, but otherwise are of similar nature, then they should have similar index values. We propose several indices, analyze their properties, and use them to (a) derive a new map of approval elections, and (b) show similarities and differences between various real-life elections from Pabulib, Preflib and other sources.

Fused Gromov-Wasserstein (FGW) distances provide a principled framework for comparing objects by jointly aligning structure and node features. However, existing FGW formulations treat all features uniformly, which limits interpretability and robustness in high-dimensional settings where many features may be irrelevant or noisy. We introduce FGW distances with feature selection, which incorporate adaptive feature suppression weights into the FGW objective to selectively downweight or suppress differentiating features during alignment. We propose two approaches: (1) regularized FGW with Lasso and Ridge penalties, and (2) FGW with simplex-constrained weights, including groupwise extensions. We analyze the resulting models and establish their key theoretical properties, including bounds relative to classical FGW and Gromov-Wasserstein distances, and metric behavior. An efficient alternating minimization algorithm is developed. Experiments illustrate how feature suppression enhances interpretability and reveals task-relevant structure, with a special application to computational redistricting.

We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from multiwinner voting (e.g., justified representation (JR) and its variants) can be adapted, satisfied, and verified in this setting. However, much less is understood about their interaction with social welfare. In this work, we quantify the efficiency cost of enforcing proportionality. We formalize the welfare-proportionality tension via the worst-case ratio between the maximum achievable utilitarian welfare and the maximum welfare attainable subject to a proportionality axiom. We show that imposing proportional representation in the temporal setting can incur a growing, yet sublinear, welfare loss as the number of voters or rounds increases. We further identify a clean separation among axioms: for JR, the welfare loss diminishes as the time horizon grows and vanishes asymptotically, whereas for stronger axioms this conflict persists even with many rounds. Moreover, we prove that welfare maximization under each axiom is NP-complete and APX-hard, even under static preferences and bounded-degree approvals, and provide fixed-parameter algorithms under several natural structural parameters.

Approval-based committee voting has received significant attention in the social choice community. Among the studied rules, Thiele rules, and especially Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), stand out for desirable properties such as proportional representation, Pareto optimality, and support monotonicity. Their main drawback is that computing a Thiele outcome is NP-hard in general. A glimpse of hope comes from the fact that Thiele rules are better behaved under structured preferences. On the candidate interval (CI) domain, they are computable in polynomial time via a linear program (LP) that has a totally unimodular constraint matrix. Surprisingly, this approach fails for the related voter interval (VI) domain, and the complexity of the problem has repeatedly been posed as an open question. Our main result resolves this question: although the relevant matrix is not totally unimodular, the ``standard'' LP still admits at least one optimal integral solution, and we provide a fast algorithm for finding it. Our technique naturally extends to the voter-candidate interval (VCI) domain, also known as the 1-dimensional voter-candidate range (1D-VCR) domain, and to the linearly consistent (LC) domain, both of which generalize the candidate and voter interval domains. Although both the VCI and LC domains have been studied in social choice, their relationship was unknown. We show, through connections to graph theory, that LC strictly contains VCI. We also provide an alternative definition of LC that is closer in spirit to VCI and has a natural interpretation in approval elections; this equivalence may be of independent interest. Finally, we study an alternative tree-based generalization of VCI and show that Thiele rules become NP-hard to compute on this domain.

Spatial redistricting is a practical combinatorial optimization problem that demands high-quality solutions, rapid turnaround, and flexibility to accommodate multi-criteria objectives and interactive refinement. A central challenge is the contiguity constraint: enforcing contiguity in integer-programming or heuristic search can severely shrink the feasible neighborhood, weaken exploration, and trap the search in poor local optima. We introduce a composite-move Tabu search (CM-Tabu) that systematically expands the feasible neighborhood space in Tabu search while preserving contiguity. When a boundary unit cannot be reassigned individually without disconnecting its district, our method identifies a minimal set of units that can move together, or a pair of units (or sets of units) that can be switched, as a contiguity-preserving composite move. Candidate single-unit and composite moves are generated in linear time by analyzing each district's contiguity graph using articulation points and biconnected components. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach substantially improves solution quality, run-to-run robustness, and computational efficiency relative to traditional Tabu search and other baselines. For example, in the Philadelphia case, the approach can consistently attain the theoretical global optimum in population-equality and support multi-criteria trade-offs. CM-Tabu delivers optimization performance suitable for real-world practices and decision-support workflows.

In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some elections admit no Condorcet winning sets with a single candidate (i.e., $k=1$), and the same can be shown for $k=2$. On the other hand, recent work proves that a set of size $k=5$ exists for every election. This leaves an important theoretical gap between the best known lower bound $(k\geq 3)$ and upper bound $(k \leq 5)$ for the number of candidates needed to guarantee existence. We aim to close the gap between the existence guarantees and impossibility results for Condorcet winning sets. We explore an automated reasoning approach to tighten these bounds. We design a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to search for elections that would serve as counter-examples to conjectured bounds. We employ a number of optimizations, such as symmetry breaking, subsampling, and constraint generation, to enhance the search and model effectively infinite electorates. Furthermore, we analyze the dual of the linear programming relaxation as a path towards obtaining a new upper bound. Despite extensive search on moderate-sized elections, we fail to find any election requiring a committee larger than size 3. Motivated by our experimental results in this direction, we simplify the dual linear program and formulate a conjecture which, if true, implies that a winning set of size 4 always exists. Our automated reasoning results provide strong empirical evidence that the Condorcet dimension of any election may be smaller than currently known upper bounds, at least for small instances. We offer a general-purpose framework for searching elections in ranked voting and a new, concrete analytical path via duality toward proving that smaller committees suffice.

Novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods have enabled the generation of large ensembles of redistricting plans modeled as a graph partitioning problem. However, existing algorithms such as Reversible Recombination (RevReCom) and Metropolized Forest Recombination (MFR) have strong preferences for distributions related to the spanning tree measure. In this paper we introduce the Marked Edge Walk (MEW), a novel Markov chain proposal for sampling from the space of graph partitions. The walk operates on the space of spanning trees with marked edges, allowing for calculable transition probabilities for use in the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Empirical results on real-world dual graphs show convergence under a broad class of target distributions less constrained by spanning tree counts, including policy-based distributions, such as competitiveness on New Hampshire that are independent of spanning trees, and compactness and partisan symmetry distributions on New Hampshire and Texas that, while related to spanning trees, can now be properly targeted with a smaller degree of spanning tree bias, which represents an advancement in flexible ensemble generation.